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ABSTRACT

SEMANTIC REALISM
BRANDOM, HABERMAS AND HEGEL

By
Norman Schultz
May 2018

Dissertation supervised by Professor Dr. James Swindal
The thesis of this dissertation is that Habermas’ universal pragmatic and the recent neopragmatist semantic realism of Brandom, aimed at bridging the divide, are both based on
misinterpretations of Hegel. Both approaches misunderstand the central Hegelian idea of
historicity, and thus fail to establish a correct connection to Hegel. The aim of the dissertation is
to point to and sketch Hegel’s idea of historicity. As part of the discussion, I will defend the
controversial thesis that Hegel did not have a system, but rather a historical account of how we
develop knowledge under the historical conditions of society. Hegel, unlike Brandom or
Habermas, thinks that philosophy does not seek knowledge of reality, where ‘reality’ is
understood as the mind-independent world. Reality as such is unknown and unknowable, since it
is limited through human experience of social and historical reality.
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1. Introduction
The thesis of this dissertation is that Habermas’ universal pragmatic and the recent neopragmatist semantic realism of Brandom, aimed at bridging the divide, are both based on
misinterpretations of Hegel. Both approaches misunderstand the central Hegelian idea of
historicity, and thus fail to establish a correct connection to Hegel. The aim of the dissertation is
to point to and sketch Hegel’s idea of historicity. As part of the discussion, I will defend the
controversial thesis that Hegel did not have a system, but rather a historical account of how we
develop knowledge under the historical conditions of society. Hegel, unlike Brandom or
Habermas, thinks that philosophy does not seek knowledge of reality, where ‘reality’ is
understood as the mind-independent world. Reality as such is unknown and unknowable, since it
is limited through human experience of social and historical reality.
In order to demonstrate these points, I will discuss the problem from a historical perspective in
focusing on the recent controversy between Brandom and Habermas. I will trace this controversy
back to its origin in Hegelianism, Marxism, and the roots of analytic philosophy. I will
demonstrate that the origins for analytic philosophy can be considered as reactions to Hegel and
are further closely related to the divide between analytic and Continental philosophy.
The Brandom and Habermas-controversy includes Habermas’ praise for Brandom’s contribution
to a pragmatic integration of reference-semantics, a term that has to be clarified in its meaning
and possibility. Habermas criticizes Brandom’s conceptual realism, however, for equating facts
and norms and thus failing to grasp the emancipatory function of language.
I will reconstruct the debate between Brandom and Habermas from two perspectives:
1. From the side of reference-semantics: Brandom’s reference to individuals and his
solution of anaphoric chains can be read as the pragmatic integration of reference-

semantics. This is also a major part of Habermas’ Discourse Theory.1 The pragmatic
integration of reference-semantics, however, is a reaction to a problem that Ideal
Language Philosophy posed in following positivist tendencies to reject metaphysics, and
in the process falsely attacked Hegel.
2. From the side of our normative commitments: due to the equation of facts and norms,
Habermas claims that Brandom fails to point out the emancipatory function of our
language. Thus, Brandom objectifies our discourses. Habermas does not see the
possibility of emancipation based on Brandom’s model. The Habermasian concept of
emancipation derives from a problematic Marxist concept of the development of
societies. Habermas is unclear on the distinctions between idealism and materialism, and
on the distinction between empirical investigations and philosophical investigations. He
is further unclear about the justification of the concrete emancipation that is supposed to
be central to discourse and that he calls ‘historical materialism’. On the basis of these
unclear distinctions, he denies, falsely in my view, that a return to Hegel is possible.
The historical analysis will reveal that Brandom is unconcerned with the practical question of
emancipation, and that his project of integrating reference-semantics is not related in any
essential way to pragmatism as it has been understood in the debate. It is rather related to a
problematic realism that relies on formal semantics and as a conceptual realism equates facts and
norms. Since, moreover, Brandom’s project is based on what I will describe as a false relation to
Hegel, Brandom’s position can also not be interpreted as a return to Hegel. It is rather a return to
an aspect of Hegelian epistemology, in order to exploit partial insights of Hegel’s project. I will

1

Höffe, for example, reads Brandom for this reason as a Discourse Theoretician (see Höffe, Ottfried. Kant’s
Critique of Pure Reason: The Foundation of Modern Philosophy. Springer Science and Business 2010, 186).

2

argue that Habermas is right to point out these problems, but that he cannot offer an alternative,
for he cannot substantiate his claim that discourse communities are necessarily evolving.
In contrast to Habermas’ rejection of a qualified return to Hegel, I will describe Hegel’s
epistemology as a systematic, historical account that can usefully serve as an alternative. Hegel’s
position is structured as a non-dogmatic metaphysics, whose historical conditions need to be
worked out and that can be revised with regard to changing historical conditions. A Brandomian
inferentialism would at most be only one limited part of a system that is developed on the
grounds of history. My final goal is therefore to clarify these conditions of history and to correct
some views on Hegel in the debate.

1.1 The Divide between Continental and Analytic Philosophy
For the last 50 years, philosophy has been dominated by the division between analytical and
Continental philosophy.2 This dissertation will follow Rockmore’s suggestion that the divide can
be traced back to the early reactions of philosophers like Russell against Hegel. For Rockmore
the divide produced, moreover, a third competitor that is pragmatism. He defends the idea that
“all three of them must be taken into account for us to have any hope of arriving at a viable

2

The divide can be traced back to earlier years, but this is only due to a retrospective analysis. So, for example, it is
well known that Husserl was informed about both camps and stood in contact to philosophers from the circle of
Vienna (see Ferraris, Maurizio. “Introduction.” In Bridging the Analytical Continental Divide: A Companion to
Contemporary Western Philosophy. Edited by Tiziana Andina. Leiden: Brill, 2014, 6). The authors of Beyond the
Analytic-Continental Divide: Pluralist Philosophy in the Twenty-First Century (Bell, Jeffrey, Andrew Cutrofello,
and Paul Livingston. New York: Routledge, 2015) locate the division no earlier than in the 1960s, and Hilary
Putnam notices no divide in his studies beginning at the end of the 1940s. But he notices differences in the 1960s,
while at the same time Analytic Philosophy is already changing (see Putnam, Hillary. “A Half Century of
Philosophy Viewed from Within.” In American Academic Culture in Transformation: Fifty Years, Four Disciplines.
Edited by Thomas Bender and Carl Schorske. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998: 193-227).

3

understanding of the evolution of the recent debate” (Rockmore 2004, 467).3 The dissertation
will provide a historical reconstruction of analytic philosophy and Habermas’ Discourse Theory
as a historical reaction to Hegel.4 Before explaining the details of Discourse Theory, I will give a
short characterization of the current status of the divide.
The Divide between Continental and Analytic Philosophy: In broad strokes we could say that the
divide consists in the premise of a non-metaphysical 5 analysis of language6 (the original
positivist program), and the premise of the reflection on transcendental concepts in postmetaphysical times (Continental philosophy).7 A look at recent developments indicates that a
unification of these programs has never occurred:
[T]he division between the traditions has caused dissension, mutual distrust, and institutional
barriers to the development of common concerns and problems among working philosophers and
so has significantly limited, in many cases, the range and fruitfulness of philosophical discussions
and debates.” (Bell, Cutrofello, Livingston 2015, 2)

Rockmore arrived at a similar conclusion in 2004:

3

Rockmore, Tom. “On the Structure of Twentieth-Century Philosophy.” Metaphilosophy 35 (4), 2004: 466-478.
Accessed: February 8, 2017. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24439712.
4
While Apel attempts to find an a priori rule for human interactions, Habermas uses the theory in order to support
his own theory of a communication community that progresses toward an ideal of fair communication realized in
democratic institutions.
5
Putnam claims that under the influence of Quine ‘metaphysics’ became a dirty word in the sixties (see Putnam
1998, 207). This would mean that metaphysics could have been part of an original analytic project. Nevertheless,
metaphysics, according to Putnam became an important topic. So, for example, the question of whether numbers
really exist reemerged in analytic programs in the 1960s (see Putnam 1998, 207).
6
Some more characteristics are “varying but overlapping commitments to the linguistic turn, the rejection of
metaphysics, the claim that philosophy is continuous with science, a reductive approach to analysis, the employment
of formal logic, a focus on argument and a concern for clarity” (Chase, James, and Jack Reynolds. Analytic Versus
Continental: Arguments on the Methods and Value of Philosophy. Oxon: Routledge, 2014).
7
Continental Philosophy is, of course, much more complex, so that we cannot reduce it simply to the idea of
metaphysical concepts. Continental philosophy includes the development of phenomenology, dialectics,
deconstruction and many other approaches. Here, however, we refer to Continental Philosophy as a program that is
interested in the failure of systems to deal with metaphysical concepts.

4

Increasing, but selective, attention has been given of late to the relation between analytic and Continental
philosophy, which has been marked by a century of bad blood. Ignorance, scorn, and lack of attention on
both sides have divided them in ways that may or may not be irreparable (Rockmore 2004, 468).

What causes this divide is still a question of dispute and thus the perception of the divide varies
widely. An extreme position is held by Putnam. According to him, analytic philosophers quickly
dissociated themselves from their positivist roots (see Putnam’s discussion 1998).8 With regard
to this and despite the rare citation of continental philosophers in analytic journals (see Chase
and Reynolds 2007, 5), Putnam claims at the end of the last century that the divide had already
disappeared. Because of tendencies to approach metaphysical questions, which runs against the
positivist origins of analytic philosophy, the only remaining divide, according to Putnam, is that
Continental philosophers are unclear, or simply do not make arguments (see Putnam 1998, 219).
The view of the cured divide is not uncommon. Rorty suggests that Brandom overcomes
the difference between analytic and Continental philosophy (see Rockmore 2004, 139).9
Rockmore, on the contrary, criticizes these interpretations as in effect political moves suggesting
that analytic philosophers could do philosophy better than Continental philosophers. This belief
of stylistic superiority seems also to be implied by Putnam’s position. Rockmore objects
therefore to the inference that the divide has already disappeared:
One must wonder if it makes sense to envisage a synthesis between opposing movements, an overcoming
of the differences between analytic and Continental philosophy, two adversaries that have struggled against
each other and with pragmatism throughout the whole of the past century. Indeed, some observers now
think that a clear distinction between the two movements can no longer be drawn (Rockmore 2004, 471).

8

Putnam’s perspective is debatable. It seems Putnam suggests in his article that analytic philosophers are interested
in traditional, Continental subjects. Putnam’s analysis, however, is mainly anecdotal. I mention Putnam, in order to
develop an idea of the divide, instead of justifying his position.
9
Rockmore, Tom. Hegel, Idealism, and Analytic Philosophy. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004.

5

In other words, he suggests that a supposed synthesis oversimplifies a conflict that remained for
more than fifty years. Such simplifications, however, are common in formulating specific
programs. So researchers also believe that the divide was, or, at least, could be overcome by a
new understanding of realism and a rejection of constructivist accounts:
The confusion between ontology and epistemology is at the root of the relativism (and more
deeply, the irrealism) prevalent in the philosophy of the second half of the twentieth century,
which assumed that reality was simply the fruit of social construction and the conceptual
schemes we use to relate to the world (Ferraris 2014, 7).

The dismissal of constructivist programs and the appeal of the new realisms delivered,
according to Ferraris, a solid bridge for Continental and analytic philosophers. He
utilizes the idea of reality: “There is a solid nucleus of reality, which gives sense to our
concepts and respect to which [sic] philosophy, not unlike other forms of knowledge
can produce answers” (Ferraris 2014, 7). The divide, however, might not be simply
overcome by the new realism that discards or somehow overcomes the problem of
interpretation as Ferraris assumes. The optimism that the divide was cured stands in
contrast with the lack of citations of Continental philosophers in journals of analytic
philosophy (see Chase and Reynolds 2014, 5). Putnam’s remarks are rather anecdotal
than a source of evidence that the divide has been overcome, and Ferraris’ assumption
that realism is the marker of overcoming the divide is too broad, since Hegel, for
example, could be reconstructed as an empirical realist (as I will demonstrate in chapter
four).
Instead, it occurs that the divide will subsist because of the tendency of all scientific
inquiry to diversify into opposing standpoints as also Rockmore suggests: “Philosophy has been

6

divided among proponents of different points of view virtually since the beginning, and that
seems unlikely to change whatever happens in analytic philosophy” (Rockmore 2001, 369). 10 So
even though Discourse Theory, as many attempts, was obviously not successful in unifying the
divide, it studied and systematized both contradictory approaches and indirectly demonstrated
their broader conceptual and historical motivation. This is because Discourse Theory was not
particularly interested in bridging a divide between these two opposed programs. My thesis is
that beyond this unification of conflicting, contingently appearing theories, Discourse Theory
tried to deliver a model of how to unify different historical and contradictory approaches through
analysis and calling relation to problems that necessarily emerge. When Hilary Putnam therefore
famously asked “[w]hy can we not just be ‘philosophers’ without an adjective?”, then the answer
should have been that it never was about style, or the contingent emergence of different problems
in history, but that conflicting positions are part of emerging knowledge (Putnam 1998, 221).
Thus, I defend the idea that it is not only a question of two kinds of approaches worked out by
philosophers interested in different questions. It is rather a question of how different discourses
led to different opinions and different styles that have shaped three philosophies that symbolize a
divide. Of course, I am not going so far as to state that we “cannot understand either analytic or
Continental Philosophy without its ‘other’” (see Chase and Reynolds 2014, 9). I also do not
claim that they are both two sides of a dialectical coin. My idea is, however, that there is a
historical and systematic connection to how these different approaches came on the scene and
defended their programs on social grounds in their historical relation to each other.11 In a

10

Rockmore, Tom. “Analytic Philosophy and the Hegelian Turn.” The Review of Metaphysics. 55 (2), 2001: 339370, Accessed July 1, 2017, http://www.jstor.org/stable/20131711.
11
Of course, such systematic relations are multi-dimensional, and oppositions are also developed inside of these
disciplines. For this reason, I am not reducing the essence of Continental and Analytic Philosophy to two systematic
parts of a whole, but pointing out a weaker systematic relation resulting from their confrontation.

7

Hegelian sense, we could say that we can test the positions of these views with regard to their
rational standards that they came up with by themselves. This means, however, that we have to
reconstruct these historical standards that are not independent of their history.
Ferraris’ standard for Continental philosophy is a constructivism that denies realism.
Putnam’s standard is a clearer style for analytic philosophy. Ferraris standard for the new
philosophy is a new realism. All seem to be inappropriate to discuss the divide. A historical
analysis of these standards and how they evolved has to be delivered first.
Considering that every system of beliefs has a possible contradictory belief-system, it
might be reasonable to assume that the one view is shaped when it is in contact with the other
systematic part, its negation, so that proponents of each camp try to distance themselves from the
other part of the system. Since there is, however, a great number of coherent systems, let us say,
possible worlds of philosophy, it is not the case that one philosophy is the dialectical opposite of
the other. The historical development of standards is more complex. Rockmore writes on this
topic with regard to analytic philosophy, however:
Like Marxism, analytic philosophy tends to define itself through its opposition to idealism, where the latter
is understood as whatever analytic thinkers reject. This longstanding negative attitude toward idealism still
exists for many analytic philosophers. But it has been partly defused for others through the recent selective
nascent analytic turn (or return) to Hegel (Rockmore 2004, 472).

In other words, a program like analytic philosophy is not independent of its historical moment,
but stands in a relation to its opponent and its Zeitgeist. For this reason, it was not a coincidence
that the beginning of analytic philosophy was motivated by a rejection of Hegel’s Idealism.
Russell famously claimed: “I began to believe everything the Hegelians disbelieved” (Russell

8

1995, 48).12 Russell’s rejection signifies the initiation of a divide that is carried out as a
miscomprehension of what Idealism means and that shaped our conception of Hegelian
philosophy as well as the way of how we have followed analytic streams. Analytic philosophy in
its beginning phase followed the standard of an anti-holistic movement that claimed to find
immediate truth as an instance of what is externally real. The continued debate quickly revealed
this as a mistake. But its false rejection of idealism, which meant, according to Russell, that only
the mind exists, remained. Since Hegel’s theory was obviously not completely absurd, thinkers
like Sellars’ adopted arguments against immediate knowledge, but did not discuss the more
important relation to idealism. So the return to Hegel was only semblance. The later emergence
of the neo-pragmatisms and their cognitive realisms is hardly interpretable as a return to Hegel
since they all reject to position themselves with regard to idealism. They exploit partial insights.
Thus, Rockmore writes:
Though Hegel is a leading German idealist, analytic philosophers now turning to Hegel routinely draw a
tacit distinction between Hegel and idealism. Everything happens as if it were possible to appropriate Hegel
for analytic concerns while simply bracketing his idealism. Though they are starting to come to grips with
Hegel, to the best of my knowledge none of them has yet found a way to come to grips with his idealist
commitment or with idealism in general. With the signal exception of Pirmin Stekeler-Weithofer, who
knows Hegel’s conception of dialectical logic well [...], the nascent Hegelian turn in analytic philosophy is
distinguished by its utter disregard for the deeply idealist dimension of Hegel’s theory (Rockmore 2004,
472).

According to this misapprehension of idealism as denying that reality exists, and its false return
to Hegel without idealism, I claim that Ferraris standard of realism is already infected by the
analytic perspective. According to Ferraris, the Hegelian philosophy as a Continental philosophy
12

Russell, Bertrand: My Philosophical Development. London: Allen and Unwin, 1995.

9

must be a constructivist anti-realism. Hegel’s philosophy, however, is an empirical realism and
there is no German Idealist philosophy that is known to me that denies that reality exists. Ferraris
characterization is therefore not historically grounded.
Given these arguments, I follow Rockmore’s thesis that the divide is connected to the reception
of Hegel’s philosophy. I consequently claim that a reintroduction of Hegel into the debate is
useful only in so far as we understand his idealism. A discussion of the cure of the divide must
therefore be related to a historical examination of the origin of the divide and point out the
development of different possible standards.
In particular, I am concerned with the Habermas-Brandom-debate. While Habermas
explicitly rejects a return to Hegel, Brandom’s return to Hegel is questionable. While Habermas
falsely reconstructs Hegel as a teleological thinker with a closed system, Brandom does not
include a discussion of the concept of history or the so-called system. The history of the system,
however, is one of the major discoveries of Hegel, which I intend to discuss as a general standard
that with rare exceptions was simply ignored in the analytic debate.
The standard of historical systematization itself, however, no matter how much it is an
intratheoretical or extratheoretical criterion of science (see Rockmore 2005, 198), is, indeed, a
subject that can explain a feature of the divide between Continental and analytic philosophy,
especially when it comes down to its metaphysical implications.13 Though Continental
philosophy is complex and certainly there is no explicit program that philosophers have
committed to, Franks comes to the following conclusion with regard to these omitted subjects:

13

While the early Wittgenstein had certainly a systematic account of approaching the first unknown true
propositions, the later Wittgenstein is clearly anti-systematic as he rejects all final propositions (see Biletzki, Anat,
and Anat Matar. “Ludwig Wittgenstein.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2016), edited by Edward N.
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“[T]he German idealist conception of systematicity and its value stands between the AngloAmerican and Continental traditions, which still, for the most part, pass each other by in mutual
incomprehension.”14 I agree with Franks that the analytic position is based on an ungrounded
fear of a closed, metaphysical system, since “the system, if successfully executed would be the
culmination of philosophy as traditionally conceived” (Franks, 2005, 3). That we have such a
system, however, is also not the guiding Continental position. Continental philosophy is rather
concerned about the failure of what is traditionally conceived as the system (see Franks 2005, 4),
and advanced therefore towards an account of systematicity, meaning a system that is open in its
circularity. A system that is open, however, must include a conception of history. I claim that,
contrary to popular beliefs, Hegel defends such an idea. He opens the idea of a system with his
account of historicity.
It follows that I do not claim that systematization needs to become the only measure of
scientific progress in current times.15 I disagree here on two levels with regard to HoyningenHuene’s thesis that the sciences are characterized through higher systematicity. First,
Hoyningen-Huene believes that systematization can be achieved without a metaphysical theory
of unity.16 Thus, he follows an analytical perspective, because the metaphysical question of unity
cannot be appropriately addressed in a program that denies access to non-descriptive
presuppositions such as unity. The account of unity that Hegel proposes does not mean that unity
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See Franks, Paul W. All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism in German
Idealism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005, 3).
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This point is defended by Hoyningen-Huene “[…] I will argue that the essential difference between scientific
knowledge and other forms of knowledge consists of the higher degree of systematicity of the former.” He further
notes that “the notion of systematicity is far from clear; in fact, it is vague and ambiguous.” (Hoyningen-Huene,
Paul. Systematicity: The nature of science. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, ix).
16
He acknowledges, for example, the Wittgensteinian opinion that “[a]ll of the sciences are united by relation of
family resemblances only” (Hoyningen-Huene 2013, 27).
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is presupposed as a reality, or that a mind-independent reality is structured with regard to it.17
Instead, we need an idea of historical systematization without presupposing that there is a unified
whole in a presupposed reality. In my view, however, what I am calling ‘unity’ is ideally
produced in discourses for pragmatic purposes relative to their historical moment. This has two
consequences. First, the ideal of unity is part of our discourse and for that reason real. Second,
the ideal of unity is only real as an ideal and thus allows the system to be open. This means that
we make decisions on the basis of having systematized our experiences with regard to an ideal of
unity of our historical moment. Our experiences are then the result of a historical unity. The idea
of unity, however, is not real in a theoretical sense. But it is true in a pragmatic sense, since we
need to agree on making progressive steps towards it. It is presupposed and developed for our
discourse as a goal in order to cooperate, but it is not necessarily achieved. I will, moreover,
defend the thesis that this concept of a historical systematicity is an original Hegelian idea.
Contrary to Hoyningen-Huene, this means that historical systematicity must include a
metaphysical conception of unity.
I further disagree with Hoyningen-Huene as concerns the fact that systematicity is not
only an intratheoretical criterion for science. This means that systematicity is more a historical
agreement about what it means to do science than what it is derived from science itself. I agree
that systematicity plays a role in many current, scientific approaches,18 but it is neither clearly
developed, nor entirely explicit to these sciences. For example, the idea of systematicity as “a
systematic interconnection of facts” leaves open what facts are and poses thus the much larger
questions of what this ‘interconnection of facts’ is supposed to be (see Hoyningen-Huene 2013,
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This is what Russell calls the ‘jelly-bowl-view’.
As Hoyningen-Huene demonstrates with regard to physics, for example (Hoyningen-Huene 2013, 14).
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15). Such kinds of factual realisms might even confuse the productive idea of systematization
that does not require reference to isolated, immediate facts. My thesis is therefore that scientists
follow roughly of what they think is science with regard to the content they discover.
Hoyningen-Huene who has written to my knowledge one of the few analytic accounts of
this theme investigates systematicity as a method that is independent from content. But he
actually demonstrates that sciences have only a rough idea of what systematization means. This
occurs to me as contradictory to his idea that scientists follow the idea of systematicity in a better
way.19 To me it rather implies that Hoyningen-Huene presupposes the independence of the
sciences from their historical embeddedness in a society. The unrecognized problem consists
then in Hoyningen-Huene’s standard of a science as separated from the standards that people of a
historical moment use in order to discuss problems. He must mean that the role of the scientist is
distinguishable from the role of being a ‘normal’ person in a society. This, however, poses the
difficult question of whether scientists are ‘normal’ persons at home and abnormal persons at
work. These sharp distinctions would introduce too many absurdities in my mind. I think that
scientist use similar reasoning at work and at home and it is hard to entirely distinguish these
mindsets. Most important, however, is the fact that systematicity is something that we do at
home, at work, and in sciences, but not because it is the only standard but because it is practical
at this moment in history.
I am interested in how to describe systematicity appropriately. I perceive this theme to be
an attempt to resolve the difference between conflicting positions in a higher unification. I regard
19
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this as a normal occurrence of natural consciousness that happens on all levels of cognition and
discourse. I do not claim, moreover, that this systematicity is independent from its historical
discussion. ‘Systematicity’ is rather the abstract and historically generated description of how
our natural consciousness works. Furthermore, it describes how we order the contents of our life
in a society with regard to the historical moment. What I call ‘systematicity’ resembles then the
Hegelian idea of development towards a system on the basis of a subject understood
anthropologically. This development is guided by the notion that something is posited as an
identity by posing a difference to itself. According to Hegel, this posited difference spreads out
into extremes, before it finds its way back to its unity (see Hegel’s theory of the threefold
syllogism).20 Though I use the term ‘systematicity’, it remains unclear whether we can have an
entirely formal theory of this concept. Thus, systematicity cannot be a clear intratheoretical
criterion. It is rather a description of a criterion that is demonstrated with regard to different
contents in our historical moment. In this sense, I am opposed to a formal Discourse Theory or a
formal pragmatics.
In what follows, I will understand ‘systematicity’ as, firstly, the presupposition of a norm
for a context of unordered phenomena to be coherently explained with respect to a theory of its
historical moment. Secondly, systematicity includes control of the concrete development until
the outcomes make it possible to evaluate the formerly presupposed norm. Thirdly, systematicity
allows for the conceptual correction of the norms by a process of experience.
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Hegel remarks in a famous passage that everything that is reasonable [vernünftig] must be the result of a threefold
syllogism: “Der objektive Sinn der Figuren des Schlusses ist überhaupt der, daß alles Vernünftige sich als ein
dreifacher Schluß erweist, und zwar dergestalt, daß einjedes seiner Glieder ebensowohl die Stelle eines Extrems als
auch die der vermittelnden Mitte einnimmt“ (Hegel, G.W.F. Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im
Grundrisse 1830; Erster Teil Die Wissenschaft der Logik mit den Mündlichen Zusätzen. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2014,
§187, 338).
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If we, however, follow this idea of systematicity as a formal method, namely if we seek
for a higher unification for extremes that we have posited, then it seems to me that all our further
descriptive ideas must be opened up for contextualism. This is because every determined concept
is explained with regard to its extremes, while the mediation between these extremes must itself
form an extreme. Every concept is then open for a reinterpretation, so that concepts gain histories
of negation. These histories of negation have further implications for contextualism so that
Rockmore, for example, writes:
If Hegel is correct, the commitment to contextualism already entails a commitment to a historical
conception of knowledge, hence to historicism, that is to a view about the intrinsically historical character
of all of all first-order cognitive claims (Rockmore 2005, 193).

This means that all our knowledge claims are result of historical process and cannot be
understood independently from history. It seems to me that this further implies that there is not
last word or an end to the debate. The remaining, grounding and more important question is then:
what is history?
Thinking about historical relativism, leads me to the following conclusions: the idea of
knowledge itself cannot be an arbitrary belief that we follow, because beliefs are not knowledge
and societies do not justify themselves as arbitrary belief systems. They understand their
interactions as justified with regard to a rational criterion that can be defended. Consequently, if
historical relativism is the foundation for knowledge, then it would not have much to offer for
society. My intuition is therefore that historical relativism must be in some sense compatible
with a theory of truth. I will explain this intuition in the following paragraphs.
The following arguments are usually made against relativism. If I claim that ‘everything
is relative’, then there are two strategies to encounter this relativism. In case, I hold a strong
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relativism, I commit a performative self-contradiction, because I performatively claim something
to be true, so that the content of my claim contradicts my performance. As a consequence, I
might hold a weaker version of my original claim in order to avoid this performative
contradiction. So I do not claim that it is absolutely true that there is no truth. Instead, I say:
‘according to my perspective there is no truth in an absolute sense.’ Then, however, my position
might be just irrelevant for the discussion, since somebody else could claim that his perspective
is different from mine and he believes in truth. In any case it seems to me that a mere relativism
is a position that is hard to defend.
Historically relativistic claims are different. If I claim that ‘everything is historically
relative’, then somebody could demonstrate that my claim must be obviously itself historically
relative. My claim, however, does not stand in contradiction to my performance. While I claim
that everything is historically relative, it could still be that my position depends on my history
and hence is based upon history. One could object that my claim excludes meaningful claims,
but, in fact, it is not excluded that my historicist claim could be true. I only deny that given the
structure of our discourses, we can identify it as independent from history. This history, however,
could be true. So, in this case I am open for a discussion on rational standards and expect
falsification. This is a decisive difference to a mere relativism, because relativism excludes any
possible opening towards truth. I am therefore opposed to equate historicism and a mere
relativism. Hence, historicism is in theory compatible with truth. Margolis writes on this issue:

16

Historicism, in short, is itself a universalized doctrine found under quite contingent, particular
circumstances to be distinctly compelling but not conceptually inescapable at every possible price
(Margolis 2007, 310).21

I interpret this in the way that historicism is not only based on falsification, but that it also does
not deny an opening. In this sense, I can claim that systematization as self-reflection with regard
to history can support itself as possibly true. It is not only about the regional order of some bits
of knowledge that we sometimes accept to be valid for some sciences, for it can develop a
relationship to truth that is relative to its historical moment. Historicism can thus defend itself
without performative contradiction or without becoming irrelevant. ‘Systematization’ can then
still be understood as the extended pursuit of a unified theory of knowledge, ethics, art, and
religion. Hence, it has no other end than pursuing the whole and is thus a holistic, systematizing
epistemology with regard to history. I acknowledge, however, Margolis’ critique:
In fact, it is a characteristic of numerous historicist theories that they end by embracing some form of
universalism. The reason is simply that historicists are often motivated by the wish to avoid relativism or
the appearance of relativism (Margolis 2007, 40).

Margolis seems to exclude a compatibility of historicism and truth as a final result. So, for
example, I cannot say that everything is historical, but I know this as a truth. However, I could
agree that historicism might end at some point in history because we have found truth. It could
also be that we find truth through investigating history and following historicism. I would
therefore phrase it differently than Margolis: It is a question of testing historical positions to
determine whether they can hold to an ahistorical, universal standard. The task of historicisms is
therefore not to deny truth, but to test historical positions with regard to their standards.
21
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Given the significant differences between Hegel’s theory of history that is critical and the
recent epistemological holism in analytic philosophy that is realist, I agree therefore with
Rockmore that “the distinctions between analytic and Continental philosophy are real and
persistent and cannot obviously be bridged merely through continuing the debate.” (Rockmore
2004, 474). I will therefore attempt to push the debate into the direction of historicism.
A further interesting feature of the debate is the following: Rockmore further excludes the
view that the link between analytic and Continental Philosophy can be established by the
fundamental rule of logic. This is because the Hegelian logic is distinct from the ordinary,
historical logic programs (see Rockmore 2004, 474). Thus he rejects a notion of a possible whole
as a semantic net of logical relations. Instead, Rockmore puts emphasis on constructivism:
The promise of the new century does not lie in continuing the fruitless effort, which stretches back in the
Western discussion at least until Plato, to know the way the world is. As Kant suggests, it lies rather in
further working out a constructivist approach to knowledge (Rockmore 2004, 477).

For a long time I understood constructivism as an attempt to find objective criteria of how we
construct reality. I claim that this was the discourse theoretical program. Now, I acknowledge
that constructivism has to be defended on the grounds of history. The advantage of history is that
it is not a mere relativism, but that it claims to know objects with regard to what they have
become. It tests absolute truth claims, and even falsifies them. But it does not exclude a possible
opening towards truth. The challenge is to demonstrate this position in roots for the Hegelian
philosophy and compare it with Brandom’s approach.
I have to remark that I am only working out the roots but that the major focus is not to
demonstrate Hegel’s historical account in its entirety. Rather, I would like to discuss the debate
between Brandom and Habermas, and its problematic relationship to Hegel’s historicism. I
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believe that my discussion of historicism in relation to this debate can open a fruitful field for
further philosophical investigations.

1.2 Epistemological Holism – The Pragmatic Integration of Semantics
In the following, I will discuss the specific steps of my dissertation. My goal is to comment on
the debate between Habermas and Brandom. In order to demonstrate the deficits of the debate
between Continental and analytic philosophy with regard to their discussion of Hegel, I need to
examine the historical relation of Brandom’s and Habermas’ approaches to Hegel.

1.2.1 Epistemological Holism and its Relation to Brandom

Epistemological holism is one of the later insights of the analytic debate that also signifies a
partial return to Hegel. I will reconstruct it as one of the main bridges between Habermas and
Brandom. Such a holism is, first, the denial of atomistic structures and assumes that meaning is
grasped by capturing the conceptual relations between contents such as tables, atoms, or even
persons. Second, the so-called pragmatic turn emphasizes the function of a knower who is
necessarily involved in such processes as capturing conceptual relations. This assumes that
conceptual relations alone are not sufficient for delivering significant content. Conceptual
relations must be embedded in meaningful actions of persons. If, for example, Austin’s focus on
utterances demonstrates that the mere propositional part of statements is not enough to express
significant content, then we need to think about the performances of persons who are involved
more intensively. The performative part of a statement involves what somebody does when he
claims something. Thus, epistemic claims and normative commitments are related.
Consequently, we need to explain the strategy of integrating a reference-semantics into a
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pragmatic structure that includes a concept of linguistic performances of persons. This seems to
indicate that we have to test the combination of epistemology with a normative approach or a
performative semantics. In my view, however, pragmatics has to subordinate semantics to
pragmatics. In this sense, I reject a semantic foundationalism, the Brandomian view that the
proposition is the downtown of language. A pragmatic integration cannot be founded on the
primacy of the proposition.
In order to demonstrate these theses, I will first reconstruct the foundations for the
pragmatic turn that emerged within the program of analytic philosophy. I will demonstrate that
the pragmatic turn is an attempt to compensate for what I will call a birth deficit of analytic
philosophy that is related to a false attack on Hegel by Russell and Moore. This birth deficit is its
external realism. Furthermore, I will show that both of these philosophers misinterpret Hegel as
denying the external world as well as how they shift analytic philosophy’s focus to external
realism. Against Hegel’s assumed ontological monism, which he, in my mind, does not defend,
Russell proposes an atomistic epistemology based on reference-semantics.
By ‘reference-semantics’ I mean the different linguistically informed approaches in
philosophy that presuppose immediate beings, individuals, or structures as a source for our
epistemological and practical discourses. These theories still presuppose the idea of representing
symbols and represented objects.22 Brandom’s pragmatic integration attempts to respect these
immediacies as an integral part of a theory and thus also assigns a space for theory of
representation. I will point out the fundamental difficulties with this dualistic conception of
objects and their representation, especially when it is taken to be foundational. My overall goal
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here, however, is to reveal that the pragmatic integration is an attempt to compensate for the
problems caused by the misinterpretation of Hegel’s philosophy. The question remains then
whether this pragmatic integration leads to the desired outcome of a justified cognitive realism
which basically means that reality must have the same structure as our conceptual operations.
I agree with the main assumptions: since there is no immediate or direct experience,
symbolic mediations miss their ‘real’ semantic reference. ‘Reference’ itself is an abstract and
formal term of a theory, while even the referenced object of the concept ‘reference’ is hidden
behind its symbolic mediation. In other words, ‘reference’ as a linguistic term is meant to refer to
something non-linguistic by linguistic means, certainly a paradoxical undertaking. With regard to
Sellars’ critique of the ‘myth of the given’, I will demonstrate that these theories are not
successful. I do not deny that we cognitively identify points of reference, but I do deny that we
can reach a universal meaning concerning what these references ultimately mean. In a more
detailed analysis of Sellars’ approach, I will discuss the consequences of an excessive rejection
of reference which is an empty coherentism. His attempts to present a universal criterion for
knowledge after rejecting any kind of given will be demonstrated as highly problematic. As an
alternative, I will indicate that Hegel does not reject a given and thus conserves an empirical
component, while Sellars replaces this by a linguistic rationalism. This indicates that there is
possibly no need for a picture-realism.
A further problem arises since the truth values that we assign to statements, including
symbols understood as representing immediacies, are embedded in utterances that are structured
with regard to different social roles. Thus, it is one task to understand truth values objectively
with regard to the grammatical structure of sentences, and so to lead a theoretical discourse. Yet,
it is another task to understand how this theoretical discourse also depends on the social bonds of
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the communication-community and therefore the ethical situation in which the members of a
community try to cooperate and thus establish a communication-community. It is assumed by
neo-pragmatists that the failure lies in underrepresenting the role of the participant’s perspective.
I will test this hypothesis. My hypothesis is that Sellars’ failed attempts led to a normative
analysis of the person in order to compensate for the lack of a given. Through the introduction of
Hegel into the debate analytic philosophers utilize a partial conception of Hegel’s overall
historical approach. However, they only pay attention to a contextualism of interacting persons.
They do not discuss their position concerning history.
A unification of the propositional part of the utterance and the performative action with
regard to actors can only be achieved if we follow a systematicity that will lead us to the
metaphysical and historical concept of a person in a historical society. My claim is that any
holism will lead to this question of historical societies. By ‘holism’ I then understand the task of
explaining the foundational role that metaphysical concepts like world, soul, and God play in
historical discourses. All other concepts will eventually reveal themselves as dialectically related
to these concepts that we, however, only understand historically. I do not see how we can ground
these questions once and for all. Furthermore, I do not say that Brandom’s approach advances
into these important fields of Hegel’s theory. I will close the chapter with a detailed analysis of
Brandom’s account of semantic realism. I will investigate Brandom’s concrete approach of
embedding a reference-semantic into an inferential pragmatics. Brandom’s solution of anaphora
to the question of singular terms will be discussed. Finally, I will indicate that his linguistic
solution remains only partially successful compared with the Hegelian development of historical
systematicity that includes metaphysical terms and that positions itself with regard to a historical
whole.
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1.2.2 Habermas’ Post-Marxism and the Linguistic Turn

Habermas’ Discourse Theory stands in close relationship to the neo-pragmatic tradition. With his
book Theorie des Kommunikativen Handelns (1981), he initiates a linguistic turn in his approach
to societies. Apparently, a linguistic theory promises a post-metaphysical method that avoids the
fallacies of consciousness paradigms. There are two reasons why Habermas’ Discourse Theory is
relevant for the debate. Firstly, Habermas, as well as Brandom, attempts to unify analytic and
Continental approaches in a pragmatic theory. Secondly, however, Habermas’ criticizes
Brandom’s neo-pragmatism in Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung (1998). Thus, Habermas‘ approach
is intrinsically related to Brandom’s philosophy. Yet, he also distances himself from this theory.
For this reason, I will investigate Habermas’ criticism of Brandom by reconstructing his theory. I
will debate Habermas’ overall post-Marxist position and its misguided interpretation of Marx
through the lens of Marxism. It will turn out that Habermas cannot justify a rational standard of
human emancipation through language. Furthermore, I will demonstrate that his view of Hegel is
distorted by the misinterpretation of Hegel through Marxism. Habermas also relies on the
achievements of analytic philosophy with regard to the pragmatic integration of referencesemantics. I will identify the significance of the linguistic and pragmatic turn for his Discourse
Theory and relate its core-concepts to epistemological holism.
The pragmatic turn, at first glance, seems to lead us away from metaphysical terms of
world, soul, God, or truth, objectivity, reality and reference, validity and rationality. 23 According
to Habermas, a pragmatic theory has to explain their function and fulfill the following
23
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conditions: it has to deliver a “normative concept of linguistic coorperation”, explain the
“discursively validifiable claims,” demonstrate what “formal pragmatic suppositions of the
world” mean, and demonstrate “the conditions of rational acceptability” of the former term (see
Habermas 1999, 9).24 For Habermas, the difficulty concerns the possibility of discussing a
“world independent of our description” with regard to the pragmatic insight that an “immediate
approach to a naked reality” is impossible (Habermas 1999, 9). My arguments should
demonstrate that the pragmatic shift puts a clear emphasis on the conditions for speech acts that
were worked out in Habermas’ theory of Communicative Action, but that there are metaphysical
conditions necessary for its success that supersede Habermas’ approach of Discourse Theory.
For these reasons, several points distinguish my approach from Habermas’ theory of
pragmatic cooperation. Firstly, I do not see that actions are intelligible in themselves. Instead,
they are crossed with the epistemic whole that is historically derived through reflection. This
means that a person does not simply act. Rather, a person acts teleologically with regard to
historical ends, and with a historical idea of the end of all ends. This further means that a
dialectical understanding of the whole is also necessary for guiding discourses. So we need to
accept that dialectic leads us to questions of world, soul, and God, but overall to their relation to
history.
Secondly, I will classify the historically involved person and its co-subjects as the
question of an anthropology with regard to the historical development of what it means to be a
human. Habermas replaces this idea of a historically developed concept of humanity by a weak
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naturalism that from my perspective is unnecessary and metaphysically misleading.25
‘Naturalism’ in general is rather the result of a theoretical discourse in which people produce the
concept of nature in contrast to dismissible supernatural entities like souls and God. Since I do
not assume that an immediate approach to reality is possible, the concept of nature is as much a
product of inferences as souls and God. For this reason ‘naturalism’ has to be explained in its
dialectical relationship to these ‘supernatural’ ideas and cannot be grounded in itself. Habermas’
escape to a weak naturalism therefore reduces philosophy to an empirical enterprise that does not
have to be grounded any further.
Despite these deficits, it is important that Habermas delivers a concise criticism of
Brandom’s conceptual realism. For Habermas, the tradition of analytic philosophy has treated the
propositional claim as the paradigmatic case of meaning and truth. He notes that Frege and
Russell, the semantical theories from Quine to Davidson, and from Sellars to Brandom pursued
the mental theories of consciousness with analytical means (see Habermas 1999, 9). The
question, however, remains: what is the “internal relation between successful communication
and the representation of facts” (Habermas 1999, 11)? For Habermas, the second person
perspective was widely ignored. According to the analytic position, we understand a sentence
with regard to the following condition: we know what would be the case, if the sentence were
true.26 Habermas argues, however, that the access to the conditions of truth is not immediate.
Thus, there is a shift of the conditions for understanding the claim as true. It is not the „solipsistic
approachable conditions of truth“ (Habermas 1999, 11), but the condition of what can be
25
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accepted as publicly rational (see Habermas 1999, 11). ‘Rational’ means here that our reasons
can be shared publicly. It suspends private reasons. The mastery of a concept means therefore to
know how to use an expression “in order to cooperate with others on something” (Habermas
1999, 11). This indicates that there must be an „internal relation” between successful
communication and the representational function of language that is neglected in the framework
of Brandom (see Habermas1999, 11). Consequently, he accuses Brandom of pursuing a
methodological individualism. In other words, Brandom’s discourse participants do not
cooperate but they only observe tactically. Habermas’ criticism will be demonstrated in detail,
but, as I have pointed out earlier, his own theory of formal cooperation does not offer an
acceptable alternative.
Since Habermas rejects a transition to the Hegelian framework, because in his mind
Hegel reduces the responsibility of individuals who are controlled through a predestining concept
of Weltgeist, he rejects a further discussion of Hegel. Habermas’ reconstruction of Hegel,
however, is based on the assumption that Hegel has a closed system, while all development is
predestined by absolute spirit. A different understanding of Hegel would therefore be the most
viable option if Habermas’ objections against Brandom turned out to be true. I will particularly
focus on Habermas’ concerns with respect to a reinvigoration of Hegelian topics. I will offer an
interpretation of Hegel that respects Habermas’ criticism of Brandom, but proceeds with Hegel’s
account of a system that is open towards history.

1.3 Reconstruction of the Hegelian, Historical Systematicity
The pragmatic integration of a reference-semantics leads to the idea of the person in order to
complete the pragmatic, holistic conception. According to Discourse Theory and Brandom’s
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inferential role semantics, this progression toward the person is because the validity of
propositional statements depends on the ethical commitment of the speaker in a social
community. The discernment of the ethical commitment of the speaker requires not only a an
analysis of language, but also entails a metaphysical dimension.
Hegel’s epistemology leads us to this metaphysical dimension of the person that will
finally reveal itself as a question of history and society. Epistemological analysis and claims
depend on human beings and their historical context. On the contrary, the pragmatic turn as a
social contextualism does not develop this historical dimension. Brandom’s analysis, for
instance, focuses on developing the ahistorical, propositional structure of our communication as
a foundation for objective discourses. In my final chapter on Hegel, I therefore present
Hegelianism as a historicist philosophy that is incompatible with Brandom’s semantic analysis of
discourse conditions as the foundation of our epistemology.
I intend to highlight that Hegel’s solution to the problem of individuals is different from
Brandom’s ahistorical solution of anaphora. I agree that Brandom made thoughtful contributions
to the problem of deixis by replacing the idea of representation with an inferentialist account.
However, he attempts to solve the epistemological problem semantically by presupposing a
propositional mind-independent reality. However, based on Hegel’s epistemology, the
conception of individuals as ultimate, transcendental points of reference are produced by persons
and their cooperation with others in a historical moment.27 Thus, individuals are not mind-
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independent. Individuals, as transcendental points of convergence, are, on the one hand, useful
tools in order to discuss shared objects. On the other hand, they are only ideal because we
assume them as mind-independent, but ultimately cannot justify their mind-independent
existence. Hegel’s epistemology investigates how we produce such points of convergence. This
means that Hegel rejects the idea of knowing a mind-independent reality. Yet, he does not deny
the notion that human beings find objective ways of cooperation and thereby he develops an idea
of what truth is for us.
In order to defend this interpretation, I will discuss the Hegelian epistemology and its
development of a systematic approach to knowledge that finally converges into a theory of
historically developing societies. Based on his belief of the impossibility of knowing a mindindependent reality, Hegel proposes a theory of intersubjectivity, society, and history. In order to
explain this theory, I will show, firstly, how Hegel’s epistemology is traditionally rooted in
Kant’s Copernican Revolution. Kant reverses the traditional order of explanation. Instead of the
object, the subject becomes the center of the investigation, a notion that influences Hegel. For
Hegel, however, we cannot separate a formal subject from its content, or its experiences. While
Kant therefore investigates a formal, epistemological subject, Hegel transforms this inquiry into
an anthropological question. His phenomenology is a presentation of the dialectic development
of subjective, experiential knowledge that is related to a human being in a historically evolved
society.
In the second part of this chapter on Hegel, I therefore explain Hegel’s epistemology and
how it is based on an intersubjective, historical perspective that is related to experience. Contrary

Brandom defends a semanticist account that he discovers in the early parts of Hegel’s Phenomenology. Hegel,
however, is an anti-semanticist.
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to Brandom, Hegel does not subscribe to an ahistorical model of communication. In the
“Introduction” of the Phenomenology of Spirit, he develops his epistemology with respect to the
experiences of consciousness. Experiences, however, alter consciousness itself, and therefore,
self-consciousness, that is always involved in the process of consciousness, is also evolving with
experiences and does not simply exist in isolation from its content. Knowledge that is a result of
experience is based on these historically emerging forms of both consciousness and selfconsciousness. Therefore our forms of communication have histories, a concept that is
unimportant to Brandom.
In a third part, I investigate Hegel’s historical epistemology with regard to his chapter on
‘Absolute Knowing’. Contrary to Habermas’ simplistic reading, I will show that Hegel’s
epistemology is entirely open to history, and yet, we can achieve an absolute standpoint.
‘Absolute’ means that we have exhausted all historical possibilities to clarify our moment in
history without any extrinsic means. With the Absolute, we achieve a self-transparent science
that according to the standards of our historical moment cannot be superseded. Yet, this achieved
objectivity that comes with the scientific standpoint remains a concept that is secondary to
human beings and their inevitably changing lives. This means that history does not stop with
Absolute Knowing.
Nevertheless, my interpretation of Hegel seems to conflict with his Science of Logic. In
terms of the Science of Logic, it seems that subjects can achieve an ahistorical objective
standpoint. When Hegel claims that reality [das Wirkliche] is rational [vernünftig] and that the
rational is real, it sounds as if we can know the core structure of all knowledge because it is
identical with a mind-independent reality. Indeed, while Hegel’s reinterpretation of the
ontological proof of God comes to the conclusion that we can prove the reality of the concept,
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we can prove this only with respect to subjectivity.28 Knowing this, one could object that we can
know this subjectivity by objective categories so that we still have an ahistorical, objective
ground. Subjectivity, however, is not based on an unchangeable categorial framework for Hegel.
Although Hegel uses the term “diamond net” in the Encyclopedia in order to describe this
framework, it still is a historical result.29 This expressions sounds ahistorical. However, Hegel
uses a conditional “as if it were, the diamond net” (Hegel PoN §246, Addition, italics added).
This implies that the categorial framework serves us in a specific function. Nevertheless, it does
not mean that it is an ahistorical structure of our thinking that can never change. Rather, it means
that our thinking is the result of a historical compression that after a long series of sublations
occurs in an almost unchangeable structure. For Hegel, we have achieved the highest point in the
history of philosophy, after going through the stages of empiricism, rationalism and critical
theory, but this does not imply that history has ended.
I therefore presuppose that Hegel treats the question of possible ontologies in his Science
of Logic, while the Phenomenology of Spirit30 presents his epistemological, historicist account
that is the original framework for these ontologies. The Phenomenology is the clarification of the
historical limitations of science and of all ontologies. The question remains: how can we
understand ourselves as finite human beings with respect to our historical becoming? After
having achieved the absolute standpoint of science, the task of the Science of Logic is then to
demonstrate how subjects construct objectivity from this absolute standpoint.
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My guiding idea in this dissertation is that Hegel does not follow a closed system with a
foundational logic, but that he follows a systematicity that is fundamentally open towards further
experience and history. I will focus on Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit as the epistemological
grounding of all his further thoughts including the Logic. Given the limitations of this study the
important question of the Logic cannot be addressed. Instead I have to focus on the absolute
standpoint of a historical epistemology that grounds the Logic.
Given this structure, I am not able to adhere to a strict “philosophical analysis [that]
provides a complete and consistent systematization of concepts for the description and
explanation of things (objects) and their modifications over time” (Swindal 2012, 30).31 Instead
of having a complete and exhaustive view on Hegel that clearly fulfills the criterion of a closed
system, I opt for the idea of systematicity as a strategy to increase knowledge in clarifying our
intentions and in providing a reflective view within the ongoing historical context. My goal is
therefore to investigate in which way Hegel is a thinker of historical systematicity and not of a
closed system. This change of interpretation might provide the strongest link to and also
promises a reinterpretation of Discourse Theory that mistakenly focuses on the pragmatic
integration of a reference semantic. In the end, this will turn out as a historicist pragmatics that
also allows for metaphysical contents to be approached through an empirical realism.
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2. The Pragmatic Integration of Reference Semantics
The goal of this chapter is to demonstrate that Brandom’s semantic realism has its roots in
Russell’s and Moore’s false rejection of Hegel as an anti-realist. In the first part, I intend to
highlight how their misinterpretation of Hegel led analytic philosophy to embrace realism.
Moreover, it misguided the later analytic philosophers to a second misinterpretation of Hegel as
a merely social thinker who defends an ahistorical, social solution to the problem of our contact
to reality. In the second part, I will present this as the problem of pragmatically integrating a
reference semantics. This problem is central for inferentialism. In the last part, I will discuss
Brandom’s semantic realism and his pragmatic solution to the epistemological problem of
knowing a mind-independent reality. I will argue that it is a mistake to ground the pragmatic
integration on semantics as Brandom does

2.1 From Hegel to Analytic Philosophy to Pragmatic Contextualism
In this part, I will summarize the ‘linguistic turn’ as a reaction to Hegel and demonstrate its
changes during the pragmatic movements with regard to Wittgenstein, Sellars, Rorty, and
Brandom. Firstly, I will focus on the reasons for the Hegelian decline in the 19th century.
Secondly, I will outline Russell’s creation myth as explicitly anti-Hegelian. Thirdly, I will
explain the strong external realism that resulted from a false inpretation of Hegel as anti-realist.
Fourthly, I will explain how the external realisms and the assumption of an immediate contact
with reality led to neo-pragmatism’s rejection of the myth of the given by introducing
contextualism. To support my argument, I will incorporate Sellars’ inferentialism that aims to
replace the false paradigm of a simple representation of the world with a paradigm of correctly
applied, inferential rules in a community. This pragmatic turn is heavily influenced by a second
32

misunderstanding of Hegel as a merely social thinker. According to the neo-pragmatists, Hegel
employs the normative communication structure of a society to achieve an ahistoric
understanding of truth, however, their position ignores Hegel’s historicist idea of truth. In a fifth
point, I will highlight Rorty’s contribution in this debate. If we cannot represent the world,
according to Rorty, we must become skeptics and must entirely deny the objectivity of cognitive
claims. Thus, all philosophical efforts will turn out to be only conversation. Furthermore, Rorty,
even though he does not follow the Sellarsian tradition, is still anti-Hegelian, since Hegel argues
that objective knowledge claims are possible, even though they do not represent mindindependent reality.
Sixthly, I will introduce Brandom’s position in relation to the analytic tradition. As a
student of Sellars and Rorty, Brandom stands in line with the analytic and pragmatic
misinterpretation of Hegel. Since Hegel defends that cognitive claims are restricted to the
historical moment, Brandom’s major project is anti-Hegelian. For Brandom, it is the task to show
that semantics, an understanding of what the world really is, builds the foundation for our
pragmatic interaction. On the basis of this assumption, Brandom describes furthermore an
ahistorical method of how we have to contextualize claims.32 Hegel would probably not deny
that it is useful to develop such linguistic models, but he would deny that these linguistic models
can be regarded as independent from their historical moment, as Brandom claims. Since
Brandom does not reflect on this epistemological problem, which is the central Hegelian point of
reflection, his linguistic model cannot be seen as relating to Hegel’s philosophy.
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Habermas, though he has strong Continental influences through the Marxist tradition, follows the direction of this
type of analytic philosophy. Due to his model of discourses he is also concerned with the integration of a referencesemantics into pragmatics. Habermas is a complicated hybrid. He adopts the Marxist goals for society, but holds that
epistemology needs to be carried out in terms of pragmatics. He praises Brandom with regard to the latter. Habermas
relation to the analytic tradition will be investigated in the third chapter.
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2.1.1 The Hegelian Decline and the Birth of Analytic philosophy

Since I will reconstruct analytic philosophy and Habermas’ attachment to this tradition from a
Hegelian perspective, I will start with presenting the Hegelian decline during and at the end of
the 19th century. After this, I will briefly summarize the three major philosophical movements of
the 20th century, and then in the following chapter concentrate on Russell’s and Moore’s
rejection of the Hegelian philosophy. The goal is to demonstrate the internal relation that analytic
philosophy has to Hegel, which resulted in the neo-pragmatic interpretations of Hegel and their
ignorance of his historicism.33
Historically, the decline of Hegelianism is complex, so there are different tendencies in
philosophy after Hegel’s death. These tendencies, and thus also Hegel’s decline, stand in a
relation to the emergence of analytic philosophy. Though I do not claim that these tendencies are
necessary for the rise of analytic philosophy, they have some significance, since many of the
motifs occur as explicit topics in analytic philosophy. I identify four such tendencies that occur
during Hegel’s decline in Germany after 1831.34
Firstly, the upcoming and dominant position of empirical sciences after the reopening of
the German universities led to a rejection of metaphysical theories, and a turn towards sciences
(see also Rockmore 1996, 2). Secondly, the resulting materialism struggle [Materialismusstreit]
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Rockmore defends a similar thesis: “Marxism and English-language analytic philosophy emerged in reaction to
Hegelianism” (see Rockmore, Tom. On Hegel's Epistemology and Contemporary Philosophy. New Haven:
Humanity Press, 1996, 2).
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tendencies, I do not follow the idea that history is a chain of facts, but I will demonstrate a possible development of
ideas that occurred in the history of philosophy. This is because on the macro-level of societies, the various factors
that influence each other create a chaotic system, so that causes of change might influence other causes back and
forth undistinguishably.
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fostered a return to Kant and opened the field for phenomenology. Thirdly, the reinterpretation of
Marx and the political influence of a social democracy replaced the theories of Hegel that the
‘progressives’ labeled as bourgeois. Fourthly, philosophers like Kierkegaard and Nietzsche
pointed out various problems that the Hegelians faced who defended a strict system. All of this
resulted in the fact that Hegel’s system philosophy could only claim to be a science amongst
others and thus lost its central position.35
It is not possible to summarize all philosophers and to account for all historical relations
emerging from Hegel’s theory.36 Dealing with history is rather a matter of reflection than of
exact science. Nevertheless, I would like to give a short Hegelian answer to the four causes or,
better said, to the correlations of his decline. Firstly, Hegel’s philosophy does not attempt to be a
science of nature, but a philosophy of nature. The results that Hegel came up with in the
philosophy of nature are therefore only products of reflection. In his Philosophy of Nature, Hegel
demonstrates that the concept, the overall unifying idea, is capable to explain phenomena of
nature by coherently connecting them through thought. This, however, does not mean that the
philosophy of nature predicts phenomena of nature apriori. If materialism is a reaction to the idea
that Hegel claimed that we could know nature apriori, then this is, for the reason above, an
entirely misguided belief. To say it briefly, Hegel was opposed to apriori foundationalisms. This
leads to the second defense of Hegel. Since Hegel’s philosophy is a phenomenology that relies
mainly on Kantian insights without the Kantian apriorism, we do not need another neo-Kantian
phenomenology that is detached from the historical insights that Hegel has achieved. One could
say that Hegel attempted to proceed with the Copernican turn without a noumenon. This
35

These tendencies were probably part of a larger trend that ultimately resulted in the scientification of philosophy.
As stated above the decline of Hegel’s philosophy is much more complex, and in the historical philosophies of,
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resembles the phenomenological project of Husserl. Hegel’s project, however, is more accurate
in its acknowledgement of the historical development of former theories and thus relates it to the
history of philosophy.37 Thirdly, Marx is deeply involved into Hegelianism and reapplies
Hegelian ideas. It is for these reasons incorrect to treat both of these as entirely opposing
philosophies.38 Fourthly, the Nietzschean, and the Kierkegaardian criticism of the Hegelian
system brought forth the correct criticism of right-wing Hegelianism, but it is unclear how much
Hegel defended a system overall. An involvement of his views on history will relativize his idea
of a system of science. Against popular belief, Hegel probably does not have an ahistorically
presupposed system, but works systematically with regard to history.
While Hegel’s influence declined in Germany, Hegelian idealism emerged in England
and Scotland, and was also popular in the United States in the latter half of the 19th century. The
late popularity of Hegel in the British tradition was linked to the late translations of Hegel’s
works. According to Mander, William Wallace’s translation of Hegel’s Encyclopedia occurred in
1874, while translational work began in the 1860s.39 Despite this late popularity similar problems
with Hegel’s Idealism occurred in the Anglo-American tradition. William Wallace, for example,
was fascinated that Hegel could replicate the concept of the evolution of species as the evolution
of thoughts. With regard to the Darwinian interest in the “actual historical development of
things” (Mander 2011, 43) Wallace, however, already refers to the main competitor of Hegel’s
project, the natural sciences, and explicitly rejects Hegel in these regards.
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Phenomenologists such as Husserl or Heidegger usually underestimate how much the problems of their time relate
to the tradition and how much they stood in a historical continuity of Hegel’s thought.
38
I will demonstrate this with regard to the distinction of materialism and Idealism in the chapter on Marx and
Habermas later.
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Due to Hegel’s late rise in British thought, the rejection of Hegelianism inaugurated by
Russell and Moore, occurs about fifty years later than in Germany. With regard to this break,
Rockmore identifies three new philosophies that emerged in reaction to Hegel: “American
pragmatism, analytic philosophy, and what is misleadingly called the phenomenological
movement” (Rockmore 2001, 340).40 Firstly, the phenomenological movement, which stands for
the new continental philosophies, is hard to grasp, since this philosophy does not relate to
Husserl’s foundationalist phenomenology that seeks to identify evident grounds after a
phenomenological reduction. It rather seems that the phenomenological movement reinterprets
what empiricism means by reanalyzing our experiences. I am not going to investigate the
different threads of the phenomenological tradition explicitly. Later, however, I will deliver an
argument for why Hegel’s historicist philosophy represents a phenomenologist theme.
Secondly, whether Brandom’s philosophy is pragmatist cannot be completely answered,
as it seems that his philosophy rather relies on what is called pragmatics that is the influence of
the context on claims. I am not going to investigate Peirce, Dewey or James in detail. I will
include, however, short passages of Peirce that suggest that the tradition that Brandom follows is
not pragmatism in the classical sense.
Thirdly, with regard to analytic philosophy, I defend a similar thesis to Rockmore:
If I am right, Hegel turns out to be a key but mainly unacknowledged figure in analytic philosophy, from
whom it departs and to which it is now returning, but which it has twice misunderstood. The first, highly
productive misunderstanding was one ingredient in the rise of analytic philosophy. It remains to be seen
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whether the second misunderstanding, which is only now taking shape, will prove as productive in the
further evolution of analytic philosophy (Rockmore 2001, 340).

I will reconstruct this double misunderstanding of Hegel and identify the key moments of the
reaction to Hegel in analytic philosophy. I will reconstruct how analytic philosophy
misunderstood Hegel at its beginning by defending the idea of an external world, which Hegel
never explicitly denies. Moreover, I will explain how the return to Hegel to repair broken parts of
analytic philosophy fostered a second misunderstanding of Hegel as a social thinker without
paying attention, however, to his idea of systematicity and historicity. It will turn out that the
analytic philosophy is grounded in a misunderstanding of Hegel.

2.1.2 The Creation Myth of Analytic Philosophy – The Rejection of Hegel

Russell presented various ‘birth documents’ for analytic philosophy that explicitly denounce
Hegel’s ideas. When Russell escaped from the “hot-house on to a wind-swept headland”41 he
meant to reject the core-conceptions of the idealist framework (see Russell 1995, 48).42 As a part
of his creation myth of analytic philosophy, Russell focused on the complete opposite of
everything that could be Hegelian: “I began to believe everything the Hegelians disbelieved”
(Russell 1995, 48).43 In particular, Russell assumed that the major mistake of Idealism was
hidden in the Leibnizean predicate logic: “[E]very proposition attributes a predicate to a subject
and (what seemed to him almost the same thing) that every fact consists of a substance having a
41
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property” (Russell 1995, 48). This predicate logic was based on the observation that every
substance stands in a relation to a predicate, which suggested for Russell a possible closeness to
the Aristotelean syllogistic that presupposed a fundamental dependence on substances. For
Russell, this was the main mistake of Idealism (see Redding 2007, 3). Especially, Russell’s
rejection of Bradley’s Idealism is justified by this ‘major mistake’. Russell assumed further that
Hegel still relied on these old forms of logic, though Hegel actually wanted to renew logic.
It is unclear how Bradley and Hegel are related, but for Russell there is no great
difference. Thus, Russell writes: “Mr Bradley has worked out a theory according to which, in all
judgment, we are ascribing a predicate to Reality as a whole; and this theory is derived from
Hegel” (Russell 1914, 3844 Hegel, however, does not imply such an ontological monism,
according to which there is only one ultimate substance. Instead, Hegel discusses the question of
unity from an epistemological standpoint. Russell includes a short discussion on this aspect (see
Russell 1914, 37-38), but in consequence he assumes that Hegel’s logic is identical with
metaphysics, while metaphysics for Russell represents the universe as it is.45 Beyond this
assumption that Hegel is a metaphysical realist, Russell proceeds with a discussion of the
traditional status of logic in Hegel:
Now the traditional logic holds that every proposition ascribes a predicate to a subject, and from this it
easily follows that there can be only one subject, the Absolute, for if there were two, the proposition that
there were two would not ascribe a predicate to either. Thus Hegel’s doctrine, that philosophical
propositions must be of the form, “the Absolute is such-and-such,” depends upon the traditional belief in
the universality of the subject- predicate form (Russell 1914, 38).
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Against Hegel’s presupposed ‘bowl of jelly’ view of the world, the view that there is only one
absolute subject to which all things as predicates are ascribed to, Russell came up with the
‘bucket of shot’ view (see Redding 2007, 4), the view that individuals contain predicates. In the
following, Russel assumed an anti-holistic program that replaces the internal relations of subjects
to predicates by external relations without subjects (see Redding 2007, 4).
Russell’s criticism of ontological monism does not necessarily justify ontological
pluralism because this might be an unjustified dichotomy. Russell was well aware that we cannot
demonstrate or that we have demonstrated an ontological pluralism. Yet, according to Ockham’s
razor, Russell favored ontological pluralism over his misinterpreted Hegelian ontological
monism. In reading Hegel as an ontological monist, Russell ignores Hegel’s position on
epistemology that strictly denies an approach to a mind-independent reality. Moreover, Russell’s
later developed neutral monism offers an interesting alternative to former problems of mindmatter-distinctions. It lacks, however, the dialectical development of these concepts that Hegel
had already offered. Russell demonstrates no historical awareness about this problem and thus
repeats positions that have already been developed. The problem with Russell is his superficial
reading of the tradition that is also determining the further development of analytic philosophy.
An example for this is that Russell’s definition of Idealism reappears in the Stanford dictionary
as follows: “Like idealism (the view that nothing exists but the mental) and physicalism (the
view that nothing exists but the physical), neutral monism rejects dualism (the view that there
exist distinct mental and physical substances)” (see Irvine 2015).46 At least German Idealism is a
position that is entirely different from believing that everything is mental. German Idealism is
46
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rather tied to an epistemological standpoint, according to which philosophers deny knowledge of
the world by virtue of representations. They usually defend that epistemological inquiry has to
begin on the subjective side and lead to objectivity. This rough characterization, borrowed from
Kant’s Copernican turn, does not mean that the world is only mental as assumed above.
Russell, however, identifies idealism as a theory of reality as mental, and influences
analytic philosophy by this misinterpretation. Moreover, as already mentioned, he misses the
point that Hegel is concerned with epistemology; the question of how to justify knowledge.
Hegel is not concerned with ontology, the question of what the world really is (see Rockmore
2005, 5). Questioning, nevertheless, how to know the world, is less controversial than
questioning the existence of an external world, or stating what the world really is. Due to such
superficial interpretations of idealism, however, the question of the external world becomes
central for the early analytic philosophy and resulted in an unnecessary fight against the shadows
of anti-realism.

2.1.3 The Problem of the External World in Analytic Philosophy

In his reading of the early analytic tradition, Rockmore focuses on Moore’s perception of the
British idealists. According to Rockmore, these British idealists were mainly opposed to British
empiricists who claimed that we discover reality and not construct it (see Rockmore 2001, 344).
In consequence, there are several conflations that Rockmore accuses Moore of when he, like
Russell, presumes that “modern idealists” claim that the “universe is spiritual” (Rockmore 2001,
345):
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First, it indicates his [Moore] awareness of a distinction between modern and other forms of idealism.
Second, it simply ignores Hegel and other German idealists, none of whom holds this or an analogous view,
and takes up English-language idealists like Berkeley and Bradley (Rockmore 2001, 345).

Hegel, unlike the idealists that Moore has in mind, does not discuss the question of an external
world, but simply replaces the idea of a noumenon by phenomenology.47 By this I mean that he
is interested in how an object appears to the subject as an object in-itself, while the in-itself is
something that the subject produces in its process of knowing or constructing the object. The
noumenon as a presupposed, real and external thing is thus rather a part of the phenomenon, or
better, of the consciousness that attempts to connect the fact that the sensed, perceived and
conceptualized object is always dependent on this consciousness. Moore’s denial, however, leads
him to the position that “sensation is always sensation of something” (Rockmore 2001, 345) in
the sense that we are always in immediate contact with external things, and thus always already
outside of spirit (see Rockmore 2001, 345). The problem, however, is not the outside world, but
that the understanding of this outside world is not fundamentally distorted. One idealist problem
is to identify how we can reliably link the distorted sensations, perceptions or conceptions of
47

Rockmore gives three clues on the position of Hegel as somehow acknowledging something outside of the mind:
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world, or one must acknowledge its existence and be able to know it as it is. The third possibility, which he does not
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know the mind-independent external world and the weaker” (Rockmore 2001, 350).
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objects to a mind-independent object. But, Hegel’s view is that we are not capable of
establishing such a reliable connection. It is, nevertheless, a Hegelian position that natural
consciousness takes objects as immediate, but to be more precise, their immediacy is an
immediacy for us. As Hegel demonstrates then in the introduction to the Phenomenology of
Spirit, this split between the in-itself and the for-itself is a split that is for consciousness. This
major observation motivates his project of a further investigation of self-consciousness and its
occurrence in historically grown societies. Rockmore claims that Moore’s simplification of
Hegel’s idealism in favor of being immediately in contact with reality influenced the later
analytic debate (see Rockmore 2001, 345). Historically, Moore’s view is neither new nor
informed, yet it is guiding the debate so that it finally led to Sellars’ intervention with his theory
of the myth of the given.
2.1.4 The Neo-Pragmatic Turn and Sellars’ Myth of the Given

Moore’s historically uninformed position on the problem of immediacies, which for him is also
connected to the affirmation of the external world, stands in contrast to Wittgenstein’s later
objections. According to Wittgenstein, it is important to ask whether claims to know are
“mediated by a frame of reference (Bezugssystem)” (Rockmore 2001, 346). Beyond the impact
of the social on our activity of claiming, Wittgenstein also suggests that the pseudo-problem of
an external world should not be of any concern for philosophers. In our practical lives, we barely
make claims about an external world as independent from our perception of it; rather, we discuss
how the world is for us and how we can mediate these views with others. Though Moore
certainly influenced the analytic tradition, Wittgenstein’s objections against Moore fostered a
broader rejection of the ideal language philosophies and their kind of raw empiricism. The
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holistic movement arose, which became a social turn towards the contextual conditions of
utterances and also included Hegel in its later phase.
Though these steps towards epistemological holism are advances relative to analytic
philosophy, the neo-pragmatists48 still misinterpreted Hegel or could not reach the achievements
of his historicist position. Instead, the hypothesis of having immediate access to an external,
mind-independent world constituted the main problem that the contextualist pragmatists
attempted to solve.
Rockmore distinguishes three forms of contextualist pragmatisms: “Quine is concerned
with how we can reasonably be said to know; Rorty, who is an epistemological skeptic, is
concerned with why we can reasonably be said not to know; and Putnam is occupied with what
and how we know” (2001, 356). Though all of these contextualist pragmatisms develop
important arguments against representationalism, I will primarily deal with Sellars’ influence on
Brandom. Firstly, I will reconstruct his position as rejecting the raw empiricism of analytic
philosophy and discuss his linguistic coherentism. His linguistic coherentism will, however, face
the problem of a frictionless void. Secondly, I will discuss Sellars’ parallelism as a solution to
this problem. In the three last points, I will argue that Sellars can neither be considered as
Kantian, Hegelian, or pragmatist in the classical sense, since he still commits to an anti-Hegelian
framework by arguing for knowledge of a mind-independent world.
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The comparison to the original pragmatism is only to some degree reasonable, for the original pragmatist
movement started with deflationism. According to Williams, “The pragmatists associate representationalism with an
excessive intellectualism that tends to divorce knowledge from the activities of inquiry” (Williams, Michael.
“Pragmatism, Sellars and Truth.” Sellars and his Legacy. Edited by James R. O’Shea. Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2016: 223-260). Instead of assuming that theoretical claims are the foundation of knowledge, the classical
pragmatists focus on truth as action (see Williams 2016, 223). Consequently, ‘making true’ is an activity in which
we show that something helps us in coping with practical problems (see Williams 2016, 223). But ‘making true’ is
only one specific field of interaction. There is therefore a problem to call the contextualist, pragmatic movements
pragmatism, since they either maintain a theoretical approach to truth or fall entirely into skepticism.
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2.1.4.1 Sellars’ Break with Empiricism and his Linguistic Coherentism

As one of the first analytic philosophers, Sellars breaks with representationalism by
rejecting it as a metaphysical ideology that falsely assumes a given on the level of the senses.
This so-called myth of the given means that many analytical approaches assume an immediate
contact to an external world. In other words, Sellars identifies the historical problem of a strict
dualism between a coherent formal side of knowledge and its independent material information.
For him, it is questionable whether the receptivity of the senses is entirely independent from the
conceptual framework. In this sense, Sellars’ objection indicates, indeed, a turn towards a
Hegelian investigation that questions a raw empiricism.49
Even though this is an advancement within analytic philosophy, Sellars still holds on to
the question of an ahistoric, objective criterion for knowledge that is independent from our
action. This does not only distinguish him from pragmatism, but also reveals that his approach is
ultimately incompatible with Hegel’s philosophy.
It is true that Sellars relates to the holistic arguments of Hegel’s chapter on sensecertainty in the Phenomenology of Spirit. The idea is that direct knowledge, in Hegel’s language
‘the immediate’, is a myth that fueled representationalisms, but that finally could not justify their
positions (see also Rockmore 2001, 360). Thus, Sellars develops the foundation for
epistemological holism that will deliver the ground for Brandom’s ‘linguistic rationalism.’ At its
core Sellars denies that claims of truth are justified by a relation to the external world. Under this
perspective, the comparison to Hegel occurs as reasonable, since Hegel denies that we can know
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Rockmore writes on Sellars’ rejection of raw empiricism: “His [Sellars] central point seems to be that we do not
and cannot depend, as classical empiricists believe, for the justification of claims to know on immediate experience
whose probative force is undermined by the rejection of the myth of the given” (2001, 348).
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an external world. It is also similar to the original pragmatist movement that started with a
deflationism, the idea that truth is bound to action and not an adequation between intellect and
things.
As an alternative to a raw empiricism, Sellars’ concept of semantic assertibility should
ground truth in a normative commitment to rules, which is a normative action. In Science and
Metaphysics, Sellars states his central thought, “for a proposition to be true is for it to be
assertible, where this means not capable of being asserted (which it must be to be a proposition
at all) but correctly assertible; assertible, that is, in accordance with the relevant semantical rules,
and on the basis of such additional, though unspecified, information as these rules may require
[…]. ‘True’, then, means semantically assertible (‘S-assertible’) and the varieties of truth
correspond to the relevant varieties of semantical rule” (Sellars 1968 §26, 101).50 So semantic
assertibility means that truth depends on the semantic rules that govern the semantic framework.
Since truth exists if we follow these semantic rules. truth is then more an action than the
adequacy of a word and a fact.
With such proposed sets of semantic rules, we can then define the relation between
different predicates, so that, for example, the implication of the common phrase, if it rains the
street becomes wet, suggests a specific relation between ‘rain’ and ‘wet.’ Here, we could, for
example, conclude that if ‘wet’ is not ‘dry’, then ‘rain’ cannot be ‘dry.’ In other words, we can
derive a net of semantical relations without making sense data our only foundation. Kolb
explains: “Different predicates will have different formal relations to other members of the
genus. Thus ‘red’ and ‘green’ would be related as species of ‘color’ while ‘loud’ and ‘piercing’
would be species of ‘noise’; ‘noise’ and ‘color’ would be species of ‘sensations’, and so on”
50

Sellars, Wilfrid. Science and Metaphysics - Variations on Kantian Themes. New York: Humanities Press, 1968.
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(1978, 386).51 This means that material implications have important effects on the understanding
of predicates and their relations to each other, building classes of predicates. Overall, this means
that we interpret experiences coherently with regard to our language, but that we do not simply
represent an external reality. In a word, there is no inference back from our semantic assertions
to external reality. Kolb paraphrases: “Of course our names do relate to the world, but they do so
by being part of a language which is being used to picture it. Names (in atomic statements) are
the basic elements which picture particular entities within the world, but they do so only by
virtue of being part of the network of interlocking linguistic types which form a language. Their
individuality and meaning are established by their places in that network, not by the picturing
relation” (1978, 388). In other words, the semantic net that is defined by the relations of the
terms will determine the meaning of the used names. The meaning of a name does not represent
a single fact outside of our semantic net, but displays various structures that help us with our
practical orientation.
The problem of semantic assertibility, however, is that it “provides no way to adjudicate
whether the semantical rules of one linguistic framework are more adequate than the rules of
another” (Levine 2007, 248).52 This means that there can be many equally successful, semantic
nets that are in themselves coherent but incompatible with other semantic nets. Rockmore argues
therefore that Sellars’ rejection of empiricism causes the problem of a frictionless coherentism:
“The space of reasons relies on coherence, or the interrelation of concepts in a conceptual
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framework. Yet since the coherence in question cannot rely in any way at all for justification on
the given […], it is an instance of what McDowell, who is otherwise sympathetic to Sellars, calls
“unconstrained coherentism” […A] theory can be coherent but false. Many individuals in mental
institutions have coherent worldviews” (Rockmore 2012).53 As already stated, the evaluation of
one framework as ‘more true’ than another framework would be relative to the semantic rules of
the framework. This deficiency leads Sellars to his concept of “picturing” (see Levine 2007,
248). By this, Sellars wants to recover a connection to an outside reality (see Williams 2016,
224) as a criterion for securing higher truths. Sellars’ account of picturing motivates the
following conceptual realism. Conceptual realism is the idea that we cannot approach reality
directly, but that reality and our cognitive operations must have the same structure, since
otherwise cognition could not be possible. Since this idea is one of the grounding ideas of
Brandom’s semantic realism, I will reconstruct Sellars’ approach of picturing in the following.

2.1.4.2 Picturing for Compensating an Unconstrained Coherentism

Sellars acknowledges that “the hook-up of a system of rule-regulated symbols with the
world is not itself a rule-governed fact, but […] a role in the rule-governed linguistic system, and
[…] a role in the structure of tied sign responses to environmental stimuli.” (Sellars 1949, 310).54
Thus, Sellars accepts that the normative constitution of our language is not simply caused by the
world. Yet, he assumes that something justifies the linguistic system from the outside. Though
the signs of our language signify something within the system of language, they also picture an
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outside world by virtue of “causal uniformities” (see Levine 2007, 254). Levine emphasizes this
difference: “The causal hook up between language and world that takes place through our being
inculcated into certain non-conceptual uniformities is one of picturing while the rule-regulated
aspect of a language is one of signifying” (Levine 2007, 254). In other words, Sellars defines the
relation of signification and picturing as non-interference. Signification is about the intentional
action that the speaker performs (see Levine 2007, 254). In representationalist truth-paradigms,
this aspect had been ignored and words were thought to receive meaning only by virtue of a
representation. As a consequence, representationalist theories defended a conception of truth that
was independent from the action of the speaker and his normative ways of conceptualizing.
Picturing should avoid the problem of omitting our normative interaction and, at the same time,
it should not interfere with the normative role of the speaker. Therefore, these theories describe
picturing as a mere “isomorphic relation between two types of objects” (Levine 2007, 254).
These two objects are linguistic words and natural entities. Speaking more generally, it involves
a parallelism between “the rule-governed assertibility of semantically signiﬁcant items” (Levine
2007, 254) and the “natural objects in the real order” (Levine 2007, 254). To paraphrase in
epistemological terms, this parallelism is supposed to escape the problem of ontological
difference, i.e., that is explaining the connection between material and forms, two different
ontological categories. For Sellars, world and language simply share the same structure.
Kolb explains picturing as follows. Firstly, language replicates the structure of the world
(Kolb 1978, 393) to a certain degree. According to Kolb, Sellars assumes a “complex
isomorphism between the particulars in the world … and the atomic sentences in the worldstory” (Kolb 1978, 393). This parallelism occurs as “a structural similarity between two arrays of
particulars” (Kolb 1978, 393). In order to justify this parallelism, Kolb employs Sellars’
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naturalist justification: “What makes the one a picture of the other (and not just a similar
structure) is that the linguistic array is used by an organism to guide its behavior” (Kolb 1978,
393). In other words, Sellars thinks that the linguistic sphere is motivated by our success in the
natural world. A successful linguistic action occurs only if a sentence can resemble the same
structure of the external natural world. If linguistic actions would not resemble the natural world
in its structure such success would be impossible.
This explanation is grounded on a naturalist presupposition. My criticism of this is the
following: firstly, it might be true that an organism uses language to guide its behavior from time
to time, but that does not mean that we can causally explain the structure of language by this
behavior entirely. This inference from part to whole needs further justification.
Secondly, we cannot explain the entire constitution of language as a tool for guiding
behavior, as language only successfully guides our behavior in certain instances. For example,
language could also have an aesthetic or a social function. It is possible that it supports people’s
cooperation or that it help them to discuss structures of meaning that are not tied to the external
natural world. We could, for example, use language in order to build our identities in a social
hierarchy. The instrumentalist view of language, on the contrary, neglects further, important
interpretations of language by claiming that language is for its most part directed towards success
in the external natural world.
Thirdly, language could be an additional function of the brain that evolved as an
unnecessary appendix. Thus, it is possible that it does not stand in relation to the external world.
Language would then have no intrinsic function. Rather, it would be a tool that an underlying
will utilizes for a specific purpose.
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If any of these arguments are reasonable, then the naturalist argument is not more than
one hypothesis amongst many. It might be relevant for a science of biology wrestling for
explanations of language, but then Sellars would not be able to make an empirical claim. I do not
see how there must be necessarily a parallel between an external reality and language, nor do I
see that language evolved on top of such conditions of biological success. Though I do not deny
the plausibility of such an explanation, we must assume more than one function for language. If
language has more than one function, then we need to know the ways, we use language. Unless
we better clarify how we use language for success in nature, we cannot accept Sellars’ naturalist
assumption.
Nevertheless, let us grant that language helps us in guiding our behavior. Does that mean
that we grasp reality as it is, or that we become better in grasping it? Language is supposed to
give orientation in the external world. Yet, only a few of our tasks are based on orientation in
space-time. Sometimes, for example, we use language to set down normative rules. Marriage is
not something about facts in the external world. But it is instituted by language as a fact that can
only be discussed in language. Sellars, however, makes clear that the fundamental function of
picturing, must be orientation. In fact, he only applies picturing to the language entryconditions.55 He uses the example of a robot that scans its environment by virtue of radiation.
The more this robot moves around and records data, the more information it collects about its
environment, i.e., the way the world is. 56 Kolb writes about this: “Once we give up the notion of
an intentional relation between the mind and the world, the isomorphism of picturing forms the
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link between the world and our brains as organic computers juggling symbols in accordance with
formal rules” (Kolb 1978, 393). The idea is that we map the external world, and though the
reconstruction depends on our semantic rules, we arrive at a more and more adequate picture of
reality. Driving from Chicago to San Francisco, for example, would not deliver a merely
contingent picture (see Kolb 1978, 393). We would reveal inadequacies of our maps by bumping
into unexpected events like “Kansas City or the Rocky Mountains […] small deviation in the
orbit of Mercury, or unexpected behavior on the part of our children” (Kolb 1978, 393). The idea
is that through these corrections our picture becomes more and more subtle (see Kolb 1978, 393)
and thus more accurate.
The idea that a mere collection of data supports higher knowledge with regard to a mindindependent world, however, is flawed. Let us assume that two persons have each the task to
solve a labyrinth on a computer. They each work independently and do not see any lines
representing walls or whatsoever on the screen. They only see a cursor representing their
position. Let us further assume that after a random amount of time, the labyrinth will be solved
independently from what the two persons have done. This means that all the moves that these
people made with the cursor are unimportant for the solution of the labyrinth. Nevertheless, both
of them will have collected entirely arbitrary data about how to solve the labyrinth. They will
present these data as knowledge. For example, person A might claim in front of person B: ‘I
made good experiences with going up two squares and then turning to the right.’ Altogether their
knowledge systems are false. They created pseudo-knowledge. It is unclear when their systems
will fail, because they might still rely on the chosen collection of data. Without further
knowledge about the labyrinth, or without a person waiting and doing nothing, these persons
cannot determine their degree of error. It is also questionable how much time they will need to
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figure out that the solution to the labyrinth comes about independently of their actions. Such a
total collapse of the system, moreover, is also possible for our coherent systems, if we are, as
Putnam suggested, for example, brains in a vet.
Independent of these examples, however, I see different factors that make Sellars’ idea
problematic: first, of course, the picture of a trip from Chicago to San Francisco (the example
from Kolb) depends on our idea of normal physical extensions and our normal movement
through one time in one direction. These are, however, ungrounded presuppositions about a
mind-independent reality. In fact, ideas of philosophy externsion and movement are not
independent from what we take ourselves to be, physical bodies. Of course, it is hard to
determine whether we are only physical bodies, but, according to Sellars’ theory of neurological
states, he assumes that we can explain mind with regard to a mind-independent world. Sellars
self-confidently states that we will know by virtue of neurophysiological states what it means to
be a thinking substance. He writes: “I submit that as belonging to the real order it is the central
nervous system, and that recent cybernetic theory throws light on the way in which cerebral
patterns and dispositions picture the world” (Sellars 2007, 228). This implies that we are not
only talking about a parallelism, but that we can easily translate the structures of our mind into a
scientific theory that grasps what the mind really is. So his theory is grounded on the
presupposition of a scientism that can exhaustively explain the mind.
Secondly, we also have to take into account that the physical world might change. Thus,
we can only make a statement about reality for a certain moment in time.
Thirdly, we must accept that reality occurs as large and includes a large number of
possible events. It is unreasonable to assume that by knowing only a part of it, we know the rest
of the structure a priori.
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In any case, we first have agree of what we take to be a reasonable statement about any
labyrinth that we plan to produce knowledge about. If reality resembles a labyrinth, then I claim
that we have not clarified the rules which we must follow for this labyrinth. We have agreed as a
society about the rules that can be counted as successful for the parts that we have experienced
and acknowledged so far. By this, however, we have no secure idea of what reality really is.
Instead, we rely on experience. Thus, the only thing we have achieved so far is a somewhat
stable society based on the cooperation of individuals and their experiences as the justification
for their knowledge systems.
Let us come back to Kolb’s example of a trip from Chicago to San Francisco. This
specific operation includes a clear teleology, namely getting to a physical location that is San
Francisco. It means travelling through a previously clarified space-time with a very limited
number of events (in comparison to the amount of events in the known universe) that might
prevent this trip. The story of achieving a more and more accurate picture is easily told in this
case, but it seems to me that the goal of human kind and its journey through space-time, history,
evolution and whatever else has much more to offer than an arrival in San Francisco. Achieving
better knowledge does not depend on the random collection of data with regard to an arbitrary
goal in a physical space. What we acknowledge as knowledge depends on the goal we have
defined, but who says that driving from Chicago to San Francisco brings us anywhere nearer to
the truth? Despite this, we cannot solve so-called open-world-problems by the collection of data,
because it is unclear what data we should collect in the first place, especially if we have no goal.
In the end, any presupposition of a particular kind of data can only provide us with a better
picture of what reality means for us. Then, however, this will depend on how we define our goals
in the first place.
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Given these objections, we can argue that Sellars assumes his parallelism only for a
small amount of language entry conditions, and that the normative commitments between
humans do not relate to these conditions. Kolb, however, makes Sellars’ commitment to the
original atomism of analytic philosophy clear: “While any partial or complete world-story would
be a system of juggled symbols, the true world-story will be the one whose manipulations end in
the pattern of atomic sentences which is isomorphic with our world” (Kolb 1978, 393). The idea
is that the ultimate picture is then the unification of “everything under one set of laws and
name[s]” (Kolb 1978, 393). I admit that it might be a transcendental necessity for sciences to
assume a possible unification, but I think that Sellars conflates the necessity of a unity with the
real possibility of achieving this in a final theory. He takes a necessary regulative idea for
sciences to be reality. According to Kolb, Sellars’ “full world-story” would identify all
particulars and utilize all possible predicates (see Kolb 1978, 390). In other words, we are only
speaking within a minor variation, a dialect, of what is real truth-talk. Yet, we speak our
language with the necessary structure in order to decide by comparison that we are coming closer
to truth (see Kolb 1978, 390). Though such an ideal can be guiding for discourses and might be
necessary, since we need a criterion for truth discourses in, let us say, sciences, this does not
mean that such an ideal is clear or that such an ideal is correct for all time, thus, independent
from history. I claim that Sellars transforms the necessity of a criterion for practical endeavors,
and our choice of some criteria in historical contexts (for example, to arrive in San Francisco)
into the existence of an absolute criterion, namely to tell the story of physical time and space.
Kolb makes Sellars’ commitment to scientism clear by revealing another internal
contradiction of Sellars’ approach. Firstly, he refers to Sellars’ “skeletal relational predicate […]
which signifies the fundamental type of order in which the individuals to which the language can
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refer must stand” (Kolb 1978, 374). Brandom describes these fundamental relations as “robust
material exclusions,” since for him incompatibilities are a condition for meaning at all. Kolb
proceeds: “Since material rules of inference make world-stories possible, there could be no
world-story whose individuals do not stand in an appropriate skeletal relation” (Kolb 1978, 374).
So all individuals stand in material relations to each other, since material conditions are the
precondition of our semantic skeleton. The assumption is that if these material conditions remain
unfulfilled, then there would be no meaning at all. The argument is then: since we have meaning
there must be a reality that fulfills these conditions. This, however, is problematic, since,
according to Sellars, reference to individuals is not possible (see Kolb 1978, 395). It is a
misapplication of our normative intentionality to even assume individuals.57 Individuals are
conditions for communication, but this does not mean that the world consists of individuals.
Terms like “individual” might only be an abstract way of coping with particular problems. To
assume a reality of such individuals, and then to presuppose that our striving for a coherent
picture refers ultimately to simple entities, is then contradictory. In other words, a normative
system of semantic references and a picturing realism do not go along with each other. Kolb
denies their compatibility because there is no apriori link from Sellars coherentism to the
necessary truth of picturing. Thus Kolb writes: “Sellars would like to claim that in the ultimate
picture every basic particular would have only one non-relational attribute, but it is not clear that
this ideal is enforced a priori by his theory” (Kolb 1978, 396). Picturing is helpful, but it is not
necessarily the ultimate truth of what we do.
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I agree with the view that ‘individual’ is a theoretical term to tackle specific intratheoretical problems.
Nevertheless, it is unclear whether ‘individuals’ exist besides our intratheoretical problems.
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In the end, Sellars defends only a scientism that cannot justify its grounds. Kolb writes
about this scientism:
Thus we can deduce from the theory of language and picturing that the best world-stories will be systems of
non-metaphorical atomic propositions naming very simple spatio-temporal objects, with laws relating their
behavior to their location and to the basic attributes of other simple objects. This is physical science (Kolb
1978, 397).

All of this reveals that Sellars follows a deeply ahistorical approach. He expresses this himself,
when he writes down his popular slogan in Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind: “[I]n the
dimension of describing and explaining the world, science is the measure of all things, of what is
that it is, and of what is not that it is not” (Sellars 1997, 83). Sellars’ restrictive view of science is
the “descriptions of spatio-temporal entities (or events) of a very simple sort” (Kolb 1978, 382).
Later, Kolb adds “science is the preferred candidate for that final language” (Kolb 1978, 382).
As an alternative Kolb sees proposes a perspectivist approach:
Others see each theory as a complementary way of describing a world which cannot be captured by any one
of them. On either view, science approaches no one perfect description of the world. Even though he
accepts many of the premises of such historicist views, Wilfrid Sellars has long argued for the unity,
perfectibility and primacy of science (Kolb 1978, 381).

After Sellars’ failure, which divided the left-wing-Sellarsians, who focused on Sellars’
coherentism, from the right-wing-Sellarsians, who focused on Sellars’ picturing, the following
question remains: After the failure of representationalism, should we dismiss epistemology
altogether?
The latter is Rorty’s position, the dissertation director of Brandom. I will investigate his
position later. Contrary to Rorty’s skepticism, I will claim that Hegel offers a historicist
perspective that relies on experience in order to produce justified knowledge. Before I will
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discuss Rorty’s position, however, I should make some remarks on Sellars, who according to
Rorty transitions analytic philosophy into its Kantian stage.

2.1.4.3 Why Sellars cannot be Kantian

Regarding the break with the raw empiricism of a sensory given, Rorty distinguishes two
schools of analytic philosophy: The first school is interested into how we represent things as they
are. The second school is interested in how we use language internally (see Rorty 1988, 215). 58
Even though Sellars breaks radically with first order empiricism,59 Rorty still sees Sellars in
relation to the representationalist theories. According to Rorty, Sellars transitioned analytic
philosophy from its Humean phase to its Kantian, and Brandom, Sellars’ student, transitioned
analytic philosophy from its Kantian phase to Hegel (Rorty 1997, 3, 8, 9).”60 These
interpretations are, however, problematic.
Sellars’ rejection of empiricism is not necessarily Kantian. Kant was a second-order
empiricist. This means that we gain “knowledge of an independent object through knowledge of
a dependent object” (Rockmore 1997, 197). My conclusions on Sellars’ are the following: I
agree that our language strives for a single description, but that does not mean that we make
progress regarding reality. It only means that we make progress in society with regard to better
ways of cooperation. I do not think that pragmatism can be grounded in a material semantics that
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is supposed to line up with the real world. Sellars’ parallelism is motivated by successful
knowledge based on experiences. Yet, we cannot legitimately extrapolate this experiential
knowledge to represent the structure of a whole, but can only see what the consequences of the
extrapolated terms based on experience mean for us, so that we can possibly derive regulative
ideals for our sciences. If we depend on such ideals, that does not imply that they are
constitutive. In effect, Sellars produces a transcendental argument for the necessity of such a
parallelism, but he neglects Kant’s insights that these cannot be constitutive. Kant remains
modest when, for example, he claims that a Newton of the blade of grass cannot exist. Sellars,
however, makes contrary claims, when he refers to the explanation of the cogito by neurological
states. All in all, it is unclear then how, according to Rorty’s claim, Sellars has transitioned
analytic philosophy into a Kantian state.

2.1.4.4 Why Sellars cannot be a Pragmatist

I have given an admittedly rough reconstruction of Sellars’ account of picturing.
Picturing became the central claim of Sellars’ theory. I attempted to demonstrate the
incompatibility of his picturing with his inferentialism of semantic assertibility. If my thoughts
are correct, then we cannot even classify Sellars as a pragmatist. Peirce, for example, followed a
scheme of a regulative ideal, while Sellars seems to assume a regulative ideal that is constitutive.
Levine writes in this regard on Peirce: “For Peirce, truth as the ideal outcome of scientiﬁc
inquiry is a regulative idea that always outruns the mundane conceptual practices that are
undertaken in its light. As such, the gulf between appearances and things-in-themselves is
unbridgeable” (Levine 2007, 65). In other words, science is moving beyond our original,
conceptual practices, but this does not mean that we will ever achieve a complete scientific
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explanation of everything at some point. Sellars, on the other hand, assumes that the scientific
community possesses an Archimedean lever and thus wants to direct its inquiry towards the real
world. Levine writes in this respect: “For Sellars, on the other hand, the distinction can in
principle be bridged because the scientiﬁc community, in having the notion of picturing, already
possesses what Sellars calls an Archimedean point outside the series of beliefs toward which
inquiry approximates” (Levine 2007, 65). This means that there is a real, possible, and a priori
defined outcome for Sellars. I agree, on the contrary, with Levine’s argument against Sellars’
claim that we have such an Archimedean lever:
“[…] for ﬁnite beings within inquiry there is no such point. What Sellars should conclude is that while our
conceptual practices have conditions of possibility in the real order (insofar as we are living beings), these
practices, once they have emerged philogenetically, have — like their practical counterparts — a sui
generis logic which must be countenanced in any theoretical account of this world” (Levine 2007, 269).

Possibly Hegel can develop such a self-generating logic. Yet, he would only justify it with regard
to our current historical situation of thinking. This would be pragmatist, while Sellars’ linguistic
coherentism develops an ahistorical scheme according to which we get closer to reality.

2.1.4.5 Why Sellars and his Followers are not Hegelian

Because I aim to demonstrate Hegel’s historical account of the development of
knowledge, it is therefore important to explain why we cannot classify Sellars as Hegelian and
why Brandom also does not transition into a Hegelian direction. I will discuss two reasons for
why that is not possible.
First, Sellars rejects the importance of experience, while, on contrary, he includes a kind
of realism that Hegel does not defend. Rockmore writes on this:
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“For Hegel, on the contrary, categories, or concepts arise out the effort of the subject to come to grips with
the given, to come to grips with experience, hence on an a posteriori basis. Though Hegel is not an
empiricist in the classical British sense, he retains an empirical component as the basis of the formulation of
the categorical grasp of experience” (Rockmore 2012, 30).

If we read the chapter on sense-certainty in Hegel’s Phenomenology, we will encounter the fact
that the given in experience cannot be made entirely intelligible. All the attempts in the section
on sense-certainty lead to a hardly bridgeable gulf between what is meant and what is known.
This, however, does not imply that the given is ultimately dismissed, it only means that we deal
with a dialectic between language, which is universal, and the point of reference, which is
individual. I interpret this point to be showing that our experiences are concrete, a mediation of
what is individual and universal, immediate and mediated. In each stage of Hegel’s
phenomenology, he will transform the immediate. The immediate is always the starting point of
each cognitive movement. The task of the dialectic is then to grasp the following cognitive
movement as the knowing of knowing, which is relative to the way that consciousness develops.
We can conclude, however, that Hegel operates with immediacies, while Sellars seems to reject
such givens overall, focusing only on semantic assertibility as the lever of a logically coherent
system. If this is the case, then, as explained above, we have two incompatible approaches.
Second, there are some indications that Sellars endorses a dualism between content and
form, even though his ultimate goal is a monistic scientism. While, according to my
interpretation, there is no epistemological dualism for Hegel, because he investigates the
interplay of the subject and its object, Sellars assumes an independent status of concepts (see
Levine 2007, 253). In “Is There a Synthetic A Priori?“ Sellars proposes a divide between
content and form: “the conceptual status of descriptive as well as logical - not to mention
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prescriptive - predicates, is constituted, completely constituted, by syntactical rules […].” 61
Sellars argues here dialectically, exploring the positions of empiricism and rationalism. It is hard
to see whether this is his final position. If my interpretation, however, is right, then he thinks that
the rules for referring to content are not material, only formally interpreting content. In order to
constitute material, observational content, these formal rules do not explicate the meaning of
what we observe. He must therefore proceed:
Notice that I am not saying that “’rot’ means red” is true merely by virtue of the intralinguistic moves
proper to “rot” (in German). For “‘rot’ means red” can be true only if in addition to conforming to
syntactical rules paralleling the syntax of “red,” it is applied by Germans to red objects, that is, if it has the
same as “red.” Thus, the “conceptual status” of a predicate does not exhaust its “meaning.” The rules on
which I wish to focus attention are rules of inference. Of these there are two kinds, logical and extralogical
(or “material”) (Sellars 1956, 154).

We see here how Sellars runs into the problem of dualism. His intra-linguistic approach cannot
explain how Germans condition each other, in order to accept something as red. This means that
an approach to experience must be involved. Sellars’ solution, however, is a parallelism that
essentially preserves the difference between form and material.
The main problem is that Sellars takes the partial success of a coherent structure of
symbols to represent the whole structure of reality. If we preserve a strong distinction of
material and content, then we need a parallelism in order to avoid the problem of an ontological
difference, an unbridgeable gap between form and content. If we do not want to operate with
parallelisms, then it seems to me that a dialectics between content and form is necessary, which
means to give up the strong distinction of content and form that Sellars pursues.
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Sellars encounters the problem of the ontological difference as the problem of a
frictionless coherentism on the formal side. This leads him to explain that the formal rules for
semantics are not enough to make an utterance of ‘I see red’ meaningful. If we look into Sellars’
rule of substitution, we will see why he encounters such difficulties to deal with individuals:
I can best indicate the difference between them by saying that a logical rule of inference is one which
authorizes a logically valid argument, that is to say, an argument in which the set of descriptive terms
involved occurs vacuously (to use Quine's happy phrase), in other words, can be replaced by any other set
of descriptive terms of appropriate type, to obtain another valid argument. On the other hand, descriptive
terms occur essentially in valid arguments authorized by extralogical rules (Sellars 1956, 154).

Sellars proposes here that logical systems follow the rule of salva veritate. This means that we
can replace one term by a term of the same extension without changing the truth-value of a
proposition. Reference to individuals becomes, therefore, the main problem for his theory,
because his system is formulated without an explicit connection to experience.
Hegel argues against a division of method and content, and thus does not fall into the
paradoxes that Sellars poses for his theory. Since this dialectic of form and content is central for
Hegel, since Sellars pursues an Archimedean lever, it must be difficult to call Sellars theory in
any way Hegelian.
Of course, Rorty does not call Sellars Hegelian. Yet, if Sellars’ followers are Hegelian,
they must dissociate themselves from some of Sellars’ central claims. This, however, would
make them hardly Sellarsian then. Rorty’s descriptions of a Hegelian transition within analytic
philosophy fits only if we accept that using someone’s idea makes him a follower of that kind.
Since analytic philosophy turns towards social epistemologies, we can only describe it as a
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Hegelian turn if we ignore the fact that the dimensions of dialectics of form and content, and
historicity are a core of Hegel’s philosophy.
Instead of calling it a Hegelianism, the stronger influence on analytic philosophy seems
rather to come from Wittgenstein’s theory that references need a framework. In this respect,
Sellars enterprise is motivated by a rejection of immediate knowledge (see Rockmore 2001, 347)
and representationalism, a project that rather stands in relation to Moore’s and Russell’s rejection
of Hegelianism.

2.1.5 A Note on Rorty’s Skepticism

Despite Sellars’ attachment to picturing, it is important to see that the problem of the
presupposition of an external world disappears as an unquestioned condition, which implies the
possibility of a rehabilitation of Hegel. In this sense, the tradition of the reemerging pragmatism
completes also a shift towards an epistemological holism. In light of this discussion the insight
that our concepts mirror nature becomes meaningless (Rockmore 2001, 357). Yet, Rorty
transforms the associated arguments falsely into skepticism: since knowledge must be
representational, but since we have no means to investigate the source of representations except
for using representations, there is no way to look behind representations (see Rockmore 2001,
357). With this rejection of knowledge claims and the resulting skepticism, Rorty commits to the
ideas of Continental philosophy as conversational philosophy: They [Die Gessellschaft für
analytische Philosophie in Deutschland] correctly perceive that a thoroughgoing holism will
sooner or later lead to a conversational view of philosophy.”62 The shift from the
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representationalist view towards a “contextualist theory of justification” (Rockmore 2001, 357)
is for Rorty a shift away from the problem of truth. He does not see that, for example, circular
epistemologies could be an alternative to representationalism. Because of the failing
representationalism that was one of the cornerstones of analytic philosophy, analytic philosophy
splits into different programs: a holistic movement that would be instantiated by left-wingSellarsian, and a remaining representationalism, which accordingly would be instantiated by the
right-wing-Sellarsian. Moreover, there is also a third party: Rorty believes that philosophy
cannot achieve any knowledge about knowledge itself (see Rockmore 2001, 357). Rockmore
summarizes Rorty’s position:
If analytic foundationalism fails, then philosophy in all its many forms fails. Since philosophy is concerned
with knowledge, and since analytic foundationalism fails, there is nothing interesting to say about
knowledge (Rockmore 2001, 357).

This presupposes that analytic philosophy, according to Rorty, was the last serious attempt to
deduce the means of our knowledge. It is, however, unclear why we should have exhausted all
our means for this endeavor, especially if we see how inaccurately we have proceeded with the
Hegelian tradition. Hence, I defend the idea that there is knowledge relative to reflections on
history, which is a Hegelian idea that analytic philosophy never touched.
2.1.6 A Note on Brandom’s Epistemological Holism and its relation to Hegel

For Rockmore, it is questionable whether we can interpret the return to epistemic holism that
qualifies for Sellars, Putnam, and Brandom as a return to Hegel. Rockmore distinguishes three
forms of holisms: firstly, an “epistemic holism, or the Quinean view that theories meet their fate
as a whole”, secondly, a transition into the “Wittgensteinian ‘social’ justification of claims to

65

know in relation to a form of life”, and thirdly, “the Hegelian idea that claims to know are
indexed to the historical moment” (Rockmore 2001, 363). Even though Rockmore sees
similarities between Hegelianism and neo-pragmatism, he argues that the basic differences are
misconceived. The neo-pragmatist contextualism represents a denial of knowing the world
directly as it really is (see Rockmore 2001, 365). Beyond this rejection of a mind-independent
reality, however, we must also understand contextualism with regard to history (Rockmore 2001,
366).
Brandom relates to Rorty’s insights against representationalism, but, according to his
attachment to Sellars, he does not commit entirely to Rorty’s skepticism or to deflationism (see
Rockmore 2001, 361). His book Making it Explicit directs us instead to the context of social selfconsciousness, which represents another attempt of bridging the gulf between content and
formal, inferential semantics (see Rockmore 2001, 361). Bavaresco emphasizes this shift to the
relationship of thought and action. According to him, Brandom who wants to explain semantic
content in terms of the interactions between people:
Brandom is associated with these strategies. He is interested in such issues as these: (i) nature and culture:
‘Cultural products and activities become explicit as such only by the use of normative vocabulary that is in
principle not reducible to the vocabulary of the natural sciences’ [… Brandom 2000, 33] 63; (ii) the Hegelian
pragmatism and his influence about conceptual norms. Kant understood concepts as the norms that
determine what we ourselves are responsible for, committed and entitle us to it, by particular acts of
judging and acting. However, Kant punted the origins of this normativity into the noumenal realm. “Hegel
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brought these issues back to earth by understanding normative statuses as social statuses, … all
transcendental constitution is social institution” [… Brandom 2009, 34] (Bavaresco 2012, 77). 64

Though this social turn in epistemology is progress in terms of its analytic predecessors, it is not
yet on the level of the achievements of Hegel. Rockmore’s main criticism is that Brandom fails
to grasp Hegel’s historicism and only focuses on the constitution of self-consciousness in a
society. Society is, for Brandom, simply the game of giving and asking for reasons, a social,
logical space.
Brandom’s analytical position replaces the difficult task of sociology that is explaining
the occurrence of human institutions on the level of macro-societies by understanding sociology
as a task of calculable events on the basis of people’s micro-social activities (as if they scored
points in a baseball game). Rational choice theory does not reflect on the question of the
contextual position of these language games in institutions and their broader, normative
development in history. Similarly Brandom ignores the question of whether societies are
independent from their historical formation. Though Brandom refers to rather metaphysical
terms like ‘self-consciousness’, his concept of self-consciousness occurs as an inferentialist
observer who plays language games without relation to history.
I will discuss Brandom’s approach in more detail later. Before, I will point out the
problem that analytic philosophy has set up for itself with regard to the pragmatic turn, namely
the integration of a reference-semantics. I perceive this as the central problem that Brandom
attempts to solve in Making it Explicit.
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2.1.7 Conclusions on the Birth of Analytic Philosophy from the Spirit of Hegel

The birth of analytic philosophy is historically hard to determine. But it is undeniable that we can
identify certain topics in Moore and Russell. Since I defend viewpoints of historicism, my goal is
not to replace these founding-myths of analytic philosophy by “historical truths.”65 Rather, I
historically contextualize the starting point and the goal of analytic philosophy. With regard to
such historical contexts, we can also read Redding’s remarks:
Myths are more than sets of mistaken beliefs about the world, they are cultural products which play
constitutive roles in the formation and maintenance of group identities, exemplifying and reflecting back to
their members the shared fundamental norms and values binding them as a group (Redding 2007, 7).

The birth of analytic philosophy is for these reasons founded on a historical myth that rejects
Hegel, but is historical itself. Analytic philosophers assumed that Hegelianism captured
something fundamentally wrong. Yet, their rejection could also have been the expression of a
cultural formation. This rejection might then be less about Hegel, but more about the institutional
politics that led to such a rejection.
I cannot achieve a precise analysis of the historical conditions, which is a task of the
science of philosophy and history. Instead, I offered reflections on how ideas developed and
unfolded historically according to the misguided view of Hegel as an ontological monist, who
denies that there is a reality. The recent return to Hegel, in order to tackle problems of analytic
philosophy, is then not necessarily a return to Hegel. But, it is a return to the myth of Hegel as an
ontological monist.66 Since Hegel, however, has never been an ontological monist,67 analytic
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philosophers might still want to correct errors that Hegel has never committed. Ontological
monism has been an easy enemy, in order to justify logical atomism (See Redding 2007, 8). If
we assume now that the further development in analytic philosophy follows a historical dialectic,
then the current return from the perspective of logical atomism to Hegel must be different from
Hegel’s position. Hegel is not concerned with an ontological monism, but is skeptical with
regard to semantics. Instead, Hegel is a philosopher of history, first and foremost concerned with
the epistemological problem of a historical contextualism.
Given the analytical line of thinking, a return to a historicist Hegel is not yet prepared.
For this reason, Redding’s suggestion of how to proceed is flawed. Redding writes: “Given the
fundamental and obvious philosophical errors known to lie at the heart of the idealist tradition –
that is, those errors learnt about from Russell – what could be possibly learned from them?”
(Redding 2007, 8). It is unclear what these obvious mistakes are that we should learn from
Russell’s analysis of Idealism, because Russell obviously did not discuss Hegel. It should be
clear that without Hegel’s concept of history, we discuss a strawman of Hegel. There is nothing
in Russell, nor in the analytic philosophy that I discussed above that prepares us for the
historicist insights of Hegel.
The analytic philosophy directed our attention to the problem of the external world as an
anti-Hegelian idea. Rockmore’s reconstruction of this line of history introduces the social

slogans as long as we work in a reconstruction of the historical framework, but, of course, this work should not be
limited to myths and slogans. The more serious attempts shall be a reconstruction of problems that we face with
regard to a systematic approach to the whole” (Redding 2007, 7).
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interpretation of Hegel as a compensation of these former problems. In addition, there might be
many more historical and institutional reasons why a return to Hegel occurred.
Pinkard’s book Hegel’s Phenomenology68 appeared in the same year as Brandom’s
Making it Explicit. So the question remains why there is an interest in the social construction that
Hegel offers. The switch from the ontological questions of semantics to the questions of use, the
normative space of reasons, emerges as a theme in Brandom. For Pinkard, social space is
important, too. He writes:
Within a ‘social space’ individuals assert various things to each other and give what they take to be reasons
for these assertions, and people impute certain reasons to them on the basis of the shared social norms that
structure their ‘social space’ – that is, on the basis of what they take the person to be committed to in light
of what he does and their shared norms (Pinkard 1994, 7-8).

This means that we socially contextualize utterances. Instead of linking the Hegelian turn back to
the social insights of pragmatics, an alternative historical interpretation could be to analyze the
neo-classic arguments that reject a historical Marxist analysis of economy and reduce the subject
to a profit-maximizing individual. The turn toward the social is, in this sense, another return to
Hegel that was, however, not motivated by the problem of the external world. Neo-classic,
economical theories expressed a rejection of the Continental interpretation of historically
developing societies. Historically, however, there are different standards of cooperation. It is not
only about maximizing our profits. In effect, it is questionable whether we can identify the one
reason by which we operate in a society. Pinkard therefore points out that there are many ways of
how we can deduce principles of societies:
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All the various activities of reason-giving – for example, of telling someone why you take some belief to
be justified […] are themselves forms of social practice in which we in turn mutually evaluate each other’s
actions, in which we each assume certain types of epistemic and ethical responsibilities, and in which we
impute certain moral and epistemic responsibilities to others in light of their behavior. In the various social
practices involving reason-giving, we also have principles of criticism for evaluating the reasons we give.
Reason-giving, that is, is itself a social practice goes on within a determinate form of ‘social space’ that
‘licenses’ some kinds of inferences and fails to ‘license’ others (Pinkard 1994, 7-8).

In other words, there is not one rationality of cooperation that is at work in the social space.69 If
we follow this interpretation, then the return to the social Hegel is motivated by further historical
factors. This could be actors acting with regard to a social space of shared values.
Redding proposes to read Hegel as a response to Russell’s animosities with German
Idealism, and Brandom demands a semantic reading of Hegel as an inferentialist philosophy (see
Redding 2007, 15). The problem is that they reduce reason to only one mode of cooperation.
Thus, Brandom’s inferentialist philosophy closely relates to the pragmatic turn that analytic
philosophy undergoes. It does not discuss how societies operate by different forms of reason that
we have to analyze as Spirits, i.e., the concrete forms of self-consciousness at a given moment of
history. Hegel’s idea is to analyze these spirits and how the occur in history. He will analyze
their history and present them as absolute. This means that we cannot further exhaust their
meaning because we have taken everything into account that has occurred in history. This
resulting Absolute Knowing remains, however, historically relative and is open to change.
In this sense, we can tie the discussion to Habermas’ criticism of Brandom. Habermas
accuses Brandom of treating societies from a theoretical perspective of observers who create one
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form of communication that is necessary for meaningful interactions. However, Habermas does
not make explicit that the question of how societies evolved is originally a Hegelian question. It
is only implicit in Habermas’ theory. Moreover, with its goals of a quasi-Marxian emancipation,
the relation to Hegel gets obscured. I will explain these problems with Habermas’ theory in
chapter 3.
To summarize, it is difficult to determine historically why we return to Hegel.
Nevertheless, if there is a prevalent reason for a return, then it is because we do not yet
understand the complexity of his approach to history, its influence, and its meaning for our time.

2.2 The Pragmatic Integration of Reference-Semantics
In this part, I would like to introduce the discourse-theoretical position, according to which the
pragmatic turn is a reaction to the linguistic turn. This interpretation summarizes Habermas’ and
Brandom’s position from the analytical standpoint of language philosophy. Later, I will
reconstruct Brandom’s semantic account from Making it Explicit as an attempt to pragmatically
integrate a reference-semantics. I regard this as the key question in the current debate of
language philosophy. For understanding this aspect, I will reconstruct the linguistic and the
pragmatic turn in the following points.
Though language has always been an important subject in philosophy, it never became
the center of the investigation due to the search for alternatives to metaphysical theories of
consciousness (Fierke 2015, 75).70 According to the linguistic and pragmatic turn, language is
not only regarded as a mean to transfer thoughts, but it also plays a role in all cognitive acts as an
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apriori for disclosing the world (see Braun 2007, 413).71 Thus, the transcendental-pragmatist
Edmund Braun states, “Sprache begleitet, begründet, stützt und formt unser Denken und
Handeln“ (Braun 2007, 414). This means that there is only linguistic thinking and all thoughts
and cognitions occur within language. This is also referred to as the Unhintergehbarkeit of
language, i.e., the impossibility to reach behind language. In particular, Discourse Theory
attempts to provide a non-metaphysical demarcation criterion for our epistemological discourses
on the basis of pragmatics. Discourse Theory, in this sense, is supposed to clarify the
hermeneutical foundation for our understanding. It claims that we operate on grounds of a
holistic conception of language within our discourse community. It therefore investigates the
universal conditions for us to make references and knowledge claims.
Since the instrumental concept of language is widespread, Discourse Theory is
considered as an extreme philosophical position. Though it is absurd to assume that we deal with
concepts rather than with pictures, only language can investigate the relation between subject and
object. This means that only language can build the ground for developing scientific theories and
claims. This, however, does not mean that all our cognitive activity is conceptual. Since language
gives us the possibility to reflect, it has means to operate on the objective and subjective level.
Therefore, it might achieve an identity that could serve as the starting point for science. If we
understand language representationally, however, we would presuppose a fundamental
difference between subject and object that could not be bridged. Instead, Discourse Theory

71

Braun, Edmund. “K.-O. Apel - Transzendentalpragmatik als normativ-semiotische Transformation der
Transzendentalphilosophie.“ In Aufgang – Jahrbuch für Denken, Dichten, Musik 4. Edited by Jose Sanches de
Murill und Martin Thurner. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 2007: 413-434.

73

focuses on the language as a sense-giving [sinngebend]72 achievement that can only be
recognized by introducing pragmatic concepts.
I will explain the above indicated apriori of language, in the following three points. In
order to do so, I will examine, firstly, the ‘linguistic turn’ with regard to Wittgenstein. According
to Wittgenstein, language is the limit of cognition. After this investigation of Wittgenstein’s
reference-semantic position, I will look, secondly, at the pragmatic advancements with regard to
Peirce, the later Wittgenstein, and Austin and Searle. Lastly, I will problematize why the
pragmatic integration of reference-semantics should not be interpreted as a semantics of
semantics. I will argue that it has to be its own qualitative pragmatics, a pragmatics that is open
for further development. In the subsequent part, I will discuss Brandom’s flawed attempt to
pragmatically integrate a reference-semantics by virtue of a semantics. My analysis will enforce
the fact that Brandom’s approach cannot be considered Hegelian since Hegel does not solve the
problem semantically but rather develops a historically open pragmatic account.

2.2.1 The Importance of the Language-Apriori in Discourse-Pragmatics
The most important goal of discourse-pragmatics is to give the foundation for a universal,
normative ethics. 73 In order to guarantee an appropriate discussion of the linguistic concept of
reason with regard to a normative ethics, the idea is that normativity [Sein-Sollen] can be
grounded in the structure of language. Language is the horizon through which we interpret rules,
make rules, and eventually produce rules (see Braun 2007, 414). This means that language is not
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only a means, but also a space, in which recognition of the participants and their social status
occurs. Thus, language turns out to be a major condition for the foundational norms of our
communication-community. According to Discourse Theory, however, the justification of norms
is only possible if language as a relative a priori of sense and validity is historically established in
a community (see Braun 2007, 418). Accordingly, meaning [Sinn], laws and communities cannot
be complete without language because they are based on linguistic rules. Language, however, is
a complex phenomenon. On the one hand, the various human institutions are equipped with a
spirit of language that nobody actively pursues. On the other hand, institutions and games of
language do not merely exist by themselves, but are achieved through human interactions. 74
Therefore, language as an undeniable normative instance is neither simply a product of human
intentions, nor a phenomenon of nature. Yet, language, according to Discourse Theory, is
constitutive for any normative ethics as the foundation for societies. Consequently, it becomes
the main object of investigation. We are left with the question: Is there a fundamental function of
language?
The guiding idea for Discourse Theory is pragmatic. According to the pragmatic turn we
can understand the function of language as representational, though only in the dialoguepragmatic dimension, indicating that we can only explain the content of a concept by the use of
the concept in a communication-community. The representational function of language is only
possible as an interpretation of signs with regard to their communicative function of representing.
Furthermore, language only occurs in communicative situations and the semantic-syntactic sense
[Sinn] can only be the content of speech-acts within a communication-community. I will describe
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this as the ‘performative-propositional double-structure of a speech-act, which is fundamental for
understanding Discourse Theory (see Braun 2007, 418).
In the next paragraphs I will carve out the historical motivation for the performativepropositional double-structure. Specifically, I will rebut the claim that language is a ready-made
tool that, at some point in time, was only found.75 I will also deny that language is a ready-made
tool that no longer changes. I will discuss both points in relation to the linguistic turn of the early
Wittgenstein. With regard to the pragmatic integration of such a semantics, Braun describes three
phases of development: the semiotics of Peirce, who discovers the triadic sign as a foundation
for every language-use; the pragmatic turn, which describes the conception of a languagegame-theory; and a specification of the pragmatic turn by Austin‘s and Searle’s speech-acttheory, according to which each possible utterance consists of a propositional content that,
despite being content, is only interpretable with an eye to its performance (see Braun 2007, 418).
Before this discussion, however, it is necessary to explain the linguistic turn as the starting point
for the pragmatic turn.
Analytical philosophy moved language towards the center of the philosophical
investigation. Though it is one goal to avoid metaphysical confusions that came with this as
‘unclear’ perceived language of Continental philosophers, the goal is to replace the inexact
ordinary language with an ideal language that follows the rules of a logical syntax (see Braun
1996, 36). The early phase of analytic philosophy, the approach of Wittgenstein becomes crucial,
and is even interpreted as the very beginning of the linguistic turn (Fierke 2015, 74) that takes
language to be a constructible system of signs. This system has the function to describe facts as
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functionally ordered, and expressed by signs. Each description is considered to be a meaningful
sentence as long as it represents the logical structure of facts.
The Kantian, transcendental philosophy is undergoing a transformation after the linguistic
turn. Since cognition is no longer said to depend on a relation between intuition and concepts by
presupposing a transcendental object, the sense phenomenon is interpreted and grasped as a pure
and simple concept. Now, cognition depends only on a language a priori (see Braun 2007, 416).
This dependence is expressed by Wittgenstein: “The limits of my language mean the limits of my
world.”76 This implies that we cannot achieve cognitions beyond our language. The recognizable
world is equivalent to the logical structure of our current historical language. Of course, the first
analytic approaches attempted to grasp cognition in terms of an ideal language. According to
Wittgenstein, cognition occurs if and when we identify the meaning of a phenomenon in
linguistic symbols (see Braun 2007, 417). We identify a fact only by a linguistic proposition.
What can therefore be understood as a matter of fact [Sachverhalt] is predetermined by the
propositional structure of the language we are using. Insofar as the proposition is considered as
matter of fact [Sachverhalt], its existence can be demonstrated by language. Language and world,
accordingly, have an identical logical structure, and the sum of all meaningful and true sentences
[sinnvolle, wahre Sätze] represents the sum of all facts in the world (see Braun 1996, 37). 77
Now, the question exists: how can the reference-semantic paradigm, which is
propositionally oriented, take into account the intentions of speakers who actually speak (see
Braun 2007, 418). Language, after all, is not a ready-made fact, nor a ready-made tool, but
happens to emerge during interactions. In Wittgenstein’s approach, however, language exists as a
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constructed fact next to all other facts, as if there could be a book that includes all true sentences
that represent the entire structure of the world. But Wittgenstein understands language as a
transcendental framework for the representation of the world. Hence, for him, the ideal, logical
structure of all true sentences expresses the criteria by which true, scientific language is
demarcated. Nevertheless, how do we then achieve this language? Just by happening to use it?
Language is certainly not a complete product of its users, but is evolving with regard to
their actions. For example, the sum of the German language does not exist in a book. Its
existence is closely bound to the fact that we use it. It is therefore also unclear whether we can
reduce language to a set of formal, logical rules. But even if we interpret language as logically
constrainable, did we, for example, just happen upon its logical principles? As discussions
around the principle of non-contradiction reveal, there is no unified solution with respect to the
idea of language having fundamental principles. Also, the problematic attempt to reduce the
fundamental structure of language to a generative grammar has revealed many difficulties. Braun
proposes, therefore, that we must extend the reference-semantic model to the pragmatic
dimension (see Braun 2007, 418). Thus it is not only an extension, but also a replacement of
semantic theories in general.
Since there cannot be isolated propositions, for these always occur in the reflectiveintentional and interpretative use of language and its users, the first intuition we might have is to
extend the dual base of language to the triadic structure of a pragmatic semiotics (see Braun
2007, 418, or Habermas 1999, 9). Accordingly, we have to reconstruct language with regard to
three irreducible dimensions: with regard to the language-interpreter or sign-user, with regard to
the sign that has a material quality, and with regard to a signified and assumed object. Peirce
writes with respect to this: “I define a Sign as anything which on the one hand is so determined
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by an Object and on the other hand so determines an idea in a person’s mind, that this latter
determination, which I term the Interpretant of the Sign, is thereby mediately determined by that
Object” (Peirce 1998, 482).78 By this semiotic triangulation, Peirce respects the fact that the
relationship between the signifier and the signified can be understood only in a communicationcommunity. Peirce understands the pragmatic dimension of language as a reflective-intentional
act of its interpreters. The relation between the sign and its so-called ‘object’ has an effect on the
interpreter (see Braun 2007, 418). It follows that the content of consciousness that is mediated by
signs can only be explained by reference to the semiotic triangle (see Braun 1996, 31). Cognition
without interpreter, without sign or without reference cannot be. 79 None of these terms can be
explained without assuming the others. They are sense-dependent.80
The sign captures, in its syntactical relations, the logical function of language, which,
however, is only meaningful, if the relationship between both a referent and its reference is
assumed and established. The sense in which this relation is causal is, of course, complicated and
we tend to commit category mistakes. Altogether, we face here the inclusion of semantics into a
broader pragmatic scheme. In this sense, we do not reject representations or references, but we
want to ask which role these play with regard to sign-users or with regard to a structure. The
sign-user plays the more important role. Brandom expresses this point with regard to locutions in
Making it Explicit: “The point of the inferentialist order of explanation is not to object to using
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representational locutions to talk about semantic content” (Brandom 1998, 496). Instead, he
proposes his idea of inferentialism:
“The inferentialist idea is to start with a preliminary understanding of conceptual content in terms of
inferential articulation – to approach semantic contentfulness by means of the functional role claims play as
premises and conclusions of inferences” (Brandom 1998, 496).

Whether conceptual content can be exhaustively explained by its inferential role without any
concept of representation is one of the major questions that Brandom debates in Making it
Explicit. I claim that Discourse Theory with its pragmatic integration follows a weaker version of
Brandom’s inferentialism. Rather, Discourse Theory defends the thesis that reference-semantics
is only possible if a communication-community that interprets signs (pragmatics) is assumed by
the speaker and addressed. As Habermas demonstrates in Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung, it is not
about a theoretical individualism, in which others only assume potential competitors. Instead,
there is a fundamental dimension of the other as cooperating with us. This idea is an important
component of language. Habermas also discusses this in his critique of Marx’s merely
instrumental approach to human interaction. Prior to explaining the relationship between the
sign-user and the co-users that is not merely instrumental, however, I will discuss how the
semiotic understanding is further advanced by Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations.
According to the linguistic turn, it was argued that signs do not possess any meaning by
themselves. On the contrary, true statements are only possible with regard to a sentential
structure that is logically ‘compatible’, i.e. identical, with the possible world of facts. It is
problematic to assume such a parallelism. Thus, it is necessary that we introduce the concept of
sign-users, who uses language self-reflectively and intentionally. Only by these means comes the
difference between signifier and signified to the fore, since otherwise the signs of the private
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user of language would be the reference and remain unidentifiable for others. Conclusively,
there are no facts without sign users within a communication-community who interprets signs as
related to facts. This acknowledgement of a play in the signification makes signification
possible. The sign user acknowledges that disclosure of the world is not guaranteed, but that it
should somehow be coordinated in our language. It should become clear then that the sentence
‘It is true’ is not only a redundant structure, but that it hints towards a presupposition of all
sentences. This presupposition is ‘the sign-user’, who addresses a communication-community
with a claim about the status of the world. Interpreted in this way, it is clear that it is not about a
universal language consisting of atomic sentences that is the sole transcendental framework, but
that language is world-disclosure through language by setting up a relationship between a signuser, his co-subjects, and the possible reference (see Kuhlmann 1992, 20).81
In the following paragraphs, I show how Wittgenstein demonstrates that cognition of
objects can only occur with respect to a community of subjects who give the signs of a languagegame a common value by use, and who wrestle for a common language. Formal logic is only one
aspect of this problem. Of course, it is not a tactical game or battle between members, but a task
of friendly coordination. No matter, however, whether we see this disclosing function of
language as a strategical game of score-keeping or of coordination, language is not a ready-made
tool that we merely pick up and use. If we look at the instrument of language, it should become
clear that we construct it at the same time as we use it. The claim that a sign signifies a realworld object presupposes an already established connection between sense and referent.
Wittgenstein brings this fact to light by demonstrating the manifold relationships between world,
language-game and language-users (see Braun 2007, 415). For these reasons, Wittgenstein does
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not explain the semantic content of a sign by a relation between a sign and an object, but
explains it from a relationship between sign, signified reference, and sign-user who uses the sign
in a series of communicative actions and who clarifies the meaning of the sign in
communication-procedures. The sign-users correct their use of signs until the intended use is
sufficient, but not necessarily true. Language-use is therefore not only theoretical observation,
but emphasizes the role of language as a tool for coordination and creates coordination. The
possibilities for referring to a world are manifold and not explainable by only a logical identity
between the structure of world and language. Instead, this world is not presupposed, but
constructed within language. The meaning of a word is thus not explicable by the signification of
objects that we can find in the logical world, but we also develop meaning from the use of an
existing although not ready-made language of a communication-community. Thus, the subjectobject-relation (the representation of the world in one subject) is brought into the subject-tosubject-relation (cognition as the discourse about the linguistically and publicly interpreted
world, see Kuhlmann 1992, 13). Meaning, in this sense, is not the present use, but emerges from
the historical use of language. This ‘ordinary’, conventionally established language, and not the
ideal language, is the place where meaning and sense occur.
Altogether this means that it is not the ideal subject who constitutes the identity of world and
language, but the community of speakers, who refer with language to a linguistically, preinterpreted, intended and historical concept of world. Speakers, thus, reflect on themselves, if
they speak about the world (see Kuhlmann 1992, 12). What we mean when we say ‘we’82
includes a notion of a socially shared and historically produced surrounding. Consequently,
language is not an organ of representation, but an absolute lifeform of the speaker who finds
82
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himself in using this language and is thus reflectively broken in front of the horizon of history.
Representation occurs in this life-form, a historically developed language. The difficult part,
however, is to demonstrate how this life-form-approach does not drift into skepticism. Lafont
addresses this problem:
[A] global critique of reason, one that radicalizes the detranscendentalization inherent in the linguistic turn
to the point of advocating an absolute contextualism. The insurmountability of worldviews inherent in
natural languages turns any universalist position into a mere illusion, the illusion of achieving a ‘God’s eye
point of view’ (as Putnam puts it). It would seem as if the linguistic turn as such lends support to a
contextualist position. (Lafont 1999, 121)83

The question is whether the turn towards an anthropological, historical philosophy that grasps
language as an historical lifeform, can produce any kind of knowledge. Instead of following the
pragmatic turn in its focus on the social lifeform, I will defend an interpretation of Hegel,
according to whom we have the possibility of a phenomenological logic that develops and thus
historically achieves knowledge.
In the following points, I will introduce some distinctions that are remarked by the
ordinary language philosophers point out and that are helpful to reconstruct a needed and
improved concept of language. The ordinary-language-philosophers work out the concept of a
pragmatic turn with further fertile distinctions (see Braun 1996, 40). For Austin, the focal
question becomes: how do we use our means of language (Levinson 1990, 228).84 Prior to
Austin, to say something was equivalent to claim something in analytic philosophy (see Austin
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1972, 35).85 Austin observes a different phenomenon, namely sentences that are not claims and
that we thus cannot evaluate as true or false. He calls these sentences ‘performatives‘, and
assumes firstly a false dichotomy between these and sentences that express claims, called
‘constatives’. During the course of his investigation, however, he must acknowledge that he
cannot defend the dichotomy and that constatives represent performatives, namely the
performative of a claim. For this reason, we can see in his lectures How to do things with words
(1972)86 how Austin develops a theory of illocutionary acts from an original distinction between
performatives and constatives.
For universal and transcendental pragmatics there are two essential insights: first, each
utterance is a unity of an illocutionary act and a propositional content (it is
“sachverhaltsbezüglich”) of this act. Second, meaning cannot be reduced to a reference-semantic
structure. There are other parts that influence the meaning of that structure which according to
the principle of expressiveness (Searle), must be explicable (see Braun 1996, 43).

2.2.2 The Pragmatic Integration of a Reference Semantics
After this brief sketch of the reference-semantic situation and overview of language as an act that
we must to investigate as an attachment to a historical artefact and its communicative conditions
within a communication-community, we must explain what a reference-semantic is with regard
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to the pragmatic situation. For this reason, Braun writes with regard to the current situation of the
discussion in transcendental and universal pragmatics:
Die Struktur des propositionalen Satzes in der semantischen Relation der Sprache muss durch die
pragmatische Dimension, d. h. genauer durch den ichhaften intentionalen und interpretativen Gebrauch von
Sätzen im Situationskontext durch Zeichensubjekte, die dadurch performativ eine Sprachhandlung
vollziehen, ergänzt werden (See Braun 2007, 419).

To elaborate, we have to pragmatically integrate the reference-semantic with regard to its
intentional use of language by sign-users within a communication-community, in order to avoid
a shortened [verkürztes] concept of language. The claim is that we can achieve this by
recognizing the complementary structure of propositions and the pragmatic-performative selfrelationship of a sense-intentional [sinnintentional] articulation. The illocutionary force has
significant importance for the sign-user who uses language sense-intentionally as I-We, because
they understand the reference-semantic sentence as a meaningful act. By this so-called
performation, claims become reasonable, since they are uttered self-reflectively (see Braun 2007,
420). Under this self-reflective structure, a proposition counts as fulfilled if the receiver
understands the message. Understanding, however, occurs only if the self-reflective sense of the
used symbols can be clarified, i.e., if the knowledge about the act is available, and if,
furthermore, the illocutionary force, i.e., the subject-reflexive-intentional, as well as the
performative sense is grasped (see Braun 2007, 420). For example: consider a student who
suddenly stands up in a lecture, uttering the words ‘I am in a lecture.’ After this utterance, he
immediately sits down. Though we would admit that the meaning of this propositional structure
is somehow transported, there is no real transportation of meaning without clarifying its sense.
Why does he stand up and utter a claim that is trivially true? Of course, this sentence is
meaningful according to the early Wittgenstein, since it is a descriptive sentence that can be true
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or false. Nevertheless, we understand the meaning of the propositional structure conventionally,
since we are already used to the propositional talk. The meaning of this sentence might arouse
some further thoughts in his fellow students and they might search for the self-reflective meaning
that he pursued as a member of their communication-community. Did he make a claim? If so, it
would be trivially true. Did he discover a Cartesian moment in his philosophical life? On that
account, we would grant him this moment. Is he conducting a social experiment? Or is he rather
just crazy? This would simply devalue the meaning of his utterance. In each situation, the
pragmatic interpretation changes the meaning of the utterance. Moreover, the utterance includes
a communicative entitlement that each member of our communication-community can utilize. Is
he nevertheless entitled to make such a claim? In this context, are students allowed to stand up in
lectures and make claims? The student simply makes a claim, but the reflection on the pragmatic
context has consequences for his claim. The assumedly redundant structure “it is true that…”
expresses therefore that we make a claim always with regard to an expressible content and with
regard to a community of reasonable beings who can evaluate this claim. It is not only me who
makes a propositional claim, but it is me with regard to a community of speakers who attempt to
coordinate meaning by internalized, open performative pre-structures. I also try to mediate my
own position in order to clarify the reality of the signs by saying that this is not only a
perception, but that I am also convinced that this is talk of the truth. All of the contexts are weak
linguistic bonds between the members of a community, and are expressed in a performative
coherence that exhibits the gentle force of reason. Austin analyzes this as the illocutionary force.
The described double-structure of an utterance can be expounded upon now: on the one
hand, with regard to the conventionally established ordinary language of a communicationcommunity, meaning must be interpreted as lebensweltlich, and historically with regard to this
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gentle force of reason that we internalized as some normative structures; on the other hand, and
as a consequence of the dependence of the propositional structure on the self-reflective use, with
regard to the discourse a priori, according to which at any time an illocutionary claim of a
proposition can be questioned in its validity. We are even capable of opening its conventional
sense for discussion (see Braun 2007, 421). Let us consider our example of the confused student
who stood up in a lecture to announce that he actually is in a lecture. We, as fellow students or
lecturers, could, indeed, question whether this is really a lecture. Does he question the concept
‘lecture’? Such instances might have a revising force that ultimately changes our language. The
condition of the openness of the signs is necessary, in order to be capable of describing the
manifold uses of language and in order to explain sentence- or sign-ambiguities. But this
openness contributes to our understanding of our social relations. It is not only a descriptive
sentence. A claim is always an opening for a society to agree or disagree and thus it is also a
possibility that the society might revise its fundamental concepts.
This focal point of a principal openness of the pragmatic reference-semantic by the
possibility to question and criticize will be explained in the next chapter with regard to
lexicology and lexicography. In addition, I will suggest the term of openness, in order to describe
linguistic discourses and discuss the problem of a misinterpretation of pragmatics as a semantic
of a semantic. The question is whether whatever contextualism we could introduce could convey
meaning. This question poses the fundamental challenge that Habermas will finally address in
Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung. Habermas does not offer a solution for this problem. At the end of
this dissertation, I will discuss Hegel’s solution, namely a historical relativism.
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2.2.3 Problems on the Border between Semantics and Pragmatics
Lexicography attempts to describe the mental concept of a pragmatically used concept. I will
discuss the difficulties of understanding lexicography semantically in the following paragraph.
The sign ‘school‘ can be lexicographically described with regard to its semantics. As
lexicographers, we can capture the content in three semantic core concepts: first, ‘school’ as an
institution, second, ‘school’ as a building, or third, ‘school’ as a branch within a discipline (for
example, ‘the Frankfurt School’). With regard to lexicology, we can assume that the core
contents are semantically represented by mental concepts in the brain. This assumption,
however, has some problems. On the one hand, if there were three semantic concepts of ‘school’
in the brain, the sign ‘school‘ in the sentence ‘there have been some problems with school‘ could
not be meaningful as long as the specific mental concept is not activated. The proposition would
remain incomprehensible, because the question of which mental concept ‘school’ our brain
should activate arises. On the other hand, even if we assume that all three mental concepts are
activated at once, we would run into further problems. For example, ‘to go to school’ is not the
same concept as ‘to leave for school’. While ‘to go to school’ can mean ‘going to the school
location right now’ and ‘attending a school in general’, the concept ‘leaving for school’ has only
one meaning. As a consequence our brain would be highly inefficient, if it had to activate all
mental concepts, in order to grasp meaning. The sheer amount of semantic extensions of a
normal conversation would lead to an excessive activation of mental concepts. We can conclude,
signs neither simply signify something immediate, but also do not refer to distinct concepts. For
this reason, I argue that all signs and concepts are ambiguous, even if they are perceived as
immediately clear. Thus, if we want to explain signs with regard to their reference, it would be
hard to identify which reference is meant. This institutes a pragmatic argument to reject
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reference-semantics as the core of our language capacity. The gulf between what is meant and
what is said is not easily bridged. It is clear that if we had followed the reference-semantic
approach, we would have to explain the enormous effort that speakers would have to invest in
order to learn all of these concepts.
For these reasons, lexicography faces the challenge to appropriately describe our mental
lexicon. Lexicography asks: what is the core meaning of a name according to our mental
lexicon? Because of this modus operandi, however, we should not commit a lexicographic
fallacy and understand our mental lexicon consisting of entries in a lexicon. In lexicology, that is
interested in the mental concept and not in the lexicographic concept, we must first recognize the
speaker as a sign-user who interacts in a communicative situation. This is necessary in order to
make reference-semantic ambiguities at least interpretable. Since only speakers utter sentences,
we have to socio-pragmatically interpret the content of concepts.87 The concept, furthermore, has
a meaning that we utter in a specific context. A rough socio-pragmatic explicit phrasing of ‘to go
to school’ could therefore be ‘Hereby, I convey to you the information that I as a student have
some reasons to tell you as my only father that I go to the school as a building because of a
gentle force of commitment within a society, namely to attend a school as a publicly
acknowledged institution.’ Of course, it is absurd to make all such structures explicit and it is
more than possible that we will find a further ambiguity. Even though we constantly assume that
we can specify ambiguities, we strategically operate with regard to the fact that reality cannot be
communicated in its entirety. Instead, I suggest that we work strategically with regard to
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circumstances and not with regard to formal rules. We work with vagueness and not with
formally explicit structures. Yet, we know that if necessary we could unfold the vagueness in
more formal interpretations that suffice the context. Lexicography is therefore always bound to
the status quo of how communicators communicative and can never fully achieve a final,
explicit, semantic map of our mental lexicon.
A complete semantic explication of the hermeneutic, communicative situation runs
therefore into the problem that each sign in a sentence has to be interpreted with regard to its
hermeneutical ‘as’ within the already consisting circle of self-reflectiveness of language-users.
Thus, we cannot achieve a last valid semantical explication of a concept, since this would mean
to grasp the essence of the speaker and his surroundings, which is impossible. Concepts are
dependent on users and users are finite in their capabilities. Moreover, we would hypostasize the
linguistic capacity of the speaker as an ergon (as a readymade fact) and would not capture his
linguistic creativity as Energeia (as an activity). All of this hints to the fact that we must
understand the sentence as an utterance that is performative and we have to accept that we cannot
entirely express intentions of performatives by semantics. The explicit formulation of the
implicit performative ‘Hereby, I claim’ is therefore not captured with the semantic explication
of the implicit pragmatic horizon. We must interpret the used signs as well as the sentence itself
with regard to a pragmatic context that is open. I thus disagree with Brandom that the
propositional claim is the downtown of language, and regard linguistic actions in a specific
historical context that is open as being more important. The pragmatic context is conventionally
established in the linguistic life-form. The life-form, however, cannot be entirely explicated with
a set of performative vocabulary. This is also because the performatives of one utterance are
ambiguous. In the following paragraphs, I will explain the ambiguity of performatives.
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If a general gives orders to a civilian, then the order cannot unfold its illocutionary force
that it would have with regard to a soldier. An illocutionary force is a socially established form
of interaction that can be successful or not successful. We could only assume that there might be
an illocutionary force of making somebody to do something. Yet, it is not an order. For this
reason, it is difficult to assign the correct semantic performative with regard to its illocutionary
force. While a soldier would follow the order, and while it seems that in such a case the
performative should be entirely clarified, we cannot do this as easily in the case of a civilian.
Because of this, Austin sees it as a necessity to introduce the idea of a perlocution, the idea that
an action can have results that were not intended or socially secured. If a general therefore gives
an order, and a civilian follows, then this would be a perlocutive effect with regard to the order.
However, we could also evaluate this as the illocution of asking somebody to do something. In
this case, the illocution would be successful. Then, however, the possible performatives are
semantically ambiguous as well as the meaning of concepts are ambiguous. The question of
which illocution was finally used is unclear.
My claim is therefore that that there is no strong force that works causally and forces
subjects to do things; instead societies exercise weak forces. Instead of eliminating the possibility
of recognizing these weak forces, we have to accept that ambiguities are an essential part of our
discourses. There should be no explicit reference-semantics, in order to allow for ‘Spiel’.
Wittgenstein’s idea of language-games refers to the German, technical notion of Spiel, which
also invokes the idea that something has play. The performative part of the utterance itself is
pragmatically ambiguous, and thus we need to develop a pragmatic understanding of the
openness of concepts that allows for ‘Spiel’. So what is the horizon of pragmatics in terms of this
play?
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In order to answer these problems I introduced the concept ‘poetic’, which was already
realized in numerous publications by the word ‘metaphor’. An example for this can be found in
Lakoff’s book Metaphors we live by (1980).88 In so far as the metaphor and metonymy principle
are recognized in their poetical function to structure phenomena, pragmatics can be understood
as semantically open. If semantics is open for pragmatics, then semantics is not entirely
integrated, but also not completely replaced by pragmatics. This would acknowledge the
anthropological situation of humans who are, indeed, determined by the conventions of
language, but who are creative within these conventions, who change these conventions, an who
make these conventions.
The pragmatic integration does not mean to reintroduce a further semantic interpretation.
Rather, we must emphasize a qualitative difference between the holistic conception of a
pragmatic approach that allows for openness and play, and the particular approach of a
referential semantic that ties meanings down to an explicit reference. Instead, a pragmatic
conception can be achieved by the manifold determinations of the poetic functions of language
within a historical communication-community. We have to point out, however, that the sign, the
propositional sentence as well as the performative act are embedded in historical situations.
Finally, pragmatics has to be interpreted as historically open, and thus discourses are a nonclosable circles and occur in histories. In the end, the concept of openness shall achieve a first
interpretation of the creative use of language as well as the creative interpretation of co-subjects
within pragmatics.
Furthermore, Hegel’s idea of historical systematicity will give us a criterion of
demarcating any sort of a game from the specific games that should achieve knowledge. Despite
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such a relative openness, Hegel will show that we can achieve objective knowledge with regard
to our historical moment. The pragmatic project can only move towards a Hegelian perspective,
if the concept of history becomes a central point.

2.2.4 Summary
The transcendental and universal pragmatic reconstruction of language as the foundational
condition of cognition and of all communication communities is based on the pragmatic
integration of a referential semantics. Yet, it cannot be limited to this analysis, since a correct
understanding of language has to be amended by the historical understanding of language. I
demonstrated the pragmatic integration with respect to three stages (Peirce, Wittgenstein and
Austin). Finally, I have pointedout that the final result cannot be a semantics of semantics. I
criticized all projects that point out the foundational character of language as a logical form.
Rather, we have to understand language as a life-form in a historical context.
Nevertheless, this life form shall not express a pragmatic perplexity. The question of
history remains untouched in the neo-pragmatic tradition. Yet. a discussion of history might
ground relative, yet objective knowledge. Before I come to the question of history, however, I
will reconstruct Brandom’s account as an unhistorical attempt to pragmatically integrate a
reference-semantics by virtue of semantics. I will argue that he cannot deliver a criterion for
objectivity of knowledge.
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2.3 Brandom’s Pragmatic Semantics and its Relation to Realism
Historically, we can read Brandom’s theory as a systematic attempt to address the problem of the
pragmatic integration of a reference-semantics by formal semantic means. Though this problem
has its origin in a misinterpretation of Hegel and though Brandom claims to be neo-Hegelian,
Brandom’s intended solution for these problems does not represent a return to Hegel. The recent
return to epistemological contextualism, resembling a Hegelian holism, is motivated by the
failure of analytic philosophy to provide atomistic knowledge. In particular, analytic philosophy
was firstly interested in demonstrating that reality exists, a claim that Hegel never denied.
Secondly, analytic philosophers invested great efforts to prove our immediate contact with such a
reality. It is a proof that Hegel thinks is impossible. Instead, Hegel’s arguments for an objective
epistemology evolved around a phenomenology based on experience. Analytic philosophy’s
recent turn to contextualism rejects similar to Hegel the idea of an immediate contact with
reality. Yet, we cannot dissociate this rejection from the realist motivation of analytic
philosophy. In this sense, Brandom’s Sellarsian rejection of immediate knowledge, leads to an
unreasonable rejection of experience. Accordingly, experience would only deliver a relativist
source of objectivity for epistemology. Brandom’s rejection of experience and his turn to a
linguistic rationalism, however, faces then the problem of an empty coherentism in a frictionless
void. ‘Linguistic rationalism’ means for Brandom to integrate an inferential semantics into a
pragmatic framework that can be objectively secured from the inside of language. Since Hegel’s
account is, however, also anti-semantic, Brandom’s use of formal semantics to ground
pragmatics cannot be called Hegelian. Since Brandom, furthermore, presupposes a reality
expressed in his semantics, it cannot be Hegelian either, since Hegel denies the possibility of
metaphysical realisms on the epistemological level.
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In order to contrast Brandom and Hegel, I will therefore reconstruct Brandom’s
arguments for semantic realism in detail. I will point out four characteristics of Brandom’s
approach:
a) his external realism
b) his procedural realism
c) his formalized, linguistic model
d) and, finally, his incomplete solution of anaphora for the problem of reference.
In particular, I will develop, firstly, a general notion of his realism, which is, however, not
clarified by himself. For this, I will also lay out the general structure of his central work Making
it Explicit and explain the before analyzed realism as one of its major goals.
Since it seems that Brandom’s realism could also be read as a matter of objective
procedures, I will, secondly, investigate his idea of linguistic normativity. Moreover, I will
demonstrate that the objectivity of these normative discourse-structures cannot be objectively
secured either.
Thirdly, I will demonstrate that the ontological consequences from his distinctions of
commitment and entitlement are not carrying his philosophy beyond linguistics and that his
transcendental argument for the mastery of discourses does therefore not hold for demonstrating
truth in discourses.
All of these steps converge into the final analysis of Brandom’s explanation of reference
with regard to his solution of anaphora. I will demonstrate that his idea of inferentially relating a
linguistic model to perceptual episodes does not solve the problem of communication.
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2.3.1 Brandom’s Realism

My thesis is that Brandom is a realist without clarification of what this means. In order to prove
this claim I will distinguish an external realism and a procedural realism. External realism is the
idea that there are determinate things that can be known as independent from our mind.
Procedural realism is the idea that we can get closer to reality by the correct methods. I defend
the thesis that Brandom is a realist in both senses and that Brandom’s account is thus
incompatible with a Hegelian account.

2.3.1.1 Realism, Brandom and Hegel

Though I do not deny that something about our experience is real, I deny that we can
clearly distinguish our methods of construction from an unfiltered content, a naked reality.
‘Reality’ is therefore a rather abstracted term that we produce, in order to describe something
that occurs in our experience. The term ‘reality’ has a function for subjects who cannot
ultimately justify themselves as subjective, but who need to develop a concept of objectivity.
Hegel develops this concept at the end of his Greater Logic. This conception of reality, however,
is derived dialectically. The Brandomian attempt to secure objective, procedural discourseconditions, on the contrary, does not follow such a dialectical discussion, but rather simply
presupposes reality.
To be more specific, Brandom’s formal pragmatics is a propositional, inferentialist
realism that is supposed to liberate words like “true” and “refers” from the representationalist
paradigm (see Hookway 2016).89 Yet, his inferentialist realism still translates these ideas into
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ahistorical, procedural terms of normative correctness. Thus, Brandom’s connection of semantics
and pragmatics, for example, is not only the question of whether pragmatics stands on the
grounds of an inferential role semantics, but it is also the question of whether semantics
ultimately solves the epistemological problem of justifying and identifying our conceptual
contact to a presupposed reality. Hegel does not deny a reality, but he denies such
epistemological efforts to distinguish what is constructed and what is reality once and for all.
This endeavor is difficult, if not impossible. For Brandom, however, our participation in reality is
a condition for objectivity, even though we cannot say what reality is. Thus, Brandom states:
The objectivity of conceptual norms requires that any attitude of taking, treating, or assessing as correct an
application of a concept in forming a belief or making a claim be coherently conceivable as mistaken,
because of how things are with the objects the belief or claim is about (Brandom 1998, 63).

In other words, our attitudes depend on how things really are. It is hard to deny that this is an
external realism, since Brandom presupposes things as independent from our thoughts. Despite
this strong external realism, Brandom, however, also believes that all semantic content is
normatively grounded in social interaction. He does not believe that reality can be represented,
but that it must restrict the way of how we forge concepts. Knowledge would then be about
achieving greater mastery of concepts and about creating concepts with regard to what is reality.
This indicates that we could read the statement above in a rather charitable way. In this case, our
interactions would be about objects of assertions and not necessarily about an external reality.
Brandom’s realism, however, comes more explicitly to the fore in the following statement:
A semantically adequate notion of correct inference must generate an acceptable notion of conceptual
content. But such a notion must fund the idea of objective truth conditions and so of objectively correct
inferences. Such proprieties of judgment and inference outrun actual attitudes of taking or treating
judgements and inferences as correct. They are determined by how things are, independently of how they
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are taken to be. Our cognitive attitudes must ultimately answer to these attitude-transcendent facts.
(Brandom 1998, 137).

So “things”, which are independent from us, influence our judgements. Brandom’s main idea is
that correct cooperation involves a concept of what reality is. In other words, we do not know
what reality is, but we are in contact with reality because otherwise there would be no successful
communication. There is a necessity for “attitude-transcendent facts” such as real objects, which
are entirely independent from us and that are thus an absolute foundation for our communication
(Brandom 1998, 137). I have to test whether this is only an assumption or whether Brandom can
deliver proofs for such a correcting influence of reality.
I am not denying that we probably need to presuppose an idealized content for our
preferred communication, let us say, in sciences. Brandom, however, claims that we know that
reality is independent from us. His central claim is that we do not know reality in its essence so
that we can represent it, but that we know reality in how it objectively structures our discourses.
In other words, Brandom claims that an ‘attitude-transcendent reality’ guarantees the objectivity
of our procedures. Since he also thinks that our content is not an immediate representation of
reality, he must assume that we get closer to reality by greater mastery of concepts. Thus,
Brandom does not claim that we are more successful only with regard to standards that we set up
by ourselves, which would be a Hegelian model, but that we, indeed, get closer to reality. This is
what I call his procedural realism. Brandom’s commitment to this second kind of realism masks
his ungrounded external realism.
My thesis is therefore that despite his procedural realism, Brandom is an external realist
in presupposing that there are things that are independent from us. I hold that both realisms are
impossible to defend.
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2.3.1.2 Realists and the Cheerful Constructivists

Some analytic philosophers celebrate Brandom for his realist account. Their enthusiasm
leads them to critically anticipate any skeptical attempt to deconstruct his realism-argument.
Here is one example:
Given the open-ended nature of the game it need not come as a surprise that experts working in the
philosophy of science or in the sociology of knowledge that tend to be a bit on the pessimistic side, might
feel themselves inclined to endorse the thesis that objectivity will simply be unavailable in the final
analysis. They might join forces with cheerful constructivists who embrace the thought that entitlements
have in the final analysis (Bransen 2000, 23).90

For Bransen these “cheerful constructivists”, or “[t]hese not so sophisticated anti-realists won’t
find Robert Brandom on their side” (Bransen 2000, 24). On the contrary, Bransen knows that
“the expert who becomes familiar with the deep problems about knowledge, reality, objectivity
and truth” will agree with Brandom. According to him, “the expert” needs to reconstruct
Brandom’s approach according to the following steps:
a) We have to demonstrate first “that normativity cannot do without entitlements”
(Bransen 2000, 23). Only if I am entitled to something there will be a normative
force. Entitlements are based on endorsements that are expressed as normative
commitments in an interactive space of reasons.
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b) Structures of entitlements have ontological implications because without these
implications, we would not acknowledge the possibility of being correct. In other
words, we need to presuppose a reality during our interactions in the space of reasons.
c) The open games will let the attitude-transcendent facts speak, express themselves,
and they will intervene mistaken discourses.
I will discuss the whole argument under point 2.3.3 in more detail. For now, I have to point out
that all these claims are, however, at least problematic. A) since a further presupposition of
Brandom’s model is that all our language is normative, the first claim assumes that entitlements
are the core of our communication, which reduces language already to its instrumental function.
Language is used in order to achieve or secure entitlements. B) the need for ontologies and the
presupposition of an ontology does not guarantee that ontologies are adequate. C) it is
questionable whether ‘attitude-transcendent facts’ utter themselves, or whether this is an
anthropomorphism. Facts do not act. Or, at least, this assumption needs more theoretical
foundation. Bransen’s conclusion expresses therefore a problematic excitement that analytic
philosophers of Brandom’s color feel, and it is then questionable whether we can claim that we
become better in a game of truth, as Bransen proclaims further:
[…] appreciating these problems is a matter of playing the same game as the child whose cognitive
development displays a rapidly growing success in coping with objective reality, namely the game of
human understanding, the game of giving and asking for reasons — a game in which it is possible to
become better (Bransen 2000, 23).

I have discussed the problem of more sophisticated coherence games with regard to Sellars
above (2.1.4). I attempted to demonstrate that more detailed knowledge in one domain of
knowledge depends on the conditions of our conception of knowledge in the first place. In this
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sense, we can agree that Brandom provides new solutions for formal semantics, which is a highly
elaborated game that some analytic philosophers have agreed to play and that they call
knowledge. Beyond this elaborated game, however, we also have to demonstrate that his attempt
does not only cater to a small group of experts who agree on a problem. Margolis, for example,
is critical of Brandom’s selective pragmatist tradition that turns its insights into solutions for the
problem of reality. He criticizes the necessary idealizations that a formal semantics undertakes in
order to understand ordinary language. He describes the abstractions for such an idealization:
“notably, an analysis of the holist, contextual, societally embedded, historicized, tacit,
profoundly informal, improvisational, consensually tolerated, and practically effective forms of
discourse” (Margolis 2009, 184).91 Given the complexity of our interactions, Margolis is very
skeptical of formalist semantics and evaluates Brandom’s project on the basis of this:
But I find it more than unlikely that Brandom would be satisfied with the verdict that his conception was
hardly more than a heuristic prop catering to the interests of a stubborn cohort of skillful specialists who are
committed nevertheless to a project that was probably impossible (Margolis 2009, 184).

To summarize, Brandom’s approach might be only relevant to the inner circle of analytic
philosophers who are interested in a transition to pragmatics, but his approach is grounded on the
problematic assumptions of this tradition. Though I have discussed these aspects before (2.1.3
and 2.1.4) I will summarize Brandom’s problematic assumptions with regard to Sellars’
coherentism.

91

Margolis, Joseph. “A ‘Pragmatist’ among Disputed Pragmatists: Robert Brandom’s Between Saying and Doing:
Towards an Analytic Pragmatism.” In Contemporary Pragmatism 6 (1), 2009: 185-196.

101

2.3.1.3 Brandom’s Relation to Sellars’ Coherentism

On the one hand, Brandom adopts Sellars’ inferential coherentism for his semantics. On
the other hand, Brandom inherits the idea of attitude-transcendent facts from the above described
Sellarsian problem of picturing (2.1.4). Sellars attempted to constitute objectivity in a coherence
structure of inferences by assuming a necessary operation of picturing reality. Since Sellars
rejected the given as a myth, he could not rely on experience that gives objects, in order to
ground a coherent structure. Brandom follows this strategy. In his major work, Making it
Explicit, the term ‘experience’ does not appear in the index. Brandom, in accordance with
Sellars, believes that a merely inferentialist framework can constitute a coherent theory of
meaning that is a formal theory that constitutes knowledge without experience. Without
experience, the major question is then how to qualify one coherent system to be better than
another one. Brandom claims that he has found a lever of objectivity inside of the inferentialist
paradigm. The idea is that individuals, usually the non-conceptual content of statements, are
normatively structured by navigational actions of the speakers. Brandom believes that knowledge
is “norms all the way down” (Brandom 1998, 44). Knowledge of individuals is then relative to
our social contexts. In the preface, Brandom makes clear that he is interested in the “objectivity
of concepts” with regard to such social contexts (Brandom 1997, 156). Jackman writes on this
Brandomian issue that “[u]ltimately, being correct is to be explained in terms of being correctly
taken to be correct” (Jackman 2017).92 For this reason, I assume that there is no attempt to justify
the individuals contents of statements as ultimately true, but we adopt them in discourse
practices that only work if we presuppose reality as attitude-transcendent. It introduces a revised
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verificationism, which is here the idea that we can use right procedures that get verified in social
practice.
It is, however, questionable whether the idea of correct procedural conditions can be
deduced. The main problem is therefore that Brandom tries to operate without a concept of
experience. As an alternative, Brandom develops a formalized, procedural realism. This
procedural realism has to be investigated in more detail.

2.3.1.4 Conclusions on Brandom’s External and Procedural Realism

Even if we granted a minimal, external, realist presupposition, it would be unclear how
such a reality influences our discourses epistemologically. In this case, it is not enough to say
that there is a reality, but if there is a reasonable argument, it must entail what reality is and how
it influences our discourses. Rockmore cannot find further arguments that support Brandom’s
realism. He remarks that Brandom’s verification of concepts is “no more than a promissory note”
(Rockmore 2016, 112):
In Brandom’s position, verification consists in ascertaining which concepts are true through confronting them to reality.
This is no more than a promissory note, which cannot be redeemed. The insuperable difficulty lies in going from factdependence to objectively correct inferences through relevant conceptions of normativity. That an inference is
objectively correct according to prevailing normative standards is unrelated to what is really correct about the real. In
short, the suggestion that inferences respect the facts according to the best current standards is insufficient to show they
succeed in grasping how things are. In other words, as Kant points out in his Copernican turn, no one has ever been able
to show how one can correctly infer from appearance to reality (Rockmore 2016, 112).93
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For Rockmore, it is impossible to obtain objective inferences through normativity by stating a
fact-dependence. Our standard of what counts as objectively correct, is independent from what is
real. Rockmore indicates further that a discussion of this actually Kantian problem is necessary,
in order to demonstrate the impossibility of knowing reality by current means of philosophy.
I intend to discuss this Kantian problem as the ground of the Hegelian epistemology later
(4.1.2). Before, however, I need to clarify the general structure and thoughts of Brandom’s
central work Making it Explicit, in order to test his argument - if there is one. Despite the
acknowledgement of Brandom’s contributions to formal semantics, it is questionable whether it
contributes to the epistemological problems of the Kantian, Continental tradition. If this is true, it
entails that Brandom does not bridge the gap between Continental and analytic philosophy, and
that he cannot be called Hegelian.

2.3.1.5 Brandom’s Making it Explicit

Before I investigate Brandom’s arguments for procedural realism in more detail, I would
like to give an accurate representation of the goals that Brandom pursues in Making it Explicit,
his central work. With regard to the specified replacement of the paradigms of consciousness by
pragmatics, Brandom attempts to explain the semantic content of our statements by a pragmatic
integration.94 Brandom states: ”The book is an attempt to explain the meanings of linguistic
expressions in terms of their use” (1997, 153).95 This further attempt of a pragmatic integration
of semantics has to be tested. The book starts with “an account of social practices” (Brandom
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1997, 153), investigating the structural conditions that makes them “linguistic practices”
(Brandom 1997, 153). For this account, Brandom distinguishes the capacity of speaking from the
capacity of only producing sounds. Speaking is about our mastery of treating something
inferentially, instead of only referring to things. This means, we can distinguish between good
and bad inferences. Photocells or parrots do not understand the concept of red (see Brandom
2009, 170).96 If they ‘answer’, it will only be a stimulus response. Humans, on the other hand,
can master this concept by understanding its inferential role (See Mosteller 2014, 81).97
Understanding its inferential role means to accept that an utterance has certain implications for a
system. Such a “conceptual role semantics” focuses on the question of how we exchange
different speech-acts and produce content during these acts (see Brandom 1997, 153). In this
sense, content is not magically picked up and introduced into a formal system of language, but
content is produced by language itself and by the requirements of the pragmatic situation.
Brandom does not want to leave anything to a mystical force outside of language. Thus, his
account can be seen as embedded in the analytical tradition that rejects any metaphysical
discussion without its justification in linguistics. Nevertheless, he does not commit to the view
that all Continental considerations are meaningless. In his reply to Taylor he admits to have a
very broad position:
I am working within a broadly pragmatist tradition that includes not only the classical American pragmatists,
but also the early Heidegger and the later Wittgenstein. My pragmatism is distinguished from theirs, however,
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by being joined to a kind of philosophical rationalism. It is this unusual combination of commitments that
draws me to Hegel (Brandom 2010, 301).98

Despite this commitment to such a broad spectrum, Brandom’s relation to claims, which he
describes as the downtown of language, is a controversial point. Claims are significant for his
analytic position. According to Brandom, we can describe a claim as a specific form of speech
act. It exhibits a relation of meaning and use in the context of descriptive or ascriptive
vocabulary (see Brandom 1997, 153). His overall goal is to tie down this meaning of a sentence
to the proposition expressed by such claims.
Brandom discusses the problem of use, since use seems to adjust the meaning of claims.
He mentions simple cases of use-specification. So we can use, for example, “the word ‘not’ to
express negation” (Brandom 1997, 153). We find the contrary extreme in the open field of
theories that present concepts as very vague. These are “descriptions of the movements of
particles expressed in the vocabulary of physics” (Brandom 1997, 154). The use of such
vocabulary cannot support a stable meaning, since “expressed by various noises or inscriptions,
it will in general fail to settle even that anything is meant or expressed by them” (Brandom 1997,
154). According to Brandom, this difficulty to settle any meaning is because our normal
“intentional vocabulary”, as well as our “naturalistic vocabulary” cannot transfer what we mean
entirely (Brandom 1997, 154). In order to solve these difficulties, Brandom wants to apply
“normative vocabulary” (Brandom 1997, 154). For him, each communicational practice includes
norms of correctness with regard to the used expressions. In other words, speech-acts need to fit
the social standards (see Brandom 1997, 154). I assume that the limits of intentional vocabulary
and natural vocabulary are found where we do not speak about clearly observable phenomena, or
98
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describable objects of physics. In these cases, we must be aware of how we are doing things with
language, in order to avoid misuse. Brandom suggests that our claims are normative in any case
and that such extreme physical examples will reveal the need of normative vocabulary.
Altogether, Brandom’s realism is here hard to express, since he does not explicitly discuss this
claim. In fact, his claim that things are normative all the way down, interferes with his realism.
His realism, however, is clearly stated with regard to physical limit cases:
For the properties governing the application of those concepts depends on what inferences involving them are
correct, that is, on what really follows from what. And that depends on how things really are with electrons
and aromatic compounds, not just on what judgments and inferences we endorse (Brandom, 2000, 27).

Brandom needs to specify what is real about “electrons and aromatic compounds.” As his
realism is expressed in this passage, it stands in contrast with the claim that things are normative
all the way down. So, we have to understand how his normative pragmatics is supposed to be
combined with his external realism.
In Chapter One, Brandom presents his “normative pragmatics” and its origin with regard to
Kant, Frege, and Wittgenstein (see Brandom 1997, 154). His goal is to achieve an explanation of
meaning without the use of any naturalist vocabulary. Brandom assumes that all speech acts
include normativity: “Interpreting states, performances, and expressions as semantically or
intentionally contentful is understood as attributing to their occurrence an ineliminably
normative pragmatic significance” (Brandom 1997, 154). Brandom does not treat this implicitly
normative practice as inexplicable (see Brandom 1997, 154), because these norms are “instituted
by social, practical activity” (Brandom 1997, 154). This social activity on its most fundamental
layer involves commitments and entitlements (see Brandom 1997, 154). For Brandom, it is a
discursive practice, in which participants acquire points. He writes:
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Beginning with basic deontic scorekeeping attitudes and the practices that govern them, an account is offered
of how locutions must be used in order to express explicitly the very normative notions - is committed, is
permitted, ought, and so on - that are appealed to in laying out the normative pragmatics (Brandom 1997,
154).

In other words, Brandom explains meaning in terms of use, while use is depending on the
normative pragmatics. The core of a normative pragmatics are locutions. The terms of “attitudes
of attributing, [...] acknowledging deontic statuses of commitment and entitlement” (Brandom
1997, 154) are then the key-terms for his project because they express the most foundational
actions in identifying what really follows from what. The more crucial issue is, however, the
following:
The next step is to say what structure such a set of social practices must have in order to qualify as
specifically discursive practice. This is a matter of moving from pragmatics to semantics. The defining
characteristic of discursive practice is the production and consumption of specifically propositional contents
(Brandom 1997, 154).

This must mean that after having moved from semantics to a pragmatic strategy of explanation,
we will move back from pragmatics to semantics. Brandom declares the propositional content to
be the key ingredient for his system, which is contradictory to the original attempt of a pragmatic
integration. It also contradicts the claim that things are normative all the way down. The reason
for this can be found in Chapter Two, in which he argues that “propositional contentfulness
should be understood in terms of inferential articulation; propositions are what can serve as
premises and conclusions of inferences, that is, can serve as and stand in need of reasons”
(Brandom 1997, 154). This means that Brandom, declares inferentialism as the binding force in
our language games, and inferences demand for propositions. Brandom wants to point out that
this activity is beyond “nonlinguistic creatures” that have intentional states (see Brandom 1997,
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154). The application of the term ‘intentional’ is “parasitic” to “full-blooded linguistic
intentionality”(Brandom 1997, 154) that humans have, and thus the observation that animals
have intentionality is only possible with our developed vocabulary. Intentionality depends,
instead, on the capability to make inferences, which can only be achieved, if we claim
something.
There are three important steps to Brandom’s endeavor of a linguistic realism. Firstly, to
show that all meaning is normatively depending on use. Secondly, that all use depends on
inferences, and inferences depend on propositions, which can be objectively demonstrated.
Third, the third step of his project is to demonstrate that our so called “substitutional inferences”
can explain singular terms and predicates, since they cannot “directly play the inferential role of
premise or conclusion in an argument” (Brandom 1997, 155). This step is the most difficult and
most controversial aspect of his endeavor. Brandom analyzes singular terms and the “systematic
contributions to the directly inferential roles of sentences in which they occur” (Brandom 1997,
155). In chapter six, Brandom relates then to the main issues of Sellars’ inferential role
semantics. He addresses the problem of an empty coherentism by his notion of anaphora, “the
relation between a pronoun and its antecedent” (Brandom 1997, 155). Anaphors are supposed to
explain singular terms, and thus they are supposed to solve the Sellarsian problem of an empty
coherentism. In Chapter seven, Brandom will accordingly argue that anaphora can express
unrepeatable events. In particular, anaphors can explain “demonstrative tokenings” (Brandom
1997, 155).
After these three steps, Brandom adds a proof of objectivity that will be carried out with
regard to a conceptual role semantics that is determined by the distribution of roles and the
“implicitly normative linguistic social practices of a community” (Brandom 1997, 155).
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Brandom’s main target is to explain the representational dimension of our discourses by
inferentialist terms. The word ‘of’ “that expresses intentional directedness”, as well as the word
‘about’ make only sense if Brandom’s communicative, inferentialist model is applied (Brandom
1997, 156). Chapter Eight is supposed to demonstrate how these expressions are actually used
within this model and finally require a notion of reality (see Brandom 1997, 156). Brandom
intends to demonstrate how his inferentialist model “institute[s] objective norms” of a discourse
that has to be directed towards attitude transcendent facts. In other words, to an external reality.
His overall conception of norms, rooted in an inferential role semantics that relies on
propositions, expresses therefore his procedural realism:
“norms according to which the correctness of an application of a concept answers to the facts about the object
to which it is applied, in such a way that anyone (indeed everyone) in the linguistic community may be wrong
about it” (Brandom 1997, 156).

Brandom’s proof for the correctness of procedural conditions relies therefore on a formal
understanding of reality that is for everyone the same. I will investigate this as his procedural
realism in more detail.
To summarize, since Brandom does not clarify what mind-independent things are, a possible
argument for his realism must be found in the idea that reality has to be presupposed during our
discourses and that we get closer to it, even though we do not know it.

2.3.2 Brandom’s Procedural Realism and The Problem of Rules

After having discussed Brandom’s relation to realism as a heritage from Sellarsian problems,
after having distinguished his twofold realist claims (an external realism and a procedural
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realism), and after having explained the relation of external and procedural realism in his major
work, Making it Explicit, I have to discuss Brandom’s relation to normative vocabulary in detail.
Brandom argues that according to our normative attitude of giving and asking for reasons,
meaning is intersubjectivley conveyed by inferences that make propositions necessary and that
arguments are hereby objective. For Brandom, there are three components necessary for
meaning:
a) The intersubjective play of deontic score-keepers,
b) an inferentialist structure of their moves during their play,
c) and the fact that inferences depend on propositions.
Despite these strictly formal requirements, it is hard to identify Brandom’s realism immediately,
since each of these structural moments could be provided as an internal moment of our
communication, and thus we could argue that Brandom is actually not a strict realist. With regard
to this Rorty even states that Brandom’s account leaves “no room” for realism. He writes:
There is, as far as I can see, no room for anything unconditional in Brandom's view of things, nor any room
for a "foundation" for an existing consensus. I take it that for Brandom no principle can claim a higher
status than being presupposed by some ‘de facto’ established practice (Rorty 1997, 176).

99

We have to test this peculiarly relativist reading of Brandom, since, as I have claimed, the
problem of Brandom’s position is exactly his realism.
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2.3.2.1 Brandom a Relativist?

Rorty evaluates Brandom’s relativism with regard to an unnecessary notion of progress
towards reality:
[T]he intuition that we are making intellectual progress is simply the intuition that, in respect to selfconsciousness and intellectual responsibility, we are getting farther and farther away from the cavemen; it
does not need backup from notions like ‘closer to Reality’ or ‘more nearly universally valid’. This would be
analogous to saying that the intuition that inquiry is in touch with reality is simply the intuition that it is
constrained by reality; it does not need backup from notions like ‘corresponding’ or ‘mapping’ (Rorty 1997,
176).

Rorty denies that we can get closer to reality, while, according to Sellars, we make progress in
getting closer to reality. Therefore, we can call Rorty clearly anti-Sellarsian.100 If Rorty,
however, is right, then Brandom cannot be a real follower of Sellars, which he, however, is.
In this regard, Brandom states that there are objective criteria of how we should apply
concepts, as he indicates in many passages of Making it Explicit:
It was pointed out […] that it is a critical criterion of adequacy on any account of concepts that it make sense
of a distinction between how they are applied in fact, by anyone or everyone, and how they ought to be
applied – how it would be correct to apply them (Brandom 1998, 593).

Indeed, the foundation for this statement is Brandom’s denial that meaning depends on a correct
reference between concepts and things, which is compatible with Rorty’s statement. Correct
application and the mastery of concepts produce meaning. Meaning would then depend on the
norms of how to apply concepts.
Even though this resembles Rorty’s relativism, at the same time, Brandom argues against
regularism. The behaviorist or naturalist idea that we follow norms depending on the authority
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Rorty further concludes that philosophy should rather ecumanize than revolutionize (see Rorty 1997, 176).
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that establishes them. So, in this case, norms would depend on the current authority and hence
they would be relative. For Brandom, however, there must be still “an objective sense of
correctness that governs their [concepts] application – a sense of appropriateness that answers to
the objects to which they are applied and to the world of facts comprising those objects”
(Brandom 1998, 594). This means Brandom includes a sense of correctness as much as a world
of independent things, as demonstrated above. Both qualify as different kinds of realism. How
Brandom tries to avoid relativism must therefore be the goal of the following paragraphs. Rorty
obviously misinterprets Brandom on this issue. I will show that Brandom assumes that we make
progress with respect to reality.

2.3.2.2 Rules and the Progress towards Reality

Already at the beginning of MIE, Brandom implies that he is concerned with an
anthropological question. Specifically, he wants to clarify the meaning of the word ‘we’. His
work does not include a historical, sociological discussion of this aspect, but focuses on the
central activity of humans that is undertaking commitments. Furthermore, he claims that we can
describe this normative activity objectively. The attention to commitments entails also
Brandom’s defense of a grounding propositional structure. Though it is true that, according to
Brandom’s framework, these commitments are fundamentally bound by rules, he rejects the
historical dependence of rules. They rather respond to how the world really is.
Wittgenstein already explicated rule-based approaches: any rulebound understanding runs
into an infinite regress of rules because we need meta-rules of how to apply rules, rules of how
we apply these rules of rules, and so forth. Historically and socially, it is clear that the regress
has stopped, since action took place. Brandom’s solution for the infinite regress of rules on the

113

theoretical level acknowledges therefore that rules do not come from the internal source of
thinking itself. Rules are not explicit. Rather preexisting human communities established them
with preexisting understandings and without interpretation necessarily involved. For Brandom,
this is practice: “grasping a rule without interpreting it is grasping it in practice, rather than by
substituting one expression of a rule for another” (Brandom 1998, 65). This, in his words,
pragmatist approach101 raises the question of how we follow performative rules implicitly. In
other words, Brandom suggests that following rules is necessary in order to have discourses at
all. He denies, however, that we can make them entirely explicit (see Brandom 1998, 23). Since
he, however, repetitively states that “[t]he book is an attempt to explain the meanings of
linguistic expressions in terms of their use” (1997, 153), he argues that understanding,
committing to, and “[…] grasping a concept is mastering the use of a word” (Brandom, 2000, 6).
Yet, mastering implies to do something objectively better. If this is true, then Brandom replaces
the question of non-perspectival knowledge of the world, by a realism of objective procedures.
Then he might be a relativist with regard to the contents that we discuss, but, on the procedural
side, he would still be a realist, which means that the truth of these procedures is independent
from the historical, or social contexts, and that we get closer to reality. This is the notion of
progress that Rorty denies.
In Brandom’s theory, mastery of a concept is accordingly a “kind of know how rather
than knowing that” (Mosteller 2014, 81). This means still that a so-called normative pragmatics
is supposed to avoid problems of externally approached meaning, but Brandom claims that an
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Brandom writes: “The conclusion of the regress argument is that there is a need for a pragmatist conception of
norms – a notion of primitive correctnesses of performance implicit in practice that precede and are presupposed by
their explicit formulation in rules and principles.” (Brandom 1998, 21).
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objective, specific form is necessary for us to make a system of inferences work.102 This means
that even if Brandom’s system did not presuppose a naked reality, it would approach persons as
juggling formal, propositional meanings, and objectively becoming better at it as they acquire
mastery over these procedures.
There is a further tension in Brandom’s work. On the one hand, Brandom refers to Sellars
that “[a] rule is lived, not described” (according to Brandom 1998, 25); on the other hand,
Brandom describes the “primary task” of his book as making these norms explicit: “The
pragmatist starts rather with a notion of norms implicit in practice and is obliged then to develop
an account of what it would be for such things to become propositionally explicit, as claims or
rules” (Brandom 1998, 26). As stated above, persons establish norms through the
acknowledgment of the commitments of other persons while, according to Brandom, both
participate in a formal game of exchanging reasons. The possibility of explicating implicit rules
is a presupposition and the question remains whether we can address the entirety of the human
animal with a formal semantics. It seems to me, according to Sellars’ expression of a lived rule,
we should then rather describe ways of how we live together instead of seeking for an entirely
objective explication. Brandom’s idea is “navigating among perspectives without sharing
contents” (see Mueller 2014). This is what makes us, according to Brandom, rational.
Problematic is that this navigation is ultimately guided by ahistorical formal rules depending on a
propositional structure. Brandom assumes then that the possible form of content restricts our
interaction. In this particular case, Brandom sees persons not as metaphysically involved in
various contents and as persons also shaped by these discussions, but reconstructs persons as
ahistorical, objective entities in a community. These objective members play formal language
102
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games of exchanging reasons. This is clearly anti-Hegelian. Not only that persons are determined
independently from their history, but Brandom also assumes the possibility of separating form
from its content once and for all. Another assumptions to which Hegel’s Phenomenology is
opposed.
Giving and asking for reasons demands for an underlying structure and raises the
question of what good reasons are. Or in Brandom’s words, it raises the question of what are
good, and what are better moves. Good moves depend for Brandom on the mastery of the game,
while the mastery of the game has an objective justification. This ‘better’ must mean that by
playing the game more appropriately, we express in a better way how things really are. Due to
such implications, I cannot follow Rorty’s claims that Brandom does not commit to the idea of
getting closer to the truth.
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2.3.2.3 Anti-Realism in Brandom?

I admit, however, that the reconstruction is difficult, as it is not entirely clear whether
Brandom commits to realism or whether he is an anti-realist. In his response to Taylor, for
example, Brandom affirms the question of whether there could be “rational creatures who are
not logical creatures” (Brandom 2010, 304). He then affirms that there could be creatures who
do not use “expressive resources provided by propositional-attitude ascribing locutions”
(Brandom 2010, 304). Finally, he even agrees that there could be meaning without cooperation,
which, according to him, would distinguish him from Habermas (see Brandom 2010, 304). These
statements make Brandom’s account very hard to understand because if there are other attitudes
or techniques in order to approach meaning, then the question of why Brandom’s method is
better than another one emerges.
Brandom responds to Wittgenstein’s claim of language as a city without a center: “But I
think language does have a downtown, and that it is the practice of giving and asking for
reasons” (Brandom 2010, 301). This downtown is for Brandom the assertion with its
propositional structure. Nonetheless, if communication is possible in various sorts of ways, as
Brandom admits above, why then should we be committed to his propositional language at any
given moment? Once we have given up on the idea that there is only one objective universally,
valid procedure, then our objectivity consists only in the fact that we have agreed to accept a
conventional procedure in our current, historical community, let us say, to do analytical, formal,
Brandomian semantics. This agreement, however, would be fragile. A brief research in so called
Discourse Analysis, a branch of General Linguistics would reveal that speakers do not
communicate in clearly identifiable packages of assertions. The content of communication
cannot always be revealed in clear propositions. Rather, most of our daily communication in life
is directed by coordination. It seems to me that only in sciences, we want to commit to a rigid
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paradigm. But even visiting a philosopher’s conference, as a meeting of a sort of scientists,
leaves sometimes the question of whether propositions are communicated at all, or whether the
content is fuzzy and negotiated. It is rather only the intention, if not only the claim to be more
rigorous.
Now, we could read the idea of a downtown of language as expressing that Brandom’s
approach is better than the other approaches to communicate, better than the people from the
village. Then he must claim that other approaches are either incapable of certain insights, or that
they work less efficiently than his proposed inferentialist pragmatic, formal semantics that is
erected in the downtown of language. Again, at its core, Brandom claims that our
communication in terms of formal semantics is correct because it refers to how things really are.
At the same time, Brandom claims that there is a possibility to communicate. Somehow
Brandom wants to hold on to the possibility of a pluralist epistemology, yet, at the same time, he
wants to restrict it. The concept of language varieties, however, suggests that our language is in a
flux, constantly mediated by the cooperative efforts of different speakers. There is not one
language we choose. Instead, we accommodate our practices with regard to the sufficient success
in a communicative situation. It would be hard, if not impossible, to decide whether Brandom’s
downtowners can cover all the problems that might occur. The fact, that there is no preestablished form of discourses, no downtown, would certainly be a problem, but it does not make
communication impossible.
Even though it is true that Brandom does not commit to a direct referential approach, his
objective proceduralism is realist. Procedural realism means here that the objectivity of the
procedures must be independent from our historical activity. Brandom seems to claim that there
are many ways to truth, but that effectively people from downtown speak better language. This,
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besides the problems mentioned above, presupposes to know that truth is, and that truth is one.
If, however, Brandom’s approach guarantees truth as knowing mind-independent reality
progressively, then we should dismiss any approach that has not guaranteed truth. Then,
however, Brandom must ultimately dismiss his relativist remarks and reject the villagers that do
not live in downtown. This seems to indicate that Brandom is not entirely certain about his
claims.
My argument needs more explanation: Since, according to Brandom, the final result of all
our efforts must be one, namely one reality of determinate objects, and since the final result is
independent from the method, our approach to truth, the method, would ultimately not matter.
This has the consequence that if Brandom claims that he is successful in securing truth, then he
must obviously dismiss all other approaches because they are simply unnecessary. Again he must
dismiss the villagers. The independent truth that he assumes to be an independent reality of
objects, however, is constructed within his system. It is the world-view of a downtowner. If the
idea of reality is generated within this method, then it would not be mind-independent, or, at
least, the result would be dependent on his method. If truth, however, depends on method, then
there is no possibility to ultimately exclude other methods.
In all of its instances it rather occurs that Brandom simply presupposes a mindindependent reality than dealing with this problem. So far I can abstractly summarize this as
Brandom’s overall account. In the following, I will reconstruct, and test his arguments for his
realism with regard to the specific terms he employs in his work.
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2.3.2.4 The Reality of Deontic Score-Keeping

We have to look at Brandom’s argument in more detail. For this, it is important to
understand Brandom’s idea of deontic score-keeping and how it relates to his conception of
reality. Levine reconstructs Brandom’s language game as played with regard to different
scorekeepers that charge contents normatively by committing and by acknowledging
entitlements: “On this deontic scorekeeping conception of our discursive practices agents can
have commitments and entitlements only if they are taken or treated as having those
commitments and entitlements by other scorekeepers” (Levine 2007, 9). So far, this is the idea
that meaning arises from the intersubjective dependence of language-users. It seems then that it
is the subject, in Brandom’s terms, the scorekeeper, who obliges others to play his particular
game of propositional truth. Levine explains this further: “This is so because without other
scorekeepers attributing normative statuses to them, whatever commitments and entitlements that
seem right to them would be right” (Levine 2007, 9). This idea of Brandom’s reciprocal deontic
scorekeeping introduces the other as an instance of necessary correction. Without the other my
perspective would always be right, which would consequently annihilate the idea of correctness
or at least make it useless. In a word, everybody is always correct with respect to himself. For
Levine, the idea of correctness must therefore have a relation to discourse itself:
But if whatever seemed right to an agent were right, then the notion of being right would have no sense
because there would be no way for an agent to be wrong about the commitments and entitlements they take
themselves to have. For one to have a sense of incorrectness, and therefore of correctness, concerning one’s
commitments and entitlements an agent must therefore take part in a social practice that ‘essentially
involves a distinction of social perspective, between what one is doing in acknowledging a commitment (to
oneself) and attributing a commitment (to someone else)’ (Levine 2007, 9).
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So correctness depends on multiple players. Such a navigational, pragmatic account of meaningproduction, however, does not have to be related to an external, mind-independent reality. Since
we introduce the game of truth obliging each other to play this particular game that other rational
life-forms might not play, truth depends on each particular game. Taking somebody as correct
depends under these premises on further cultural norms of playing these truth-games at all.
Attributing correct beliefs is then no more than a particular, historical practice related to how
truth is for us.
Brandom conflates normative, regulative ideas of how to intersubjectively produce
knowledge of truth for us with knowledge of a metaphysical, mind-independent reality. Yet, our
practices are not necessarily arranged with regard to how things really are, but according to how
we take things to be in an experiential, historical process. This is even the case, if we assume
how things really are in the agreed game of truth. The real is then still normatively charged, and
only a theoretical conception within this specific framework. Hence, it is relative to this
framework. The chosen game that Brandom is interested in is the specific form of the
propositional language game, which should be formalized, or, in Brandom’s words, made
explicit. Brandom believes that the achieved notion of truth can be justified as related to an
external reality, if we reconsider the different roles that speakers obtain with regard to content.
His argument extends to his concept of de-re and de-dicto ascriptions. I will explain these two
concepts and the related argument for realism in the following subpoint.

2.3.2.5 De Dicto- and De Re-Scores

Brandom repeats in multiple passages that his approach depends on how things really are.
For this reason it is odd that Rorty calls him a relativist. With his idea of how things really are,
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Brandom assumes a stable world that verifies our beliefs and he assumes that all different
methods must presuppose this stable, mind-independent reality. Whiting is then right if he refers
to this as “a semantic externalism”: This, Brandom states, amounts to a semantic externalism
according to which ‘what we mean depends on how things actually are, whether we know how
they are or not’ (Whiting 2008, 584).103 Brandom’s claims for reality are spread out all over his
book, and he even makes the challenge of proving objectivity as related to mind-independent
reality central to his approach:
One of the central challenges of an account of conceptual norms as implicit in social practice is accordingly
to make sense of the emergence of such an objective notion of correctness or appropriateness of claims and
application of concepts (Brandom 1998, 594).

As mentioned above, Brandom already states this as the main challenge with regard to “attitudetranscendent facts” (Brandom 199, 137), “the idea of how things actually are” (Brandom 1998,
137). In Articulating Reason Brandom replaces the formulati4on of how things really are with
“transcending the attitudes of practitioners” (Brandom 2000, 198):
So the challenge for assertibility theories is to start with a notion of propriety of assertion that is grounded
in and intelligible in terms of the practice of speakers and audiences, and yet which is rich enough to fund
normative assessments that are objective in the sense of transcending the attitudes of practitioners
(Brandom 2000, 198).104

The main problem of assertibility theories is the idea that we gain truth through processes that
are secured through the majority of people, but that we have no other means of correction. For
the “objective correctness” of norms, Brandom, however, introduces a further criterion (see
103

An interpretation that Whiting will correct later (see Whiting, Daniel. “Meaning Holism and De Re Ascription.”
Canadian Journal of Philosophy 38, 2008: 575-599. Accessed on November 25, 2017.
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1353/cjp.0.0033).
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Brandom begins to consider metaphysical questions: “Traditionally philosophy says that beliefs are many, but the
truth is one” (Brandom 1998, 594)
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Brandom 1998, 594-595). He suggests that we can distinguish between “claims or applications
of concepts that are objectively correct and those that are merely taken to be correct” (Brandom
1998, 595). He further claims that this “is a structural feature of each scorekeeping perspective”
(Brandom 1998, 595). With regard to this, he then distinguishes between de-dicto-ascriptions and
de-re-ascriptions that we as language-users keep track of in different books. Chung I-Lin writes
on this: “The de dicto book distinguishes and inferentially correlates the commitments the
interlocutor is disposed to acknowledge by overt performances; contents so specified are
correspondingly what the interlocutor takes himself to be expressing (Chung I-Lin 2008, 107).105
So ‘de dicto’ is something that somebody has said and thus was expressed as a clear
commitment, while ‘de re’ expresses the consequents and antecedents that the speakers
objectively commit to (see Chung I-Lin 2008, 107). ‘De re’ is thus the question of what
inferentially follows from the statement. In a word, ‘de dicto’ stands for the statement of
somebody, while ‘de re’ ascriptions stand for what the statement is about.
Brandom does not introduce these terms dialectically.106 Instead, he grounds them on
plausibility. Here, it becomes clear that, for Brandom, all terms are only tools employed in a

105

Lin, Chung-I. “No Communal and First-Person Errors: A Critique of Brandom’s Objectivity Proof.” National
Cheng Chi University Philosophy Academic Newspaper 20, 2008: 105-122. Accessed on November 26, 2017.
http://oldthinker.nccu.edu.tw/new_paper/paper001/20-3.pdf.
106
This distinction is similar to Hegel’s investigation of the in-itself and the for-itself. Hegel, however, remarks that
this distinction is produced by consciousness itself and thus Hegel conducts a dialectical investigation, which results
in his circular, epistemological strategy that finally extends itself to an anthropological investigation of selfconsciousness in its historical development in a society as spirit. Hegel’s strategy is overall circular because we must
understand the distinction between a presupposed, external reality and reality for us as a distinction that is only for
consciousness. In this sense, Hegel does not defend a mind-independent reality, but focuses on truth for humans.
Brandom, on the contrary, introduces this distinction without such a reflection. His structure is foundational, since
he claims that we need these structures in order to say something significant at all. He thus does not fulfill the
standard of a philosophical investigation that Hegel has already achieved. Beyond Brandom’s foundationalism, a
possible deduction of the term ‘objectivity’ remains also unclear. Hegel discusses this problematic term in his
chapter on objectivity in the Greater Logic. Hegel agrees that objectivity is necessary. The argument resembles
Brandom’s argument for objectivity, since subjectivity taken only for itself would annihilate its meaning; then, a
subject could not claim anything. Brandom, however, presupposes that objectivity is concerned with the relation of
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discursive machinery to get closer to the mind-independent real. On the grounds of the
distinction between de-re and de-dicto, objectivity is then nothing but a “structural aspect” of our
communication:
On this account, objectivity is a structural aspect of the social-perspectival form of conceptual contents. The
permanent possibility of a distinction between how things are and how they are taken to be by some
interlocutor is built into the social-inferential articulation of concepts (Brandom 1998, 597).

This statement makes clear that objectivity must depend on the afore-mentioned distinction of de
re and de dicto. In particular, Brandom claims that by virtue of this distinction the possibility of
error becomes intelligible. Accordingly, “it is possible that (I believe that p and it is not true that
p)” (Brandom 1998, 604). The ground for this possibility of error is our capacity of rehearsing
and taking over others perspectives: “[I]f you want to understand what I say, you have to be able
to associate with it a sentence that in your mouth expresses the same claim as the sentence
uttered expresses in mine” (Brandom 1998, 510). From this perspectival view of Brandom,
Whiting is falsely correcting his perspective that Brandom is a semantic externalist. Brandom is
a semantic externalist. Whiting gets as much confused as Rorty and so he writes:
In fact, on closer inspection, Brandom's version of IRS [inferential role semantics] does not any way appear
to provide a genuine externalism. According to it, the meaning of an expression or the content it expresses
is determined by how things objectively are according to the one ascribing or attributing that meaning or
content. It is, then, still the case that, on Brandom's theory, meaning is determined in the first instance by
the attitudes of each speaker, not by extra-linguistic reality (Whiting 2008, 593).

But if Brandom, is not an externalist, why then does Brandom refer so often to how things really
are? Whiting points out some passages that are in favor of Brandom as a relativist:
our statements and a mind-independent reality. Furthermore, he claims that we have to speak in propositions, if we
want to say something significant.
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Indeed, this is evident from careful attention to Brandom's actual formulations. On his view, the correct use
of an expression (and thereby its meaning) is not determined, as he often suggests, by objective matters
'transcending the attitudes of practitioners' (AR, 198), but rather by 'how things objectively... are taken to
be' (MIE, 498, my underlining; cf. AR, 183). Hence, this aspect of Brandom's IRS does not really provide a
determinate of meaning that is unaffected by differences in inferential profiles, and so does not circumvent
the communication problem (Whiting 2008, 593).

It is true that Brandom also includes formulations that suggest an account of how truth is for us,
but from the other passages quoted above, we can conclude the opposite as well. The principle of
charity turns Brandom into an anti-realist for some, and a realist for others. On the basis of my
arguments, however, we have to conclude that Brandom is unsure about what his realism entails,
while he is a semantic realist.
In order to make his realism more prominent, I will reconstruct his central proof of the
real in terms of the objectivity of procedures. His central proofs for objectivity in relation to a
mind-independent real are found in Chapter Eight of Making it Explicit and repeated in his
discussion of objectivity in Articulating Reasons.

2.3.2.6 Objectivity

In the subpoint, I will explore how Brandom attempts to prove objectivity by
demonstrating that we necessarily use mind-independent objects in our communication. To
discern his proof of objectivity, we need to understand his “linguistic rationalism” (Brandom
2000, 189).
In order to reconstruct Brandom’s proof of an objectivity, I will, firstly point out the
problem of incompatibility-difference that assertibility theories face. Secondly, I will explain that
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Brandom does not solve this problem, but that the problem is rooted in a misunderstanding of
what statements are really about. A propositional statements depends for him on mindindependent objects that transcend the context of their utterance. Thirdly, I will attempt to
construct an argument of how truth is guaranteed according to Brandom’s approach. All of this
will demonstrate that Brandom, contrary to Rorty’s interpretation, can be clearly identified as a
realist.

2.3.2.6.1 The Problem of Assertibility Theories
For Brandom, assertibility theories face the problem of an incompatibility-difference, if
equal propositional sentences are transformed into an explicit formulation. To explain
incompatibility difference Brandom uses the following examples:
1. “The swatch is red.” (Brandom 2000, 198)
2. “The claim that the swatch is red is properly assertible by me now.” (Brandom 2000, 198)

The two claims are related, since the second claim is an explicit version of the former one. Thus,
as Brandom argues further, the assertibility conditions are the same. The truth conditions,
however, are not the same (see Brandom 2000, 199). Brandom claims that if both statements
were the same, then both of them would be equally incompatible with other claims. In case of the
claim ‘rational beings never evolved’, however, the first claim that the swatch is red would be
compatible with it, while the second claim could not be stated (Brandom 2000, 199). Obviously
humans have to exist in order for this claim to exist. The difference of the explicit version in (2)
of the former proposition (1) poses a troubling problem for assertibility theories, because it
seems that ultimately we cannot have a viable theory of assertions that can consistently explain
how to make a proposition and its context of utterance explicit. Brandom wants therefore to
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prove the point that the truth of a statement does not depend on the person uttering it. He states
that:
[…] the commitments and entitlements they associate with ordinary empirical claims such as ‘The swatch
is red’ generate incompatibilities for these claims that differ suitably from those associated with any claims
about who is committed to, entitled to, or in position to assert anything (Brandom 2000, 204).

In other words, the objectivity does not depend on the community that makes it true or not. It
involves further conditions that constitute the possibility of objective errors of the speakers. For
Brandom, these further conditions depend on how things really are. I will discuss this
subsequently as the reference-dependence of assertions.

2.3.2.6.2 The Reference-Dependence of Assertions
Brandom suggests that there are incompatibilities that are independent from utterances.
He further suggests to discuss these context-invariant truths through his distinction of de dicto
and de re. As explained above, de dicto are claims that I am committed to and de re are claims
are claims that I am entitled to by virtue of objective entailments of the included propositions. He
writes, “[…] those contents display objectivity of a particular sort: they are not about any
constellation of attitudes on the part of the linguistic practitioners who produce and consume
them as reasons” (Brandom 2000, 190). It is not correct that this distinction will solve the
aforementioned problem of incompatibility-equivalence. Rather, Brandom claims that the
original sentence ‘the swatch is red’ cannot be simply transformed into the assertion of claiming
without noticing that it changes from a de re claim into a de dicto claim. This is because our
original claims are, according to Brandom, about a mind-independent reality. Hence, they should
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be discussed as de re claims and not as de dicto claims. This mind-independent reality is a
feature of our discourses that governs our discourses. He argues:
The point of all this is that the objectivity of propositional content […] is a feature we can make intelligible
as a structure of the commitments and entitlements that articulate the use of sentences: of the norms, in a
broad sense, that govern the practice of asserting, the game of giving and asking for reasons. (Brandom
2000, 203).

So Brandom takes the incompatibility-inadequacy as an indication for the fact that we refer in
our statement to how things really are. This is distinct from our de dicto claims. By ‘objectivity’
he understands then “something that could be true even if there had never been rational beings”
(Brandom 2000, 203). In Brandom’s words this means more explicitly “that in claiming that the
swatch is red we are not saying anything about who could appropriately assert anything, or about
who is committed or entitled to what” (Brandom 2000, 203). For Brandom, the content of a
claim is different from our navigational efforts and the position of the speaker. He argues that
only by virtue of accepting propositional content our claims gain objectivity. Thus, it is the
mutual acceptance of a mind-independent reality that is necessary for language games. This is, of
course, not yet a proof, for the mind-independence of objects. It is only the formal description of
the conditions of language games. Therefore, Brandom needs to provide a better argument. I
attempt to reconstruct such an argument derived from his theory in the following point.

2.3.2.6.3 Brandom’s Truth-Guarantee
The argument that Brandom presents is incomplete. It only presupposes that we talk
about mind-independent objects, but this does not say that we actually relate to mindindependent objects. Brandom, however, argues further that there must be something that
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grounds our assertions. This something must be the way of how things really are. Brandom uses
for this proof his normative vocabulary of commitment and entitlement. He firstly observes that
the simple ‘enhancement’ of the explicit form of our sentences does not alter incompatibilitydifferences:
2’. “I am now committed to the claim that the swatch is red.” (Brandom 2000, 200)
2’’. “I am now entitled to the claim that the swatch is red.” (Brandom 2000, 200)

Both of these claims are still incompatible with the claim that ‘rational beings never evolved’.
Nevertheless, they indicate how the speaker’s position in a community depends on more
conditions than the conditions for asserting. The first claim depends on the speaker’s attitude,
while the second claim depends on the reasons for the speaker believes to be entitled. With
regard to this, Brandom wants to make the following point:
Put another way, looking at propositional content in terms of incompatibilities, themselves defined in terms
of the fundamental normative statuses of commitment and entitlement, provides the expressive resources to
distinguish between the sense of ‘assertible’ that falls short of guaranteeing truth […], and the sense […]
that would guarantee truth (Brandom 2000, 203).

So, secondly, by using the normative vocabulary of commitments and entitlements we can,
according to Brandom, identify assertions that guarantee truth. This prepares the ground for a
possible-worlds-semantics. All possible-world-semantics must presuppose something that is
independent from rational beings because, since otherwise we could not make rational assertions.
For example, there is a “consequential commitment” so that the interpreter of the claim can
conclude from the assertion ‘the swatch is red’ that ‘the swatch is colored’ (Brandom 2000, 191).
Communicators must commit to this model. Brandom explains this again with regard to parrots.
Parrots respond by virtue of a stimulus. There is no further consequential commitment to the fact
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that the swatch is colored. Sapient animals, on the contrary, answer in terms of inferences. We
therefore agree that there is something connected to our assertion. Only on this basis, we
guarantee truth for our statement. Yet, this is still not a proof for a mind-independent reality. We
claim only that something else has motivated the claim.
Thus, thirdly, assertions possess “inferential consequences,” and “inferential antecedents,
relations to contents that can serve as premises from which entitlement to the original content
can be inherited” (Brandom 2000, 193-194). So we are committed to an assertion because it
entails something and we are entitled to our assertions because they depend on antecedents. The
idea must be that without such commitments to entailments and without entitlement by virtue of
antecedents, we would not have assertions that could be taken seriously. We would not be able to
play language games.
Fourthly, we have to consider that in order for something to count as an antecedent or an
entailment it must be propositionally structured, since otherwise we could not pick it up in our
assertion. Therefore, a mind-independent reality must be structured conceptually. So Brandom
deduces a concrete structure of mind-independent things, since otherwise our discourse would be
impossible.
I suggest that we reconstruct the complete argument as follows: we need to assume
objectivity in our inferential exchange of reasons. I must ask what does the other speaker infer
with regard to the content of his statements. This exchange has to include propositions, since
otherwise our statements would be incomprehensible to each other. Furthermore, propositions
are a requirement for inferences and inferences are part of the game of giving and asking for
reasons. From this follows that we all presuppose one reality that resembles the inferential
structure of our discourses, if we communicate. This secures a procedural objectivity. However,
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we have not yet secured contact with a mind-independent reality. If this were the argument, then
it is only securing a relativist, procedural truth. The fact that we assume an assertional force that
is independent from us does not yet prove that we have contact with a mind-independent reality
that could not be otherwise.107
Brandom does not ask for the conditions of assertion anymore, but he asks for the
circumstances that entitle us to claims (see Brandom 2000, 196). These conditions are not
context variant, but are assumed as stable, based on mind-independent facts, since without these
there would be no rational way to communicate. I must conclude that this is his proof. In other
words, all rational communities follow the pattern of assertive speech, since otherwise there
would be no communication. According to Brandom, our assertions are related to a mindindependent reality:
I have tried here to explain how we can begin to understand the objectivity of our thought – the way in
which the contents of our thought go beyond the attitudes of endorsement or entitlement we have toward
those contents – as a particular aspect of the normative fine structure of rationality (Brandom 2000, 203).

Objectivity consists consequently in the fact that our games of commitment and entitlement
presuppose a propositional syntax that resembles the structure of the world. Without this syntax
we could not be rational. The syntax, however, would also not be rational if it did not relate to
the world. Brandom’s argument is therefore a transcendental realism for the stable objectivity of
how to play language games and how we can only justify our claims through a contact with a
mind-independent reality.
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Brandom further defines then: “committive (that is commitment-preserving) inferences, a category that
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generalizes inductive inference; and incompatibility entailments, a category that generalizes modal (counterfactualsupporting) inference” (Brandom 2000, 195). For Brandom, this is the “normative fine structure of rationality”
(Brandom 2000, 196). Overall, this means that he transforms assertibility theories, but it still does not mean that he
proves a mind-independent reality.
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This cannot be a completed proof, since the assumption of a reality in order to
communicate does not guarantee knowledge of the mind-independent world. However, we can
answer the question of whether Brandom a realist? He is a realist. He says that without the
assumption of a mind-independent reality, rationality would not be possible. Since we
acknowledge each other as rational, we must acknowledge that there is a mind-independent
reality that is for everyone the same. It is not only the truth for the players within their language
games, but it is the truth for all meaningful language games. If there were not an underlying
reality, we could not be rational, which, according to Brandom, would be incompatible with the
fact that we are rational. Given these arguments it is justified to call Brandom not only a
procedural realist, but an external realist.108 I do not think that the argument is convincing. For
this reason, I will attempt to reconstruct further proofs from the corpus of Brandom’s works.

2.3.3 From Endorsements to the Objectivity of Entitlements
Above, I have discussed the relativist tendencies that Rorty sees in Brandom. I have
demonstrated that Brandom, on the contrary, pursues a procedural realism that ultimately
converges into an external realism. I summarized his proof of objectivity with regard to
Articulating Reason, which can be read in parallel to his proof of Making it Explicit. The proof
turned out to claim a necessity of the mind-independence of objects, since otherwise rational
108

The problem is that Brandom makes contradicting statements. First he claims that the recognition of
propositional contents that are objective is open to any community whose inferentially articulated practices
acknowledge the different normative statuses of commitment and entitlement (Brandom 2000, 203).
So it seems that Brandom suggests how we should lead our discourses. Then however, Brandom states, contrary to
such an epistemological pluralism: “I argued […] that this includes all rational communities – all of those whose
practices include the game of giving and asking for reasons. According to the thesis of linguistic rationalism, this is
all linguistic communities whatsoever” (Brandom 2000, 203).
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discourse would be impossible. The argument presupposes that one form of rational discourse
and its occasional success justify the concept of a propositionally structured, mind-independent
reality. This proof is weak, since there could be other forms of discourse. Success of our current
discourse model is not entirely guaranteed.
Despite these problems, I still need to investigate Brandom’s employment of the terms
‘commitment’ and ‘entitlement’ that are the main tools, in order to justify our relation to an
objective, mind-independent reality. It might be that Brandom claims that there are other poofs
possible.
I will firstly summarize how Brandom’s linguistic theory and its ‘fine-structure of
rationality’ contributes to models of communication. Then, I will explain the structure of
commitments, and finally on the basis of his linguistic model discuss a further possible argument
that endorsements, commitments and entitlements must correspond to mind-independent objects.

2.3.3.1 Brandom’s Linguistic Model as Opposed to Philosophy

Brandom follows the main idea of the linguistic turn that the way of how we can believe
something must be related to claiming (see Giovagnol 2001, 53).109 Beliefs are then not justified
by references. Rather, they are connected to an “inferentially articulated commitment”
(Giovagnol 2001, 53). Content is consequently formally defined within the discursive boundaries
of the propositional structure of these commitments (see Giovagnol 2001, 53). Though I do not
endorse Brandom’s claim to know a mind-independent reality, Brandom’s conceptual role
semantics is, in fact, a desideratum of discourse theory. According to Habermas’ approach, I can
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claim something to be true, but, at the same time, my invitation for critique seems then to be
incompatible with my claim that this is true. How then could I claim something to be true and
say, at the same time, that my claim is worth of critique? Brandom’s solution is supposed to
discern between absolute and limited truth claims in linguistic terms. His idea is that we cannot
decide whether a specific content is absolutely true, but that the way we communicate can be
objectively related to mind-independent objects. It is possible to explain the moves of a language
game that is related to claiming and the possible critique of these claims by virtue of Brandom’s
terms ‘commitment’ and ‘entitlement’. I can be committed to a claim, but the entitlement is
another question. According to Brandom, our activity is then guided by the idea of deontic scorekeeping which includes “attributing those statuses [commitment and entitlement] to others and
undertaking them themselves” (Giovagnol 2001, 53). “Assertional commitment” introduces a
discourse that demands a justificatory, propositional structure of all our commitments.
Commitment and entitlement, which are practical attitudes and the corresponding “deontic
attitudes of attributing” will reveal themselves as the ground for Brandom’s understanding of
truth (see Giovagnol 2001, 53). Brandom defends this as a propositional, discourse realism that I
discussed as anti-historical. I claim, however, that this particular discourse that Brandom defends
is based on a historical agreement of how we lead discourses.
There is, moreover, a seemingly important shift in Brandom’s thinking. Brandom’s strong
objectivist, semanticist claims seem to transform in recent years. In between Saying and Doing
(2008),110 he describes his future project as, on the one hand, to preserve the analytic enterprise,
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and, on the other hand, to explain the vocabulary of the pragmatic and the analytic vocabulary in
one possible but not conclusive meta-vocabulary. He writes:
For thinking of the metaphysical enterprise in semantic terms, as seeking to establish distinctive sorts of
relations among vocabularies, opens up the possibility of considering in this case, too, pragmatically
mediated semantic relations between vocabularies, in addition to the traditional kind (Brandom 2008, 230).

Despite this metaphysical commitment to a kind of universal, pragmatic vocabulary, Brandom
admits that this is not to express everything through this vocabulary. He specifies his project with
regard to use:
In particular, we can lay alongside the aspiration to find a vocabulary in which everything can be said, the
aspiration to find one in which one can say everything one must be able to do in order to say anything, that
is to use any vocabulary whatsoever. This is just the idea of a universal pragmatic metavocabulary
(Brandom 2008, 230).

This means that we still follow the idea of a universal, pragmatic metavocabulary, but Brandom
limits its range. We ask for a vocabulary that expresses the practical actions that are necessary
for saying something to be meaningful at all. It is the task of specifying what it means to produce
determinate content. Brandom is, indeed, conservative about a possible success. He denies that
“regimented de facto universal pragmatic metavocabulary” is as powerful as a universal semantic
language (Brandom 2008, 230). The latter would explicate all possible contents, the former
explicates all necessary actions for expressions, which is, in this sense, universal for actions (see
Brandom 2008, 230). But even for this universal vocabulary of necessary actions, Brandom
claims that success is not necessary:
I have already suggested, however, that the real payoff from the metaphysical enterprise should not be
thought of as consequent upon the anticipation of complete success at producing a regimented semantically
expressively universal vocabulary. In place of such a wholesale cognitive reward, we should think of the
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accumulation of retail rewards. Each only partially successful try at a universal metaphysical vocabulary
draws a line between those antecedent vocabularies it can reconstruct, and those it cannot. And each such
endeavor will draw a different line (Brandom 2008, 230).

With this emphasis of partial success, Brandom contextualizes, and relativizes his universal
claims. It is a strategy of falsification to see what we cannot do. Still, however, the claim that
there are particular actions necessary in order to say anything at all, can be grasped as the
classical foundationalism. The metaphysical implications of Brandom’s endeavor are blurred by
his shift from inferentialism to this kind of neo-pragmatism. These metaphysical implications
decide, however, whether Brandom is doing philosophy or linguistics. In light of his analysis, I
tend more and more to read Brandom as a model-theoretician of linguistics. His endeavor turns
out to be linguistics rather than philosophy. On the basis of this, it is reasonable to talk about
Brandom’s account as a linguistic model of how we produce meaning under agreed conditions in
particular situations, while the following ethical, religious, metaphysical consequences have to
be linked to this historical agreement in a particular situation. We cannot derive metaphysical
implications that are unhistorical from such a linguistic model. However, Brandom still intends
to ground all philosophy on the foundation of our communication, which is a philosophical
claim, but ultimately only justifiable if he can prove the objectivity of his linguistics as related to
a mind-independent reality. Then, all philosophy would, indeed, be linguistics.
I will discuss Brandom’s linguistic model and ask whether it is philosophy. I will present
the supposed “fine-structure” of rationality and then attempt to reconstruct his proof of mindindependent objects with regard to the terms ‘endorsement’, ‘commitment’ and ‘entitlement’.
This will be the last form of a proof for a mind-independent reality that I will investigate in
Brandom.
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2.3.4.2 Preserving Relations - First Dimension of Semantics

In particular, Brandom’s linguistic model distinguishes the dimensions of inferential
practices. In Between Saying and Doing (2008), the semantics is drawn in a more concrete
shape.111 Here, Brandom elaborates his semantic views of use in three dimensions. We are
already familiar with the first dimension from Making it Explicit: commitment preserving,
inferential relations.
In order to introduce a notion of propositional truth the first dimension should be
understood according to two relations:
1) commitment-preserving, inferential relation
2) the permissive or entitlement-preserving inferential relation

For 1), it is clear that if I say that all humans are mortal, and Socrates is a man, then I am
committed to the conclusion that Socrates is mortal. In this sense, a commitment stands
somehow in a relationship to deductive inference. If I want to preserve my commitment, then I
have to agree to deductive consequences. Of course, the question remains why our commitments
transition from universals to individuals, but I agree that we can observe such commitments in
our natural languages.
For 2), my commitment to certain statements is based on entitlement. Brandom gives here the
example of a red sky in the morning that the sailor takes to be a sign for an uprising storm (see
Brandom 2008, 120). I am entitled to this claim, though I cannot express it with certainty. The
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conclusion is not in contradiction to the premises, and the premises somehow support the
conclusion. Apparently Brandom believes that the concept of material incompatibility follows
from this approach:
Two assertible contents are incompatible in case the commitment to one precludes the entitlement to others.
Thus commitment to the content expressed by the sentence ‘The swatch is green’ rules out entitlement to
the commitment that would be undertaken by asserting the sentence ‘The swatch is red’ (Giovagnol 2001,
53).

The principle of non-contradiction is fundamental for Brandom. I cannot hold two ground-level
experiences at the same time. He, however, does not explain this by experience, but solely by the
logical commitments of different speakers and their entitlement. The principle of noncontradiction is based on how semantics work for Brandom according to his linguistic model.
This means that he presupposes non-contradiction that, however, is not necessarily observable in
experience. Graham Priest, for example, argues that it is reasonable, to have contradictory
commitments (dialetheism) that are meaningful. The principle of non-contradiction is not
abstracted from our phenomenological experience, but it is a helpful distinction on the level of
logic. Since it is not derived from experience, I therefore claim that it might not always hold.
Priest, for example, discusses the question of whether we are in a room or outside of a room, if
we are standing in the door and gives various other examples, in which the principle of noncontradiction is not followed in natural languages (see Priest 2017).112 Because of the feared,
‘logical Armageddon’, the idea that commitment to p and not p, will make q true in any case,
because of this principle of explosion, paraconsistent logics were held not to be possible. The
discussion around this is complex, but the insight that a theory does not necessarily have to be
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built upon the principle of non-contradiction is not entirely absurd. This is independent from the
Aristotelean question of whether such a first principle can be rich enough to derive all possible
phenomena from such a foundation.113 It occurs to me that Brandom makes non-contradiction
central to his approach, but, in fact, it is justified within his linguistic model and, thus, not
context-invariant.114 My point on the first semantic dimension is therefore that Brandom presents
a linguistic model with its own limitations that without a dialectical discussion lacks
philosophical importance.

2.3.4.3 Entailments of Commitments - The Second Dimension of Semantics:

Here, Brandom distinguishes between “concomitant”, and “communicational […]
inheritance of deontic statuses,” the way of how we adopt statuses (Bavaresco 2001, 53). From
the concomitant follows that we agree with a certain coherent structure that comes with the
claim. So, for example, if I say that something is red, I am also committed to the fact that it is
colored. The corresponding interpersonal use means that my commitment licenses others to
attribute these claims (see Brandom 2008, 121).
Brandom discusses these relations of individual language entries in their relation to
universals in his yet unpublished analysis of Hegel’s chapter on perception. The dialectical
relation between universal and individual has to be investigated. Contrary to Brandom’s
argument that we somehow commit to a logically consistent semantic whole, the phenomenon of
metaphors suggests that the consequences cannot always be easily traced. If I say, for example,
that a piece of music occurs to me as rather yellow than green, I play with the extremes of the
113
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application of the concept of yellow. The association of yellow and color might be more
complicated and this is a simple example. From saying that a piece of music is yellow, however,
it does not follow that it is an object that possesses colors in the narrow sense. So the
commitment to an individual statement is not necessarily a force that relates me entirely to other
consequences, neither pragmatically nor semantically. For this reason, it is unclear what my
commitments really entail.
I do not disagree that Brandom’s conclusions are plausible, but I do not see that the force
he describes as a relation between individuals and universals is necessary. This indicates that
Brandom discusses rather the characteristics of a linguistic model than that he follows a
philosophical, dialectical discussion, which would qualify as philosophy.

2.3.4.4 The Third Dimension of Semantics: Responsibility

Brandom claims that commitments stand in relation to responsibility. The main form of
the assertion does two things: It authorizes for further assertions, but more important by virtue of
it we take over responsibility. Brandom writes: “The responsibility emerges from the entitlement
to the commitment expressed by the performer’s assertions” (see Brandom 2008, 121). I am not
entirely sure whether Brandom intends to reduce normativity to propositional commitments. If
so, then this formalism needs to be criticized, because responsibility induced by commitments
and entitlements is an abstraction and does not include the full range of human responsibility.
This means that responsibility does not only depend on explicit assertions expressed in claims.
The limits of the model become clear if we consider the example of a judge. A judge can also
assume a certain commitment of a person without this person having uttered his intentions
explicitly. Responsibility is not only introduced by utterances in the form of assertions, but can
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also be concluded from practices that consist or have consisted. Then, responsibility is not only a
matter of the objective and ‘freely’ uttered commitment. To reduce responsibility to
propositional claims would therefore be a mistake. Responsibility does not only depend on
formal actors and their choice of participating in discourse, but is beyond this tied to us as
humans who live in communities with various forms of discourse, and possibly non-discursive
forms of living. It is also a stretch that language implicitly includes all of these normative
obligations. Instead, we could also say that it is people in their specific historical moment who
perform relationships of responsibility. For our historical moment, we might do this mainly in
the form of language. This leads to the thesis that expressions of language might only be the
momentary surface expressions of an underlying dialectical structure of reason/spirit, or even the
determinated symbols of an underlying, existential paradox that is expressed in our history. A
formal structure of commitment and entitlement misses the openness of human history; it
attempts to bring history to a closure by bringing language to a closure.115

2.3.4.5 Conclusions on Brandom’s Linguistic Model

We can conclude that Brandom develops his linguistic model, which in itself might be a
valuable suggestion to pragmatics and linguistic theory. Yet, it fails to develop the claims from a
systematic, historical perspective, which I regard to be an important philosophical standard. This
includes to justify the different, introduced criteria of entitlement and commitment. ‘Entitlement’
and ‘commitment’ serve as tools in order to explain different problems of assertoric theory.
Brandom justifies them by a relation to propositional structures and deduces different, debatable
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consequences from them. It is a way of how we trace truth values by ascribing roles to actors in
our language games. This, however, leaves open an investigation of propositions that Brandom
might justify by the idea that only propositions can serve as reasons, and which finally reveals a
further commitment to inferential holism. With regard to this lack of justifications, it occurs that
the standpoint of science has to be achieved by a phenomenological investigation of us engaging
in sciences, starting with natural consciousness that attempts to explain meaning. On the opposite
side, Brandom’s kind of transcendental pragmatics of assuming the possibility of truth-talk, and
then demonstrating the necessary conditions is insufficient and certainly not Hegelian. Hegel, as
I will show later, follows a dialectic phenomenology. Brandom, however, presupposes, firstly,
that we actually talk about a mind-independent reality. And, secondly, he deduces this
presupposition from the idealizations of a semantic language. With regard to Hegel’s starting
point, we can say, furthermore, that Hegel does not believe that content requires material
incompatibility as Brandom presupposes. He does not develop a semanticist vocabulary. He also
does not introduce different actions like commitment and entitlement. Rather, he points with his
dialectic to contextualism which converges in all of its instances into a conception of history.
This means that if there is a semantic theory, then this theory is a product of its history, but not a
universal foundation for all theories that will emerge.
According to Habermas, Brandom’s theory does not yet achieve an ontological status of
what is, but only a formal, probably empty talk of theoretical observers. In a word, it is a
linguistic model. This model cannot yet give us insights into metaphysical questions. A too
strong commitment to formal pragmatics rules out a way back into the ethical, substantial
questions that have to be answered. Brandom’s philosophy desubstantializes, for example,
responsibility that is reduced to the attribution of different commitments in language games.
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Despite these well-known problems, there are many philosophers who believe that
Brandom’s model can open a path to reality. Stout mentions in his Introduction to Pragmatism
that we can achieve objectivity for our communicative practices by Brandom’s model. He writes:
For the same reasons that baseball can be played on the sandlots and soccer can be played in the streets,
ethical discourse can retain an objective dimension without there being a single authority on questions of
truth and falsity. In ethics, as in most other forms of objective discourse, we are all keeping track of our
interlocutors’ attitudes, as well as our own (Stout, 2004, 272)116

As already pointed out before, however, a coherent system, does not qualify to be a true system
expressing a mind-independent reality. This is because there are many systems possible. We still
need a criterion why this system is supposed to be better than others. A baseball game that Stout
uses as an example, moreover, is not inherently related to morality and is quite different from
moral questions of just actions. We can play many games and agree on many rules. All these
games would be coherently played. So it is not only the question of how to play an arbitrarily
chosen game. There is not much a difference of whether we prefer to play baseball or basketball.
It matters, however, if we decide to do genetic engineering or whether we decide against it.
During a baseball game, it only means that we accept something to be an authority for playing a
game. Whether this authority that we accept is ultimately correct or wrong remains undecided.
The metaphor of a game is therefore too limited for discussing responsibilities in a society. It
would be cynical to argue that the war in Syria, for example, is only a particular form of
language game like baseball.
The idea that we are only keeping track of our competitors in a game is, moreover, a too
shortened understanding of how societal interaction occurs and it is also a too short answer for
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what is a just rule of action for mankind. The question is: what are the substantial ontological
entailments that we can derive from Brandom’s position? What are the normative obligations
and how do they influence questions of morality? Either Brandom’s theory remains empty, or, as
Habermas assumes later, it leads to an annihilation of individual responsibility, since it
overemphasizes arbitrary, theoretical communication without considering the historical,
substantially contingent position of the participant.
Before, I come to these questions, however, I will demonstrate the ontological entailment
that Brandom assumes for his model. This entailment is his semantic realism. I attempt to
reconstruct a final proof of reality from the presented fine-structure of rationality.

2.3.3.6 Realism and Brandom’s Linguistic Model

Once more, the question is: what follows ontologically from Brandom’s conclusions?
Beyond the question of the productivity of his vocabulary for explaining certain target
vocabulary, it is questionable which normative force can be applied to this theory of use, and
what Brandom thinks reality is. Brandom seems to claim that we can somehow construct the
ontologically rich notion of a real world by looking at the use of our language. I will reconstruct
his argument in more detail, especially with regard to Bransen’s’ interpretation of Brandom’s
realism-argument.
The argument begins with an analysis of endorsements. An endorsement is, according to
Bransen’s interpretation, a “way of how we take the world to be” (Bransen 2012, 6).117
Endorsing doors means, for example, that we could walk through them, in order to leave or enter
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a house. The next step follows the insights of the linguistic turn. Bransen thinks that these
endorsements are conceptualized in language and are not an independent work of the mind:
“Many philosophers now tend to think that language is the fundamental locus of intentionality,
and that thinking comes in late as a kind of inner saying” (Bransen 2012, 6).
In other words, expression comes before meaning. This actually reverses the order of
explanation. It is not that doors simply exist, but that we interpret them by an integration into our
practical net of language. Bransen stresses here that the utterance of a concept is an invitation for
endorsing the commitments of actors (Bransen 2012, 6). They are language-entries. The speaker
emphasizes how the world looks to him, according to his use of language. So the speaker assigns
a space for something in his net of inferential reasons. In the instance of endorsing a door, it is
not only an event, but an inferentially understood reason that makes other moves possible (see
Bransen 2012, 7). In this sense, intentional content has to be articulated in linguistic terms (see
Bransen 2012, 8). The content, however, is not yet explicated in a propositional structure so that
we can commit to various consequential reasons. Endorsements are expressions of entering a
language, while commitments are the explicit versions of the implicit structures of endorsement.
Commitments: A commitment is the explicit acknowledgment that something is in a certain
way. It is embedded in an underlying ontological structure of reasons so that it actually is
assertible (see Brandom 1998, 157). These structures can be traced in different directions, since
they can serve as a premise or as a conclusion. So the task is to describe how observational
reports that we endorse are expressed in commitments (see Bransen 2012, 7). This means that I
am inferring somehow that my endorsement is not only a semblance, but that it also relies on a
world in which things appear. Commitments express a justifiable content with regard to the order
of a world (see Brandom 1998, 157).
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With regard to commitment and endorsement, we can find a problematic connection to
linguistic consciousness. If it is true that expressions precede thinking, why then are we entitled
to ascribe awareness to, for example, sticklebacks, who do not express commitments in language
(see Bransen 2012, 7)? The ascription is relative to our language. It is because we only attribute
awareness from our perspective (see Bransen 2012, 7). Animal consciousness is therefore
concluded from our sphere of discourse. The particular awareness expressed in endorsements
needs to be characterized as a “discursive entry transition” that leads us to commitments
(Bransen 2012, 9). Bransen explains this transition from endorsements to commitments.
Observing a sunset, or a door, or a trespasser over there, in the conceptual mode, is a matter of being
committed to certain discursive inferences. The fact that the perceptual state is a receptive, or affective,
state just means that it is an entry transition: by being in this state one enters the game of giving and asking
for reasons with a specific ‘deontic score’ (Bransen 2012, 9-10).

In other words, we transition from a mode of observation to a language that explicates nets of
reasons. The observation has no independent status. Rather, it is interpreted and integrated in our
net of reasons. Thus, the world is not represented, but interpreted. The question arises again:
what can be identified as realism here?
Brandom’s realism argument: Bransen claims that only on the basis of these common
commitments we can share endorsements. Now, uttering that something is a door is not only an
observational report, it, moreover, embeds an action into a net of inferential relations. We open a
space of reasons “in which entitlements can be one’s share — and this means that there are
doors!” (Bransen 2012, 11). Somehow our entitlement is supposed to justify the real existence of
something that our interpretations are about. Without such a fundamental aboutness, our
endorsements would be meaningless. In order to support this thought, Bransen claims therefore
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that somehow our communication is only instrumental and its particular structure makes a mindindependent reality necessary.
Brandom has, however, different strategies in order to prove the mind-independent
reality. So, for example, he also criticizes a mere phenomenalism that cannot successfully
establish a relation to the reality (see Brandom 1998, 294). He makes this clear with regard to the
claim that the world is a constellation of facts: “[T]hose facts are structured and interconnected
by the objects they are facts about; they are articulated by the properties and relations the
obtaining of which is what we state when we state a fact” (Brandom 1998, 333). So Brandom
thinks that our commitments only make sense if they are about objects that are “propertied and
related” (Brandom 1998, 333). Brandom further elaborates that we cannot understand
endorsements, if they are not supposed to relate to a mind-independent reality. In other words,
this means that even though all of our assumptions about the real object might be wrong, the
endorsement of a commitment means to assume the entitlement that at least these assumptions
are about something real that is mind-independent (see Bransen 2012, 11). His idea is that
without any entitlement justified by something that is mind-independent, there could be no
normativity and even endorsements could not be understood as endorsements. So the argument is
that only if all three, endorsement, commitment, and entitlement are given, each one would have
justification. Bransen gives an example:
‘Thunder will be heard soon’ or ‘The streets will be wet’ or ‘That is a door’, then this means, truly and
objectively, that there is thunder and that it will be heard soon, that there are streets, and that they will be
wet, and that there is a door (Bransen 2012, 11).

I do not disagree with a phenomenal experience. If an alcoholic, for example, claims that he sees
white mice, he probably sees white mice. However, this does not mean that there are white mice.
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Bransen’s attempt becomes clearer if we consider so-called seems-talk. If I say, for example, that
there seems to be a door, I would withhold to assign an absolute truth value to my argument. If I
used the seeming-operator in any situation, I would never commit to any content that would be
traceable in a discourse. Brandom notices this problem, too. According to him, a first analysis
would bring us to the absurd idea that something seems to seem. So, at least, we had to accept
the phenomenalist perspective. Brandom argues further that the withholding of an endorsement
(it only seems) stems from a former experience of failed beliefs (see Brandom 1998, 293).
Seems-talk therefore presupposes an original aboutness. Brandom thinks that this is where the
“subjective phenomenalism” of the classical pragmatisms fails (see Brandom 1998, 212).
Brandom elaborates here in more detail that ‘seems’ is a result of experiential episodes:
[T]hese locutions are introduced after such a practice is under way, as a way of dealing with systematic
sources of perceptual error that one becomes aware of through having to withdraw unreflective,
noninferential claims on the basis of their incompatibility with commitments one is otherwise entitle to […]
(Brandom 1998, 293).

In other words, that something seems a certain way comes from an experience that things are
different from how we take them to be. For Brandom ‘seems’ expresses a “withholding” of an
endorsement (see Brandom 1998, 293). He explicitly formulates: “Because in order of
understanding, grasp of what is expressed by concepts of the form ‘seems-K’ presupposes grasp
of what is expressed by corresponding concepts of the form ‘is-K’” (Brandom 1998, 295). The
discovery of a relation between semblance and reality, nevertheless, is not such an overwhelming
insight. In fact, it is very similar to Hegel’s insight that something is, on the one hand, for
consciousness and that, on the other hand, something can be taken as in-itself. Hegel, however,
discovers both of them as dialectically related, and argues further that the distinction itself is for
consciousness. On the contrary, Brandom’s discovery that seems-talk is related to a concept of
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reality fails to understand this relationship as dialectical and presupposes the thought of reality as
prior.
We can argue, moreover, that also the term of reality itself is meaningless, if there is not a
possibility of semblance. By this I mean that we would never talk about an ideal of reality, if
semblance would not always be a possibility. According to my view, both terms are then
equiprimordial and need another grounding in order to be discussed appropriately. Thus,
phenomenalism, which Brandom explicitly rejects, is an equal choice compared with Brandom’s
semantic realism (see Brandom 1998, 296). Thus, we have to investigate the dialectical relation
between semblance and content.
However, Brandom claims that for each phenomenalist claim there is a corresponding
“realist” (Brandom 1998, 296)118 claim, since semblance is grounded in ‘real’ experiences. In
other words, Brandom wants to trade in phenomenalism for an account of linguistically
“undertaking and attributing commitments” (Brandom 1998, 297). Brandom reduces therefore
the problem of a genuine phenomenology to a linguistic confusion that only needs to be clarified
by the “fine-grained” terms of commitments and entitlement (Brandom 1998, 297).
My argument is different: even though seems-talk is a talk that we utter after
disappointments, truth-talk would be talk that we utter after knowing that disappointments are
possible. As a result both talks mean that the object that natural consciousness attempted to grasp
might finally not correspond to the theory that we have generated. I do not see, however, how we
could ever verify our theories. Rather, I do acknowledge that our theories result from experience
and our reflection on those. After all, all our theories start with experience.
118

One of the only passages where I could find Brandom referring to ‘realism’. The rare use might explain why
Rorty does not interpret Brandom as a realist.
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Proving the reality of experiences, and proving that there are consequents, and
antecedents does not prove a mind-independent reality. It only explains the structure of having
experiences so far. I do not deny that this analysis can be meaningful. It, however, does not give
us a clear realism in exchange. I agree with the argument that there is no experience of
something immediate that is not mediated. To claim, however, that these real objects are mindindependent and not a result of our interaction is the point of debate. ‘Reality’ in its dialectical
relation to semblance remains a subordinate term of a broader epistemology. In fact, Bransen
does not demonstrate reality with his examples, he demonstrates that we justify and associate our
endorsements with a certain structure of the world that is expressed here in terms of
commitments and entitlements, a linguistic model. To do so is not wrong, but it does not cover
all possible communicative or non-communicative problems. For these reasons, there remains a
very pragmatic question: can the proposed structure of Brandom’s inferentialism support such an
experiential structure without failure?
Now, it is right that there is a problem of communication that Bransen summarizes:
That is, we need to be able to relate the inferential relations that characterise particular conceptual contents
from our own perspective to the inferential relations that characterise these same conceptual contents from
other perspectives. (Bransen 2012, 18).

I agree with Bransen. This is the problem of communication. How do we relate to others?
Bransen’s conclusion, however, is problematic:
And we can only succeed in relating to one another in this way – and that means we can only succeed in
playing the essentially social game of giving and asking for reasons – if we have the capacity to individuate
conceptual contents that are de re, that are “objective in the sense of transcending the attitudes of
practitioners (Bransen 2012, 19).
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Since Brandom’s arguments are not successful in proving reality, since he also does not say what
he understands reality to be, I suggest to read his theory as a linguistic model, while its
philosophical claims are too bold. With regard to the presupposed solutions, I can agree that we
might become better at playing baseball. Nevertheless, I do not see how we approach with his
communicational model any mind-independent reality. ‘Endorsement’, ‘commitment’ and
‘entitlement’ are terms that are introduced in reference to problems of experience that occurred
in our history. This history focused more and more on formalizing our language and abandoned
the concepts of consciousness. Can we justify beyond our experience that the propositional
standards of analytic philosophy bring us closer to a mind-independent reality? I could not find
sufficient arguments for this in Brandom.
In general, I have to say that I do not reject the term of reality. I argue, however, that
reality is a subordinate concept that I needs to be reconstructed within a historical model of how
we express ourselves during the course of our historical development.

2.3.4 Anaphors and the Problem of Communication?

I have demonstrated firstly that Brandom’s semantic realism remains unclear. Secondly, that his
idea of normativity is vague and that its objectivity cannot be secured. Thirdly, that the
ontological consequences from his distinctions are not carrying beyond linguistics. Despite these
difficulties, I still would like to ask whether we may identify meaning only on inferentialist
grounds. For doing so, I will first discuss how the so-called communication problem is related to
Brandom’s inferentialism. The communicational problem describes the difficulty to explain
communicational success without references to individuals. After having reconstructed this
problem, I will discuss Brandom’s substitutional semantics that is supposed to access the

151

problem of individuals by anaphoric structures. Anaphors are used, in order to explain how
communicational success is possible without referencing such individuals. First, however, I will
clarify the main terms that are guiding Brandom’s endeavor. This is his inferentialism in relation
to a meaning holism.

2.3.4.1 Inferentialism and Meaning Holism

Inferentialism is the idea that we know objects by virtue of inferences. It goes hand in
hand with the assumption that speakers can always hold different opinions based on the possibly
different inferences that constitute an object for them. It is consequently unclear of how we
communicate about given objects if they are based on different, experiential systems that are
rather accessible to the speaker than for the communication-community. Lacking a stable point
of reference, we face the problem of skepticism again, here the impossibility to communicate
exhaustively our different cognitions about objects. The problem can also be phrased in terms of
the communication problem: what does it mean to have shared determinate objects in a
community in which each individual has different access to objects?
A meaning holism assumes, in contrast to an atomism, that the meaning of all words is
interconnected. This means that there are no stable reference points, but that we point out
structural, and partial relations between objects that we have determined. It is also different from
molecularism according to which words are bound to small groups of meaning. In this case ‘kill’,
for example, would be bound to ‘die’ and ‘cause’ (see Jackman 2017). This means that each
word is composed by smaller parts that in composition can provide meaning. Meaning holism
goes far beyond this. We can find the first traces of meaning holism in analytic philosophy with
regard to Quine’s famous rejection of the distinction between analytic and synthetic judgements
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which brings him to the following conclusions: “[I]t is misleading to speak of the empirical
content of an individual statement” (Quine 1951, 40),119 and that “[t]he unit of empirical
significance is the whole of science” (Quine 1951, 39). In these two statements Quine expresses
that there is no simple reference of an individual statement, but that it is instead the whole of
science that is captured in each statement because each statement is made on grounds of a
possible whole. Hempel comes up with a similar idea: “the cognitive meaning of a statement in
an empiricist language is reflected in the totality of its logical relationships to all other statements
in that language” (Hempel 1950, 59).120 This means that each statement is bound to a systematic
whole that is implicitly presupposed by the speakers. Meaning holism means therefore that each
individual statement refers to language as a whole. Both meaning holism and inferentialism lead
to the communication problem, since a possible whole might be structured differently by each
individual speaker (see Jackman 2017).
Brandom follows an inferentialist, meaning holism, as exemplified in the following
statement: “For the content of each concept is articulated by its inferential relations to other
concepts” (Brandom 2009, 15). So content is understood by inferences, and since every concept
is understood by inferences that direct us beyond the immediate, concepts are determined by
their relationship to a whole of concepts. Brandom claims more explicitly that “inferential
articulation broadly construed is sufficient to account for conceptual content” (Brandom 2008,
28) and that such an „inferentialist semantics is resolutely holist” (Brandom 2008, 15). This
means, moreover, that knowing one concept requires knowing many, since each concept is
generated on the basis of other concepts (see Brandom 2008, 15). Finally Brandom states:
119
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“Conceptual holism is a straightforward consequence of that approach” (Brandom 2008, 16). So
Brandom sees a close relation between inferentialism and holism. Many, if not all concepts, are
involved in the constitution of the content of one concept. If, however, all concepts are involved,
then the question of successful communication becomes problematic, since we can refer to one
concept in many, and possibly infinite ways. I will explore this problem in the following
subpoint.

2.3.4.2 Navigational Semantics – Sharing Content without Content

According to Mueller,121 Brandom defends a navigation-model. This means that we do
not share contents, but give information on how to navigate around contents. There are some
premises for understanding this. Most important, we communicate because we have different
perceptions and conceptions of objects, since we interpret objects with regard to different
inferences that we draw according to a holistic, conceptual, and individual network that each
speaker possesses. In a word, we have a different understanding for each object. Thus, Mueller
points out: “Brandom considers the systematic difference in information among individuals as
the ‘point’ of communication” (see Mueller 2014, 141). This point of communication leads to the
necessity of navigating “among perspectives without sharing contents” (Mueller 2014, 141),
since we cannot refer to one and the same content by using different concepts. In other words,
we do not have the correct content in our mind, just because somebody utters a word that is
associated with a content in their mind.122 On the grounds of this, Mueller defines the relation
121
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between meaning holism and meaning with regard to Brandom’s approach: “Welchen Gehalt ein
bestimmter Ausdruck (im Gegensatz zu anderen gehaltvollen Ausdrücken ähnlicher
grammatischer Art) hat, ergibt sich wiederum vollständig aus der Rolle, die der Ausdruck für das
Gesamtsystem guter Schlussfolgerungen spielt, dem er angehört“ (Mueller 2014, 146). So the
content of an expression is defined by the singular role it has in a complete system of
conclusions to which the expression belongs. Since, however, an expression can be interpreted in
dependence of the language-user, there is no single determinate role and thus also no single
determinate content. There are only users who attempt to agree on the content they discuss.
Let us say, for example, I see an object and call it a plane, while another person sees it
and says it is a car. Now both of our statements are interpretations depending on the contextual
conditions. We both might have reasons to call it this or that. Now, if any interpretation were
possible, so that somebody else could call it a mule, or another person could call it a planet, then
we face the problem of contributing meaning to something at all. It is reasonable to assume that
something restricts our approach to the world. So how are we forced to specify the meaning of
our sentences? We can also find an example that is more understandable. If I say ‘I see a bird’,
then ‘bird’ can have a very different meaning for different people. It might mean an object that
can fly, or I might mean a bird that cannot fly such as penguins. In one instance, I could refer to
something that is capable of flying. In another instance, I might not refer to this feature of flying.
The main problem is that referring to something does not mean to refer to its essence, but
referring to its construction. That, however, means that referring is preceded by certain types of
inferences. And this means that we are not talking about objects as existing in an external reality,
Systems von den potentiell gehaltsbestimmenden Bedingungen ausgeschlossen, dann stellt sich unter der
unproblematischen Annahme, dass die genauen Hintergrundbedingungen zur Gehaltsbestimmung individuell
variieren werden, die unmittelbare Frage, wie Kommunikation unter dieserart perspektivisch gehaltsbestimmenden
Individuen möglich ist“ (Mueller 2014, 142).
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but about how we agree to construct something. Thus, there are two questions: firstly, how to
construct an object for our mind? Secondly, how do we construct objects that can actually be
shared with others, so that we do not merely construct objects for ourselves? Agreement on
construction can guide us to come to an agreement on shared, determinated contents.
The form of these questions, however, already implies my constructivist grasp of the
communicational problem. In my mind, it is a mistake to distinguish these questions, since we
could assume that the formal construction of objects in the mind (the method) is never
independent from its referent (the content) that we discuss between communication partners. It is
necessary to develop a phenomenological account of how something appears to us, and how
formations of identity are involved in this process. As discussed before, Brandom, however,
distinguishes the formal method of rationalism, which is the normative discourse between
speakers, from determinate objects and how they really are. He avoids, therefore, a dialectical
investigation of content and method.123
My thesis is that Brandom, in order to escape the problem of explaining the ontological
difference between things and language, and their dialectical relation as content and form,
introduces anaphora. Anaphora are means that always refer to something that preceded them. By
virtue of the mechanism of anaphora, we could reasonably pick up content without representing
it. The main question is then: Are these anaphoric backward inferences rich enough to guarantee
the exchange of content between speakers so that communication is successful? The other
important question is: Are anaphora really inferential structures? In order to investigate these
questions, I will introduce the idea of anaphora in more detail in the following.

123
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2.3.4.3 A Relativizing Note of Brandom on his Solution

Before I will present Brandom’s inferentialist solution to the communicational problem, I
have to emphasize Brandom’s self-critical remarks about the inferentialist account. After
releasing Making it Explicit, Brandom seems to have come to a different position, or, at least, he
implicitly acknowledges that inferentialism and representationalism might be a problem of a
hidden dialectic. Already in Making it Explicit Brandom writes:
Other possibilities include treating neither representation nor inference as explanatorily prior to the other.
One might then go on to explain both in terms of some third notion, which is treated as more fundamental.
Or one might eschew reductive explanations in semantics entirely and remain contented with describing the
relations among a family of mutually presupposing concepts (Brandom 1998, 669, footnote 90).

This footnote already reveals that it is less a question of either one of two theoretical approaches.
In one of his later responses to problems of his inferentialism, Brandom relativizes the meaning
of inferentialism further:
It may be, after all, that neither can be understood apart from the other — that reference and inference come
as an indissoluble conceptual package that cannot be analyzed reductively, but only relationally. I agree, of
course. Looking for a way to get an independent theoretical grip on one range of concepts, and then
explicating the other in terms of it is only one strategy for illuminating the relations between the
representational and inferential perspectives on semantic content (Brandom 2008, 215).124

Brandom opts indirectly for a dialectical solution, which then, however, relativizes his
foundationalist claims with regard to an inferentialist, formal semantics. His inferentialist
strategy aims to develop a structure of reasons that provides a notion of objectivity. If this
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objectivity, however, is only one side of a dialectical coin, then it is not objectivity in the sense
that our discourses bring us closer to external reality. This is because in this case we would not
have yet considered the whole, but only the dialectical side of inferentialism and thus statements
about its striking power would be too early.
As already pointed out, epistemologically, the problem of the existence and access to an
external world is based on a major rejection of the Idealist framework of Hegel. Though proofs
of the external world do not play a role in Brandom’s framework anymore, he follows the
remainders of this tradition. The question is transformed. Now, it is the question of whether the
external world, which is presupposed, is immediately approachable or whether it is only
mediated by concepts. The recent neo-pragmatist epistemology transformed analytic approaches
into contextualism. This means, immediate contact with reality was given up. Brandom follows
the line of Sellars’ and proposes the extreme of this perspective on mediation, a merely
inferentialist account. As already pointed out, the term ‘experience’ does not belong to his
vocabulary anymore. Giving up on immediate references, a concrete contact with an outside
world, such an inferentialism encounters the communication problem, the problem of how we
share contents. Brandom wants to solve this problem by using the idea of anaphora.
Overall, the contribution of anaphors explains to us interesting structural relations of how
we construct, transport, and extract meaning during communicational exchange in terms of a
linguistic model. Even though Brandom considers a hidden dialectic theoretically, as seen above,
he treats anaphora as the overall solution to the problem of reference. As a consequence, the role
of experience, which includes the problem of how to construct objects at all, is only partly taken
into consideration. So, for example, Brandom constantly presupposes the existence of
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determinate objects in an external reality, but does not discuss how this is also an inference. I
will explain this problem and his solution of anaphora in more detail.

2.3.4.4 Substitution

Before I can discuss anaphora, I have to explain once again Brandom’s substitutional
semantics, in order to assign the theoretical space for anaphora. This involves discussing the
problem of a merely substitutional account and its relation to the problem of individuals.
According to Brandom’s linguistic model, content is understood by virtue of coherence.
More concretely, Brandom states: “To be propositionally contentful is to be able to play the role
both of premise and of conclusion in an inference” (Brandom 2009, 167-168).125 This means that
semantic identity does not depend on the accurate representation of an outside world, but
depends on how much a term alters the coherence and interrelations within a constituted system.
Knowledge, for Brandom, is then about our mastery of treating something inferentially within
the systematic boundaries of a coherent system. This coherent system is established by a
community of speakers, and their normative, objective rules. Their normative, objective rules are
guided by the only way of how they can have meaningful discourse, according to Brandom’s
linguistic model. Brandom’s model is supposed to work without the representationalist
repertoire, thus it operates only with so called norms of coherence.126
Substitution is here the most important tool for Brandom. This means that in order to
know a term, we need to be able to substitute it salva veritate. In other words, the overall
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inference remains the same. These rules of substitution are borrowed from Sellars, and Frege, as
demonstrated above. If we identify content correctly, then we can find cases in which we can
substitute its term by another equivalent term. This, however, means only that we must be
capable to apply such a substitution according to a criterion of prior, correct identification. In
fact, a merely substitutional account faces the problem of how we come to concepts empirically.
How do we possess concepts that are substitutable? This further implies that somehow the
content of our empirical experience must be translated into inferential structures. However, we
have to keep Brandom’s restrictions in mind: without substitutions there are no inferences. So if
there were something that preceded the idea of substitution, then this preceding object would be
meaningless. The complicated question is then: how do we refer to objects that cannot be simply
referred to as being outside of the inferentialist structure? It seems that we cannot avoid
reference here because we cannot give any identity criterion for determinate objects that are not
part of our inferentialist chain. This is at its core the problem of singular terms, which I will
explain in the following subpoint.

2.3.4.5 Singular Terms and Individuals

Singular terms are subsentential expressions that, according to a descriptivist account,
refer to individuals. Accordingly, they build a relation between word and world by picking out
an individual object that is unrepeatable and not universal. Thus, it seems that we refer to
individuals by using singular terms. This, however, faces the problem of an ontological
difference, the question of how to translate something of the ontologically causal world order
into the conceptual order of the mind. This could also be signified as the problem of
representationalism.
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For Brandom such subsentential expressions could not be inferential, since only a
proposition can function in a syllogism (see Brandom 1998, 335). According to this model, it
seems then that individuals could be known only aposteriori through experience, which would
imply that we think them in an extensional order. According to its extension, a term would have
many objects that fall under it, while a singular term would have only one object that can be
pointed out and signified with a singular term. Such accounts usually lead to paradoxes of
different beliefs. For example, Londres, which is the French word for London, is said to have bad
weather, while London, which we know from personal experience, might be quite nice. As a
consequence, we would hold contradictory beliefs about the same object. Brandom’s anaphoric
account is supposed to solve, or rather to avoid such contradictions, also known as the Kripke
puzzle.127 How does Brandom, therefore, solve this problem?
Brandom’s main thesis is that an object that can only be referred to in one individual way
does not bear any universal characteristics, and thus there is nothing that can be referred to. This
thesis therefore rejects the representationalist strategy for relating individuals and singular terms
by a simple reference. It is similar to my analysis above. For Brandom, singular terms are only
comprehensible if they are grasped within a network of substitutional inferences. This means that
a singular object that is pointed out to me as a concrete object is not perceived as a unity without
difference. The singular object has features by virtue of which I must be able to identify it. For
127
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Brandom, objects are the same, or reidentifiable, if they follow the same rules of substitution that
means they must be related to predicates. Or, in other words, they must be part of a network of
syllogisms.
If we, for example, refer to a man wearing a military uniform, and I point him out with
my finger, the problem of reference comes to the fore. This is similar to Quine’s famous Gavagai
example. It means that perceptions are not inferential. Yet, they are meaningless without their
integration into the inferentialist structure. So I perceive this man, but it is unclear whether I refer
to this man in his capacity of being a soldier, whether I refer to his uniform, the color of his
uniform, his reoccurrence, or whatsoever. Only if I make the rules of his appearance explicit then
I will produce an information package about an object. Rules of its appearance make objects
determinate for me, and the idea is that I transport these rules of appearance to others by making
the rules explicit. Thus, singular terms are not describing the object directly, but are indirectly
used to locate the event according to our method of construction. This is Brandom’s solution.
Prima facie, it looks like a nominalism, but it will turn out to be a realism and we have to
demonstrate this with regard to anaphora in more detail later.
Brandom wants to demonstrate that demonstratives depend on substitutions.128 The model
of substitution might allow us to refer to something without repeating its complete meaning. If I,
for example, see a specific color, and I only relate it to a preexisting network of semantic
relations, I do not mean this individual color. Instead, I substitute this experience with a higher
formal term that belongs to a class of similar substitutions. The main idea is that something is not
properly described, if we only refer to its occurrence and how it only occurs to us individually. If
there are unrepeatable events, then we cannot substitute these events by other terms, since they
128
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are unrepeatable. In this sense, we cannot simply introduce them as the experience x. To know,
means rather to utter in a way that somebody else could receive information about the object.
According to Brandom’s model, the interpreter does so by reconstructing the meaning conditions
of one’s use of singular terms (see Mueller 2014, 147). He basically concludes how the speaker
refers to something that is unrepeatable.
For Brandom, there is a decisive problem left. If there is no individual that motivates
singular terms, what entitles us to make a claim? According to Brandom’s approach, we can only
claim something, if the consequences of our statement line up with a certain coherent structure
that we have committed to. How do we, however, incorporate a new object reliably? According
to Brandom’s model, we are constrained by the fact that our coherent systems somehow respond
to reality, and that, overall, we get closer to reality by greater mastery of our inferential
commitments. In order to demonstrate that “[t]he way the world is, constrains proprieties of
inferential, doxastic, and practical commitment in a straightforward way from within those
practices” (Brandom 1998, 332), Brandom uses the example of litmus paper. A sour-tasting
liquid can be perceived as acidic, and thus it should turn litmus paper red. If it does not turn the
litmus paper red, we have to acknowledge our “practical failure” (Brandom 1998, 332). Our
perception must have been wrong. We are corrected by the way the world is. For this reason
Brandom is not a nominalist as, for example, discussed by Habermas, but a realist.
Mueller criticizes Brandom because without a determined meaning of the words there is
no necessary “incorporation of the causal order” (Mueller 2014, 155). It is true that we have two
incompatible commitments according to his example, but the unexpected perception of blue
litmus paper can be interpreted either way (see Mueller 2014, 155). Either we change our idea of
litmus paper, or we change our idea of this being an acid. It is a mistake to assume that
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falsification alone will lead to better theories, since obviously we could always choose the wrong
route.129 This means that there have to be more determining factors that influence the speaker in
order to create a coherent worldview (see Mueller 2014, 153).
In my approach, we also have to consider the view that we are not approaching an
external reality, but that we significantly construct realities by our conceptual activities. Since
Brandom’s semantics, however, are purely inferential, and are supposed to refer to only one
reality, he needs to find another mechanism that deals with the problem of new objects, and
initiating events for his system. Of course, he cannot skip the phenomenon of individuals, even
though it is interpreted inferentially. His claim is therefore that anaphora are non-referential and
that they are also sufficient for transmitting interpretable information. Anaphora are components
of a sentence that relate to another content, an antecedent, that precedes the anaphoric
expression. The meaning of a word (semantic) is decoded by a backward inference (a conclusion
back to the premises of a word). This backward inference is of a specific type that resembles
anaphora. Mueller, however, is skeptical:
Regarding the latter, a new argument based on context-sensitive semantic phenomena in anaphoric settings
shows that the crucial distinction between initiator or anaphoric antecedent and anaphoric dependent cannot
be drawn according to Brandom’s own premises without overt and irreducible referential premises (Mueller
2014, 141).

These claims of Mueller that anaphoric chains have irreducible referential premises have to be
demonstrated later. For now, I would like to summarize. Brandom’s solution is to work without
the representationalist repertoire, but to operate with so called norms of coherence. His main idea
129

This is also the main reason why falsificationism cannot work. A scientist whose thesis meets contradictory
results either has to dismiss his overall theory, reduce the informational value of his theory by introducing further
hypotheses, or replicate the test. Accordingly, there are more criteria for scientific investigation than merely
falsification, because he has to make a choice between at least these three options.
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is that singular terms cannot be without reasoning activities, and that they are bound to the use of
anaphora. In this sense, a singular term does not have a meaning by itself, but by virtue of a
language that surrounds it. We will have closer look at this surrounding language in the
following subpoints.

3.3.4.6 Anaphora

So Brandom grasps singular terms by anaphoric initiators. And he thinks that deixis,
referentially picking up individuals or complex entities, is only possible if there are anaphora.
Thus, he writes:
[...] the capacity of pronouns to pick up a reference from an anaphoric antecedent is an essential condition
of the capacity of other tokens (which can serve as such antecedents) to have references determined
deictically. Deixis presupposes anaphora. No tokens can have the significance of demonstratives unless
others have the significance of anaphoric dependents; to use an expression as a demonstrative is to use it as
a special kind of anaphoric initiator (Brandom 1998, 462).

This means that demonstratives are only meaningful by virtue of their relation to a coherent
structure of one’s language. It is a language entry-condition. Deictic expressions are therefore
particular moments that are understood by the virtue of coordinates for the entry into language.
So their main task is not to transport the complete richness of the original event. They rather
introduce an anchor for a backward inference to the initiating event. This means that the richness
of a possible experience is reduced to the communicational means and their expressive power.
Anaphoric expressions, however, only introduce us to the substitutional relevance of such a
language-entry event. It creates a relation between “repeatables and unrepeatable tokenings” that
the speaker commits to (Brandom 1998, 476). With regard to their opening, anaphora create a
relation of how we commit to unrepeatable tokenings expressed in a structure that can coordinate

165

these language entry-events. Anaphors are, furthermore, nothing more than a recurrence of a
precedent occurrence. We can trace them back and create their meaning by understanding
possibly incompatible commitments that might contradict former language entries. Thus,
language means to narrow down meanings by virtue of our substitutional coherence structure
under the use of anaphoric coordination. The more we communicate, and thus navigate, the
smaller the field of possible interpretations becomes. If we master the possible conclusions that
follow from the assumption of such language entries, we will get closer to reality. This means
that our language is more structured by coordination than by original events.
Brandom’s main goal is to justify inferentialism, particularly that deixis presupposes
anaphora. So let us look at the example of Nickel which exemplifies Brandom’s strategy best:
(A-i) Jane is tall. (A-ii) She is young. ∴ (A-iii) Somebody is young and tall.
(D-i) [pointing at Jane] She is tall. (D-ii) [pointing at Jane] She is young. ∴ (D-iii) Somebody is young and
tall (Nickel 2011, 19).130

Deictic references allow for no connection of the deictic claims as we see in (D). Each
signification is a moment of its own. Anaphora, however, provide a structure of transition, so
that a syllogism is possible. By anaphoric chains, contents are preserved and connected in a
meaningful way. The main idea is therefore that without anaphora there would be no meaning
overall, but only random moments of pointing out something undetermined.
Brandom delivers here an inferentialist explanation for the necessity of such an
asymmetrical substitution by virtue of anaphora.131 He supports the arguments further: “A
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Nickel, Bernhard. “Dynamics, Brandom-Style.” Philosophical Studies 162 (2), 2012: 333–354. Accessed May
29, 2017. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13041028.
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‘Asymmetric’ means that not all of the content is important. The equivalent term will lose some of the original
meaning. Brandom distinguishes two forms of substitution, symmetric and asymmetric substitution, which will be
important for his concept of anaphora. An example for asymmetry would be: Concluding from the syllogism ‘This
man is tired. A man is an animal. Therefore, an animal is tired.’ that we talk about an animal that is tired.
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language cannot refer to an object in one way unless it can refer to it in two different ways”
(Brandom 1998, 425). This means that if we just picked out the object in only one possible way,
there would be no possible connection of one fact to another. We would pick out an isolated fact
that has no inferential relation to anything. From an epistemological standpoint, we could also
say that there would be no communicational problem, because we would have a designator that
is clearly linked to what is real. Since there is, however, a communicational problem, our access
to the world must be restricted. Since, moreover, communicative success occurs, we must have
picked out things not in only one way, because then they would be unrepeatables, but in one way
of many accesses to the object. We make then one possible interpretation explicit. Anaphora, in
this sense, are a place holder for the original experience, but different from demonstratives or
singular terms. They are determined and enriched by the individual inferences that the speaker
relates them to, and so they allow for many interpretations. They link back to something that is
coordinated in our language. Brandom discusses this further:
Understanding an expression’s purporting to refer to an object in terms of its use being governed by the
properties articulating its significance according to substitution-inferential commitments dispels the
puzzlement that can otherwise attend this phenomenon. An object that can be referred to in only one way is
the sound of one hand clapping (Brandom 1998, 425).

So reality itself does not have individuals that we pick out, but delivers events that we
anaphorically relate to in many ways.132 Brandom claims that this approach solves the puzzle of
individuals by ultimately dismissing it. Moreover, Brandom points out that information gains are
justified by the anaphoric argument:
Nevertheless, we will have lost some of the original meaning. The guiding thought is here that we substitute
asymmetrically an original event with regard to a structure.
132
This is, of course a nominalist interpretation of Brandom that I introduce. This means that we neither grasp the
individuals directly, nor do we claim that the universals of language are what is real. Brandom, however,
presupposes the existence of determinate objects, which then distinguishes him from a nominalist and makes him a
realist.
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When such a simple material substitution-inferential commitment linking two expressions is made
propositionally explicit (as an assertible), it takes the form of a nontrivial identity claim (Brandom 1998,
426).

So our activity expressed in a claim achieves meaningful identities. I assume that he means by a
non-trivial identity claim a progression in our knowledge of ‘a’ towards ‘b’ (a=b), instead of just
saying ‘a’ equals ‘a’ (a=a). In this sense, we can guarantee a progression of claims, instead of
only reclaiming tautologically what has already been stated. With regard to this interpretation,
singular terms express a more complex process involving anaphora. They are condensed
expressions of how we relate to the world. Relating to the world as described above is then the
use of singular terms. This further means that: “mastery of the use of one expression as a
sentence [...] involves mastery of the use of many” (Brandom 1998, 426). So singular terms are
only the condensed expression of having already mastered many of similar questions of
coordination. This means further that the “the conceptual content expressed by a sentence
depends on its place in a network of inferences relating it to other sentences; the terms”
(Brandom 1998, 426). In other words, Brandom secures the transition from representationalism
to inferentialism, from individual terms to more universal terms.
Again, how can one element be individuated? It is interesting that Brandom quotes
Davidson in this regard:
Why say the stimulus is the ringing of the bell? Why not the motion of the air close to the ears of the dog or even the stimulation of its nerve endings? Certainly if the air were made to vibrate in just the way the
bell makes it vibrate it would make no difference to the behavior of the dog. And if the right nerve endings
were activated in the right way, there still would be no difference.” Typically there is a whole causal chain
of covarying events culminating in a response” (Brandom 1998, 426-427).

The main idea is that there is no originating causal event that can be clearly located. And this is
coherent with Brandom’s account: since the world is inferentially structured, terms of causality
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are problematic. One event that we individuate is connected to all other possible events, but our
explication is only one interpretation. The object is picked out, and presented in one perspective
of many. Anaphora provide the information for the minimal, necessary location in an inferential
network. Brandom writes:
[…]to pick up a speaker’s tokening […] and so to connect it to their own substitution-inferential
commitments is part of what makes it possible for them to understand the speaker’s utterance by extracting
information from it (Brandom 1998, 475).

In other words, the speakers, “connect it [an initiator] to their own substitution-inferential
commitments” (Bavaresco 2001, 56), which allows them to extract information. The speakers
basically demonstrate their relation to such an event, and can thus compare their events to the
events of other speakers.
Finally, Brandom refers to anaphora as a tactile model of understanding, which frees it
from the representationalist paradigm: “Conceptual […] contents […] are therefore best thought
of on a tactile rather than a visual, model” (Brandom 1998, 583). This switch from the
representationalist model to the tactile model is also supposed to support his realism, a last
connection to reality, but this reality is not represented but grasped conceptually (see Brandom
1998, 583). I will discuss this realism, which is problematic, in the following.

3.3.4.7 The Meaning of Anaphora for Inferentialism and Realism

With his approach to anaphora, Brandom makes empirical content available for an
inferentialist program without importing the empirical content itself. There is no problem of
empirical importation, but only a question of navigation. Our interactions with an environment
entitle for certain vocabulary (see Brandom 1998, 596), and we justify these interactions as long
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as they do not contradict former expressions (see Mueller 2014, 160). The question remains
whether there is a contact to a mind-independent reality that can be justified. Brandom writes:
The possibility of incompatible commitments arising from the cycle of perception, inference, action, and
perception reflects the way the normative structure of perception and action incorporates elements of the
causal order (Brandom 1998, 332).

So, according to Brandom, nature as an objectively independent instance, can be incorporated by
understanding ourselves basically by navigating through nature. Our way of doing it incorporates
then the causal order. Brandom makes this incorporation of the causal order very explicit:
“Normative statuses are domesticated by being understood in terms of normative attitudes, which
are in the causal order” (Brandom 1998, 626). Due to the socially interdependent influence that
speakers exercise on each other, discourses build up semantic norms of how a certain object is
constituted with regard to anaphoric commitments (see Mueller 2014, 11). These anaphoric
commitments are restricted by the language initiating event.
I have criticized above that Brandom’s dualistic conception of history and nature is not
clarified. As already explained above, anaphoric commitments restrict more and more the
possibility of commitments that are incompatible with regard to former assertions (see Mueller
2014, 11). Mueller calls Brandom’s approach therefore “sozial-inferentialistisch”, but it would
probably be more correct to call it a realist inferentialism. If we called it “sozialinferentialistisch”, then the interpretation is possible that we commit more and more to a way of
how the world is supposed to be, which, however, is in contradiction with Brandom’s realism
that presupposes a definitive way of how the world is. His realism is not about a commitment to
a paradigm of our worlds that is achieved, but a commitment to how the world really is.
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Despite his realist comments, there are some passages that support a sozialinferentialistische interpretation133:
For information (whether true or false) to be communicated is for the claims undertaken by one interlocutor
to become available to others (who attribute them) as premises for inferences. Communication is the social
production and consumption of reasons (Brandom 1998, 474).

In this understanding truth is non-existent and there are only the normatively produced
inferences, so that “truth and reference are philosopher’s fictions, generated by grammatical
misunderstandings” (Brandom 1998, 324). In other words, all conceptual content is inferentially
articulated, which depends on normative attitudes of inferential substitution. Bavaresco writes on
this deflationism: “Speakers’ attitudes, through the mechanism of anaphora as the structure of a
repeatable token, confer conceptual contents on singular terms and predicates” (Bavaresco 2001,
56). Conceptual content depends then entirely on its place in a network (see Bavaresco 2001,
56). All in all, this means that content can be described differently by different speakers. From
that follows that there is no content that is neutral. For speakers, it is irrelevant who has uttered
the expression, since they uttered it with regard to formal semantics and without formal
semantics there would be no determinate objects that they could discuss. I assume, to put it
metaphorically, that without an inferentialist structure, there would be flashes of events without
any meaning. But even such an assumption would be assuming too much. There would be, to use
a Kantian expression, a “Gewühle von Erscheinungen” (Kant, KdrV A111).134 Anaphora is
therefore not a reference but a form of asymmetrical substitution that inherits and is inheriting
content. Brandom makes this very clear:
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I have already discussed these issues with respect to Rorty.
Kant, Immanuel. Kritik der Reinen Vernunft. Hamburg: Felix Meiner 1990.
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[…] [I]t permits each interlocutor to produce utterances employing tokenings that have been stipulated to
be recurrences of arbitrary tokenings by others. […] [S]uch recurrences provide the basic points of contact
between different repertoires of commitments […]” (Brandom 1998, 458).

As I will discuss in further detail later, Habermas will criticize this coherentism. There is strong
tension between realism and constructivism. Giovagnol refers to Habermas:
The perspective of the participant who reconstructs from the inside the linguistic practice doesn’t allow the
speaker to talk about truth, but about how truth appears to him (Giovagnol 2001, 54).

Brandom, however, does not address this problem of the relation of an inside of language to an
outside of language, which would be the most important point of his book to make. What is this
nature that our utterances are about? Anaphoric relations are only necessary conditions for
having content, but they do not give us a necessarily correct identification of what really is (see
Mueller 2014, 160). Anaphoric chains would only adopt the content of former sentences (see
Mueller 2014, 160). If there is no stable anchor, then the following expressions would not
constitute an equivalent class (see Mueller 2014, 160). This, however, is Brandom’s claim: we
will know better by greater mastery of our inferences. Again, the question remains: what do we
know? So the remaining criticism must then be that anaphora cannot build the stable link to
reality that Brandom desires because we ultimately do not know what this reality is. It seems also
a definition of nature must remain in the inferentialist, navigational sphere. This problem should
be pointed out last.
As presented above, anaphoric expressions are related to an antecedent expression, or an
anaphoric initiator. If the last antecedent, the anaphoric initiator is, however, only partially
determined, then communication would still fail in terms of getting closer to reality, since
possible variations of interpretations would be possible (see Mueller 2014, 162). We could not
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decide whether we got closer to reality. Since the anaphoric initiator is for Brandom a connection
to reality, such an ambiguity would undermine his project. Brandom writes that these anaphoric
initiators, however, are non-inferential:
Since recurrence and inheritance of substitutional commitments is transitive, so is anaphoric dependence.
[…] They [anaphoric chains] can be anchored or initiated by tokenings that are not themselves
anaphorically dependent on other tokenings. These are anaphoric initiators (Brandom 1998, 458).

So there is a first tokening that does not depend on something else. It is somehow outside of
language, yet it is inside. Now, it is problematic that the anaphoric initiators are not part of the
chain itself. They fulfill the following functions:
„anaphorically structured constellations of tokenings [...] are like Fregean senses in that they determine the
referents of the name tokenings whose significance they govern. They […] provide cognitive access to the
particular objects […] via intersubstitutability equivalence classes of token-repeatables, some of which
include demonstrative and indexical tokenings. Such chains anchor our thought and talk in particular
objects […]. They determine […] what we are thereby talking and thinking about” (Brandom 1998, 582)

So real content is the relation between an initiator that functions like Frege’s reference, a real
object that can be referred to in different ways, and its anaphoric relator. Thus, an anaphoric
initiator is supposed to build a link to an unalterable reality and is thus
“inferenzkorrektheitsnormierend” (Mueller 2014, 166). Mueller discusses here two problems that
demonstrate the difficulties with such anchors.
First, kataphers, anaphoric expressions in which the pronoun is preceding the initiator,
create ambiguities. This is the case, if I say ‘his wife loves Ed’ (the example is borrowed from
Mueller). In this case, there exist two possibilities. First Ed could be the husband. Or, second, Ed
could be a person with whom his wife has an extramarital affair. Since there is no more
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information, we cannot unambiguously understand the content with only anaphoric means (see
Mueller 2014, 168).
The second problem that Mueller discusses reveals the ambiguities in a clearer sense. For
him „Informationsextraktion“ is not only a „mapping of your tokens on mine“ (Mueller 2014,
168), but also depending on further contexts to which we can relate only because there are
hidden references involved (see Mueller 2014, 168). This would mean that anaphora do not
necessarily guarantee a link back to reality, but need to be complimented by further linguistic
means.
Mueller’s consecutive example is the following: Let us assume Sigrid says ‘It rains
again’, and Herbert answers ‘It is cursed.’135 In this case, Mueller emphasizes that the utterance
could be understood as deictic, or as anaphoric. On the one hand, Herbert’s answer could be seen
as an anaphoric relation to the utterance of Sigrid. On the other hand, it could also be that
Herbert looks at a picture that represents another location. Then, it would be an initiator of a new
discourse topic. ‘It’ would be a demonstrative. So how do we identify correctly which meaning it
is (see Mueller 2014, 169)?
The point of these examples is to demonstrate undecidable cases for anaphora. Anaphora
might not be as successful in providing an anchor in reality as Brandom assumes. Since they are
supposed to represent a link to reality, on which our mapping of substitutions depends. They are
supposed to create an equivalent class of objects. In the examples above, we cannot substitute
one term for the other without changing the meaning of the sentences. The salva veritate rule
135

Mueller’s example goes further: „Nehmen wir an, Sigrid sagt „Es regnet schon wieder“, und Herbert antwortet
darauf mit „Dieser Ort ist wirklich verflucht“ und Sigrid bestätigt dies, indem sie sagt „Ja, hier fahren wir nie wieder
in den Urlaub hin. Jedes mal, wenn wir in Bad Breckenreuth Urlaub machen, regnet es.“ Was Herbert mit einem
unwirschen „Bad Idenhausen, nicht Breckenreuth‘“ kommentiert, worauf Sigrid mit „Ist doch egal, Du weißt schon,
was gemeint ist.“ antwortet.“ (Mueller 2014, 169).
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does not apply. Therefore Brandom’s solution fails in these cases. From this follows that
anaphora are not the last bits of our semantic world order. Rather, they are another pragmatic
mean that serves us in order to create meaning in particular situations. Often they might be
successful, but sometimes they fail and we have to find other means in order to successfully
communicate.

2.5 Conclusive Remarks on Brandom
I have not discussed Brandom’s view on Hegel’s historicism in particular. Brandom discusses
Hegel concretely in Tales of the Mighty Dead.136 There, he argues that Hegel is an inferentialist
with holistic intentions. Brandom, however, reads Hegel so that he can fit him to his own theory.
For this, he mostly utilizes the chapters that he can identify as semanticist. Brandom promised,
moreover, a book on Hegel that is not yet published. The major resources for Brandom’s Hegel
interpretation are therefore unpublished word-files online. In these documents, he mainly
interprets Hegel’s chapters on sense-certainty and perception with regard to his semantics. I
pointed out before that Hegel is an anti-semanticist. Brandom’s Hegel interpretation that reality
is all the way down contradictory is an ontological misinterpretation of Hegel’s epistemological
project and applies Brandom’s own incompatibility-semantics to Hegelian thought.
Though Brandom cannot simply apply his semantics to Hegel, my main criticism is
Brandom’s lack of awareness of the problem of history. Brandom writes rarely on this significant
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aspect of Hegel’s theory. One of the few passages is a discussion of history starting with an
imprecise definition of noumena and phenomena. He writes:
His [Hegel’s] answer is that the idea of noumena, of things as they are in themselves, the reality that
appears in the form of phenomena, can be understood practically in terms of a distinctive role in a
recollectively rationally reconstructed historical sequence of phenomena.” (Brandom 2009, 100).

Brandom grasps history therefore not as reality for us, but as a secondary phenomenon that
serves us to understand the relationship of phenomena to a noumenon , namely to the way of
how things really are. Brandom proceeds:
One of the senses in which what he presents is a phenomenology is that he starts with an account of
phenomena (what things are for consciousness) and seeks to reconstruct the notion of noumena (what
things are in themselves) out of the resources it provides (Brandom 2009, 100).

This is obviously false. Hegel does not attempt to recognize the noumenon or to give a concept
of it. Instead, Hegel attempts to answer how a phenomenology without a noumenon can be
objective.
Brandom proceeds by applying his technical jargon. According to him the “rational
integration into the constellation of one’s prior commitments of some new commitment […] is
intelligible as one’s commitments as to how things really are, objectively, in themselves”
(Brandom 2009, 100). In other words, our main intention is to relate to how things really are.
History is then a process of different commitments that are replaced by new commitments. In
other words, there are no paradigm shifts in one rational history, but there is one evolving net of
semantic commitments. The underlying basis for this must be one form of communication that
never changes (see Brandom 2009, 101). Brandom writes further: “This means—as being what
one takes to be not just an appearance of that reality, but a veridical appearance, one in which
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things appear as they really are—when it is accompanied by the right kind of rational
recollection of the process of experience that produced it” (Brandom 2009, 101). Basically, he
expresses the thought that there is a communicative form that can guarantee progress for all past
events and all future events. Instead, as I will show later, Hegel defends a process of reflection
that is related to experience and which depends on the history of how we experience. In contrast,
Brandom commits to the reading of Absolute Knowing as ahistorical. Brandom thinks further
that such a kind of correct, formal process would bring us closer to reality:
The right kind of recollection is one that picks out a trajectory through the previous results of one’s actual
integrations that is expressively progressive. That is, it must exhibit a history that both culminates in one’s
current view and has the form of the gradual making explicit of what can now retrospectively be seen all
along to have been implicit. Doing that is showing for each previous episode (of those that are selected as,
as it were, precedential, as revelatory of what one now takes always already to have been there) how that
set of commitments can be seen as a partial, and only partially correct revelation of things as they are now
known (or at least taken) to be. That is, one must show how each of the recollectively privileged prior
integrations made progress towards one’s current constellation of commitments—both in the judgments
that are endorsed and in the consequential and incompatibility relations taken to articulate the concepts
applied in those judgments (Brandom 2009, 101)

Brandom develops here an idea of progress. It is not false to apply this idea of progress to Hegel
as long as it is shown as progress with respect to former views and their standards. Yet,
according to Brandom, our views are ultimately responding to reality. In this sense, progress
means to relate to a mind-independent reality in a better way, a claim that Hegel would not
defend. Brandom further claims that this presupposition of progress is part of our
communication:
In taking one’s current commitments as the standard to judge what counts as expressive progress, one is
taking them as the reality of which previous constellations of endorsements were ever more complete and
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accurate appearances. That is the lesson that the normative understanding of the representation relation
teaches: what is represented is what serves as a standard for assessing what thereby, in this normative sense,
counts as a representing (an appearance) of it. (Brandom 2009, 101).

As a result Brandom does not develop a concept of history. History is for him embedded in his
overarching theory of communication that is ahistorically grounded in semantic communication
about how the world really is. He proposes an ultimately ahistoric model that is supposed to
secure a better grasp of reality. Since Hegel’s account, however, is historicist, which means that
all our first-order knowledge claims are limited to the historical moment, Brandom’s theory is
entirely different from Hegel.
This explicit ahistoricist position is already recognizable in Brandom’s Articulating
Reason. There, Brandom introduces things that have “natures rather than history” (Brandom
2000, 27). He is careful insofar as he notices that this distinction is itself a “cultural formation”
(Brandom 2000, 27). He evaluates this formation, however, as a “thing that itself has a history
rather than a nature” (Brandom 2000, 27). This means that instead of acknowledging the
dialectic between the concepts of history and nature, Brandom thinks that the distinction is
unreliable because the distinction itself is only historical. Brandom obviously thinks that nature
is independent from history.
Despite Brandom’s assumption that this distinction is itself a historical formation, I
therefore cannot avoid interpreting Brandom within a naturalist paradigm; a paradigm that he
explicitly wants to avoid. Indeed, he explicitly denies “naturalistic vocabulary”, since it cannot
explain what we mean by our statements, or how we make statements at all (Brandom 1997,
154). In this sense, Brandom also acknowledges that “even concepts such as electron and
aromatic compound are the sort of thing that has a history” (Brandom 2000,27). Yet, he
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proceeds, “they are not purely historical” (Brandom 2000, 27). However, without a discussion of
the dialectical relation between nature and history, this distinction remains unclear. His realism is
simply based on the idea that concepts are not “purely historical,” which implies that there is a
strong remainder of naturalism in Brandom’s thought (Brandom 2000,27). This becomes even
clearer in the following statement:
For the proprieties governing the application of those concepts depend on what inferences involving them
are correct, that is, on what really follows from what. And that depends on how things are with electrons
and aromatic compounds, not just on what judgments and inferences we endorse (Brandom 2000, 27).

Using the word ‘really’ relativizes all other theory that relies on inference and historical
formation. Instead, it assumes something as a foundation that must have a nature and is
ultimately ahistorical, and probably also not inferential. Brandom does not clarify what his
realism about electrons entails with regard to ahistorical natures and what exactly is historical. In
this specific case, Brandom might even suggest that Being is composed from beings or that
Being is not one. I assume this because he suggests a real existence of determinate objects such
as electrons that have a particular ahistorical nature. The fact that we deal with determinate
objects, however, does not mean that reality is ultimately grounded in determinate objects. Our
perception of determinate objects might be a human confusion, not capable of accessing the
universal order of the one.137 Brandom indirectly presupposes that our concepts must be
grounded in outside things that are real and determinate and thus have a nature. He thus would
reject oneness without discussion and he would assume that things have their own, independent
nature.

137

I do not subscribe to this concept of oneness, but I point out the problem of assuming the former side without
considering the latter.
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Overall, it seems that Brandom says that we cannot step outside history, but that there is
something underlying history that must have an ahistorical nature and is determinate. Something
that is real. Though it is hard to deny an external reality, it is as complicated to simply assume a
determinate reality as the ground for our histories and systems of knowledge. Brandom does not
discuss the concept of history in his philosophy. Instead, he simply claims that there are things
that have no history. Contrary to Brandom, Hegel claims that all that we can investigate is
ultimately within history. Thus, Hegel and Brandom are incompatible. Before I come to Hegel,
however, I will introduce Habermas’ criticism of Brandom.

3. Habermas’ Marxian Approach without Marxism and the Pragmatic
Turn

I regard Habermas’ criticism of Brandom’s approach as striking. In particular, he criticizes the
presupposition of a formal, mind-independent reality. This criticism, however, also reveals a
significant change in Habermas’ own approach. At the end of Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung, after
criticizing Brandom’s approach, Habermas surprisingly suggests a desubstantialized
relativism.138 Yet, even though he changes the outcome of his Discourse Theory and distances
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With regard to the relativist position of philosophy, Habermas writes: “Hier begegnet uns der eigentümliche Zug
einer Vielsprachigkeit, welche die Philosophie instand setzt, in den auseinandergetretenen Vernunftmomenten eine
Einheit zu wahren, ohne die Geltunsdifferenzen einzuebnen. Diese formale Einheit einer pluralisierten Vernunft
kann die Philosphie nicht etwa dank eines inhaltlich gefüllten Begriffs des Seinenden im ganzen oder des
allgemeinen Guten aufrectherhalten, sondern dank ihrer hermeneutischen Fähigkeit, Sprach- und Diskursgrenzen zu
überschreiten, während sie gleichzeitig für holistische Hintergrundkontexte empfindlich bleibt“ (1999, 328).
Habermas is probably not clear about his position, since he returns to a substantial, non-relativist position in the
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himself further from the transcendental realist account of Apel,139 he does not see parallels to
Hegel’s relativist account. This is because Habermas misunderstands Hegel as an ultimately
ahistorical thinker.
While Habermas’ criticism of Brandom’s semantic realism is concise, his criticism of
Hegel is a result of his imprecise understanding of Marxian theory. Seen through the lens of
Marxism, Habermas believes that Hegel suggests an ahistorical solution to the problem of human
development by implementing the concept of Absolute Knowing. Absolute Spirit occurs here as
an ahistorical goal for human development by which Hegel’s theory remains in the paradigm of
consciousness-philosophy. On the basis of this interpretation, Habermas rejects a possible return
to Hegelianism in order to solve the problems of analytic contextualism. Thus, he also rejects
Brandom’s conceptual realism as Hegelian.
Habermas’ criticism of Brandom is an important moment in the debate. Habermas’ theory
is at its core Continental. Yet, he also claims to follow the insights of the anti-metaphysical,
linguistic turn. For its Continental core, Habermas develops, according to his own claims, a
Marxian theory without Marxism. In this regard, Habermas assumes to “surpass an earlier
position“ of Marx and Critical Theory (Rockmore 1989, xi).140 On the basis of this, he rejects
Hegelianism as a subjectivist, ahistorical philosophy that commits to the paradigm of a nonempirical self-consciousness. Habermas’ theory can be consequently divided into two parts: on
the one hand, a strong epistemological endeavor that proceeds with the Kantian, critical project

Menschenparkdebatte. In his book Die Zukunft der Menschlichen Natur: Auf dem Weg zu einer liberalen
Eugenik?(2001), he argues that the presuppositions of our societal discourse build the basis for substantialist norms
by which we can forbid preimplantation diagnostics (Habermas, Jürgen. Die Zukunft der menschlichen Natur: Auf
dem Weg zu einer liberalen Eugenik? Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 2005.).
139
Apel’s theory follows the idea of securing an objective ground for discourses with regard the performative
contradiction that occurs if we deny truth.
140
Rockmore, Tom. Habermas on Historical Materialism. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989.
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through an analytical, philosophical approach after the linguistic and pragmatic turn, and, on the
other hand, a Marxist background, in contrast to which Habermas focuses on language that
works as an alternative superstructure to labor in our society. Habermas wants to secure the
epistemological foundation in a communicative situation and to apply these insights to the
development of social interaction on the large scale of societies. Accordingly, language
presupposes the assumption of an ideal that, if followed, will provide a pathway to a just society.
With his continental-analytical approach Habermas stands, therefore, as a mediator between
Continental and analytic philosophy. With his flawed interpretation of Hegel, however,
Habermas cannot bridge the divide and stands rather in the formalist tradition after the pragmatic
turn.
In order to understand Habermas’ criticism of Brandom and also to understand his
intervention historically, I will reconstruct Habermas’ overall position. In the first part of this
chapter, I will discuss his method of reconstruction, since ‘reconstruction’ is Habermas’ essential
method in order to improve former theories. My thesis is that his method of reconstruction is
flawed, since it identifies a goal before the theory is reconstructed. I will demonstrate this with
regard to his reconstruction of Marx’s theory. Habermas claims, for example, to have the same
goal as Marx, but in his reconstruction he never lays out a detailed analysis of Marx’s goal.
Instead, he presupposes that Marx wants to achieve a reflection of presuppositionless selfconsciousness.
After discussing this methodological problem, I will explain in the second part of this
chapter the relation between practice and theory that Habermas derives from a Marxian
standpoint. Due to his flawed method of reconstruction, however, it will be problematic to
identify how much his position is supposed to be Marxist or Marxian. I will first demonstrate in
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the second part of this chapter that Habermas does not read Marx as a philosopher who relates to
the Hegelian tradition, but as an empiricist, perhaps as an unusual kind of socialist scientist.
Habermas’ understanding of Marx’s goal is therefore distorted by his unclear notion of German
Idealism and Marx’s relationship to this tradition. I will develop an interpretation of Marx that
grasps his theory as a result of German Idealism, which is different from Habermas’
understanding.
Even though I will not entirely clarify why Habermas understands his goal as Marxian, it
is fairly clear that he argues against positivism. After having falsely identified Marx as a
positivist, Habermas can easily reject his paradigm. As a consequence, Habermas proposes an
alternative model of social evolution, which I will discuss secondly. This alternative model is
supposed to include the communicative contributions that, for example, family-structures made
for our community. Thus, the superstructure of society does not rely only on labor, according to
Habermas, a Marxian position, but is also substantiated by positive functions of language that
can be defended and should be preserved.
Though Habermas argues against positivism and its instrumental interpretation of
language, he is also critical of hermeneutical methods, because they presuppose a covert
consciousness paradigm. Habermas wishes to eradicate the relationship to consciousness, since it
is not metaphysically justifiable. I will therefore show thirdly how this denial of consciousness
leads his theory to a non-substantial philosophy. His philosophy is supposed to secure the
conditions for fair communication in concrete, discourse situations. This anti-metaphysical shift
brings him closer to the analytic programs, but distances him from Hegel. In terms of the relation
between theory and practice, Habermas attempts to deliver the theoretical foundation of
discourse in the form of a discourse method that he believes is socially relevant for societies. I
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will show that the social relevance of his theory for our societies is problematic. His account
presupposes that the micro-sociological relations of communication can be replicated on the
macro-sociological level of societies and that macro-structures follow the same conditions of
success.141 Thus, I am going to contest the assumption that epistemology derived from the
constitution of language between members of a society can be entirely foundational or even
justify large scale processes of history.
After having clarified Habermas’ Marxist background and the relation between practice
and theory in Discourse Theory, I will present in a third part the relation of Habermas’ Discourse
Theory and the pragmatic turn. I, furthermore, will discuss how Habermas gives up his former
model of truth as justifiability. Instead, he will introduce a concept of truth based on practice.
This change in his theory will prepare his criticism of Brandom.
In the fourth part, I will discuss Habermas discussion of Brandom’s approach in detail.
His criticism focuses on Brandom’s presupposition of a mind-independent reality, his
theoreticism and his equation of facts and norms, which represents his cognitive realism.
Habermas’ criticism of Brandom is similar to my arguments above. Unlike my arguments,
Habermas does not consider Hegel’s account as a viable alternative. In the final part of this
chapter, I will therefore discuss Habermas’ criticism of Hegel. Habermas identifies a Hegelian
motivation in Brandom’s conceptual realism. His final rejection of Hegel as a future of the
philosophical debate is, however, based on the miscomprehension of the Hegelian problem. All
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Habermas is aware of this critique when he writes: “Das Curriculum der bisherigen Weltgeschichte, das eine
Sequenz von fünf oder sechs Produktionsweisen aufweist, legt die einlinige, notwendige, ununterbrochene und
aufsteigende Entwicklung eines Makrosubjekts fest. Ich möchte diesem Modell der Gattungsgeschichte eine
schwächere Fassung gegenüberstellen, die sich den bekannten Einwänden gegen den Objektivismus des
geschichtsphilosophischen Denkens nicht aussetzt“ (Habermas, Jürgen. Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen
Materialismus. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1976, 154).
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of this will lay out the ground for an appropriate discussion of Hegel’s historicist account, which
will follow in the fourth chapter of my dissertation.

3.1 Reconstruction with regard to Marx and as a General Method
Habermas’ methodological problem with reconstruction can be demonstrated with regard to his
interpretation of Marx. I will firstly give an interpretation of Habermas’ relation to Marx. It will
reveal that Habermas cannot clearly express what makes his approach specifically Marxian,
neither with regard to the means, nor with regard to its goal. This will lead to the conclusion that
his method of reconstruction must be flawed. Secondly, I will discuss Habermas’ methodological
problem with reconstruction from a rather formal perspective.

3.1.1 The Means of Habermas and the End of Marx

My argument is that Habermas does not ‘reconstruct’ Marx adequately, and that this is related to
his flawed method of reconstruction. ‘Reconstruction’ means to take another theory apart and
then to put it together, in order to achieve the theory’s intrinsic goal. It will turn out, however,
that Marx probably has a different goal than Habermas. For demonstrating this, I will focus on
Marx or Marxism and its relation to practice. It is well known that Marx is critical of the
theoretical attitude of philosophers before him. Marx prefers practice over theory. Habermas’
philosophy is a reaction to the Marxist problems of historical materialism. In identifying Marx,
however, Habermas conflates a Marxian approach with Marxist historical materialism and
positivism. His denial of the Marxian method and the Marxian goal is therefore false. I attribute
this mistake to the failure of Habermas’ method that assumes a goal before it has reconstructed
the philosophy itself.
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With regard to Habermas’ reaction against Marxist historical materialism and positivism,
Rockmore draws the same connections between Habermas’ overall goal of a theory of language
and his rejection of this positivist, historical materialism. In particular, Rockmore sees Habermas
“leading to his own theory of communicative action, consisting of the interpretation, critique,
reconstruction, and rejection of historical materialism” by discussing a strawman (Rockmore
1989, 169). With regard to the “rejection of historical materialism,” Habermas proposes the
aforementioned theory of communicative action as an alternative framework to all former
approaches of philosophy (see Rockmore 1989,169).142 In these former philosophies, there are
two methodological paradigms that Habermas fights against: a hermeneutics that relies on a
paradigm of consciousness and a positivist account that is too empirical. Firstly, he believes that
earlier theories fail to surpass the paradigm of consciousness. Thus, they rely on a hermeneutics
that still uses an empirically unjustifiable, teleological goal of human development. In this sense,
Marx can only produce a distorted goal for human societies. Secondly, Habermas interprets the
Marxian approach as an empirical theory that, despite the non-empirical, metaphysical
presupposition of consciousness, remains overly empiricist. Thus, for Habermas, Marx’s
approach results in a positivist paradigm that reduces all human interaction to a materialist
mechanism.
Methodologically, Habermas situates his philosophy between these two paradigms, which
results in a problematic interpretation of Marx, since Marx is neither empiricist nor does he
simply reduce his theory to the paradigm of consciousness. Marx introduced an economic
interpretation of modern societies on the basis of capitalism. It is therefore true that his approach
has empirical roots. He is, however, still a philosopher who reinterprets the Hegelian tradition.
142
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Habermas wrestles with this tension between empiricism and philosophy, which comes to the
fore when he rejects the means of Marx, but not Marx’s ultimate end (see Habermas 1976, 9 and
Rockmore 1989, 169). Marx’s goal is about resolving the conflict of the distorting, unrecognized
relationship that members of a society have to themselves and to others through alienating labor.
In this sense, Habermas claims to surpass Marx’s position by applying a better method. I will
study Marx’s goal in more detail.
With regard to his goal, it is clear that Marx, according to his Early Manuscripts, rejects
the misshapen communisms that still rely on a concept of property. This reliance on property is a
covert bourgeois concept that hinders societies’ attempts to break with self-alienating forms of
consciousness. The alienation caused by property will finally result in the estrangement of
classes, namely individuals who oppress themselves and others in different value relationships.
While Marx argues against the distorting influence of property, Habermas’ goal suggests a
preservation of at least some economical processes that rely on property, since they help to
unburden [entlasten] us from existential threats. Habermas wants to protect a fundamental lifeworld sphere as an unburdening institution. For Habermas, the social phenomenon of the
colonization of the life-world needs to be encountered with a protective space for genuine human
interaction. Habermas’ defense of our current system focuses therefore on the fact that these
systems unburden the individual, and free the individual for genuine interaction. Habermas is
thus a conservative thinker who defends the constitutional state, and who wants to only draw
limits for the colonization of the life-world by instrumental, capitalist agendas.
It is questionable whether this conservative goal of preservation can be identified as a
goal of Marx or Marxism. What is more problematic, however, is that for Habermas
reconstruction means to identify the goal of a philosophy before the philosophy is reconstructed.
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With regard to Marx’s method, Habermas’ main criticism of Marx is that he emphasizes the
influence of labor too strongly by expressing it as a superstructure that governs all other human
relations. According to Habermas, Marx does not see that the psychological development of
humans already includes a history of emancipation that is independent from the superstructure of
labor.143 Consequently, Habermas’ theory appears to be entirely different from Marx’s, since he
replaces both its means and its ends by rejecting the materialist method and by adopting a more
conservative goal. If Habermas’ theory is supposed to be an alternative to Marxism, then its goal
must obviously be to replace Marxism (see Rockmore 1989, 169). Then, however, Habermas
cannot justify that his theory advances beyond either Marxism or Marx.
Before I will study these questions in further detail, there are some problems that we have
to identify with regard to Habermas’ own method of reconstruction. Habermas’ ‘reconstruction’
does not explain how the intrinsic goal of a theory is obtained. The goal of a theory is constituted
by its means, and the means are constituted by the goal. In other words, identifying the goal of a
method cannot precede the reconstruction of its means. Such a method would mean to know
what a theory is about before we know the theory. Habermas can therefore only claim to have the
same goal as Marx; but, if he does not reconstruct the original goal, then his claim to have the
same goal is meaningless. I will demonstrate this thesis in the following part.
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Rockmore emphasizes Habermas’ concern with the distinction of work and interaction at several occasions.
Habermas’ critique of the uncritical attitude of Marx becomes a lesser concern for Habermas. Thus, Rockmore
senses a further conflict in Habermas’ critique: “If the epistemological problem is not a central concern, then there is
no reason to criticize Marx for his possible failure in this regard. Second, it would be inconsistent to continue to
scrutinize Marx’s view as the necessary source of a theory of knowledge in the Kantian sense since Habermas is
here mainly concerned to criticize historical materialism as an economic theory” (Rockmore 1989, 92).
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3.1.2 Habermas’ Concept of Reconstruction

The lack of clarity of Habermas’ relation to Marx is caused by Habermas’ unclear method.
Pedersen, for example, states: “[…] it is surprising that his method, rational reconstruction, has
not caused more debate” (Pedersen 2008, 457).144 In the following, I will therefore look at
Habermas’ method.
In theory, we can distinguish different models of historical development. We can deal
with a theory of entire replacement, or with a theory of continuation, in which we somehow
preserve the intrinsic goal and replace mistaken arguments of the theory. Habermas proposes a
variation of the latter: “Rekonstruktion bedeutet in unserem Zusammenhang, daß man eine
Theorie auseinandernimmt und in neuer Form wieder zusammensetzt, um das Ziel, das sie sich
gesetzt hat, besser zu erreichen“ (Habermas 1976, 9). In this sense, Habermas’ reconstruction is
supposed to reconstruct Marx’s means without, however, replacing the goal. It also suggests that
something of the method will be preserved. In this sense, it must mean a theory of continuation.
With regard to this, however, Rockmore, finds the following passage that, according to him,
alters Habermas’ idea of reconstruction and makes it thus more problematic:
With the preceding investigation I want to introduce a theory of communicative action, which clarifies the
normative foundations of social theory. The theory of communicative action should offer an alternative for
the no longer defensible philosophy of history [die unhaltbar gewordene Geschichtsphilosophie] to which
the older critical theory was still bound. It puts itself forward as the framework within which the
interdisciplinary study of the precise model of capitalist modernization can again be taken up [wieder
aufgenommen werden kann] (The Theory of Communicative Action, II, pp.342-343, according to
Rockmore 1989, 95).
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Looking at this passage, Rockmore emphasizes the following problem: if Habermas aims to
replace something called “philosophy of history”, then his reconstruction cannot be read as a
theory of continuation, but must mean a theory of replacement (see Rockmore 1989, 95).
Furthermore, if reconstruction is supposed to take another theory apart and then to put it together
in order to achieve the theory’s intrinsic goal, then the question of whether the goal can be
clarified before we reconstruct the theory itself remains. In order to explain this argument, I need
to introduce some general points about the idea of continuation.
Kant believed in the idea of replacement as it can be demonstrated with regard to his
Copernican Turn (see Rockmore 1989, 2). It is a “shift from one epistemological model to
another”, according to Kant, an entire transformation of the direction of explanation (Rockmore
1989, 2). Hegel, on the contrary, approached philosophy in a sharp contrast to Kant. He believed
that a theory as the result of a historical compression of thoughts has to be worked out with
regard to its historical presuppositions. Rockmore writes: “As a result, he [Hegel] substitutes a
view of theory reconstruction for the more widely prevalent view of theory replacement”
(Rockmore 1989, 3). Thus growth is […] an ongoing process of the reconstruction of earlier,
imperfect theories in order to better attain their goals. His goal is not simply to replace one
theory by another one, namely his own; it is rather to carry forward the aims of prior positions in
his own thought” (Rockmore 1989, 3). So Hegel focuses on a synthesis of historical ideas, and,
according to Rockmore, this includes exegesis, a standard that Habermas dismisses: “Mein
Interesse an Marx […] ist […] nicht historisch-philologisch“ (Habermas 1976, 9). In other
words, Habermas does not seek to provide a detailed study of the works of other philosophers,
but more so a synthesis of different core concepts that he identifies as important and that
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represent his theory rather than the theory of others. Reconstruction, in this sense, must mean
being inspired by the arguments of others and bringing them together under one’s own agenda.
Furthermore, philosophy, as Hegel defends, is a history of attempts to prove that being and
thought are the same (see Rockmore 1989, 3). This includes that “it [i.e. philosophy] is rather to
bring together in a single analysis all that is of value in the preceding tradition, in order to prove,
and not merely assert, the identity of thought and being” (Rockmore 1989, 3). In other words, it
is the question of how a method should be possible, before we have started the process of
investigation. The more important question is thus the relation of epistemology to history.
Identifying the goal is, if this is accepted, a lesser concern, since a goal can vary largely
depending on the status of working out the theory. Habermas, on the contrary, includes a goal
that he, according to his denial of teleological positions, should avoid. He must be clear that
setting up a telos is by no means an activity without interest. Moreover, even his method of
critique does not ultimately derive such a goal. The problem of the historical continuation is also
related to a denial of the “doctrine of the incompatibility of opposites” (Rockmore 1989, 3). This
means that in a historical progression the opposite view sharpens the theory and thus belongs to
the theory itself, or, if we accept that theories are relative to their history, the opposite view must
be somehow acknowledged on a historical basis. For this reason, a historical approach to
philosophy appears to be incompatible with the idea of incompatibility.145 I say this, because I
want to raise not only the question of whether a goal can be identified beforehand, but because I
also want to raise the question of determining the overall goal of a theory itself. This means, if
the goal is expressed in a proposition, it will still have a relation to other goals that are
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contradictory with respect to the goal itself. Such problems can only be addressed with a method
that accepts that goals are open to change.146
Certainly, the distinction between a theory of so-called continuation and abandonment
draws a sharp contrast, which is unlikely to occur empirically.147 For Habermas’ concept of
reconstruction it is hard to determine how the relation to former theories must be grasped (see
Rockmore 1989, 5). But it is clear that his theory presents itself with regard to two selfproclaimed goals, namely to “develop a reconstruction of historical materialism”, and
“developing a theory of communicative action” (Rockmore 1989, 5). The question emerges
whether a theory of communicative action is a consequence of historical materialism, or whether
it replaces or is intended to replace its predecessor (see Rockmore 1989, 5).
In any case, even more problematic is the assumption of identifying someone’s goals
correctly. Rockmore writes with this regard: “But it is doubtful that the goal of a theory can be
unambiguously identified” (Rockmore 1989, 11). In fact, most readers vary in their
interpretation. The Neo-Kantians, for example, display an enormous variety of interpretation (see
Rockmore 1989, 11). Yet, they all claim to be direct followers of Kant. Given these few
indications, it is at least questionable whether Habermas’ reconstruction can identify the
“intrinsic goal” of a historical materialism (Rockmore 1989, 11).
Obviously in his book “Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus”, Habermas
presupposes a clearly identified Marxian goal, without explicitly saying what this goal is. If,
however, Habermas theory is composed holistically, it will be hard to identify the goal in a
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as alternative views of conceptual progress. But it would be an error to regard the distinction between these concepts
as absolute” (Rockmore 1989, 17).
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single, atomistic phrase. For this reason, Habermas theory of reconstruction is ambiguous right
from its beginning, since, according to the paradigm that Habermas defends, a goal is worked out
in its relation to history, as opposed to being presupposed or identified.
The general goal of Habermas’ theory can be described as relating theory to practice, but,
of course, it needs more elaboration. It would be, however, absurd to read each sentence of
Habermas under the premise that it is supposed to relate theory and practice. It is as much absurd
as relating every single sentence of Hegel to the ultimate goal of absolute spirit, or to presuppose
a clear goal for Marx.
Reconsidering the arguments that I have given above, paraphrasing goals right from the
beginning should serve only as a heuristic, in order to reconstruct the theory itself. What does
Habermas therefore pursue in his theory? In the end, the question comes down to investigate the
means that Habermas employs. With regard to the means, it is fairly clear that Habermas wants
us to detach from the perspective of consciousness and shift to a theory of communication. This
shift to an anti-metaphysical philosophy might explain models of emancipation on a small,
individual scale. Is this, however, also true for a theory of emancipation on a larger historical
scale? I claim that this is the question that the Habermasian theory sets for itself. So far,
however, I cannot entirely clarify the goal of Habermas’ theory for reasons mentioned above.148
Now, there are different consequences of how to proceed with an analysis of Habermas’
theory. First of all, I will focus on his concrete steps toward replacing Marxian means with his
idea of relating theory and practice through communication. Without presupposing the final
result of either Marx’s or Habermas’ theory, we need to look at both thinkers concretely.
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Afterwards, I will come back to the epistemological part of his theory and its relation to the
linguistic turn.

3.2 Theory in Relation to Practice and Marx
The relation of theory and practice is one of the major topics of Critical Theory. It reaches back
to an original conflict that Marx identified in Hegel. Habermas wants to go beyond Marx and
Hegel (see Rockmore 1989, 51). He attributes, however, a positivist approach to Marx, while
actually Marx’s position emerges from the Hegelian position. Marx is a materialist who still
deals with the problem of identity, inaugurated by Hegel. I will therefore demonstrate that
Habermas’ perspective on Marx is distorted.
In broad terms, it comes down to the question of whether the Hegelian approach can
demonstrate the identity of subject and object, a project that was inaugurated by Kant’s
Copernican turn, and one that Marx will criticize later. Yet, Marx will not reject it in terms of a
positivism, but develop a materialist idealism. This is the idea that we have to approach the
question of identity through an analysis of the society and not as a question of the mind. Kant
wanted to prove that the subjective conditions of sensibility and understanding can be justified as
constitutive for knowledge. Hegel, who does not assume a subject that can be thought without its
origination, and thus has a different approach from Kant, approaches the question of identity
with regard to the development of experiencing humans in their civic societies through ethics, art
and religion. Habermas assumes that Hegel presupposes a successful demonstration that subject
and object are identical, which is sometimes described as Idealism (see Rockmore 1989, 53). If
such an identity between subject and object is ascribed to Hegel, we can say that positivism is a
direct rejection of Hegel’s idealism. For Hegel, nature, however, is more complicated than being
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merely the result of the mind and thus it is not easy to claim that positivism rejects specifically
Hegelian philosophy. Rather, it rejects what it takes to be Hegel’s idealism. Marx can be seen as
dealing with the complications arising from Hegel’s perspective and he does not simply switch to
positivism, which is also falsely identified as his materialism.
With regard to such a mistaken interpretation of Hegel, Rockmore identifies the following
position in Habermas: “For Hegel nature has mind as its presupposition, whereas for Marx, who
supposedly inverts this relation, nature is the ground of mind” (Rockmore 1989, 53). This
position is a simplification and we need to have a closer look. According to his Early
Manuscripts, Marx has certainly a critique of Hegel in mind:
Hegel’s Encyclopedia, beginning as it does with Logic […] and ending with Absolute Knowledge – with the
self-conscious, self-comprehending, philosophic or absolute […] abstract mind – is in its entirety nothing
but the display, the self-objectification, of the essence of the philosophic mind, and the philosophic mind is
nothing but the estranged mind of the world thinking within its self-estrangement – i.e., comprehending
itself abstractly. Logic […] is alienated thinking, and therefore thinking which abstracts from nature and
from real man (Marx 1978, 146).149

Marx’ view relies on an observation that the Hegelian endeavor, if it started with the Logic,
would start with an abstract identity achieved in the type of a logic that grasps all development
solely in logical categories. His argument is that abstract thinking itself depends on historical
conditions of production, and without acknowledging this premise the theory would start on the
wrong foot.
If, however, we do not accept that Hegel achieves identity in the absolute idea, but only
points out the self-othering that requires further proof [Bewährung], then the anthropological
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account of the Philosophy of Spirit would be primary. Hegel’s Logic would then only be a
specific realm of pure thought, but that needs to be applied to nature as approving its value
(Hegel uses the term ‘Bewährung’). Since Hegel’s account is circular, it would also be false to
accuse him of starting with wrong foundations, because he then does not have foundations.
But Marxian critique is not so simple as to criticize Hegel for starting with logic. Marx
basically takes a turn that is Hegelian by understanding objects “as arising from objective
activity, rooted in the real labor process” (Rockmore 1989, 53). For Marx, it is not logic, but
work/labor150 ] that is the fundamental, epistemological category of all philosophical inquiry.
Marx develops this materialism from a rather idealist conception. Idealism and materialism
might therefore not stand in the strongest contrast, which Habermas assumes in accordance with
positivism and later with respect to the analytic tradition. On the contrary, Marx’s concept of
social labor is inseparable from the question of the identity that is achieved in the object. By this
I mean that the achieved and acknowledged object is part of a subjective activity that is a result
of the current superstructure in which humans are living.
Rockmore attributes a materialist interpretation of Marx to Habermas: “In a word, Marx’s
materialism is said to consist in the fact that for the activity of thought he substitutes material
production, in which political economy replaces formal logic” (Rockmore 1989, 54). Before, we
come to a conclusion about the relation of theory and practice, we have to see whether this sort
of materialism is Marx’s intention. I will make a series of remarks about Marx’s unclear relation
to materialism in the following point.
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3.2.1 Marx’s Idealist Materialism or Materialist Idealism
The holistic philosophy of Hegel accentuates the priority of thinking as an ongoing critique. In
this sense, it is rather difficult to ascribe a final position to Hegel. Thus, the question of the status
of nature is already two sided for Hegel. We can approach nature with regard to the finite ends of
man. Then, nature itself is the trivial object of human interaction. At the beginning of his
Philosophy of Nature Hegel, for example, states:
But if this way of considering the matter starts from particular finite ends, on the one hand it makes them
into presuppositions whose contingent content may in itself be even insignificant and trivial (Hegel, PoN
§245, 3).

So considering the starting point from merely finite ends, makes nature trivial and all that matters
is the mind. Nevertheless, Hegel sees human beings in their nature as included in nature. In this
form human nature presents itself as a riddle:
Nature confronts us as a riddle and a problem, whose solution both attracts and repels us: attracts us,
because Spirit is presaged in Nature; repels us, because Nature seems an alien existence, in which Spirit
does not find itself. (Hegel, PoN §245, 2).

As Hegel describes this riddle, it is actually the problem that nature is taken to be outside of us,
but at the same time it has to be a part of us. It is in the first instance contingent, but also part of
our production and thus not merely contingent. It is a product of our objective forces that are
controlled and are not controlled by ourselves. Hegel investigates this as the self-positing of the
concept that grasps content as in-itself and for-itself, and its own activity according to the same
distinction. In the Logic and in the Phenomenology of Spirit this self-positing causes a cascade of
self-moving conceptual experiences and reflections that will be grasped in Hegel’s dialectic as
forms of a mind-internal or phenomenological investigation.
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Marx underlines this achievement of Hegel’s philosophy. He sees Hegel’s “outstanding” in
the fact that Hegel grasped this human condition as the dialectic of negativity:
The outstanding thing of Hegel’s Phenomenology and of its final outcome- that is, the dialectic of
negativity as the moving and generating principle - is thus first that Hegel conceives the self-genesis of
man as a process, conceives objectification as loss of the object, as alienation and as transcendence of this
alienation; that he thus grasps the essence of labour and comprehends objective man – true, because real
man – as the outcome of man’s own labour “ (Marx, 1978, 112).

Marx acknowledges this important labor of spirit, which is also the experience of consciousness
that every discovered immediacy turns into a mediated cognition. According to Marx, man
grasps himself as this production that produces him as an object and a subject. Marx, however,
underlines that this self-alienating split can be just mediated within a society by labor. According
to Marx, “[t]he real, active orientation of man to himself as a species-being”, namely to identify
himself, must be related to an act that is in his species “powers” (Marx 1978, 112). For Marx
species power is labor and only possible “as the result of history” (Marx 1978, 112). However,
this “only possible form of estrangement”, labor, is the substance that we are confronted with as
human beings, because we are the self-produced products of difference towards a pursued
identity (Marx 1978, 112). The focus for Marx shifts, therefore, from a unification of a selfestranged mind that can, according to Marx, only give a self-estranged identity, namely
abstraction, to the real products of what mind produces. We shift from the internal experiences of
consciousness to the material differences that are in our society. The resulting material difference
of this production is man himself. It is not about the mind-internal completion of the circle that is
important for Marx, but rather the riddle that human beings come up with themselves as products
in their history, certainly an objectifying history that produces classes. Here, humans cannot
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entirely unify themselves for themselves, but they have to seek for a solution in their history of
production, which includes the production of themselves.
This short interpretation positions Marx in between what is called materialism and
idealism, but also highlights Hegel from another perspective. Hegel, as much as Marx, is, in fact,
interested in this movement of man in history who is in nature and yet beyond it. If this is true, it
is hard to make the ultimate distinction between materialism and idealism, meaning that either
nature depends on the mind or mind depends on nature. Nature, for Hegel, is rather the selfpositing of spirit (or the concept) and Marx, in contrast, does not want to describe this selfpositioning abstractly but concretely in societies.
Besides the social rupture of man in his double-nature, I would like to emphasize again
that Marx takes labor as the epistemological foundation for what we grasp as reality or
materialism. He writes:
Whenever real, corporeal man, man with his feet firmly on the solid ground, man exhaling and inhaling
all the forces of nature, establishes his real, objective essential powers as alien objects by his
externalization, it is not the act of positing which is the subject in this process: it is the subjectivity of
objective essential powers, whose action, therefore, must also be something objective (Marx 1978, 115).

So Marx clearly focuses on “the subjectivity of objective essential powers.” This means that the
subject produces objective results by being its own result, not as an abstract mind, but as an
experiencing human being who is embedded in societies. This holds also true for our theoretical
reasoning, since we usually claim intuitively that our subjective claims can be demonstrated as
objective. In other words, we claim that subjective production relies on something that is not
subjective and can therefore be demonstrated as objective. This means our double-nature, or in
Hegelian terms the self-positing of the concept, desires ourselves as an objective product of our
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own subjective production. In this production our nature turns out to be not having a nature,
because it is subjective, but also as a nature that is not relying on ourselves and is thus somewhat
objective. Thus, it is correct to focus on the process of this ongoing objectifying labor that means
nothing else than producing objects in the form of an eternal recurrence of our double-nature.
Therefore Marx proceeds: “his objective product only confirms his objective activity,
establishing his activity as the activity of an objective, natural being” (Marx 1978, 115). So the
subjective activity can be reinterpreted as an activity that produces objects and is therefore
objective, but it also confirms itself by doing so in the produced object. This object can be a
product right in front of us, but as Marx shows later in the forms of self-estrangement, the object
can also be man who produces himself and is produced as, for example, a class object.
This self-production is what I will also grasp as the truth of the Hegelian open historical
system: the subject in its production of its subjectively objective reality, namely its being part of
the objective production, is itself the production. This production which must be the final result
of all absolute thinking is at the same time idealist and materialist, because by searching for a
whole it constantly brings up its double-nature of having a nature of not-having a nature in the
historical products and even as history itself. It posits itself in difference to itself. Marx’ hassle
with this phenomenon is then expressed in his idea of alienation.
When thought therefore reconsiders its own thoughts as objective products, the question
of idealism and materialism (or realism)151 suddenly disappears and our riddle, as Hegel
described it above, emerges. The unity of estrangement is therefore not found in abstract
thinking, but in the most original production of a double-natured being. On this ground the key
passage of the Hegelian philosophy in his Logic becomes clearer. Hegel states:
151

Marx uses the term ‘real’ which I interpret as close to ‘material’.
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“The absolute freedom of the Idea, however, is that it does not merely pass over into life, nor that it lets
life shine within itself as finite cognition, but that, in the absolute truth of itself, it resolves to release out
of itself into the freedom the moment of its particularity or of the initial determining and otherness, [i.e.]
the immediate Idea as its reflexion, or itself as Nature. (Hegel EL §244, 307) 152

This passage of Hegel’s Logic is well known. After having subordinated every determination to
the power of the idea, the idea has to release itself freely. Here, Marx remarks that the common
Hegelians suffered “terrible headaches” (Marx 1978, 123) in interpreting the question of
idealism and realism (I intend to use term ‘materialism’ for ‘realism’ here), which probably was
most prominent here (I add, if it were a question of idealism and realism). Instead, the focus was
always on the products that confirm the objectivity of labor of spirit that would be otherwise
without meaning.
Marx denies that Hegel was clear enough to grasp this objectivity of the subjective
production within a double-nature. Hegel’s release of the idea was “nothing else
but abstraction” (Marx 1978, 124) and it is questionable what ‘freely’ means. Particularly, the
“self-absorption” of the idea releasing something that was “hidden in itself only as an
abstraction” is for Marx a turn into idealism and thus a turn into abstract ideology not
recognizing its underlying concepts (Marx 1978, 123). It is also clear that the idea without
anything more than itself is nothing more than mere fantasy. Therefore, Marx identifies the
negative consequence of a philosophy that is merely lost in empty thinking: It is boredom that he
defines as “the longing for content” (Marx 1978, 123). Being condemned to think emptily the
same again and again without taking notice of its real production is a problem of idealistic
thought that needs a solution, because it does not grasp the real problems at hand. Marx’s
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solution is therefore to focus on the products, instead of just releasing them, while the product is
a part of a double-nature. So Marx underlines that the focal point is to look freely at ones
abstractions as the real objective product (Marx 1978, 124). The most objective product, as I
add, however, is man himself in his double-nature.
To summarize: for Marx, Hegel’s objectification of self-consciousness has led to
alienation. So the work of the mind should not be uplifted as the highest result, but as, I would
say, the most problematic result. For Marx, man is a natural product that is the objectification of
his spirit-labor and so he is finally confronted with the open question of what to do with his
nature as the product of his labor. The question of mankind is left open and is thus not
teleological. If my interpretation is correct and not only controversial, then it is more difficult to
propose a goal of Marx’s philosophy, as Habermas does. In other terms, we are confronted with
the question of an open, historical system, namely our society of producers that has to be guided
within the processes of production regarding their nature by respecting their nature of not having
a nature. I take this production of man to be history.

3.2.2 Habermas’ Empirical Interpretation of Marx
As already pointed out, Habermas follows a different interpretation of Marx. For him, Marx
simply focuses on the empirical fact of production that is an expression of the current system in a
given society. Thus, he quotes Marx: “Wie die Individuen ihr Leben äußern, so sind sie. Was sie
sind fällt also zusammen mit ihrer Produktion, sowohl damit, was sie produzieren, als auch
damit, wie sie produzieren.“ (cited in Habermas 1976, 146). While I would interpret this passage
as a moment of Marx’s materialist idealism or idealist materialism, Habermas detects a rebuttal
of the ‘phenomenalism’ of subjects that are not understood with respect to their development in
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their societies. He also detects a connotation of Marx’s turn towards mere materialism as a kind
of positivism. Marx, according to Habermas, favors interest over ideas (see Habermas 1976,
146). Humans are not abstract, but social beings. With respect to this, he quotes Marx again:
“Das menschliche Wesen ist kein dem Individuum innewohnendes Abstraktum. In seiner
Wirklichkeit ist es das Ensemble der gesellschaftlichen Verhältnisse“ (cited in Habermas 1976,
146). At the same time, Habermas sees here a rejection of a so-called methodological
individualism, which is later also his main criticism of Brandom in Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung.
For Habermas, Marx’s rejection of Hegel’s abstraction is a turn toward empirical sociology. This
suggests that Marx is more an empirical revolutionist, an interpretation which is also mentioned
in the Stanford Encyclopedia: “Karl Marx (1818–1883) is best known not as a philosopher but
as a revolutionary, whose works inspired the foundation of many communist regimes in the
twentieth century” (Wolff 2017).153 Habermas’ treatment of “historical materialism […] as an
empirically based philosophy of history, susceptible of empirical refutation” (Rockmore 1989,
33) takes away the philosophical dimension in Marx. For Habermas it is, however, also a fact
that historical materialism does not rely on first principles, but relies on practice, which makes it
“empirically rooted” (Rockmore 1989, 33). Rockmore identifies here the main problem:
The result is a tension, which Habermas is unable to resolve, between the approach to historical materialism
as an empirically based form of philosophy, and the insistence on its ‘location’ between philosophy and
science. Certainly, Habermas’ later tendency to refer to historical materialism as a social theory does not
resolve this issue, since it leaves open the problem of the status of social theory (Rockmore 1989, 34).

If philosophy were empirical, then we would certainly deny any discussion of its normative
status, because then it could only describe. We need, however, guidance for moral questions that
153
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we cannot simply decide by the current theories of observation. Since history is, moreover, not
only an objective fact, but a result of human production, we need to become aware of its course
in terms of concepts and not observations. So Habermas pushes our interpretation of Marx in a
problematic direction. By his focus on the empirical side of Marx, Habermas loses the original
connection to the Hegelian project.
Habermas proceeds with his rather empirical interpretation of Marx: “[…] die spezifisch
menschliche Lebensweise läßt sich erst hinreichend charakterisieren, wenn wir das Konzept der
gesellschaftlichen Arbeit mit dem des familialen Organisationsprinzips verbinden“ (Habermas
1976, 152). Habermas perceives the family not only through its a relationship to production and
thus attempts to broaden what he takes to be Marx’s empirical approach. Yet, he overlooks that
Hegel already worked out these relations in the Phenomenology of Spirit and that Marx
maintains this relationship to Hegel on a philosophical level. Moreover, the concept of labor that
Habermas uses, in order to distinguish it from family structures, is not the labor that I attempted
to explain above as the philosophical problem of consciousness approaching itself, but the plain
labor of people who are immersed in a historically, exploitative, but in the long run improving
structure. On the basis of these observations, Habermas claims that the broader structures of
history are not entirely related to these laboring subjects (see Habermas 1976, 154). His criticism
is then that there is no discrete series of social forms of production that Marx can derive. In other
words, Marx’s history is not based on the ‘real’ development of “hominids” during their
differentiation into humans. Habermas claims that, unlike Marx, he defends a weak naturalism,
namely that the development of our culture is only contingently related to our natural
constitution. The analysis of the empirical subject of Marx is therefore not sufficient in order to
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explain all societal structures. So Habermas rejects Marx as a positivist, which neglects his
philosophical effort of relating to Hegel by a rather philosophical concept of labor.
For Habermas, progress of both forms, labor and family, are then measured in terms of
truth values and moral correctness [Richtigkeit] (see Habermas 1976, 156). These two forms of
discourse are established in society, but have also no universal justification. They are weakly
justified by virtue of our nature that we can observe empirically. So Habermas expects that these
presuppositions of a historical materialism can be justified by means of sociology. Consequently,
he directs us into a non-philosophical, but empirical analysis of the relationship between theory
and practice. In other words, Habermas wants to reject Marx’s supposed positivism and wants to
renew the empirical dimension of sociology.
It comes down to a correct interpretation of Marx and Marxism. Marxism, according to
Rockmore: “[…] was invented by Friedrich Engels, Marx’s close friend, staunch political
colleague, longtime financial supporter, and tendentious editor of his unpublished writings. […]
There is no alternative to distinguishing between Marx and Marxism in order to understand
philosophical Marxism” (Rockmore 2008, 54). This major distinction that Rockmore stresses is
the problem of holding Marxism and Marx apart. According to him, Marx himself was probably
a trained Hegelian, which would move him into the direction of German Idealism. While Marx
has, at least, some kind of affiliation to Idealism, Engels interpretes Marx as a positivist.
Rockmore writes on this problem: “It is a major mistake to conflate the doctrines of the disciple
and the master. In the same way that Kant is not a Kantian, nor Plato a Platonist, Marx is not a
Marxist, as he is reputed to have observed” (Rockmore 1989, 6). Marxism is instead the
discipline that was started by Engels (Rockmore 1989, 6). According to Rockmore, Habermas is
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unclear on the “degree of the continuity of Marx and Marxism” (Rockmore 1989, 7).154 So
Habermas comprehends “Marxist theory as a philosophy of history formulated with an explicit
political intent, and scientifically falsifiable” (Rockmore 1989, 34). The problem that Marx
identifies is that ”ideology rests on […] a socially distorted form of society” (Rockmore 1989,
37). This has the consequence of “a distorted apprehension of itself on the level of
consciousness” (Rockmore 1989, 37). The problem of a subject that is not outside of its
historical production and the distorted consciousness creates the problem of the possibility of a
historical or immanent critique. In this sense, Marx is not a materialist in the sense of positivism,
but he acknowledges the empirical conditions that form the subject. We should not commit to an
entirely materialist interpretation and at least acknowledge the philosophical elements that are
based on non-empirical observation, namely the distinction between subjects producing objects
and subjects producing themselves in the process of production. This is necessary, since a theory
of self-alienation cannot be observed empirically. Rather, it is a condition of cognition, more
precisely, an investigation of what must have preceded cognition. Habermas, relying on the
superstructure argument of Marx, neglects such philosophical arguments. With regard to this
superstructure, Marx states, however:
“In the social production of their life, men enter into definite relations that are indispensable and
independent of their will, relations of production which correspond to a definite stage of development of
their material productive forces. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic
structure of society, the real foundation on which rises a legal and political superstructure and to which
correspond definite forms of social consciousness” (Marx 1859/1978, 4).
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The argument for a superstructure expresses the belief that economic relations build the
foundation for how humans perceive their society and themselves. The superstructural claim is
controversial, since it is unclear whether the whole of human consciousness is constituted by
these relations or only distorted. Having a distorted self-relationship, however, does not mean
that this blocks all self-recognition or the social development of life-forms besides production.
Whether Marx claims that such a superstructure is the fundamental, anthropological condition,
largely determines whether he is read as a philosopher or as social scientist close to an absolute,
social constructivism. By ‘absolute, social constructivism’ I mean that the human being in its
mental constitution is entirely composed from its social interactions.
Moreover, it is also not entirely clear whether Marx plans to achieve presuppositionless
phenomenological self-reflection that is independent from the society. Rather, he says that we
are at least partially immersed in society and cannot escape this fact. Rockmore summarizes this
as follows: “As noted, Habermas here attributes to Marx the intention to provide a
presuppositionless phenomenological self-reflection. The result of Marx’s failure is a supposedly
positivist reduction of the act of the self-production of the human species to work” (Rockmore
1989, 55-56). In other words, all these unclear interpretations form a certain direction that
Habermas needs for distinguishing his approach from a positivist, historical materialism. This,
however, is done at the expense of discussing Marx.
What follows from all of this? Habermas asks which sort of recognition is possible in
historical materialism, but he presupposes that materialism and idealism are clearly divided in
Marx’s theory. According to the Early Manuscripts, this is difficult to defend. Habermas
believes that we should not fall into a naïve scientific scheme (see Habermas 1976, 10), which he
supposes is the case for Marx’s “materialist concept of synthesis” (Habermas 1976, 10). So what

207

is the foundation of a Marxist sociology for Habermas? It is the normative foundation of claims
that we make if we communicate, and this can also be demonstrated for the natural sciences.
Since there is a history of these normative foundations, Habermas’ further complaint about Marx
is that he did not analyze the cultural superstructure of the economic relations. These, however,
would also play a role in the cultural development of societies and their normative constitution
(Habermas 1976, 12). In other words, Habermas reduces Marx to a materialist in the positivist
sense. If Marx, however, has another foundation or ground than Habermas assumes, then
Habermas’ argument is directed against positivism, but not against Marx. Altogether, the
position on Marxism will complicate Habermas relationship to Hegel who he rejects as an
idealist who commits to an ahistorical paradigm of conscsiousness.

3.2.3 The Relation between Theory and Practice for Habermas
After discussing Habermas’ ‘reconstruction’ of Marxism that underestimates the relationship
between materialism and idealism, the question remains as to whether accounts of knowledge are
socially relevant (see Rockmore 1989, 171). There is a tension between Habermas’ empiricist
‘Marxian’ goal of human emancipation and his Kantian, rigorously epistemological program
according to which knowledge is constitutive for emancipation (see Rockmore 1989, 174).
In Knowledge and Human Interest (1968),155 Habermas wants to replace the positivism
that he identifies in Marx by a non-causal interpretation of knowledge that leads us to
emancipation. It is not simply nature that guides us towards better societies, but a capability of
critical self-examination or reflection. Knowledge and Human Interest represents, therefore,
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Habermas’ anthropological investigation before he comes to his theory of communicative action.
In Theory of Communicative Action (1981) Habermas will replace the merely anthropological
discussion of emancipation by a discussion of an ideal communication model that guides our
practical discourses and finally leads to emancipation. He thus cures a problem that has revealed
itself in his earlier theory of emancipation, namely to expose the correct normative basis of
emancipation. His approach is quasi-transcendental, since he attempts to work out the conditions
that guide our current communicative situation.
On the basis of this communicative model, there is seemingly no need for substantialism.
By ‘substantialism’ I mean the assumption of universally valid metaphysical principles for our
societies. Habermas’ anti-substantialist emancipation and his subscription to Kantian rigor,
however, create a problem. If we deny substantial truths, then the question remains how we
secure the procedures that guide our societies. In other words, how can a desubstantialized
philosophy clarify what we have to do in our society in order to achieve emancipation?
With Habermas’ pragmatic turn, he further turns away from the consciousness paradigm
and turns toward a formalism.156 Habermas’ method is therefore not a dialectical consideration of
the content of our current, historical society that would be open to historical change. Instead, he
follows a quasi-transcendental demonstration of the linguistic preconditions of our
communication. Emancipation is hidden in our linguistic capability. This means by entering a
discourse, we produce, at the same time, an ideal of how to communicate. This ideal should
guide our society.
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Before Habermas works out the linguistic theory of emancipation, he already introduces
the third interest of humans in Knowledge and Human Interest: “Orientation toward technical
control, toward mutual understanding in the conduct of life, and toward emancipation from
seemingly ‘natural’ constraints establish the specific viewpoints from which we can apprehend
reality as such” (Habermas 1987, 311). The balance between our interest in social harmony, our
interest of knowledge and our interest in emancipation create apprehension of “reality as such.”
The idea is that neither representation, nor social harmony create objective standards of
knowledge, but that a critical attitude of reflection will balance both former interests. The critical
attitude will not “outwit” our natural interest, but it will make it transparent. By this
emancipation of humans, nature obtains autonomy in us (see Habermas 1987, 311). Our nature
therefore strives for emancipation through reflection. Habermas introduces this third form of
interest, namely emancipation, that is supposed to bridge the tensions between our interest of
social harmony and our interest in knowledge. This is not the Kantian idea of uninterested
reason. Obviously, Habermas accepts that we are human beings with interests. In this sense,
Habermas acknowledges the problem of ideological discourses, as discourses that are governed
by hidden interests. The third form of critique is supposed to distinguish itself from the capitalist
framework by virtue of reflection (Bohman, Rehg 2017).157 Particularly, this means that we have
to make interests transparent. The critical self-investigation shall then eradicate power structures
that were established during an overemphasize of the former interests.
I am going to discuss this third form of interest by introducing the three knowledge
constitutive interests that Habermas identifies. I will briefly discuss all three interests with regard
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to Peirce’s semiotic triangle, which already combines Habermas’ early theory with his later
theory of communicative action. This semiotic triangle postulates three semiotic relations that a
subject experiences: the relation of a subject to a referent, the relation of subjects to subjects, and
the relation of subjects to signs. However, before I focus on Habermas’ linguistic solution to the
problem of theory and practice, I will explain the problem of theory and practice in more detail.
For Rockmore, epistemology and theories of social interaction stand in a tension to each
other: “The problem is the real possibility of a view intended to be both epistemologically
rigorous and socially relevant” (Rockmore 1989, 173). How can this tension be explained? We
might, for example, have a clear account of what triangles are in trigonometry. But even if we
had, it would be unclear how this knowledge should contribute to our understanding of history
and human development. Does our enhanced knowledge of triangles lead to a better life or even
to better politics? Even though we might work out the smallest parts of knowledge, the idea of
leading up from small bits of knowledge to a theory of a whole is a bit optimistic. If, for
example, our endeavors in such theoretical subjects as mathematics are guided by the theoretical
conditions of success, then it is unclear if the criteria for success in small epistemological
endeavors are the same or even similar at the macro-level of societies and their history. In
conclusion, the first problem is to identify the criteria for success on the macro-societal level.
What can count as a success? To identify an idea of emancipation or even to point out an
emancipation in our social form of communication provides such a criterion for micro-societal
interactions, but the question remains if this criterion is applicable to the macro-levels of society.
Indeed, it is a problem of sociology.
The extension of individual discourse structures into the sphere of larger societies is
questionable. There is a tension between: “a micro-theory of rationality based on communicative
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coordination and a macro-theory of the systemic integration of modern societies through such
mechanisms as the market” (Bohman, Rehg 2017). So the goal is to “to overcome its one-sided
version of rationalization” by implementing a sociological approach (Bohman, Rehg 2017). The
theory of communicative action deals with a social problem and tries to introduce a sociological,
empirical perspective on phenomena. This includes a rejection of large-scale explanations that
was common for the Marxist theories before. Their comprehensiveness in terms of a story of
reason lacks the “explanatory power” to explain phenomena all the way down (Bohman, Rehg
2017). They only expose a certain story of reason under which macro-scale phenomena are
subsumed. Only interpreting society on the macro-level, however, makes theory not socially
relevant, or does, at least, not show how it is socially relevant.
A second problem emerges with regard to the predictability of social change on the
macro-level of societies. Theories of social change are hard to test. This means that a theory
works best if we break it down to the most universal hypothesis. In other words, we might
attempt to find something like the underlying cause for all occurrences. If we have one universal
cause that gives sufficient explanation to the greatest amount of occurrences, we will have a
theory with high informational value. Looking at theories of social change, however, we find that
most of the time they are reflective. This means that we look at history or societal change only
after the change has occurred. After the fact, we try to universalize principles from our
observations. These principles are often very vague and do not qualify for absolute universals
that predict further occurrences. They rather understand than explain. So, for example, students
of the causes of World War I disagree broadly whether the assassination of Franz Ferdinand of
Austria, the economic recession, or other events qualify as the cause of World War I. The
understanding of our past is already difficult. If we, however, cannot even understand the past,
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how then can we predict the future? If we cannot produce hypotheses that are applicable to the
future, our theory is not socially relevant in the sense that it helps us to predict. I claim that
reflections on the past help us to forge new concepts to understand the present. Yet, I think it is
more complicated to claim that these concepts can guide our present moment. Habermas’ theory
of emancipation might simplify this aspect. The question is whether the communication model
can not only deliver an understanding of past social changes, but also whether the
communication model can predict future change.
Third, a multitude of actors might have different features than the underlying behavior of
a single actor. This can be expressed as the problem of emergence, or the so-called phenomenon
of a third kind. This means that actors do not intend results on the macro-level, but that they
unintentionally cause phenomena at the macro-level by their individual behavior. This further
means that the individual reason of the micro-level might have different effects for societies on
the macro-level. It is therefore unclear whether the improvement of individual discourse
conditions will lead to better societies overall. It might even worsen the situation.
Habermas seems to have a link in mind that shall solve these problems of epistemological
rigor with regard to communicative situations and their application to societies. Rockmore states:
In his theory of communicative action Habermas proposes a position which is obviously intended to
combine the social relevance of Marx’s thought with the epistemological rigor of the critical philosophy.
[….] On the one hand, there are those, such as Plato, Kant, Husserl and even Whitehead […] on the other
hand there are those, such as Aristotle, Hegel, and Marx, who are concerned to limit, or even to reject, some
claims for the relevance of reason (Rockmore 1989, 173).

This means that Plato, for example, clearly assumes a final congruence of the good and truth as
expressed in the ideal state. The question of the criteria of success, however, remains. So in this
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case Plato’s theory of the ideal state appears to current readers as a fascist or inhuman state. His
assumption that he in fact found a pathway from epistemology to a theory of the good can be
doubted by looking at his results. This means that even if the leaders of societies were wise men,
who achieved a perfect balance in their soul, it seems that at least their state is problematic. That
knowledge makes better leaders is therefore an assumption that is not yet proven.
The problem reoccurs in Habermas who wants to secure the conditions for
communicative success. He argues that this securing will lead to more just societies. In other
words, better communicators achieve more truth, and better discourse societies achieve better
social societies. Yet, it is hard and perhaps simply not possible to prove that a non-substantialism
has these desirable results. I claim that without a criterion of success that is provided on a
historically reflective basis, Habermas’ theory will encounter tremendous difficulties to
demonstrate the validity of his theory. If he relies, for example, on empirical tests of his theory
which he described in Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit (1962), and which should validate the
new forms of public communication, then his theory seems to be outdated. The systems of power
have become successfully immunized against the new and open democracy of the 1950s. It is not
only that many leaders have found a way to assure their power democratically in a public sphere.
It is more so that the free information that people share is equivalent to the misinformation
people also distribute. The amplification of knowledge by new techniques is followed by the
amplification of misinformation. The debate on climate change can be taken as such an example.
Even though the discourses are free, that simply means that more people have access to the
scientific information, and even though scientists become more and more certain about
anthropogenetic climate change, the belief in climate change is declining. The number of climate

214

change deniers in the U.S. is a clear mismatch with regard to the beliefs of most scientists. Better
conditions for discourse lead therefore not to better social results.
Habermas believes that a critique must be formulated on the basis of an interest in
emancipation: “Knowledge-constitutive interests mediate the natural history of the human
species with the logic of its self-formative process […]. But they cannot be employed to reduce
this logic to any sort of natural basis” (Habermas 1987, 168). Here, Habermas identifies the
“technical interest” that serves as a means for controlling our relationship to nature (Bohman,
Rehg 2017). Yet, this technical interest cannot be the only interest that guides human lives. With
regard to Peirce’s semiotic triangle the technical interest expresses the subject-reference-relation.
The empirical sciences, based on this relation, aim to achieve testable hypotheses in order to
create correct descriptions of experienced phenomena.
[…] the empirical-analytic sciences are distinguished by their treatment of the object domain as governed
by predictable law-like regularities that allow for certain types of methodologically controlled techniques of
inquiry that would be inappropriate for the interpretive sciences (Bohman, Rehg 2017).

The idea of such clearly distinguishable interests is problematic, even though Peirce’s triangle
suggests that they are clearly separable. A simple linguistic discourse analysis will reveal that
people rarely clarify truth-claims. The claim that every utterance can be transformed from an
implicit utterance to an explicit utterance of the form ‘I claim that p is true in front of the current
and whole future humanity’ is difficult to defend on the practical, linguistic level. This is not
only problematic in terms of cognitive sciences. With regard to the cognitive sciences, our brain
is too inert to produce explicit performatives that are hidden in implicit structures all the time.158
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Cognitive sciences rather assume a pragmatic level of interaction that they only describe. They do not assume
that every implicit utterance has a clearly distinguishable performative and that it can be related to a clear interest.
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But Habermas’ approach is also problematic with regard to the fact that a theoretical discourse is
a learned discourse. For example, at this particular moment, we might agree on a kind of
epistemologically rigorous talk. We follow rules that, however, can vary at another moment.
Habermas’ strategy of simply introducing a relation between a subject and an object is too vague
to describe how we achieve truth in epistemic discourses.
It is also difficult to identify the different interests in a normal conversation. It seems that
Habermas relies here on a distinction between ‘systeme’ and ‘parole’ from a pragmatic stance.
Yet, it seems languages cannot be ordered in a closed system of different sub-systems. So, for
example, how can Habermas claim that there are only three interests that guide our discourses?
Particularly the multiplicity of linguistic explanations why we communicate is one reason why
research into language universals has declined over the last decades. Habermas’ explanation with
regard to the semiotic triangle is a linguistic model, but does not give an unshakable explanation
of how we communicate. Instead, he has to acknowledge that his argument is part of a historical
moment. He himself relies here on the historical constellation after the linguistic and pragmatic
turn that I described above. He believes that we can work out the contextual conditions of our
utterances. Later, I will describe how he abandons this belief in Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung
(1999).
With regard to the subject-subject-relation, we can discuss the “interpretive, or culturalhermeneutic sciences” resting on the “practical interest” of how to live in communities (see
(Bohman, Rehg 2017). Due to the fact that these discourses organize human behavior, they also
play a significant role for the relation of communities to the objects of reference (Bohman, Rehg
2017). Yet, there is not necessarily an ahistorical criterion for the right practice. Rather, the
practice is based on a commonly shared understanding of correctness during a historical moment.
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In addition to these two interests, Habermas therefore identifies the third interest of reflection,
“precisely a methodological reflection that aims to free science from its positivist illusions”
(Bohman, Rehg 2017). In terms of the Theory of Communicative Action, this third interest can be
understood through the relationship of the symbolic mediations, which an inter-subject endorses,
and the inter-subjective exploration of language. This third interest derives its normative power
from an intrinsic self-differentiation that can annihilate the power relations that the former forms
of discourse build (see Rockmore 1989, 41). The former development of philosophy can then be
revealed by a critical reflection of its development of power. I described this above as making
interests transparent. Habermas’ suggests here that language must intrinsically include conditions
for emancipation. His formal pragmatic, however, should not transcendentally deduce conditions
for all discourses, but reveal empirically how discourse achieves this kind of emancipation by
virtue of the concrete, historical development of language. The question remains whether
Habermas sees this as a formal capability. Then, language and its critical capacities would not be
related to history. The approach would be non-substantial and ahistorical.
Altogether, Habermas wants “to unmask concrete cases of personal self-deception and
social-political ideology” (Bohman, Rehg 2017). The problem is, however, that in Knowledge
and Human Interest Habermas cannot yet deliver a convincing basis for this normative standard.
In the Stanford article this problem is described as follows:
These and other deficits of his analysis posed a challenge for Habermas that would guide a decade-long
search for the normative and empirical basis of critique. Whatever the best path to the epistemic and
normative basis for critique might be, it would have to pass a democratic test: that ‘in Enlightenment there
are only participants’ […] Habermas will not resolve this methodological issue until a series of transitional
studies in the 1970s culminates in his mature systematic work, The Theory of Communicative Action
(Bohman, Rehg 2017).
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I disagree with the Stanford suggestion that Habermas solves this conflict by the formal model of
the Theory of Communicative Action. The problem is not only that the quasi-transcendental
conditions that he derives from the ideal speech situation are formal, but also that the conditions
cannot give us guidance for substantial problems. This problem was revealed in the later
Sloterdijk-Habermas-debate that dominated the German debate during fall 1999 and resulted in a
change of Habermas non-substantialist approach. His argument from the essay Zur Zukunft der
Menschlichen Natur (2001) culminates in a substantialist argument for discourse ethics with
regard to preimplantation diagnostics (PID). Habermas argues that we can forbid PID on the
basis of the premises of the constitutional state, which should secure the communicative
conditions for our society. An allowance of PID would then undermine these conditions for all
participants of our community. In other words, Habermas derives substantialist laws that are
universally true from his formal pragmatics. The whole argument is problematic, since,
according to his position presented above, Habermas strictly denies a transcendental argument
and argues that positions in a society are based on an empirically observable progression to
which we critically relate. In Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung (1999), Habermas paraphrases this
position by arguing that the human being cannot not learn, but he abstains from saying what we
learn. If Habermas changes his position in Zur Zukunft der Menschlichen Natur, then his former
formal solution must be incomplete. After this publication, it looks as if a pragmatic account of
morality must finally take metaphysical ideas into consideration. This is a drastic change in
Habermas’ position and relativizes the idea that our societies emancipate themselves by better
discourse structures. Critique is then not separable from content, and our project of reason is
rather historically reflective and informed by the content.
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To summarize, Habermas’ formal pragmatic approach resulted finally in the irrelevance
of philosophy. As a result he had to compensate this pragmatic approach by a transcendental
argument in Zur Zukunft der Menschlichen Natur. Habermas’ proposed earlier anti-metaphysics
was probably founded in a fear of objective idealism that he identified in the Marxist philosophy
as the consciousness paradigm. For him, this lays out a predestined history of humanity that
demands revolution. Habermas’ turn towards the philosophies of language means a stronger
rejection of viable, metaphysical topics. Habermas’ purification of philosophy makes it
impossible for the philosopher to defend substantialist positions. The fear of error turns
philosophy into an empty enterprise, or an empirically bound discussion that thus can hardly
defend moral judgments. In this sense, Habermas philosophy cannot do more than criticize
failures in current discourse structures. Without a notion of history and a relation of reflection to
content that Hegel develops, Habermas’ relativism cannot produce an objective justification of
progress. The lack of such a criterion is demonstrated in the Menschenparkdebatte. Habermas’
idea that the theoretical knowledge of discourses leads to better practice, cannot be proven, but
turns out to be a suggestion.
We can come to a preliminary conclusion: In Habermas, we find a variation of the
Marxist position that social practice interferes with our epistemological access to objects. Either
it distorts the relationships of subjects to objects completely or, at least, partially. The original
epistemological problem of recognition deals with the split between subject and object. The
problem with a solution for this split occurs after the Hegelian view of philosophy as a history of
reason with a teleological goal for human development. Teleology poses, therefore, another
epistemological problem in creating an identity between being and thought. Being with regard to
history is not simply a status of facts that has to be represented, but an evolving set of historical
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approaches. The epistemological problem of reflecting on a criterion is intensified if history is
part of the problem. This means that it is not only about the identification of an external object,
but also about the production of the object in history, in which the subject itself is embedded.
The question of where to place an empirical philosophy remains. Habermas develops an idea of
critique, in order to deal with this problem. His turn towards formal pragmatics, however, loses
its original meaning of a critique of the experiential conditions of human beings. Habermas’
philosophy is ultimately ahistorical, a criticism that Habermas himself will apply to Hegel.

3.3 Habermas and the Pragmatic Turn
I cannot discuss Habermas’ Theory of Communicative Action in detail. I can only indicate that
Habermas’ desubstantialist solution for the universal basis of discourses is too formal to address
problems such as preimplantation diagnostics. Despite these difficulties, Habermas’ Discourse
Theory can still be investigated in its relationship to the pragmatic turn, which links his approach
to analytic philosophy and Brandom’s formalist account of human interaction. The main
question of the pragmatic turn is: how can meaning be justified by use? In other words, how can
we replace theories of actual truths by procedural truths. I called this ‘the pragmatic integration
of a reference-semantics’. It resembles Habermas’ move toward sociology. This means that we
are not interested in actual truth anymore, but in the way of how we justify truths. The problem
of an empty coherentism, however, will also pose a problem for Habermas’ theory.
Despite this dependence of truth on discourse conditions and thus a relativization of the
concept of a reality in-itself, Habermas’ approach is supposed to be ontologically relevant, since
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it still uses the concept of a reality that is for us (see Pihlström 2015, 99).159 Reality for us is
grasped through communitive structures of discourse that can be justified ideally. The closer we
come to the ideal of a discourse community, the closer we get to reality. In Wahrheit und
Rechtfertigung (1999), Habermas, however, changes his concept of truth as ideal justifiability in
discourses. Habermas describes what has motivated this change. He argues that we are referring
to a commonly shared reality through discourse, which is, however, distorted by language.
Particularly in his criticism of Brandom, he will reveal that such a presupposition of reality is
problematic. However, he also argues that without a shared idea of reality, we would expose
ourselves to a contextual skepticism so that no justification would be possible at all (see Levine
2010, 680).160 I will reconstruct his argument in the following paragraphs.
Habermas states: “Die Wirklichkeit, mit der wir unsere Sätze konfrontieren, ist keine
»nackte« Wirklichkeit, sondern selber schon sprachlich imprägniert“ (Habermas 1999, 48). This
statement denies that we have access to a mind-independent reality. Reality, however, is
indirectly grasped in our language. The truth of a statement seems to be mediated only with
regard to other sentences. Here, Habermas identifies the main problem of contextualism:
Die Wahrheit einer Aussage scheint nur noch von ihrer Kohärenz mit anderen, bereits akzeptierten
Aussagen verbürgt werden zu können. Ein strenger Kontextualismus ist aber weder mit der
erkenntnisrealistischen Voraussetzung noch mit der revisionären Kraft von Lernprozessen, die den Kontext
ihrer Ermöglichung von innen verändern, noch mit dem universalisitischen Sinn kontexttranszendierender
Wahrheitsansprüche in Einklang zu bringen (Habermas 1999, 48).
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Habermas discusses the problem of a frictionless coherentism. According to such a coherentism,
claims can only be justified by already accepted claims. The problem is that we might have
coherent systems, but our system could still be false. Habermas further analyzes his earlier
solution of an ideal discourse:
Als Ausweg aus diesem Dilemma bot sich der Versuch an, das sprachtranszendente Verständnis von
Referenz mit einem sprachimmanenten Verständnis von Wahrheit als idealer Behauptbarkeit zu
kombinieren. Demnach ist eine Aussage genau dann wahr, wenn sie unter den anspruchsvollen,
pragmatischen Voraussetzungen rationaler Diskurse allen Entkräftungsversuchen standhalten würde, d.h. in
einer idealen epistemischen Situation gerechtfertigt werden könnte (Habermas 1999, 48).

Habermas here discusses his earlier idea of a critical community that achieves truth by processes
of communication guided by an ideal. Accordingly, truth is justified by ideal assertibility. This
means that a claim is true if it could be defended against all attempts to deny it under ideal
circumstances. We accept something as pragmatically true, if we can defend it against all
reasonable objections during an actual discourse. In this sense, Habermas’ concept of truth is
procedural. In its practice truth depends on the inclusion of all concerned members of the
communication-community who have equal rights of communication. Habermas specifies these
rules:
Diese Praxis beruht auf den idealisierenden Voraussetzungen (a) der Öffentlichkeit und vollständigen
Inklusion aller Betroffenen, (b) der Gleichverteilung der Kommunikationsrechte, (c) der Gewaltlosigkeit
einer Situation, die nur den zwanglosen Zwang des besseren Arguments zum Zuge kommen läßt, und (d)
der Aufrichtigkeit der Äußerungen aller Beteiligten (Habermas 1999, 49).

Again truth is achieved by securing the social conditions for truth to occur. Yet, the question is
whether the securing of ideal speech circumstances will actually achieve truth, or whether it only
constructs another context. The possibility of a confirmation bias that exists between the
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discourse participants cannot be excluded. Even under ideal conditions of the discourse, we
might agree on something that is simply false and we might have no means to correct our false
beliefs by merely discursive standards.
In Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung, Habermas attempts therefore to repair his concept of
truth as justifiability. He writes: “Diese prozedurale Fassung von Wahrheit als diskursive
Einlösung von Wahrheitsansprüchen ist insofern kontraintuitiv, als Wahrheit offensichtlich kein
»Erfolgsbegriff« ist“ (Habermas 1999, 50). Due to the epistemologically impossible connection
of truth and justification, Habermas acknowledges now that there is no conceptual relation
between truth and rational justifiability (see Habermas 1999, 50). In other words, something can
be justified very well, but this does not guarantee its truth. This means better discourses do not
necessarily lead to better insights of how the world really is. On the contrary, it is also
questionable whether something that is true can be justified at all. Habermas draws the following
conclusion:
Diese Einwände haben mich zu einer Revision veranlaßt, die den beibehaltenen Diskursbegriff der
rationalen Akzeptabilität auf einen pragmatistisch gefaßten, nicht-epistemischen Wahrheitsbegriff bezieht,
ohne damit »Wahrheit« an »ideale Behauptbarkeit« zu assimilieren (Habermas 1999, 51).

As a consequence, Habermas replaces his concept of truth as justifiability by a pragmatic
conception of truth. This means that an actual living being has no doubts about truth in actu. In a
word, truth is practice. Epistemic truth, on the contrary, only appears in the context of an
opponent challenging our everyday practices (see Habermas 1999, 52). Truth is thus a derivative
discourse from our normal course of action.
Habermas remarks that despite the impossibility of achieving truth the phenomenon of
cooperation remains. Consequently, Habermas asks how it is possible that discourse participants
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agree in a discourse, if truth is only artificially introduced (see Habermas 1999, 53). Actors have
a pressure to act. This pressure leads them to processes of learning. Only if an acquired belief
can be justified by a process of acquisition, they can defend this as true knowledge for acting
(see Habermas 1999, 55). Habermas writes: “Aktoren, die mit der Welt zurechtkommen,
konsumieren ihre Handlungsgewißheiten, aber für Subjekte, die sich im Rahmen von Diskursen
ihres Wissens reflexiv vergewissern, sind das Wahrsein und die Fallibilität einer Aussage zwei
Seiten derselben Medaille“ (Habermas 1999, 55). In other words, actors presuppose a mindindependent world in order to communicate practical failure. Then, it is not about epistemic
truth, but it is the pragmatist question of how truth functions in our discourses. Levine remarks
that “objectivity is rendered in the first instance not by our linguistically representing the world
but through our acting upon it and within it” (Levine 2011, 7).161 Confronted with failure, we
correct our practice, since the world does not collaborate (see Levine 2011, 7-8). Only after a
failure, we will represent the world as “a totality of objects” in order to discuss a shared world
(see Levine 2011, 8). We do not discuss facts but objects. In other words, Habermas proposes
here a model of experience, according to which practice is primary. Theories will be built on the
basis of our experiences.
Altogether the question emerges: Does Habermas give up on his former concept of
Discourse Theory and does he come closer to a Hegelian conception of truth? Though he comes
closer to a relativist account of truth, especially in his criticism of Brandom, he denies a return to
Hegel on the basis of a misconception of Hegel. Independent from his rather pragmatist
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conception of truth, the progress of analytic philosophy is for Habermas a linguistic movement to
replace the paradigm of consciousness and to develop a non-metaphysical philosophy that
resembles the supposedly non-metaphysical, empirical operations of science. In this sense,
Habermas’ position derived from Marx prevents him to reconsider Hegel.
Habermas still holds on to his former rejection of consciousness philosophy:
The appropriation of hermeneutics and linguistic analysis convinced me then that critical social theory had
to break free from the conceptual apparatus of the philosophy of consciousness flowing from Kant and
Hegel (Habermas 2015, 7).162

Habermas’ counter-approach is supposed to be sociology, a method that he believes does not rely
on the internal representations of objects. Instead for Habermas, sociology only describes human
interactions on the societal level. From his description of his theory, it becomes clear that
Habermas follows the historical trend of the analytical movement to reject Hegel as
metaphysical. In this sense, Habermas’ theory combines the continental rejection of Hegel, in the
form of a quasi-Marxism, and the analytical reaction to Hegel on account of his attachment to
formal anti-metaphysical pragmatics.
As a parallel to Habermas’ discourse theory, we can read Brandom’s Making it Explicit
as a similar historical attempt. Brandom abandons the model of an experiencing subject, and
explains semantics in terms of pragmatics, a seemingly sociological move. Unlike Habermas,
however, semantics remains the foundation for Brandom. Though, according to Brandom,
everything is pragmatic all the way down, his downtown of language is the proposition.
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From the perspective of the ‘pragmatic turn’, Brandom can then be interpreted as a
contributor to Discourse Theory, whose main exponent, however, is Habermas. This is, of
course, imprecise with regard to Brandom, since Brandom is a different realist than Habermas.
He relies on semantics. This confusion describes, however, the historical constellation, so that
Höffe, for example, writes:
One of the most advanced contemporary theories of truth, the discourse theory developed by
Robert Brandom in the spirit of American pragmatism, sets aside the (allegedly) descriptive
question about the nature of truth and simply addresses the performative question about how the
members of a linguistic community come to treat something as true (Höffe 2010, 186).163

Certainly, Höffe is a bit too excited about Brandom’s achievements, but my point is that there is
a connection between the program of Brandom’s inferentialism and Discourse Theory that is
rooted in Hegelian problems. The exchange between Brandom and Habermas demonstrates their
conceptual closeness in terms of pragmatics. So, for example, Habermas calls Brandom’s
Making it Explicit a milestone in 1999 (see Habermas 1999, 138). He also makes a note about
the program which is a “geduldig-präzise Ausarbeitung einer innovativen Verschränkung von
formaler Pragmatik und inferentieller Semantik“ (Habermas 1999, 138). I perceive this crossover
of formal pragmatics and inferential semantics as the central point of the “pragmatic turn” (see
also Habermas 1999, 170), and I take it to be the main reason why Habermas is so much in favor
of Brandom.
However, the advancement of analytic philosophy toward holistic contextualism does not
connect appropriately to Hegel’s central idea of systematicity and history. Holistic contextualism
therefore remains inferior to the Hegelian approach. My reconstruction of the discourse between
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Habermas and Brandom will therefore reveal an original conception of Hegel. It is the idea of
science that follows historically achieved standards, and thus is fundamentally distinct from
Brandom’s and Habermas’s ‘Discourse Theories’. Neither in Habermas nor in Brandom can we
therefore find a bridge for the divide.

3.4 Habermas’ Critique of Brandom
Habermas’ criticism of Brandom is closely related to his revised concept of truth. According to
his former model, truth is closely tied to justifiability. Now, truth is part of our practices that
accompany discourses and that are distinct from justifiability (see Habermas 1999, 50). From a
Hegelian perspective, this change makes sense, since the object of consciousness and the object
of how it is supposedly independent of consciousness are distinguishable. For a Habermasian
framework, it means to distinguish between two objects: the object of how it is discussed in a
real discourse community, and the object of how it were discussed in an ideal discourse
community. As Hegel, however, points out, the distinction of an in-itself object, and a for-itself
object is part of consciousness. Thus, we would also have to follow this distinction for the
Habermasian model: the ideal and the real discourse communities are themselves objects for the
discourse community. It comes down to the question of whether Habermas can justify the
distinction of the real and ideal communication community dialectically.
Habermas, however, wants to justify this distinction on the basis of a communicational
model and rejects Hegel’s model of how we can find objectivity under subjective conditions of
reflection. Since Habermas delivers an insufficient reconstruction of Hegel, he opts for the
analytical model, which is non-reflective and ahistorical.
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Habermas compares Brandom’s impact on philosophy with Rawls’ Theory of Justice.
According to Habermas, Brandom investigates the communicative actions that occur during the
game of argumentation (see Habermas 1999, 139). These actions are used to transport claims. A
reason is, accordingly, something that depends on the specific practices of the speakers’
community (Habermas 1999, 140). The strong focus on practice avoids representationalism and
pays attention to the self-binding rules that speakers oblige themselves to whenever they
communicate with each other.164 Habermas quotes Brandom with regard to this rather relativist,
cooperative perspective on language: “Being a reason is to be understood in the first instance in
terms of what it is for a community to treat something in practice as such a reason […] as
reasons for claims.” (Brandom 1998, 253, see also Habermas 1999, 140). Nevertheless, language
is not only an instrument for communication. This would be an inadequate understanding of
language. Language also serves in its discovery function to make explicit what is implicit in the
specific lifeform of individuals. In this sense, propositional knowledge must be integrated into
the activity of speakers. Habermas questions, on the one hand, the transcendental status of
propositions that are actually only part of a life-form. On the other hand, Habermas questions
what these propositions ultimately refer to, since any grasp of an external objectivity is
problematic.
So, firstly, the grasp of external objects is problematic for Habermas. The traditional,
Kantian dualism introduces a sphere of something given, which runs, however, into the problem
164
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of the myth of the given, or, at least, an undiscussed distinction between sensibility and
understanding. How can the given come from an external source? How can we distinguish
between us passive reception or active determination of the given?
Secondly, the procedural accounts of truth, in particular, to deduce the ultimate
conditions for discourses in order to get closer to reality, have been unsuccessful. Apel, for
example, attempted to point out the undeniable, preceding conditions for participating in any
discourse. Such transcendental conditions, however, are only recognized for specific situations
according to Habermas. Habermas ultimately rejects this view in Erläuterungen zur
Diskursethik.165
As pointed out previously, Brandom combines similarly problematic accounts that are the
idea to approach an external reality and the idea to deduce the procedural conditions for any
language game. In other words, he presupposes reality with determinate objects. Then, he
attempts to define procedural conditions for our interaction, while only having a distorted
perspective on reality. Habermas’ identifies here the main point of criticism, which Giovagnol
calls the “ambiguity […] between pragmatics and semantics,” a contradiction “that social
practices confer conceptual content to states and expressions and that material rules of inferences
confer, at the same time, that content” (Giovagnol 2001, 54). Both social practices as well as
material inferences are supposed to give us content. Habermas denies that we achieve truth by
either of these methods. In each case, truth occurs only as an intra-linguistic object (see
Giovagnol 2001, 54).
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In Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung, Habermas reconstructs Brandom’s work by emphasizing
the role of a pragmatic turn in philosophy while taking semantics into account. We have
discussed earlier the combination of formal pragmatism and inferential semantics that also
Habermas acknowledges as problematic (see Habermas 1999, 138). His criticism will focus on
the problems that a conceptual realism entails. That is, firstly, that the position of the speaker as a
participant in a communication community is a theoretical hypostasis and, secondly, that
Brandom treats communication from the perspective of the observer. These perspectives arise
from the compromises that a conceptual realism has to make. I will discuss Habermas’
reconstruction and his criticism of Brandom in the following points.

3.4.1 Brandom’s Pragmatism and the Problem of Reality
Habermas’ reconstruction of Brandom focuses on different aspects that are important to
Habermas’ theory. He deals particularly with the problem of realism within a constructivist
paradigm. It is the question of how to justify knowledge without an immediate approach to a
mind-independent reality. Habermas explains Brandom’s pragmatic motivation to reconstruct the
structure of language with regard to a real speakers’ community (see Habermas 1999, 140).
According to Habermas, Brandom’s approach is based on the Wittgensteinian model that there is
a “practically pre-predicative knowledge” (Habermas 1999, 140). This pre-predicative
knowledge precedes the propositional, logical and expressive vocabulary. The social practice
resulting from this pre-predicative knowledge precedes the intentions of singular speakers. In
this sense, language is a life-form that entirely determines our social interactions.
Although linguistic competence is unspoken and implicit, at the same time, we learn the
to make our linguistic competence itself explicit. Explicit and implicit structures are both
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necessary components of a language. In a word, linguistic practice and explicitness are related.
Therefore, Brandom’s complementary structure of a pragmatic semantics is justified as a project.
Logical vocabulary is used in order to reveal our implicit practices and is thus called expressive
vocabulary (see Habermas 1999, 140). It makes the implicit practices explicit. Without this
competence there would be no rational practice. Hence, rational beings are logical, expressive
beings for Brandom (see Habermas 1999, 140).
The linguistic turn has, furthermore, the consequence that the “epistemic authority”
(Habermas 1999, 140) is transferred from the private subject to the public practice of the
communication-community (see Habermas 1999, 140). This expresses also a rejection of
representationalism and introduces a community-guided understanding, in which communicators
find themselves always in a “net of interactive relations” (Habermas 1999, 141). This net has to
be responsibly explained [verantwortet] with regard to the members of the community. For
Brandom, this is the practice of giving and asking for reasons. According to Habermas, Brandom
avoids a mentalism by asking what we do, when we treat something as true (see Habermas 1999,
142).166 This includes, however, that we are not merely listeners, but that we adopt the attitudes
of the speaker, in order to understand a sentence (See Habermas 1999, 142). Since reasons
cannot be understood without knowing their ‘weight’ (see Habermas 1999, 142), the listener has
to actively judge the entitlement of the speaker. From here, we acknowledge the credibility of the
speaker and keep score (see Habermas 1999, 144).
In response to this pragmatism, Brandom develops a complementary semantics, which
Habermas signifies as his greatest achievement (see Habermas 199, 145). In order to understand
a speaker we need to judge his entitlement. We do so by tracing the material consequences of
166

By ‘mentalism‘ Habermas means a theory of cognition that is based on subjective consciousness.
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what the speaker says. Thus, we understand the conditions of an utterance pragmatically and the
material consequences semantically. The semantic dimension is then investigated in terms of an
inferentialism.
Brandom, however, is not a pure inferentialist, since he allows perception to influence our
semantical framework. For this reason, Habermas sees Brandom not as an idealist (see Habermas
1999, 145), but identifies his realism here. In effect, Habermas discovers the same problem that I
have presented in the chapters above: the combination of realism with a constructivist program.
Habermas discusses the related problem of an empty coherentism that shall be compensated by
an idea of reality:
Wenn die Praxis der gegenseitigen Zuschreibung und Beurteilung von Wahrheitsansprüchen nicht schon
durch die semantischen Festlegungen material gültiger Schlüsse garantiert werden kann, von welcher Art
sind die Beschränkungen dann? An irgend etwas muß sich die Korrektheit der Anwendung von Begriffen –
»the assessment of truth« - bewähren. (Habermas 1999, 146)

I have expressed this aspect before: how does Brandom evade a mere coherentism. How do we
form our first level concepts? Habermas concludes from this problem: Dieser »realistische«
Einwand, den sich Brandom selbst zu machen scheint, verträgt sich schlecht mit einer
»phänomenalistischen« Einstellung (Habermas 1999, 146). Realism and a constructivist
“phenomenalism“ are probably incompatible and Habermas seems to suggest to follow a merely
constructivist program himself. The question of how to achieve objectivity is Habermas’ further
focus for the discussion.
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3.4.2 Brandom’s Circle – From Norms to Norms
How do we achieve objectivity, if we have no concrete anchor in a mind-independent reality?
Since Brandom assumes that we have to understand concepts within the boundaries of a
normative pragmatics, the question of truth transforms into the question of norms. There is,
nevertheless, no norm without members of a community who acknowledge them. In this sense,
norms are not naturally part of all humans interacting with each other (see Habermas 1999, 147).
Norms develop because a society that codifies behavior rewards and punishes this behavior in
terms of attributing credibility. Yet, the instance of ‘the law-giver’ is not outside of the laws that
regulate the behavior. It is not a game like chess, in which we agree on external rules in order to
play this game. Rather, we follow a variety of rules that can change. The method that we apply in
such situations is then altered with regard to the contingent contents of a historical
communication-community. Our standards are therefore a combination of intrinsic and extrinsic
justification. Sometimes we adopt current practices, sometimes we alter these practices.
In order to justify his formal rules, however, Brandom introduces the concept of Kantian
autonomy (see Habermas 1999, 148). This is the idea that norms can be chosen merely on the
basis of rationality. Habermas is critical here since the autonomous creation of laws cannot
operate without being circular: “Eine »vernünftig« Normsetzung muß nach Vernunftnormen
vorgenommen werden und kann deshalb nicht ihrerseits das Modell für eine Erklärung der
Normativität von Vernunft selbst abgegeben“ (Habermas 1999, 148). Habermas argues that
Brandom commits a circular reasoning fallacy. In a dialectical framework, however, we could
justify such a circular strategy as a development with regard to the method itself. This means that
we presuppose a norm and control it with regard to the concrete development until the outcomes
make it possible to accept or to reevaluate the norm. Of course, such dialectics are not known to
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be ever completed. We are rather accepting a status quo. This circular strategy is part of a
historicist philosophy. Habermas remarks, therefore, that the law-giver is already within a
society that gives orientation for such norm-institution. Brandom, however, does neither discuss
such circular strategies, nor does he discuss the law-giver as embedded in a historically
developed society. Instead, he installs a kind of transcendental language game grounded in
assertions (see Habermas 1999, 154). So, as already explicated, for Brandom, the assertion is the
foundation for any kind of rational activity and must be free from cultural norms or historical
incompleteness. Assertions are thus necessary in order to say something meaningful that is
objective and also independent from the cultural presuppositions. This propositional,
unhistorical, and uncontextual understanding is then the foundation for normativity. Habermas
writes with regard to this aspect of normativity: Brandom mißversteht sich gewissermaßen
selbst, weil er einen überinklusiven Begriff von Normativität verwendet und Rationalitätsnormen
im weitesten Sinne – logische, begriffliche, semantische, ebenso wie pragmatische Regeln - an
Handlungsnormen angleicht“ (Habermas 1999, 148). The acts that Brandom has in mind, are the
acts of language. Habermas criticizes this with an important note: Die Affektion durch Gründe
ist aber etwas anderes als eine Verpflichtung durch Normen. Während Handlungsnormen den
Willen von Aktoren binden, lenken Rationalitätsnormen den Geist“ (Habermas 1999, 149). This
means that norms are binding by virtue of societal standards, and can be enforced. The better
argument, however, depends on the acceptance of the other participant to follow through
arguments and can therefore not be enforced. Brandom applies his game of giving and asking for
reasons to a society that might operate on very different standards. Habermas explains the
problem that emerges from this: Dabei verbindet sich die epistemische Autorität der Mitglieder
mit der sozialen Autorität der Gemeinschaft“ (Habermas 1999, 150). In other words, Brandom
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levels rational and social normativity (Habermas 1999, 150). But how then can rationality be
beyond the social (See Habermas 1999, 151)?
It is a common consequence of linguistic philosophy to level language and reality after
the pragmatic turn (see Habermas 1999, 152). Brandom presupposes, therefore, an identical
world of linguistic facts and social norms, but does not explain the learning contact between
language systems and social surroundings. Instead, he believes that his propositional language
must somehow stand for the structure of reality. It is a world constituted by determinate objects
that by virtue of the factual impact on our speech-acts make our discourses on norms objective.
In this sense, Brandom escapes the problem of an empty coherentism. The question remains
whether his conceptual realism can be justified.

3.4.3 Anaphora – An Anchor in Reality?
According to Habermas, Brandom follows a transcendental, linguistic deduction of the doublestructure of utterances based on simple, predicative assertions (see Habermas 1999, 154). Now,
the anaphoric treatment of singular terms is supposed to anchor our words in presupposed mindindependent objects. Despite this realist question, the central point is for Habermas that
recognizing something once is impossible, because then we could not recognize the objects
under different circumstances again. The capacity to build anaphorical chains allows for a
recursive relation to former moments of reconstruction (see Habermas 1999, 155). This implies
further that without anaphora, there is no deixis. Habermas writes: „Erst die innersprachliche
Bezugnahme auf vorangehende Satzteile ermöglicht eine Referenz auf Gegenstände, die über
einzelne Zeigehandlungen hinaus als reidentifizierbare Gegenstände müssen festgehalten werden
können“ (Habermas 1999, 156). This anaphoric relation is supposed to ground Brandom’s
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former discussed objectivity-claims. Objectivity is for Brandom the difference between what
people believe to know and what they really know (see Habermas 1999, 157). In particular, the
interpreter ascribes a commitment of p to the speaker, but distinguishes the truth of p from the
speech-act of claiming p. In this ongoing ascription, participants create an interpersonal map of
reality by finding warranting reasons that are supposed to make claims reasonable. The last
warranting factor are supposed to be anaphora.
Though cognition is not limited to these operations, they are supposed to get the
conceptual system off ground. Habermas, however, does not see in this a solution for the
possibility that all communication-participants could be wrong. This is because there is no
guarantee that our words are anchored in what really is. Brandom’s emphasis of empirical
observational sentences fails according to Habermas (see Habermas 1999, 159). He writes
critically: „Aber reicht diese Art der Verankerung schon hin, um der realistischen Intuition einer
unabhängigen Welt, die selbst unsere beste Beschreibung dementieren kann, Genüge zu tun“
(Habermas 1999, 159)? Habermas particularly remarks that such empirical anchor and the
navigation around points of reference cannot explain why there are new norms developing. So,
for example, even if parents could teach their child to reliably respond to the experience of blue
with the word ‘blue’, then it would still remain unclear how parents or there children could ever
radically change their vocabulary about such perceptions (see Habermas 1999, 161). This
indicates that it is not about an external world as the ultimate verifier, but that it is instead about
how we experience and learn. Experience is more complex and involves a dialectic of thought
and perception. Brandom’s model would presuppose a conceptual development of frameworks,
with no paradigm shifts, or the abandonment of old theories, and therefore his framework is
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entirely grounded in the premise of an external reality. Since Brandom is not able to provide an
‘absolute’ that is the foundation for our learned theories, we should remain skeptical.
Furthermore, Habermas also criticizes Brandom’s interpretation of the litmus paper test.
Brandom presupposes that something tasting sour but not turning litmus blue must account for
practical failure. He does not, however, consider a possible revision of either the whole semantic
concept of litmus paper, or the revision of the semantic rules (Habermas 1999, 160). This
exemplifies Brandom’s limited conception of how experience works.
For these reasons, Brandom’s approach to anchor our language in an external reality is
incomplete. It is further a question of whether we can find a pathway from perceptions to
concepts. Consequently, Habermas writes on Brandom’s denial of an anti-realist solution:
Brandom, der offensichtlich nicht bereit ist, antirealistische Konsequenzen in Kauf zu nehmen,
kann einen sprachtranszendentalen Ansatz, ob er nun kultarlistisch (MacIntyre),
seinsgeschichtlich (Derrida) oder pragmatistisch (Rorty) gewendet wird, nicht akzeptieren.“
(Habermas 1999, 160). Habermas will therefore criticize further that Brandom’s strategy does
not provide a model of how experience actually works, or how we get from perceptions to
concepts.

3.4.4 Critique of Brandom’s Conceptual Realism
For Habermas, Brandom’s proposed anaphoric solution is insufficient. With regard to his
examples, it cannot exhaustively explain how perceptions lead to a revision of semantic concepts
(see Habermas 1999, 162). In other words, how do we question our conceptual framework?
Simply presupposing that our conceptual framework will be verified by nature is a strong
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presupposition and seems to lean into the direction of naturalism. However, as already explained
above, Brandom pursues a non-naturalist strategy (see Habermas 1999, 163). For Habermas, the
problem of naturalism is its translation of everything into terms of causality and neurological
states, which establishes an unbridgeable gap between the original phenomena and its more, and
more detailed, but more and more unintelligible interpretation of the original phenomena (see
Habermas 1999, 162). So, for example, a table would be analyzed as composed from almost
atomic nothings, while its phenomenological relevance might not be grasped by these physical
concepts. On the contrary, Habermas asks how the perceived events should be described by
virtue of a nominalist language, a language that does not operate with references, but with senseinterdependences (see Habermas 1999, 163). For Habermas, it occurs that we have to go beyond
the immanence of language in confrontation with the world (see Habermas 1999, 163). The
relation to the world, however, is insufficiently discussed in Brandom. Habermas objects
consequently with regard to the litmus paper test: “Die objektive Welt kann diesen
»Widerspruch« nur performativ einlegen, indem sie den zielgerichteten Interventionen in eine
Welt kausal interpretierter Ereignisfolgen ihr »Entgegenkommen« versagt. Auf diese Weise
meldet sich nur im Funktionskreis instrumentellen Handelns zu Wort“ (Habermas 1999, 164)
This means that the concept of a world that is intervening upon actions is for Brandom
considered only with respect to an instrumental language. This means that the concept of an
independent world of objects is still a concept that is produced within language, and thus ‘world’
is not mind-independent. A practical failure is therefore a failure, only if it is part of a specific
language. So, for example, we could imagine societies that would not acknowledge the litmus
paper turning blue as an indication for our practical failure because they have simply no practices
in which this test should be significant. Therefore, Habermas proceeds:
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Erst wenn die Handelnden vom praktischen Zurechtkommen mit der Welt Abstand nehmen, in einen
Diskurs eintreten und die »zuhandene« Situation vergegenständlichen, um sich miteinander über etwas in
der Welt zu verständigen, kann aus einer dementierenden Wahrnehmung, die Handlungsgewißheiten
erschüttert, ein diskursiv mobilisierter »Grund« werden, der in den Begriffshaushalt und das semantische
Folgerungspotential bestehender Auffasungen kritisch Eingang findet und gegebenfalls Revisionen in Gang
setzt (Habermas 1999, 164).

This means that for Habermas an objectifying discourse turns such experiences into experiences
of failure. Brandom, however, moves linearly from perception to action (see Habermas 1999,
165), as if there is a predetermined path, and fails therefore to develop a complete theory of
learning that can also account for paradigm shifts (see Habermas 1999, 165). Habermas judges
for that reason: “Er begreift die Welt, mit der wir konfrontiert sind, überhaupt nicht
nominalistisch, sondern […] »realistisch« (Habermas 1999, 166). In other words, Habermas
criticizes Brandom’s solution of conceptual realism. This is the idea that the concepts of our
contingent language are developed only with regard to the mind-independent structure of the
world that we perceive. The phenomenon of interpretation would then be something by which
real, mind-external things are distorted. Habermas quotes Brandom with regard to his conceptual
realism:
The conception of concepts as inferentially articulated permits a picture of thought and of
the world that thought is about as equally, and in the favored cases identically,
conceptually articulated (Brandom 1998, 622).
Brandom equates the world and thought and claims that they have an identical structure. In this
sense, experiences of the world would only have a passive role in shaping our conceptual
understanding of the world (see Habermas 1999, 166). The human mind would not answer
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creatively to disappointing stimuli, but receives a passively, imprinted, and yet distorted picture
of the world (see Habermas 1999, 166).
With the hermeneutical turn, Habermas discusses a contrary, Continental concept of
language that deals with the disadvantages of a nominalism, namely that the world is only a
practically presupposed concept. This hermeneutical understanding, however, does not lead us to
a blatant realism. Hermeneutics, according to Habermas, integrates the world as an inner worldly
challenge. Accordingly, humans interpret historical occurrences within their language (Habermas
1999, 167-168). In contrast, Brandom turns concepts into objective things that are related to the
way things really are. The poetical functions of language that I have characterized as one of the
necessary insights of the pragmatic turn remain for Brandom outside the core of language, and
are thus unintelligible. The assertion expresses rationality, while other symbolic forms of arts
must be entertainment, and occupation of an overly active mind. Habermas quotes Brandom with
regard to this conceptual realism:
Concepts conceived as inferential roles of expressions do not serve as epistemological
intermediaries, standing between us and what is conceptualized by them. This is not
because there is no causal order consisting of particulars, interaction with which supplies
the material for thought. It is rather because all of these elements are themselves
conceived as thoroughly conceptual, not as contrasting with the conceptual. (Brandom
1998, 622).
The world is, in this sense, still the completeness of facts (Habermas 1999, 169). According to
Brandom, we only have to find the right way to mediate this world. The fundamental structure is
our reliance on assertions.
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3.4.5 Second Person-Perspective and the Levelling of Facts and Norms
Habermas denies Brandom’s approach to an external reality, but he also criticizes his model of
communication. In particular, Habermas denies that Brandom successfully achieves a secondperson-perspective. This is Brandom’s goal that Habermas criticizes: “Brandom will
symmetrischen »Ich-Du-Beziehungen« zwischen ersten und zweiten Personen Vorrang vor einer
asymmetrischen »Ich-Wir-Beziehung« einräumen, in der der Einzelne vom Kollektiv sozusagen
überwältigt wird“ (Habermas 1999, 173). Habermas argues that Brandom rather introduces a
third-person, the perspective of a neutral observer that, however, disqualifies the moral feelings
of the actor. By this, Brandom dismisses the importance of people achieving truths in a discourse
by virtue of their moral feelings. Habermas concludes therefore that the main premise of
conceptual realism unburdens the human society from its constructive tasks and levels facts and
norms:
Die Annahme einer im ganzen begrifflich strukturierten Welt entlastet den endlichen und falliblen
menschlichen Geist in gewisser Weise von der konstruktiven Anstrengung, in eigenen Begriffen
Interpretationen vom Geschehen in der Welt zu erzeugen. Der objektive Idealismus verschiebt die
Erklärungslasten von kooperativen Anstrengungen in einer intersubjektiv konstituierten Lebenswelt auf die
Verfassung des Seienden im ganzen. Habermas 1999, 172)

This implies that for Brandom the objective content of concepts has to be made explicit and that
this has a normative force in-itself. The world in itself is supposed to be rational (conceptual) and
thus limits our normative discourses. This is, of course, a controversial subject as discussed in
the former point (3.4.4). Hegel who is held to uncritically assume that the world is rational
[vernünftig], writes, in fact: “To him who looks upon the world rationally, the world in its turn,
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presents a rational aspect” (Hegel 1861, 11).167 It must be further investigated in how far the
world is rational because we take it to be rational. Thus, the question is more complex and bound
to our subjective perspective. The main task is to demonstrate how something that is subjective
can still yield objective cognition. Brandom, however, attempts to level an “unintelligible” gap
between subjects who operate normatively and objects that relate causally to each other:
[F]act-stating talk is explained in normative terms, and normative facts emerge as one kind of fact among
others. The common deontologic scorekeeping vocabulary in which both are specified and explained
ensures that the distinction between normative and nonnormative facts neither evanesces nor threatens to
assume the proportions of an ultimately unintelligible dualism (Brandom 1998, 625-626).

Brandom’s observed unintelligibility, however, might emerge because of his understanding of
objects as mind-independent facts of reality. Yet, for Habermas, the “burden of the concept” that
subjects carry cannot be simply replaced by the “self-movement of the concept” that develops
according to facts. Language for Brandom is consequently just another fact among other facts.
Since this would bereave humans of their moral autonomy, an autonomy that Brandom also
claims to be central in his deontic conception of morality, this is a severe tension. We would
sacrifice moral autonomy for conceptual holism. Habermas therefore emphasizes again:
An die Stelle der »Astrengung des Begriffs«, die sonst eine Sache des kooperativen Lernens einer
konstruktive verfahrenden Kommunikationsgemeinschaft wäre, tritt die »Bewegung des Begriffs«, die sich
durch erfahrfungsvermittelte Diskurse hindurch, aber über die Köpfe der meisten Diskursteilnehmer hinweg
vollzieht. Dieser Objektivismus entkleidet die Diskursgemeinschaft der epistemischen Autorität (wie auch
der moralischen Autonomie), die sie, solange sie nicht die Möglichkeit eines direkten Zufriffs auf ein
Universum von angetroffenen Ideen hat, sich selbst zutrauen müsste. Das erklärt, warum Brandom einen
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Hegel, G.W.F. Lectures on the Philosophy of History. Tranlated by J. Sibree. London: Henry G. Bohn, 1861.
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Begriff von Kommunikation verwendet, der der Stellung der spezifischen Rolle der zweiten Person nicht
ernstlich gerecht wird (Habermas 1999, 172).

Central to this criticism is that Brandom transfers the moral evaluation to the perspective of the
observer.168 Habermas uses Brandom’s example of a trial to discuss this in further detail.
Accordingly, the judge and the jury are observing and evaluating the arguments of the prosecutor
and the defender. For Brandom, it is of lesser interest how the participants judge their positions
and how they respond (see Habermas 1999, 174, and Brandom 1998, 505).169 For Habermas, this
is significant, since a statement that takes not the real answer of the participants into account
underestimates the grammatical function of the second person. Brandom’s formal account
investigates, according to Habermas, only the formal, doxastic commitments. Thus, Habermas
states: “Eine Untersuchungsstrategie, die die erste mit der zweiten Kommunikationsebene
verwechselt, ignoriert aber mit dieser wichtigen Unterscheidung die grammatische Rolle der
zweiten Person“ (Habermas 1999, 175). Consequently, Habermas calls this dismissal of the alterego ‘Theoretizismus‘. This means that communication is the result of an epistemic relation, an
epistemic relation between the assertions of the speaker and the ascription of the interpreter
about what has been said (see Habermas 1999, 174). According to my earlier analysis, this
theoreticism, the formal speaker-interpreter-relation, occurs because Brandom does not consider
the dialectic between observation (de dicto) and inferential entailments (de re). The mere model
of transmitting information fails to grasp the major idea of communication, also according to
Habermas. This major idea of communication is coordination, which has to be achieved by
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As already explained before, Brandom neglects the possibility of phenomena of the third kind. That means that
there are phenomena that occur that humans achieve socially that are, however, not intended. In this sense, language
is a phenomenon of the third kind that was not invented by a human, but that is also not a product of nature. It is
rather a result of social interaction.
169
In the particular example, Brandom demonstrates the difference between de re and de dicto ascriptions. So it is
less related to Habermas’ criticism.
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hermeneutics, a model that does not omit the embeddedness of interpreters and speakers in a preinterpreted world and a communication-community. Hermeneutics also respects that our method
of communication is not a mere formalism. Consequently, method always depends on content
and content is also achieved by the method.
In the following, Habermas emphasizes that the utterance of the speaker is, at the same
time, an imperative to coordinate different opinions, different backgrounds, and different
interpretations of what it means to be in a shared world. It is, moreover, not only a theoretical
battle of systems. It is rather a necessity of coordination that brings us into the play of language
games (see Habermas 199, 175). It is neither a self-sufficient [selbstgenügsames] play, nor a
question of whose standpoint will prevail (see Habermas 1999, 175). Habermas sees the most
important indication for this coordination in the fact that we expect answers, if we claim
something (see Habermas 1999, 174-175). For this reason, Habermas transforms the idea of
understanding into his understanding of speech acts directed towards coordination: Wir
verstehen einen Sprechakt, wenn wir die Bedingungen und Folgen des rational motivierten
Einverständnisses kennen, das ein Sprecher mit ihm erzielen könnte (Habermas 1999, 176).
Here, the cognition of somebody’s utterance is not only about understanding what follows from a
concept, which expresses Brandom’s inferentialism. Instead, it brings each communication back
to the question of social beings whose intention are to understand the other and to coordinate
their views with a possible agreement of the other party. In the scorekeeping-model of Brandom
it is only about strategical observation of the opponent, but not about coordination
(Verständigung) between discourse participants. For Habermas, this therefore expresses a
methodological individualism that fails to understand that participants work together, instead of
working against each other (Habermas 1999, 177). Thus, Habermas further concludes that the
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objectivism of Brandom takes away the major burden of achieving the truths in a community
through discourse.
Brandom binds communication to the objective representation of facts in the world that
only have to be traced by logically asserting, by making the real status of the world explicit. This
asserting seems to settle things, makes communication seemingly easier, but it rests on the
assumption that truths settle themselves (see Habermas 1999, 177). For the very same reason,
Habermas rejects all forms of objective Idealism and states finally: „Ein stillschweigende
Rückkehr zum objektiven Idealismus dürfte kaum noch möglich sein“ (Habermas 1999, 170).
This will also be Habermas’ foundation for rejecting Hegelianism. However, we have to clarify
later that Hegelianism is not a cognitive realism.

3.4.6 The Privilege of the Assertion and the Undermining of Will’s Autonomy

According to Habermas, the levelling of facts and norms leads to a moral realism that should not
be easily defended (see Habermas 1999, 178). Grounded on logocentrism, modernity might
overestimate the primacy of the assertion. Instead, Habermas points out that the social
background allows for a manifoldness of speech acts that possibly cannot be subsumed under the
idea of the assertion (see Habermas 1999, 178). Because of the question of objectivity, however,
Brandom commits to a cognitive realism, the idea that conceptual structures of the world are
coining our practices of discourse (See Habermas 1999, 178-177). Brandom writes: “Concepts
are rules, and concepts express natural necessity as well as moral necessity” (Brandom 1998,
624). As demonstrated above, Habermas particularly criticizes such a presupposed selfmovement of the concept that guides the development of societies, since it unburdens humans
from their responsibility by levelling facts and norms. To say it again, Brandom sees a
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conformity between the subjective and the objective sphere expressed in the normative structure
of the concept that is a fact among other facts. The question is now: Is this levelling of facts and
norms overstretching of what we really are? The Brandomian interpretation that everything is
normative, and that the normative can only be justified by assertions intertwines the realm of
freedom [“Reich der Freiheit”] with the causal necessities of the world (see Habermas 1999,
179). This, nonetheless, undermines the claims for autonomy that Brandom assumes for
normative beings. According to Habermas, Brandom analyzes our conceptual relation to norms
in three steps:
a) Die Rechtfertigungspflichten, die wir stillschweigend mit intentionalen Handlungen übernehmen, mit
den Begründungspflichten, die an assertorische Sprechhandlungen hängen. Sodann (b) erläutert er, wie
Handlungen in der Form praktischer Schlüsse gerechtfertigt werden können. Das soll (c) auf die Pointe
hinauslaufen: daß sich trotz einiger Assymmetrien alle Handlungen wie Tatsachenbehauptungen
rechtfertigen lassen (Habermas 1999, 180).

Since the responsibility for actions is similar to the responsibility for judgments, both should be
treated as commitments. But is an action exhausted by taking over responsibility? Brandom,
according to Habermas, does not ask this question (see Habermas 1999, 181). His “conceptual
monism”170 only discusses the theoretical responsibility but does not discuss the question of how
we bind ourselves with regard to rules of assertion (Habermas 1999, 182). Habermas explains the
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As already pointed out, it is problematic to simply equate facts and norms. This is what happens with regard to
Brandom’s semantic pragmatism. The fact, moreover, that dualism runs into certain barriers does not imply that a
monistic conception must be correct; it might be a false alternative that Brandom presents here; and with regard to a
Hegelian attitude the opposition of both terms should be investigated dialectically, while the normative goal is an
epistemological monism. There is no ontological monism presupposed, but it seems that a criterion of knowledge
demands for such monism. If the only explanation for levelling of norms and facts, however, is its practicality within
discourses, then ontological monism is still as reasonable as ontological pluralism independent from its practicality.
It seems, however, that pluralism would mean that we could never know the world exhaustively. For this reason
Habermas’ pluralism, expressed in the claim that the Kantian distinction between autonomy and heteronomy must
be considered, will be at least equally strong if not stronger.
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problem in further detail: “Handlungsnormen können aus der Beobachterperspektive zwar als
Tatsachen beschrieben werden; aber rechtfertigen lassen sie sich nur aus der
Teilnehmerperspektive, wie schon aus der ichbezogenen Form praktischer Schlüsse ersichtlich
ist“ (Habermas 1999, 182). We can conclude that the participant’s perspective of speech acts
includes another dimension that possibly cannot be objectified. The self-reference of a speaker,
the I, is an existential adoption of responsibility that can only be reflected upon after the fact.
Cognition comes late in the succession of societies. The philosopher can therefore only reflect.
At the beginning is the deed. This does not imply that action is in principle non-conceptual, but,
at the same time, it is not guaranteed that it is conceptual. It seems, however, there could be a
limit of cognition that we have not yet discovered, but that we can only reflect upon.
Beyond this primacy of the action, Habermas gives further reasons why it makes sense to
distinguish a practical will from factual knowledge. According to Habermas, Brandom does not
take into account the differentiation between the will’s heteronomy and the will’s autonomy. He
writes: “Im Falle einer zweckrationalen Wahl von Mitteln stellt die Regel, die der Handelnde
adoptiert, die Verbindung zwischen einem subjektiven Handlungsgrund und einem – technisch
genutzten – Tatsachenwissen her“ (Habermas 1999, 185). So, in the example of opening an
umbrella, prudence is the result of an empirical rule that is subjective with regard to the
contextual conditions of the surrounding world of facts. Will, however, acts autonomously, if it
is freed from subjectivity (Habermas 1999, 182). Habermas writes therefore further: “Während
prudentielle und konventionelle Gründe die Willkür nur relative zu gegebenen Interessenlagen
und bestehenden sozialen Wertorientierungen binden, beanspruchen moralische Gründe, den
Willen ganz zu durchdringen, also absolut zu bestimmen“ (Habermas 1999, 184). For such moral
actions we claim universal validity, a validity that goes beyond something that is related to the
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world of facts, but that specifies how something should be. For example, we all could be
murderers. Even if this were a fact, however, it is not sufficient to universalize the action of
murdering. Even though facts and norms have similarities in their justification, Habermas denies
therefore: “Allein diese Ähnlichkeit des Geltungsbereichs darf nicht den Kontrast der der
Geltungsgrundlagen verdecken. Die Gründe, mit denen sich moralische Handlungen
rechtfertigen lassen, haben eine andere epistemische Qualität als Tatsachengründe“ (Habermas
1999, 184). According to Habermas, and as we see in the example of a murdering society, facts
cannot deliver a sufficient foundation for decisions (see Habermas 1999, 184). Brandom, on the
contrary, clearly states: “In this way the normative is picked out as a subregion of the factual”
(Brandom 1998, 625). Yet, rather it is about the question: How can the universal character of
moral deeds be achieved? The Kantian solution seems to be unfeasible, since its mechanism of
universalization has demonstrated complicated results. So, for example, the maxim of not lying,
demonstrates itself as absurd, if formally applied to any situation. Habermas answer is therefore
that universalization must be related to fair procedures that have to be socially secured with
regard to all potentially concerned ones [Betroffene].
Finally, Habermas concludes with regard to Brandom:
Das deontologische Verständnis von Moral, das auch Brandom favorisiert, paßt nicht zu dem
begriffsrealistischen Verständnis des moralischen Vokabulars, das Brandom vorschlägt, um den objektiven
Gehalt unserer Begriffe [...] in den begrifflichen Strukturen der Welt selbst zu verankern. Ein kantischer
Begriff der Autonomie paßt [...] nicht zu dem Bild, das die Diskontinuität zwischen Tatsachen und Normen
einebnet. [...] Rationale Wesen, die sich in einer intersubjektiv geteilten Lebenswelt vorfinden müssen
gewiß ihr Tun und Lassen auch im Hinblick auf die Bewältigung eines kontingenten innerweltlichen
Geschehens voreinander diskursive verantworten (Habermas 1999, 185).
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Since the world of facts does not deliver a clear method for our universalization processes, we
need to consider our autonomy and freedom, and include them in a dialectical investigation.
Though Habermas praises Brandom, he ultimately rejects his account. The question remains:
why does Habermas then does not accept a Hegelian account?171

3.5 Habermas’ Discussion of Hegel
Habermas’ criticism of Brandom’s conceptual realism leads him to a specific perspective on
Hegel. Habermas believes that Hegel defends an absolute, ahistorical concept expressed in
Absolute Knowing. While crediting Hegel with decentralizing the subject and crediting Hegel
with introducing the means [Medien] of language, labor, and mutual recognition between
members of a society as a ground for epistemology, Habermas still sees him as preserving an
ahistorical mentalism (see Habermas 1999, 186).172 This ahistoric mentalism separates Hegel
from the later traditions of pragmatism, historicism, linguistic philosophy, and contextualism
(see Habermas 1999, 186-187). Habermas identifies the repressed [verdrängte] intersubjectivity
as the main reason why Hegel cannot deliver a successful epistemology (see Habermas 1999,
187).
While ultimately rejecting a return to Hegel, Habermas acknowledges the achievements
of Hegel: “Er glaubt nicht, daß zwischen dem Geistigen und dem Körperlichen, zwischen
unserem Bewußtsein und dessen Gegenständen eine Kluft besteht, die überbrückt werden
müsste“ (Habermas 1999, 187). According to Habermas, Hegel does not believe that there is an

171

I have already answered this question. It is because Habermas assumes that Hegel’s account is similar to
cognitive realism.
172
By ‘mentalism’ I understand the paradigm of consciousness that Habermas rejects.
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ontological gap between consciousness and the objects of consciousness. From this position
arises the idea of objective spirit by which the problem of individual, particular and universal can
be balanced with regard to a community. Habermas believes that Hegel denies the historical
consequence of objective spirit by replacing it with a history of rationality (see Habermas 1999,
188) that ends in Absolute Spirit. With this Absolute Spirit, Hegel, according to Habermas,
remains in the structure of self-consciousness, and thus proposes a non-temporal, ultimately
mentalist framework.
In what follows, I investigate each of these arguments in more detail. Firstly, my main
criticism of Habermas’ position is that philosophy cannot be entirely desubstantialized because it
would reduce philosophy to an empirical science, and thus it could not be distinguished from
other sciences.173 Secondly, I disagree that we need to detach our tradition entirely from the
mental paradigm, since the project of consciousness reflecting on itself can provide grounds for a
historicist epistemology. Subjects still belong to philosophy and it is necessary to integrate this
thought in an epistemological project, which I claim is the task of Hegel’s discussion of objective
spirit and Absolute Spirit. Thirdly, and most important, Habermas’ interpretation of Absolute
Knowing derives from an incorrect interpretation of Hegel as a foundationalist who defends a
system that is atemporal. This interpretation is based on a misunderstanding of what Absolute
Knowing is.

173

I have already demonstrated this aspect with regard to my first criticism of Habermas above.
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3.5.1 Hegel’s Denial of Mentalism
As already argued, Habermas acknowledges Hegel for undertaking steps to detach from the
traditional framework of mentalism by his focus on the means [Medien] of language and labor.
He criticizes him, however, for falling back into mentalism because of his introduction of
Absolute Spirit. Before addressing Habermas’ criticism of Hegel’s Absolute Spirit, I will
reconstruct the problem of mentalism.
The main problem for the tradition of Hegel’s time was the perceived difference between
subjects and objects. This gap between subject and object was supposed to be bridged by
different theories of self-consciousness (see Habermas 1999, 189). Posited beyond naturalist
language and beyond presupposed principles of morality, the self-reflection of selfconsciousness transformed the ancient and ethical imperative of “know thyself” into an epistemic
task (see Habermas 1999, 190). As a consequence, the mental was, however, defined within the
boundaries of this epistemic task. Habermas identifies three problems that had to be addressed
with regard to this problematic tradition: firstly, the myth of the given,174 secondly, the
foundation of knowledge through the generation of knowledge in a subject, and thirdly, the
equation of truth with certainty (see Habermas 1999, 190). In relation to these three problems,
we encounter three dualisms: the dualism between I and not-I (something that is given to the
subject as external), the dualism of inner and outer self (the private subject and its public
generation of knowledge through language), and the dualism between immediate givens
(immediate certainty) and mediated givens (see Habermas 1999, 190). In order to address all of
these three problems and their resulting dualisms, Hegel, according to Habermas, was challenged
to detranscendentalize the subject. Though Kant already developed the roots of a theory of self174

This is Sellars’ view in "Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind" (1956) that is rather related to problems of
analytic philosophy than to Hegel.
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consciousness, his approach, based ultimately on the transcendental unity of apperception, could
not grasp the essence of subjectivity. Instead, it only objectified the subject. Habermas identifies
Kant’s major flaw: the subject is affected by the empirical world, while, at the same time, Kant
assumes a mind-independent reality (see Habermas 1999, 191). This leads to a conflict between
causal dependence and transcendental freedom (see Habermas 1999, 191). According to
Habermas, it is the false mental paradigm that is the ground for Kant’s problematic, dualistic
answers (see Habermas 1999, 193). Ultimately, Kant cannot close the gap between experience
and mind-independent reality. Kant’s dualisms are, indeed, questionable parts of his system.175
In the following, the thing-in-itself, and the distinction between subject and object will be
the main points of Hegel’s attack (see Habermas 1999, 194). Kant’s project is in so far
problematic as it cannot explain how we can postulate a mind-independent reality that affects us,
but at the same time escapes our conceptual grasp. Habermas writes with regard to this gap:
“Hegel bestreitet, dass das erkennende, sprechende und handelnde Subjekt vor der Aufgabe
steht, eine Kluft zwischen sich und einem von ihm separierten Anderen zu überbrücken“
(Habermas 1999, 195). The solution is therefore not to postulate a difference between the subject
and its other. The solution is to investigate the relation of subjects to otherness. Since subjects
are already with others, they must be grasped as inter-subjects. This, according to Habermas, is
the main reason why Hegel discusses the means [Medien] that make this sort of being-inbetween possible (see Habermas 1999, 195). In the process of finding a solution, the terms of
subject and object will therefore be replaced by the concept of objective spirit (see Habermas
1999, 196). Here, we will finally find why the concept of a shared world arises.
175

Kant’s view is that we are affected by an unknown and unknowable world that provides contents, or a sensory
manifold, that we bring under the categories or rules of synthesis when constructing the contents of experience.
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For Habermas this fundamental change is already related to the traditional development
of the social sciences [Geisteswissenschaften] and their historicist tendencies. Accordingly,
philosophers are not only challenged to explain an eternal subject with regard to finite, natural
objects, but also with regard to their own historical formation (see Habermas 1999, 196) in a
possibly alienating society. Hegel’s description of human’s cultural development is therefore
shaped as a learning process, and not simply posited. In other words, all of our institutions are
the historical results of social or natural problems. From here, particularly, labor [Arbeit] and
language [Sprache] have determined the becoming of human society. Habermas writes with
regard to these means [Medien]: “Sprache und Arbeit sind Medien, in denen die vom
Mentalismus auseinandergerissenen Aspekte des Inneren und Äußeren verklammert sind“
(Habermas 1999, 198). This means that these forms of language and labor externalize the inner
subjectivity of subjects and their spirits persist while the subjects who originally generated them
can vanish in the course of an emerging history. Humans, different from animals, do not only
represent their species as individuals (see Habermas 1999, 198); rather, humans build identities
and gain their personality (see Habermas 1999, 199) within history.
The historical identities of individuals transcend the individual life-span of only one
individual. This has two consequences: Firstly, we are not only observing humans as objects
amongst other objects, but we need to acknowledge that each person has a history of growing
into his personality (see Habermas 1999, 199). Secondly, this growth, however, supersedes the
individual person. Humans are more than merely learning individuals of their species. They are
now part of a universal spirit of a society. The question remains whether this universal spirit and
the individual can be reconciled or whether both of them fall apart in a society.
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Consequently, Habermas focuses on this historical development of the community and its
historical spirit. As I noted above, for Hegel, the means [Medien] supposedly play a mediating
role between the subjects and objects of a society. Hegel’s solution to the problem of how the
individual relates to the universal structure of spirit is therefore realized in mediators [Medien].
One of these means [Medien] is the family. Language (the theoretical side of our activities), the
discourse of one single consciousness with nature, and labor [Arbeit] come together in a single
society, while society’s core is the family. As our life-background, these structures ultimately
determine how we perceive our world (see Habermas 1999, 202). Through them, we no longer
live as mere members of a species. Rather, we exist as members of a family in a single shared
world. We have a particular relation to the world as members of this species. Habermas argues:
“Weil mein Sprachwissen meine aktuellen Wahrnehmungen vorstrukturiert, kann ich nichts
wahrnehmen, ohne es in ein konzeptuelles Netz einzuordnen“ (Habermas 1999, 202). This
means that though ‘reality’ accompanies the practices of the participants, it is never experienced
independently from the medium of communication. The concept ‘reality’ depends on practice,
and more precisely on societal formations like families. As the last chapters of Wahrheit und
Rechtfertigung express a shift in Habermas‘ theory towards relativism, Habermas finds a
criterion for objectivity in the way we share spirit: „Der in einer Gemeinschaft verkörperte Geist
ist in dem Maße »objektiv«, wie er von Mitgliedern, die von denselben Traditionen zehren und
an denselben Praktiken teilnehmen, »intersubjektiv« geteilt wird“ (Habermas 1999, 204). So it is
not only a practical knowledge that produces institutions and tools. The standpoint of utility is
superseded. In order to achieve objectivity, forms of mutual recognition like family structures
have to come into play. Otherwise, the overall structure of human interaction could not lift itself
to the next level of cooperation.
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How is the family appropriately understood? For the most part, Hegel uses romantic love
as the prototype of mutual recognition. In romantic love, it seems, the difference and unity of the
subject and object can be achieved. Both lovers are different and one at the same time, leading to
a relationship in which universality and individuality are reconciled in a unity. This union,
however, lacks a stable particularity (see Habermas 1999, 205) and can only be stabilized in the
form of a family. Family is then an objective form of spirit.
The question is then: how do people find unity in their different practices. The problem is
that in love the loving partners are worldless (see Habermas 1999, 209). They find an ideality
that can never be achieved. In the family, however, the subjects are confronted with the question
of an objective world because the relation sustains even though partners will disagree. Their
struggle for recognition is not completed by a single act of romantic affection.
In order to describe this sublated romantic relationship, Habermas refers to Hegel’s
theory of recognition and quotes: “Das Selbstbewußtsein ist an und für sich, indem und dadurch,
daß es für ein anderes an und für sich ist; d.h. es ist nur als ein Anerkanntes“ (Habermas 1999,
209). So the different spirits that we will encounter must be results of the struggles for
recognition, according though which each side fights for objective recognition. With these
struggles, we enter an epistemic quality of self-consciousnesses because it is relevant for selfconsciousness to fight for a fundamental arrangement of how the world is. This will manifest
itself in institutions like the family. For Habermas it is significant that the relationship of a
family, for example, needs the presupposition [Unterstellung] of a shared, common world. He
writes:
Als Angehörige einer intersubjektiv geteilten Lebenswelt müssen sie unterstellen […], daß es eine identische
Welt von unabhängig existierenden Gegenständen gibt. […] Eine Meinung könnte nicht mit dem normativen
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Anspruch verbunden werden, von allen »geteilt« zu werden, wenn sie nicht präsumtiv eine Ansicht von oder über
etwas in der objektiven Welt ausdrücken würde (Habermas 1999, 208).176

It is this coordination of different perspectives, which underlies a true self-consciousness (see
Habermas 1999, 211). The objective standard is thus neither mine, nor yours (Habermas 1999,
212). Rather it is a procedurally derived view of how the world is. Here, Habermas moves away
from his former conception of truth as justifiability and moves towards a conception of a world
for consciousnesses that is also for Hegel an important epistemological criterion. The true world
is a world that we produce.
As I will demonstrate, however, this Hegelian criterion is not transcendentally
presupposed as a precondition for our communication. This would reduce real human beings to
the subjects of communication. For Habermas the presupposition of an objective world would
only be necessary in order to mediate claims of knowledge. For Hegel, however, the criterion
does not come from nowhere. Self-consciousnesses establish this criterion as a part of how they
operate at all. It is not external; it is internal to self-consciousness. Habermas, who wants to
reject the mentalist paradigm as a potentially substantial interpretation of philosophy, relies only
on an empirical description of how the concept “world” entered the discourse. It thus excludes an
ontological discussion of the concept of “world”, and would thus remain only a formal
assumption. From here on Habermas’ problematic interpretation and rejection of Hegel’s concept
of self-consciousness begins.
176

For Habermas, Pinkard captures this idea best: “The activities of making knowledge-claims is part of our overall
practice of dealing with the world so as to satisfy the system of desires that make up our various projects; and we
know things by integrating our conceptions of what counts as an authoritative reason for believing or acting into
these overall projects and desires. Since two points of view can clash, there will be problems of conciliating one
individual’s claims with the conflicting claims of others. But a genuine conciliation could come about only if the
parties could assume an objective, impersonal point of view […] that is, only if they could judge their own claims
not completely internally to their own point of view and experience but could judge them in terms of something that
would transcend that subjective experience […] Since the objective, impersonal point of view cannot be discovered
[…] the agents themselves must construct a social point of view” (Pinkard 1994, 57).
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3.5.2 Habermas’ Critique of Hegel’s Concept of Self-Consciousness
Though Habermas does not ontologically follow Hegel’s project of self-consciousness, he agrees
with his epistemological project of investigating the means [Medien] of spirit. In order to further
discuss his rejection of the supposedly realist conception of absolute spirit, Habermas will first
summarize Hegel’s theory of the different stages of self-consciousness.
At the beginning, the unhappy consciousness was exposed to doubt (see Habermas 1999,
212). This doubt, however, was replaced by a general form of reason. Enlightenment was
supposed to recognize the order of nature and the order of society. Habermas writes: “Die
Mentalität der Aufklärung traut der angeborenen Vernunft ebenso eine objektivierende
Wissenschaft der Natur wie die rationale Organisation der Gesellschaft zu“ (Habermas 1999,
213). Problematic was, however, that the historically generated human spirit could never fit into
the picture of man that was designed during this project of enlightenment. Habermas remarks for
that reason: “Das Wesen des historisch gebildeten menschlichen Geistes entzieht sich dem
wissenschaftlichen Menschenbild […]“ (Habermas 1999, 213). Because of these complications
involved in capturing the true essence of human beings, the question remained about how to
justify, and explain structures of spirit.
According to Habermas, Hegel analyzed a culture that assumed the possibility of selfgrounding (see Habermas 1999, 213). This self-grounding signifies ahistorical tendencies.177 In
fact, there are three significant motifs in Hegel’s philosophy that also includes a rejection of
historicism. Habermas writes on these three motifs: “Dieses Vorhaben, das Hegel in der
177

As I will demonstrate later, Hegel does not ground culture in the sense of a Cartesian foundationalism. A
universal justification is no more than a justification. It is not a foundation in a Cartesian sense or a
Letztbegründung. Habermas conflates ‘Grund’ and ‘Letztbegründung’.
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»Phänomenologie des Geistes« durchführt, signalisiert eine dreifache Abkehr von Historismus,
Naturalismus und Transzendentalphilosophie“ (Habermass 1999, 214). This means that
intellectual culture can neither be explained naturalistically, nor by virtue of an entirely reflective
project (see Habermas 1999, 213). Yet, instead of considering the option of historicism in more
detail, Habermas argues that Hegel opts for “[e]thische Selbstverständigung” (Habermas 1999,
213). Ethische Selbstverständigung is the form of cultural self-reflection that grounds a culture.
In this sense, the generation of reason is a finalizing process of learning (Habermas 1992, 214).
Spirit utters itself in our social forms of interaction. Institutions and social space belong to it as
much as Stoicism, Skepticism or Enlightenment (See Habermas 1999, 214). Habermas remarks,
however, that we cannot yet find universal forms. Thus a historicist contextualism would remain:
Wenn sie aber intern mit dieser Lebensform verknüpft sind, ist es keineswegs ausgemacht, daß sie eine über
diesen Kontext hinausreichende, universale Geltung beanspruchen dürfen. Diesen Verdacht kann auch die
genetische Erklärung, wie Leute unserer Sozialisation gelernt haben, die herrschenden Standards
anzuerkennen, ebensowenig zerstreuen wie irgendeine hermeneutische Vergewisserung moderner
Identitätformen (Habermas 1999, 216).

Habermas interprets Hegel as a defender of a foundationalist project who wants to find a
universal justification of philosophy. Therefore, Habermas characterizes his philosophy as a
forward moving process that always wants to resolve dissonances:
Es löst die auf jeder Stufe erneut aufbrechenden kognitiven Dissonanzen dadurch auf, daß es die zunächst nur
implizit gewußten Vorasussetzungen einer problematisch gewordenen Weltauffassung explizit macht und
dadurch eine befreiende Bewußtseinsstellung einnimmt, die bestehende Konflikte und Widersprüche beseitigt
(Habermas 1999, 216).

This process of dissolving cognitive dissonances is necessary in order to achieve a coherent
interpretation. Now, the difficult point is to determine the correct role that absolute spirit has in
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this process. Absolute Spirit, according to my historicist interpretation, is not the end of this
process, but an end of epistemology. It is the entrance to categorial thinking that is timeless, yet
historical. This timelessness does not mean it is ahistorical. It only means that the
representational understanding of time is insufficient to grasp the moments of spirit. Indeed, the
Logic will provide the oneness of the categories and also allow for a concept of externality.
Historically, however, it is only the greatest compression that we can achieve in our current time.
It is a diamond, compressed by the pressures and demands of our historical moment, but not an
eternal structure. Given the instruments of cognition available to humans, it is our logic. In this
sense, the problems we imposed on ourselves are freely chosen by the means of what we are.
Knowing can be acknowledged as absolute if we clarify all the influences of this epistemological
situation of the anthropologically constituted subject. In order to give this interpretation of a
historical interpretation of Hegel’s Logic some plausibility, we only have to remind ourselves
that Hegel claims in the preface of the Logic that he should have written the Logic 77 times,
given that Plato revised The Republic seven times. The introductions to the Encyclopedia Logic’s
reveal, moreover, that Hegel intended the Logic as a guide, yet not as a ready-made result.
Thinking trumps thought. With this in mind, it is true that we will be introduced to a sublation of
time, but this does not mean that the following generated ideas are ahistorical. I will clarify this
in greater detail in my concrete discussion of Hegel’s idea of Absolute Knowing.
Habermas, however, is suspicious of Hegel‘s Absolute Spirit: “Wessen Geist ist es,
dessen Entstehungsgeschichte die Leser nachvollziehen sollen“ (Habermas 1999,216)?
According to this suspicion, it is not the individual, but an anonymous form that takes over and
governs our society. For this reason, Habermas concludes: „Oder sollten wir jenem
welthistorischen Bewußtseinswandel als Subjekt nicht eher einen transzendierenden Geist
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unterlegen, der über die Schranken moderner Denk-und Lebensformen hinausgreift“ (Habermas
1999, 217)? This spirit would not be our spirit. Habermas, well aware of deflationist Hegelinterpretations such as Pinkard’s, remarks that there remains a difference between objective spirit
and absolute spirit. Habermas criticizes “Was nach unserer Auffassung rational akzeptabel ist,
deckt sich nicht notwendigerweise mit dem objektiv Wahren. Der endliche, seiner Gegenwart
und Vergangenheit verhaftete Geist bleibt, auch wenn er sich nach der Idee des unbedingt
Gültigen richtet, provinziell gegenüber künftigem, besseren Wissen“ (Habermas 1999, 219). This
position already indicates that Habermas will abandon his Discourse Theory, since this is based
on rational acceptability. As the final chapters of Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung indicate
Habermas leans more and more towards a realism. More problematic, however, is the fact that
Habermas apparently still adheres here to the myth of progress. Without a clear conception of a
mind-independent reality this progress can only be historically justified with regard to former
positions that were, however, also bound by the historical moment. Moreover, Habermas denies
a context of all contexts as exemplified in the following statement: “Sicher können wir die
Grenzen unserer epistemischen Kontexte von innen immer weiter hinausschieben; aber es gibt
keinen Kontext aller Kontexte, den wir überschauen können. Nichts berechtigt uns zu der
Erwartung, das letzte Wort zu behalten“ (Habermas 1999, 219). So it is unclear whether
Habermas’ theory of progress, the idea that we cannot not learn, can be simply justified.
According to Habermas, Absolute Spirit is related to a standpoint of progress: “Sie selbst sollen
zur Erkenntnis einer alles bloß Subjektive überwältigenden Macht des Geistes konvertieren, die
schicksalhaft durch die Sphäre der Volksgeister, also durch die Geschichte der intersubjektiven
Lebensformen hindurchgreift“ (Habermas 1999, 220). Obviously, Habermas takes Absolute
Spirit as overcoming the differences between the objective and intersubjective realm so that
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Absolute Spirit can eventually guide the individual in order to get closer to reality. With this
interpretation in mind, Habermas quotes Hegel‘s Encyclopedia: “Der Geist hat für uns die Natur
zu seiner Voraussetzung, deren Wahrheit, und damit deren absolut Erstes er ist.“ (Habermas
1999, 220) Here, Habermas sees Hegel’s clear break with the turn towards the means [Medien]
of language and labor towards an “obscure self-consciousness” (Habermas 1999, 221). It is also
crucial that Habermas makes no references to the circularity of Hegel’s project or how this final
structure rather expresses freedom than closure:
Aber am Ende der Jenaer Periode steht Hegel nur noch dieses »Selbst« eines obskuren Selbstbewußtseins als
einziges Modell für ein höherstufiges Subjekt zur Verfügung, dem er ein höheres Wissen zuschreiben kann –
eines, das kategorial allem Wissen überlegen ist, welches aus der kooperativen Wahrheitssuche von Teilnehmern
an den rationalen Diskuresn einer sich selbst begründenden Kultur hervorgehen kann. (Habermas 1999, 221).

For Habermas, Hegel sees in the self-conceptualizing thought the Absolute Spirit that comes to
itself as the substance of the subject. So Habermas claims that Hegel does this by virtue of
subjectivity, and thus he falls back into mentalism which cannot be anything else than a
substantialism (see Habermas 1999, 221). It is no longer the mediation of language, labor and
interaction that guides subjects. Instead, the overall substance of everything that we do is the
substance of this anonymous Absolute Spirit. So Habermas writes on Hegel‘s presupposed,
mental subject: “Dieses Subjekt wird als das Ein und Alles, als Totalität gedacht, die »nichts
außer sich haben kann«“ (Habermas 1999, 222). This totalizing is a return to mentalism, which,
for Habermas, constitutes the ultimately opaque precondition for Hegel’s epistemology.
Though Habermas is right to critically examine the question of subjectivity, the most
problematic part of Habermas’ interpretation is that he misunderstands Hegel’s historicism. In
the following, Habermas quotes a well-known, but often misinterpreted passage:
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Hegel identifiziert dieses »Andere« mit dem Geschehen in der Zeit, worin sich die Bewegung des Begriffs
vollzieht, während er das absolute Selbst als den Begriff begreift, der die Zeit in sich verschlingt und
gewissermaßen verzehrt. Damit verliert die Historizität der Vernunft ihren herausforderenden Charakter. Sie wird
jedenfalls entschärft, wenn die Logik über die Geschichte doch wieder auf die traditionelle Weise den Sieg
davonträgt: „Die Zeit ist der Begriff, der da ist …; deswegen erscheint der Geist notwendig in der Zeit, (aber) er
erscheint (nur) solange in der Zeit, als er nicht seinen reinen Begriff erfaßt, d. h. nicht die Zeit tilgt. (Habermas
1999, 222)

The problem here is that Hegel has an idea of absolute spirit that must be thought as beyond
time, but this does not mean that it is outside of history. Hegel discusses here rather a problem of
dialectic that I will discuss in much more detail later. It may be useful to anticipate my
arguments, however: in the preface of the Phenomenology, Hegel discusses the truth of a plant.
The single stages seemingly refute other stages of its development. The bud is refuted by the
blossom, and the blossom is refuted by the fruit. Now, it occurs that the plant, the universal
concept of all of these occurrences, is outside of time, outside of its single moments. The concept
of the plant occurs as a formal idea of what the plant is. The plant, however, does not exist if it
does not become, and thus the universal that serves as a teleological goal cannot be outside of
time. It must be somehow the process itself. At this point, my concepts are not rich enough to
discuss this relation in detail without contradiction, but it implies that it comes down to the
question of deconstructing the category of time, eternity, temporality, and history in order to
grasp the moments of the plants as necessary, and in order to free them from their contradictions
(see Hegel PoS §2, 2). We thus need another conception of time that Habermas does not develop
here.
Habermas’ problematic interpretation of Absolute Knowing, however, guides his further
evaluation:

262

Aber die intersubjektive Struktur gegenseitiger Anerkennung ist für das mentalistische Konzept von Selbst und
Selbstreflexion nicht mehr relevant, weil Hegel in der »Logik« den Begriff nach dem Modell des Ich oder des
reinen Selbstbewußtseins entwickelt. Die Intersubjektivität wird, ohne daß sie in der Darstellung der absoluten
Idee eine Spur hinterließe, von der Subjektivität verdrängt (Habermas 1999, 223).

Because Hegel’s goal of a “Vereinigungsphilosophie” (a philosophy that unites), Hegel replaces,
according to Habermas, objective spirit with a subjective idea of Absolute Spirit. Thus Hegel
returns to the, for Habermas, forbidden mentalist paradigm that relies on atemporality.
I hold that such interpretations inhibit a return to Hegel and have served Habermas to
reject such a return. Though Habermas successfully refutes Brandom’s model, and criticizes his
realism, from his own Kantian perspective, he cannot successfully take up the threads of Hegel’s
historicism that ground our situation. A return to dialectics is impossible on the developed
grounds of pragmatic-semantic and communication theory. Instead, a reading of Hegel has to be
established that grasps him as a historicist thinker. In order to show that this is possible, I must
reconstruct Hegel’s epistemology as it is developed in the Phenomenology and interpret his
passages on Absolute Knowing.

4. Hegel’s Historicism
In this chapter, I will argue that Hegel’s concept of Absolute Knowing implies that all cognitive
claims are bound to the historical moment. Thus, Absolute Knowing as a cognitive claim about
the identity of subjective knowing and objective truth must be reconstructed as historical itself.
In order to do so, I will particularly focus on Hegel’s distinction of time and history that he
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introduces in his last chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit.178 Hegel’s historical dialectic that
reaches its epistemological goal in the historicity of Absolute Knowing will finally reveal itself
as incompatible with Brandom’s semantic realism. Thus, we cannot say that Brandom bridges
the divide between analytic and Continental philosophy.
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This interpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology will have consequences for the question of Hegel’s Logic. For
some interpreters Hegel’s Logic is the presentation of a diamond net that excludes historicity and presents the
foundation of the Hegelian system. Hegel’s epistemology of a developing self in the Phenomenology and its relation
to anthropology will render these positions impossible. Hegel’s Logic only serves as a preliminary grounding, a kind
of metaphysical net that we use for interpreting experiences. Each consciousness requires a metaphysics. This
question of a ‘grounding’ metaphysics will be investigated in the Logic. I would like to make two remarks that
relativize the status of Hegel’s Logic as foundational. Firstly, Being, that is without doubt the starting point of a pure
science without presuppositions, reveals itself to be intertwined with its contrary, i.e., nothing. Hegel writes then on
the becoming of both of these concepts: “Their truth is therefore this movement of the immediate vanishing of the
one into the other: becoming, a movement in which the two are distinguished, but by a distinction which has just as
immediately dissolved itself” (See Hegel, G.W.F. Science of Logic. Translated by George Di Giovanni, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2010, 60). Due to Being’s and Nothing’s intertwinement, Gadamer makes, for
example, the controversial point that Hegel’s Logic does not start with Being (Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Hegel's
Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies. Translated by P. Christopher Smith, New Haven: Yale University Press,
1976). Rather, it starts with becoming. In other words, the fluidity of thinking cannot be captured by the abstract
immediacy that Being represents. Hegel remarks that we cannot start with nothing, since the becoming of nothing
must be the becoming of something, while something cannot be nothing. In this sense, Hegel’s position is that Being
becomes. The major point that Gadamer defends, however, is that Logic is dynamic. This interpretation stands in
contradiction to the idea that the Logic provides a stable position at the end of its movement. We cannot remain in
the abstract thought that the Logic is Being, which would be the lifeless, and dead universal result. Secondly, even
the objective truth of being and its essence are demonstrated as conceptual and syllogistic. Thus, the truth of being
depends on inference. In a word, the objective logic reveals itself to be the subjective logic. Hegel proclaimed this
already in the Phenomenology: “’I’ is the content of the connection and the connecting itself” (Hegel PoS §166,
104). We cannot find, however, an abstract form that describes this ego, except we attempt to think pure being. In
this case, we have to understand the ego in terms of its formal judgments that are at the same time its content. In this
sense, experience is known through, but is not limited to judgment. Logic is the grounding for thinking, yet it is only
the preliminary grounding that we accept in order to enter thinking. This grounding remains embedded into what
human beings are. It is the process that we have abstracted from the empiricist, rationalist, and critical arguments,
thus the highest concept that we got to know in history so far. Nonetheless, it only serves as a guidance for
developing concepts concretely and the logic is not the absolute result of history that cannot be superseded anymore.
As it occurs in the Logic, the ego might be identical with the concept by virtue of the form matching its
content. Yet, we should not forget the specific character of the Logic as only demonstrating a particular conception
of presuppositionlessness resulting from Absolute Knowing. In this sense, it is the pure epistemological ego that
discovers itself as a grounding structure, when it thinks Being’s dynamic becoming. It would, however, be a mistake
to conflate this conceptual structure with human beings. It would only lead us to the absurd conclusions that humans
are concepts. Rather, the problem occurs at the end of the Logic, since this abstract ego must achieve a relation to
nature. Otherwise, its final mediation would remain meaningless. It would remain an abstract entity that stays as a
sleeping spirit in itself, comparable to a potential God before creation, an absurd concept. God, a concept that can
only be thought as actuality, cannot be potential. Thus an ego that is self-identical must be thought as an absurdity,
too. Hegel’s main focus is therefore not the Logic, which remains only a part of his systematic account. His main
concern is the human being as he presents it later in the Philosophy of Spirit.
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The previous discussion of Brandom’s semantic realism will structure my discussion of
Hegel’s historicism. There are three concepts that make Brandom’s semantic realism
incompatible with Hegel’s position:
1) Brandom’s metaphysical realism,
2) Brandom’s presupposed formal subjects who play the universal game of giving and
asking for reasons, and
3) Brandom’s ahistorical semantics.
Firstly, I will demonstrate that Hegel does not believe that content can be independent
from form. From this follows that the presupposition of a mind-independent reality cannot be
achieved since the subjective form of cognition is involved in all cognitive acts. Thus,
recognizing a mind-independent reality means to recognize a mind-dependent mind-independent
reality, which is absurd. All epistemology is based on a subject, and thus we cannot have mere
content.
Secondly, Hegel’s epistemology is based on a subject understood anthropologically, and
thus we cannot achieve a merely formal understanding of how we act. Rather, our actions depend
on the conditions of experiencing, social human beings in their historical context.
Thirdly, the reason why Brandom believes he can relate to Hegelianism is based on a
common misconception that Hegel follows an ahistorical, social model of how we secure
meaning by inferences. Habermas also follows and perpetuates this misguided interpretation of
Hegel as a social thinker,179 while ultimately rejecting Hegel’s account as ahistoric. On the
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Like any thinker, Hegel’s epistemological project can also be accessed in relation to its predecessors. I regard the
most important task for Hegel to overcome the Fichtean opposition of content and form in consciousness and
achieve an absolute mediation of the further occurring contradictions that such a project reveals (see Greene,
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contrary, I will demonstrate that Hegel’s account is intrinsically historicist and that all our
cognitive claims are limited to the historical moment.
For proving these points, I will focus on Hegel’s “Introduction” and the last chapter
“Absolute Knowing” of the Phenomenology of Spirit.180 I will explain the structure in more
detail in the following.
The overall epistemological problem is central in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit. Thus,
Rockmore states: “we should comprehend his entire book as a single theory of knowledge
running through different phases from cognition (Erkennen) to absolute knowing” (1997, 2).
Hegel’s epistemological account will be the foundation for any further problem that we
approach. Rockmore summarizes this epistemological account as follows: “We can never
compare what is in our mind with anything outside it, but only with something else that it is
given to, hence within mind” (1997, 3). While the best epistemology in theory would explain the
universal structure of all phenomena and their relationship to a mind-independent reality, Hegel
holds the view that we can clarify truth only for us. Thus, his theory must be understood as the
second best, but currently only possible epistemology. Though such an epistemology might be
correctly considered as relativism, it is important to note that Hegel does not give up on the
possibility of cognition. Rockmore presents the central point of Hegel’s objective cognition: “we

Murray. Hegel on the Soul - A speculative ontology. Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972, 24). The last mediation in this
process will be man himself who is exposed to the command “know thyself” in an epistemological sense. This
means that Hegel does not believe in an isolated, pure ego like Fichte (see White, Alan. Absolute Knowledge
: Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1983, 24). Thus, his beginning is the
incomplete, historical status of man who faces the problem of knowledge that is supposed to be universal. This
subjective condition, its historical starting point, must therefore be included in a successful project of thought (see
White 1983, 125), and its consequences for a historicism have to be indicated.
180
Hegel’s strategy in the Phenomenology of Spirit is to start with the subjective experience of immediacy and to
demonstrate the resulting inadequacies. The experience of these inadequacies and the negation of former theories
will lead to the attempt of recognizing the subject itself, which will require the perspective of the other, since
otherwise the problem of an objectification the subject cannot be overcome. The substance of this historical
community that produces intuitive, insufficient forms of what we are will finally be grasped in absolute spirit.
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reach knowledge when our view of the object and the object as it is given to us, or is within
mind, coincide” (1997, 3). Hegel attempts to reach this identity of subject and object in Absolute
Knowing. Absolute Knowing is a historical moment, in which the subject can grasp itself as its
own object after a series of self-investigations.
In my first step, I will present Hegel’s phenomenology. Given that Hegel does not accept
noumena, but focuses on phenomena, it is adequate to call Hegel’s epistemological account
phenomenological. Phenomenology expresses for Hegel the idea that we deal with approachable
contents of experience, and not with contents that are beyond our grasp as, for example,
transcendentally deducted noumena, or real things as Brandom presupposes. Contents are thus
within our experiences. This difference between Hegel and Brandom, who presupposes a mindindependent reality, cannot be bridged. Rorty’s claim that Brandom leads analytical philosophy
into its Hegelian stage is therefore absurd.
Hegel’s phenomenological account further implies that all contents are structured
conceptually. Knowledge is therefore not immediate, but mediated during the process of
experience by virtue of our conceptual activity.181 In a second step, I will therefore explain how
Hegel’s epistemology is related to subjects and their conceptual activity. Though we cannot
access a mind-independent reality, Hegel is interested in the possible identity of all experienced
objects, which is known through historical, socially mediated self-knowledge. Since for this
reason every problem hinges on self-knowledge, the investigation of knowing the subject and its
object becomes an investigation of consciousness as its own object. Rockmore evaluates this
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Demonstrating this will support my general thesis that Discourse Theory and the linguistic turn can be
understood as reactions or even as a partial continuation of the Hegelian insights. As I will show, however,
language, in Hegelian terms is not the undeniable [unhintergehbare] condition of cognition but remains open for
historical change.
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important transformation of philosophy towards self-consciousness: “This reflexive level, typical
of Hegel’s theory, separates it from Kant’s. Kant never asks about the relation of the thinker to
the theory … [F]rom his antipsychologistic perspective, an analysis of the conditions of
knowledge must be independent of any and all anthropological considerations” (1997, 36). Thus,
Hegel does not only drop any claim for knowing the noumenon, Hegel focuses also on
experiencing subjects, which is entirely different from Brandom who relies on a
communicational model in which he formalizes language users.
Before Hegel, with the possible exception of Fichte, the subject was only understood with
regard to the requirements of knowledge, but never discussed as a full person (see Rockmore
1997, 4). Hegel, however, does not conflate rational cognizers who happen to be human, with
humans who happen to know. Instead, Hegel intends to solve the epistemological problem of
human subjects knowing themselves with regard to spirit. Rockmore writes on this central
concept: “His concept of spirit is roughly a view of people in the sociohistorical context as the
real subject of knowledge” (1997, 4). I will highlight of how spirit as a possible identity of
subjects and their objects expresses the substance of human beings who become deeper and
deeper involved in the problem of knowledge.182
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I will start with an interpretation of Hegel’s introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit in which he presents his
grounding views of philosophy as a phenomenology. All of the following points serve also to apply his
epistemological standpoint to his thoughts of the Logic and his idea of systematically approaching knowledge. Since
the Logic is widely regarded as the highest point of Hegel’s philosophy, and mistakenly referred to as an
adamantine, conceptual net, I need to provide an interpretation of the Logic that relativizes this status. I think that
the Logic is the historical, preliminary, and provisional grounding of what truth is for us. After Hegel has shown in
the Phenomenology that all our knowledge of objects involves knowledge of us in communities and our historical
moment, after he has achieved the standpoint of science, the logic is concerned with the development of the
ontological framework of what is for us. The role of the Logic is to demonstrate that the phenomena of externality
,that, according to a Fichtean account, are encountered as an external Anstoß, can actually be explained and
determined through the conceptual framework of logic itself. The absolute idea, the concept of the concept is then
the guiding, regulative idea for a systematic analysis of concepts in the ‘Realphilosophien’. In Absolute Spirit,
unlike Habermas’ interpretation, we gain the first standpoint of what reality is for us, and can apply it to natural
phenomena afterwards. In other words, Hegel’s Logic gives us an idea of how we know phenomena of experience
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In a third step, I will discuss Hegel’s solution to the epistemological problem of the
difference between subject and object. Though subject and object are ontologically distinct in
consciousness, they can be brought to an identity through a cultural learning process [Bildung] of
spirit. Absolute Spirit, the content of Absolute Knowing, occurs first in the intuitive practices of
a community that will increasingly know itself until it can conceptualize its identity by rejecting
all of its merely intuitive, hence external, assumptions about itself. Thus it can grasp itself as the
self-produced object.
The historical progression of this self-knowledge is Hegel’s central idea that does not
occur in Brandom’s semantic realism. Though Habermas propagates a model of learning in
Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung, he only offers a weak naturalism that explains the development of
different discourse practices. Habermas’ explanation relies therefore on external assumptions.
Hegel goes philosophically beyond Habermas and Brandom by focusing on our capacity of
reflection. His intention is to explain our standpoint of knowing through reflection without any
external means besides our historical experience, the starting point of natural consciousness.
In order to distinguish Hegel’s account of Absolute Knowing from Brandom’s ahistoric
language game, but also in order to distinguish it from Habermas’ misinterpretation as ahistoric,
I will carve out Hegel’s distinction between time and history. For Hegel, human subjects remain
historical, even though their substance must be grasped as independent from time. ‘Absolute’
means then that, in respect to our historically limited experience, there will be no more

without adding anything external to the process of experience. In this sense, the Logic carries further the task of the
Phenomenology and its demonstration that the subject and the object can be reconstructed as identical, which is truth
for us. The Logic demonstrates how the resulting movement of thought is rich enough to produce a concept of
externality, in order to guide our processes of experience. In terms of the Logic, we investigate how consciousness
that is in principle identical with its object actually achieves its own objectivity and thus grasps determinate objects
at all. Hegel, unlike Brandom, dialectically develops a concept of reality that is a regulative term for understanding
phenomena that we encounter, for example, in nature.
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unexplained component in our epistemology. Though, for Hegel, this is an objective starting
point for science, the achieved knowledge is still historically bound. Habermas’ criticism of
Hegel as annulling time and committing to an ahistoric perspective is therefore false. Since time
is an intuition, hence an external mean of reflection, it cannot be part of Absolute Knowing.
Though the achieved knowing is absolute, it is only absolute in the sense that it does not require
any other foundation than what is given to humans through historical experience. Hegel’s goal is
to grasp this process of experience conceptually by means of reflection.
My main and conclusive point for the last chapter is henceforth: while time is an intuitive
form that consciousness uses to order empirical phenomena perceived from a contingent stream
of events, historicity is the process in which humans can grasp their own development and
recognize their own historical substance. For this reason, Hegel does not claim to grasp history in
its contingent totality, but he offers a concept that makes contingent events part of one historical
understanding. This oneness of our understanding achieved through reflection is a regulative for
us in order to grasp irrational, contingent events organically. Neither Brandom, nor Habermas
can provide such a reflective criterion. Brandom, moreover, simply presupposes a mindindependent, ahistoric reality. Habermas criticizes Brandom, but fundamentally misunderstands
Hegel. Instead of proceeding with their analytic discourse, we have to see how Hegel develops a
historically derived criterion for the objectivity of knowledge and how he therefore delivers a
viable historical philosophy.

4.1. The Inseparability of Content and Form in Hegel’s Phenomenology
The goal of the following part is to show that Hegel’s phenomenology can be understood as an
argument for the identity of content and form, which rules out the possibility of Brandom’s
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semantic realism, a reconstruction of the formal, propositional requirements of discourses with
regard to a mind-independent reality. Phenomenology, moreover, will not be interpreted in a
Husserlian sense. Rather, I will demonstrate that phenomenology could be understood with
regard to Hegel’s concept of self-consciousness. I call this phenomenology because it focuses on
phenomena and does not presuppose or deduce any noumena. More specifically, phenomenology
means that natural consciousness is confronted with phenomena, while phenomenology is then
the “education of consciousness itself to the standpoint of Science” (Hegel PoS §79, 50). By
natural consciousness I have in mind the subconscious production of unreflected knowledge.
Thus, phenomenology refers to the method that emerges while investigating the content of
natural consciousness and the truth of its phenomenal knowledge that leads to reflection.183 The
project is reflective, since this first natural consciousness as consciousness can investigate itself.
I will show later that consciousness of something always involves self-consciousness. The
content of phenomenology is thus the description of how this phenomenal knowledge is
constituted through consciousness itself and will lead to the question of self-consciousness.
In order to clarify these points, I will firstly demonstrate the ordinary meaning of
phenomenology as essentialist and foundationalist. After mentioning some Hegelian arguments
against essentialism and foundationalism, I will discuss secondly the Kantian form of a
foundationalist approach from which Hegel derives his position. I will show the beginning ideas
of Hegel’s phenomenology, namely how he borrows from Kant the constructivist idea of the
system and how he transforms it with regard to the question of history. In the end, I will provide
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I call this phenomenal knowledge, because it is the knowledge that should be free of all presumptions about a
metaphysical world, for example: that time is independent from content, hence, that time is absolute. Of course,
natural consciousness includes contradictions, since its first insights will always reveal themselves as inadequate.
The following series of contradictions informs our process of education and should be understood as emerging
history.
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an argument for why content and form of Hegel’s phenomenology are inseparable, and how
phenomenology is a description of our conceptual, subjective activity of experiencing. Overall,
Hegel’s approach stands thereby in contrast with Brandom’s formal communication model that
refers to a mind-independent reality.

4.1.1 Ordinary Phenomenologies in Relation to Essentialism and Foundationalism
Probably common to all forms of phenomenology is the view that knowledge emerges in the
sphere of the subject, albeit under this broad definition are also gathered a lot of philosophies
that are not phenomenologies (see Rockmore 2000, 51).184 But also the established known
phenomenologies are questionable in their approach, since most of these phenomenologies
consider essentialism as necessary for claims to know. Since it is, however, impossible to claim
to know something without relating it to the context which justifies the claim, Hegel rejects the
idea of essentialism for an epistemology (Rockmore 2000, 55).
Hegel’s rejection, roughly speaking, stems from the fact that language uses general
[allgemeine] terms. So we cannot simply reference to essences which are individual.185 Despite
the rejection of essentialism, we can still apply general concepts of language meaningfully in
contrast to a social, and historical background (Rockmore 2000, 55). Therefore, it is reasonable
to suggest that we are able to operate with general concepts in sciences without any kind of
essentialism. This method is related to Hegel’s idea of historical contexts, according to which we
can achieve objective claims.
184

Rockmore, Tom. “Essentialism, Phenomenology, and Historical Cognition.” The Empirical and the
Transcendental: A Fusion of Horizons. Edited by Bina Gupta. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000.
185
Following the rough lines of the chapter on ‘sense-certainty’, immediate knowledge could not include the
meaning of ‘this’. Hegel concludes therefore that all knowledge must be mediated (see Hegel PoS §90, 85).
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Since Hegel defends the idea of historical contexts, he also revises a linear
foundationalism that is often associated with essentialism. Foundationalisms usually propose a
secured method for constituting a rigorous science, after setting out an Archimedean starting
point of certain knowledge. This means nothing else than the paradoxical demand, to know what
knowing is, before we start to know anything. Although many of these foundationalisms stand
close to essentialism, some foundationalisms follow the idea to subtract the subjective
perspective from current knowledge for uncovering the conditions of the possibility of
knowledge. Representatives of this transcendental or quasi-transcendental method believe that
they can uncover the transcendental framework of knowledge, or that they could deduce the
cause, the real object, of the in cognition given appearance. They believe that we can derive such
a framework through, for instance, an understanding of how the instrument of cognition works.
In each case foundationalism attempts to distinguish with certainty the subjective
appearance of an object from a mere semblance (false appearance) through setting out the rules
for the ‘real’ science. No matter with which kind of foundationalism the foundation of the
scientific house should be built, all approaches of foundationalism want to justify apodictic
knowledge of a real object and are therefore metaphysical realisms. They claim to know a mindindependent reality. After such a foundation, which would include a correct notion of how the
instrument transforms the real object into an object of knowledge, or how an essence is given
directly, all epistemological problems would be solved, and from this reached point the real
science could start (Rockmore 2004,1).186
Hegel; who considers these approaches; states right at the beginning of the introduction in
his Phenomenology of Spirit: “It is a natural assumption that in philosophy, before we start to
186

Rockmore, Tom. Foundationalism. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2004.
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deal with its proper subject-matter, viz. the actual cognition of what truly is, one must first of all
come to an understanding about cognition, which is regarded either as the instrument to get hold
of the Absolute, or as the medium through which one discovers it” (Hegel PoS §73, 46). Since
Hegel is deeply rooted in the tradition, he arrives at his own philosophy through critiques of
preceding views (see Rockmore 1997, 23). In the quote above, Hegel distinguishes the
understanding of cognition either as an instrument or as a medium. The following text can
therefore be read as a response to the critical epistemology of Kant, even though he never
mentions him by name (see Rockmore 1997, 23).
Hegel accepts Kant’s goal to achieve a theory of knowledge that can justify its own
conditions (what can be roughly called “critical”), and thinks that the idea is rational to ask if
knowledge can bridge the gap between appearance and reality through demonstrating how the
real object is constituted. Yet, he does not share Kant’s opinion that the justification can be
attained apart from the process of knowledge, which is the process of consciousness’
experiencing (see Rockmore 1997, 23). Instead, Hegel replaces the foundationalist idea of a
system through an idea of a circular, open system, which derives the conditions of knowledge
within the process of knowledge. This is closely related to the idea of Hegel’s phenomenology
which can be roughly described as the demonstration of the experiences of consciousness
through its development toward Absolute Knowledge.
In the following point, I would like to sketch how Hegel develops his concept of
phenomenology from a critique of Kant’s transcendental philosophy. Hegel who finally denies
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access to mind-independent objects breaks with the Kantian tradition of knowing a mindindependent reality.187

4.1.2 Kant's Foundationalism and the Hegelian Rejection
For demonstrating the differences between Hegel and Kant and the similarities regarding their
phenomenological approaches, I will explain the route from Kant’s foundationalism to the roots
of Hegel’s phenomenology. Firstly, I will sketch Kant’s position. This can only be a very brief
summary of the generally acknowledged problems of his theory and will not include an in-depth
analysis. Secondly, I will demonstrate how Hegel derives his own epistemology from his
criticism of Kant. Thirdly, I will argue that Hegel’s anti-foundationalist phenomenology leads
him to the consideration of a subject understood anthropologically. This subject will be the
center of Hegel’s epistemology that is open for historical change. Hegel’s anthropological
understanding of the subject distinguishes his theory from Kant’s foundationalism who focuses
on an epistemological subject.188

4.1.2.1 Kant's Foundationalism and the Idea of the System
Kant understands experience as based upon a synthetic unity of all appearances so that
experiences are constructed through categories provided by the thinking subject. There can be no
knowledge without this thinking subject to which objects appear (see Kant KdrV §16 B 141).
Scientists, for example, have no direct access to mind-independent objects of nature. Yet, they
187

For the same reason, Hegel must be opposed to Brandom’s semantic approach.
This will also turn out to be the reason for why Hegel is incompatible with Brandom’s approach, who has
formalized, linguistic subjects as the foundation for an objective theory in mind.
188
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order uninterpreted phenomena by virtue of an apriori conceptual framework that is provided by
a thinking subject. In other words, they interpret phenomena through an a priori categorial
understanding, and therefore they depend on this categorial understanding.
By drawing our attention to the subjective conditions of knowledge, Kant makes, indeed,
an important contribution to epistemology. He turns the metaphysical, scientific paradigm into its
opposite. Knowledge does not depend on objects anymore, but objects depend on knowledge
(see Rockmore 2007,60).189 This known as Kant’s Copernican revolution can also be described
in the words of constructivism: knowledge is based on how we construct (see also Kant, KdrV,
Bxiii).
Despite this constructivism, which is anti-foundationalist, Kant claims that there is a thingin-itself outside us. The question, however, arises: if we can only know what we have
constructed, how shall it then be possible to know that there exists a so-called thing in-itself? At
least, we cannot make a causal inference, since this would be a category mistake, namely to
apply a category to itself in order to ground it. Since the thing-in-itself cannot be experienced,
the idea of it has to be a part of the subject. However, if it is related to the thinking of the subject,
then it cannot be an objective condition of a representationalist model, but must be part of a more
complex theoretical model, a holism that includes the subject.
For Kant, the a priori principles cannot be not justified by experience, but are justified by
the necessity of a whole that stands in relation to a thing-in-itself. A science of knowledge should
not be a subjective conglomeration of merely related phenomena. Empirical knowledge
(experience) is only possible, if there is a secured unified ground available that regulates the
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Rockmore, Tom. Kant and Idealism. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007.
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application of our concepts. His idea of the system under one unifying idea emerges. In the
Critique of Pure Reason he writes: “In accordance with reason’s legislative prescriptions, our
diverse modes of knowledge must not be permitted to be a mere rhapsody, but must form a
system […] I understand the unity of the manifold modes of knowledge under one idea” (Kant
CpR B860, 653).190 In other words, Kant wants to unify all diverse modes of our knowledge
under one idea. This idea is the rational concept as a whole, according to which all concepts are
organized. But since this rational concept must be provided by the subject, the question of the
unity of the subject becomes central for his investigation. Kant relies on the formal I-think,
which must be able to accompany all representations and which is supposed to support the
coherence of all representations with respect to a possible mind-independent reality.
In fact, however, Kant does not solve the question of whether objective claims with respect
to a mind-independent reality can be made through finite, human beings. Instead, he presupposes
a formal subject that projects a mind-independent object as the absolute condition for knowledge.
The epistemological subject becomes central for his approach, while the experiencing subject
can only know phenomena. Thus the experiencing subject receives a subordinated position in his
investigation. Kant’s theory is a priori, hence ahistorical.191 Therefrom, Kant needs to prove the
unity of the epistemological subject in order to justify his theory. He needs to secure the unity of
the system, or the unity of reason, and guarantee the objectivity of the system. But this identity of
the experiencing and the epistemological subject is questionable.
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Kant Immanuel. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith. Palgrave MacMillan, 2007.
Kant’s philosophy is supposed to be the first and the last philosophy. For instance, Kant states that any change in
his philosophy “introduces contradictions not merely into the system, but into universal human reason“ (Kant CpR,
Bxxxviii).
191
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Kant wants to leave the circle of the experiences of the subject, because experience is
always subjective. But this implies a formalization of an epistemological subject that is different
from experiencing human beings. Regarding the subject of cognition, he thus defends a dualism
between the mechanisms of cognition. Sensibility just deals with phenomena, and understanding
organizes these phenomena through a priori categories. This diversity of the subject, however, is
the problem for the unity of reason. In order to overcome this dualism, Kant attempts to combine
both approaches sensibility and understanding in one system. He concludes that sensibility and
understanding must be part of a system of knowledge in order to make it coherent. This means,
on the one hand, Kant regards the sensory manifold as the medium in which subjects receive
information; on the other hand, he sees the understanding as the instrument through which the
information are spontaneously categorized and through which an object of experience is brought
up (see Rockmore 2005, 24). The general idea of this approach is to understand how cognition in
identity works. In order to justify this system, Kant believes that he can subtract the subjective
perspective from appearances in order to deduce the conditions of the possibility of knowledge,
the a priori categorial framework. The categorial framework, which is necessary for experiences,
is only possible if it produces the idea of a real thinkable object, the thing-in-itself. Kant follows
therefore a foundationalist goal, namely to justify a representational system under one unifying,
objective, and a priori idea. This goal, as explained above, presupposes a separation of content
and form, while we focus on the formal aspects that are necessary to order content.
I have only sketched the Kantian system as relying on an epistemological subject. In the
following points, I would like to show how Hegel evaluates and handles Kant’s dualism, which
in my interpretation is the root of Hegel’s phenomenology. On the contrary, Hegel argues that
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content and form are inseparable.192 Moreover, he abandons the idea of a formal I-think and a
noumenon that would close a possible system. Nevertheless, Hegel borrows Kant’s constructivist
idea, and the idea of a systematic structure of our knowledge. In this sense, Hegel is a postKantian thinker who proceeds with the anti-foundational project of Kant by reinterpreting the
Copernican turn with regard to the question of history.

4.1.2.2 Hegel's Interpretation and Rejection of Kantian Cognition
Hegel comments on Kant’s idea of separating content and form:
For, if cognition is the instrument for getting hold of absolute being, it is obvious that the use
of an instrument on a thing certainly does not let it be what it is for itself, but rather sets out
to reshape and alter it. If, on the other hand, cognition is not an instrument of our activity but
a more or less passive medium through which the light of truth reaches us, then again we do
not receive the truth as it is in itself, but only as it exists through and in this medium (Hegel
PoS §73, 46).

As Hegel states, it is obvious that an instrument alters the object, and also the medium shapes the
way we perceive it. It seems, nevertheless, that we could deduce the real object through correct
knowledge of the instrument and the medium. But Hegel discards this idea:
If we remove from a reshaped thing what the instrument has done to it, then the thing–here
the Absolute–becomes for us exactly what it was before this [accordingly] superfluous effort
(Hegel PoS §73, 47).
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Hegel’s theory is therefore incompatible with Brandom’s account which develops a formalized language game
that presupposes a mind-independent reality.
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So if we subtract what the instrument has altered, then we just receive what we had before, an
unknown object. Our effort was useless. Also, to presuppose that cognition as the instrument is
bringing the absolute closer to us, presupposes that there is “a merely immediate and therefore
effortless relationship” to the absolute (Hegel PoS §73, 47). The question is then: why did our
cognition alter it in the first place?
The same is true for the approach to apply the law of refraction to the concept of cognition
as a medium (see Rockmore 1997, 25). When we determine the deviation of this medium, and
we subtract this deviation from the object which is in the medium, then of course we know
something about the process of cognition, but not about the object in-itself (see Rockmore 1997,
25). Hegel writes: “For it is not the refraction of the ray, but the ray itself whereby truth reaches
us, that is cognition; and if this were removed, all that would be indicated would be a pure
direction or a blank space” (Hegel PoS §73, 47). Understanding the medium’s refraction would
just produce a description of the way the object reaches us and bring us back to where we were
before the object reached us. This would tell us nothing about the object as it is in itself (see
Rockmore 1996, 25).
The arguments indicate that it is impossible to separate content and form, or, to put it in
Kantian terms, to work out a categorial a priori framework that is derived before we experience
contents. Obviously, our knowledge is part of experience. And so both Kantian approaches
(cognition as an instrument, or cognition as a medium) fail, because they distinguish between the
shape of thought and the content of thought. In fact, however, our cognition works and there
should be no necessity to have doubts concerning the way consciousness experiences. Hegel
trusts our ordinary way of how we are in the world, and we do not need a secured method
beforehand for joining the road to science. Knowledge starts with experience. Yet, we can admit
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that it is ultimately not limited to it. To work out an approach to draw the right conclusions from
experience is therefore Hegel’s project.
The mistrust in the way cognition works that is the cause of Kant’s foundationalism is, in
Hegelian terms, merely “the fear of falling into error” (Hegel PoS §74, 47). For Hegel, the result
of the Kantian theory would be skepticism. Hegel specifies his rejection of Kant’s account: “To
be specific, it takes for granted certain ideas about cognition as an instrument and as a medium,
and assumes that there is a difference between ourselves and this cognition” (Hegel PoS §74,
47). Hegel rejects a dualism of cognition, because this approach divides the experiencing subject
and cognition. It would lead us to a formalized transcendental subject as well as a transcendental
object. Furthermore, Hegel writes about such an artificial separation: “Above all, it presupposes
that the Absolute stands on one side and cognition on the other, independent and separated from
it” (Hegel PoS §74, 47). Hence, Hegel rejects this transcendental and abstract method to separate
the subject from the absolute.
Nevertheless, Hegel does not give up the Kantian ‘system’. He demands that we should
“mistrust this very mistrust” in our experience (Hegel PoS §74, 47). Instead of defending the
absolute as the transcendental condition that is separated from the subject, Hegel focuses
therefore on the conditions of knowing that are within the experiences of finite, human beings. In
fact, human beings already have an understanding of the world, even when they are not grasping
a mind-independent reality. Rather than searching for the a priori conditions of science, it is
therefore reasonable to accept that human beings were always capable of dealing with objects.
Therefore, Hegel states:
One may set this aside on the grounds that there is a type of cognition which, though it does
not cognize the Absolute as Science aims to, is still true, and that cognition in general,
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though it be incapable of grasping the Absolute, is still capable of grasping other kinds of
truth (Hegel PoS §75, 47).

In other words, Hegel looks closer at the absolute which is related to our being in the world. The
Hegelian project has therefore to be described as a theory a posteriori. It observes human beings
as within the absolute and not separated from it. Since we are already in the truth through our
being in the world, our task is to make explicit the concepts of our natural consciousness that is
in a certain way already related to the absolute.
The method for this task would be phenomenology, or to put it in the proper terms, to
make explicit what is phenomenal knowledge of the experiences of consciousness (see Marx
1975, 7).193 This form of investigation, however, can only be understood as related to the content
of the investigation, natural consciousness. So far, we have not yet discussed this content,
namely natural consciousness.

4.1.2.3 Phenomenal Knowledge of Natural Consciousness and the Concept [Begriff]
I have sketched how Hegel rejects the Kantian foundationalist project which contains
many disputable presumptions such as the thing-in-itself as the cause of appearances, dualistic
views about cognition as an instrument or as a medium, or the ahistorical a priori categorial
framework that is unified through the formal I-think. After the refutation of these assumptions,
Hegel comes up with the idea that instead of investigating the conditions of a completed and
ready-made science, we have to begin with natural consciousness (Rockmore 1997, 26). Here the
concept of Hegel’s phenomenology becomes concrete: if we always possess a certain kind of
193
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truth in our natural consciousness, then the question arises, what we have to make explicit?
Hegel thinks that we have to make the Concept [der Begriff] explicit.194 He writes:
For to give the impression that their meaning is generally well known, or that their Notion is
comprehended, looks more like an attempt to avoid the main problem, which is precisely to
provide this Notion (Hegel PoS §76, 48).

As we can see, the basic epistemological task is to explicate the Concept [der Begriff]. Hegel
replaces the unifying idea of the system and the I-think by the regulative idea of the Concept that
has to be historically achieved. Hegel, as opposed to Kant and his idea of the unification of the
given, sees in the unifying activity nothing but the natural consciousness which will be
acknowledged, when we bring it to the concept which is the absolute (Marx 1975, xx). In a
certain sense, natural consciousness is therefore the ground for the unity of the object for us. This
ground is constituted through the way in which consciousness works, and therefore we are not
talking about a linear foundationalism which tries to prove the existence of a real object and
secures in this sense a science of reality; rather, we are talking about a circular system that has its
balance point in the experiencing subject. We thus enter an anthropological investigation of what
humans are and how they constitute knowledge for themselves.
Consciousness understood through the Concept [der Begriff], however, is not limited to a
concrete, conceptual shape. It is a major and often-committed mistake to attribute the position to
Hegel that humans are concepts. Rather, concepts are our conceptual tool that we have available
for our project of knowledge. To understand subjects by virtue of their conceptualizing activity
has some advantages. Concepts symbolize the reflective relationship that natural consciousness
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Hegel’s ‘der Begriff’ will be translated as the Concept in the following. The translation that I use says ‘Notion,’”
which trivializes its meaning.
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builds to contents. By assuming that concepts are necessary tools for grasping anything, for
example, we already admit that there is not an immediate relationship to a mind-independent
object. Concepts express the fact that we discuss a mediated relationship to content. Concepts,
are therefore also not empty, mere universals. They always presuppose content. Understanding
this relationship might clarify what can count as knowledge for us. Acknowledging this,
however, we have to break with the idea of recognizing a mind-independent reality because
finally each cognition that emerges in the subject is “permeated through the categories of the
self” (Marx 1975, xxi). Due to this fact, Hegel will undertake “an exposition of how knowledge
makes its appearance” (Hegel PoS §76, 49). In this process natural consciousness takes itself as
real knowledge, but has to discover that on “the pathway of [...] despair” nothing is left but
phenomenal knowledge (Hegel PoS §78,49). Thus, it reaches the insight that all reality is in
“truth only the unrealized notion [Begriff]” (Hegel PoS §78, 50). For the epistemological project
this means: there is nothing to find but language that has developed historically. Hegel proposes
here a middle-solution. It is neither a brute realism that simply presupposes a mind-independent
reality, but it also does not claim a universalism, a reality of forms. Instead, Hegel defends what I
call a nominalism, but which I will later modify as a conceptualism. Basically, it means that we
have to understand how we can use concepts for our project of knowledge.
Though this focus on concepts might occur as a relation to the linguistic turn, Hegel goes
beyond the linguistic and pragmatic turn by including the concept of a historical spirit. He
describes language as a particular human language, resulting from human interactions in a
historical community. So Hegel does not deliver a formalized model of communication that
Brandom and Habermas subscribe to, but he investigates the dependence of content and form in
relation to what human beings are. This critical knowledge of our language can be reached only
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through a series of stages which Hegel signifies as the “detailed history of education” (Hegel
PoS §78, 50). It is the history of human kind reaching the stage of science (Rockmore 1997, 27).
In this history, rejections are just the consequence of the progression within the series of these
stages. For instance, according to Hegel, every negation of a predecessor has to be understood as
a result of the tradition, and he calls this concept “determinate nothingness” (Hegel PoS §79, 51).
Therefore, the progression, to put it simply, happens relative to history. The final stage of this
investigation would be the concept of the absolute which is the Concept of the Concept [der
Begriff]. Hegel’s phenomenology is then to show how consciousness works conceptually, how
consciousness relates itself to phenomenal knowledge [erscheinendes Wissen] as real knowledge
(how the thing is for itself) by virtue of the Concept, and how it, at the same time, distinguishes
itself from this knowledge, because it has the insight of the phenomenal appearance of things.
All of this will be demonstrated as a function of the Concept that can relate to itself.
Under these premises, reality becomes a concept that is vital to our processes of
knowledge. Yet, it is not understood as a mind-independent reality, but as a reality that is
produced within the movement of the Concept. Since this movement, however, is a movement of
concepts, Hegel’s project can be called a linguistic project. This, however, does not mean that it
is exhausted by the insights of the linguistic-pragmatic turn. It is not a linguistic analysis of
contingent concepts, but it is about the historical appearance of linguistics as the current core of
our research itself. Hegelian philosophy grasped as linguistic philosophy expresses its own
historical emergence. It is about the Concept of the Concept within a particular, historical
moment, and about how it emerges necessarily in a historical process.
This Concept of a Concept means it cannot be superseded by the means of our historical
moment. In this sense, the linguistic turn is anticipated in a Hegelian philosophy, it includes,
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however, the decisive difference that it is neither understood as a secured epistemology a priori,
nor is our worldview limited to one universal form of this conceptual activity. Language and the
Concept of the Concept are rather the highest mediations with regard to the historical
epistemological problem and its consequences. This will then turn out to be the current
standpoint of science. While we could say that current epistemology is brought to an end by it, in
the sense that we cannot go further beyond, it delivers only the preliminary grounding for our
current ontology. I will justify this thesis in my last part on Hegel (4.3).
To clarify, with this interpretation, I am not rejecting analytic philosophy. I perceive it as
another historical achievement of philosophy that, however, misinterprets its own position within
history. It is not the last epistemological foundation that it delivers, but it is only the historically
achieved position of former theories. Analytic philosophy has therefore to take the problem of
history seriously and apply it to itself, in order to understand itself.

4.2. Hegel’s Account of Self-Consciousness Leading to Absolute Knowing
In the part before I have highlighted Hegel’s relation to his predecessor Kant. I have argued that
content is not independent of form. Hence, we cannot simply approach mind-independent
objects. Instead, our epistemology is related to experiencing, human beings.
In the following part, I further discuss Hegel’s introduction to the Phenomenology of
Spirit. I will demonstrate how his epistemology is rooted in the investigation of consciousness.
Before Hegel, the subject was only an epistemological necessity.195 After Hegel, the subject is
detranscendentalized and investigated as an experiencing human being in history. It will
195
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therefore turn out that the unity of self-consciousness cannot be provided by the epistemological
ego. Unity can only be achieved with regard to other subjects in a society dependent on their
historical moment. This form of epistemology will finally bring us to the question of Absolute
Knowing. The question of Absolute Knowing will be discussed in the subsequent part (4.3) of
this chapter.

4.2.1 From Transcendental Subjects to Experiencing Subjects
Hegel, acknowledging Descartes for his transition into subject philosophy, criticizes him for only
employing “canons of evidence that were uncritical and untested” (Greene 1972, 19). For Hegel,
as demonstrated in part (4.1), the problem is that knowing is already altered by consciousness
and thus certainty cannot be provided by the subject itself (see Greene 1972, 19).196 Instead,
consciousness needs to be recognized in its acts, and not in its persistence through time. Kant,
succeeding Descartes, already “enunciated the supremely important principle of the identity of
ego and Notion: the pure forms of thought, i.e., the forms of the Notion” (Greene 1972, 21). For
Kant, concepts are forms of the self-producing, unifying activity of the thinking consciousness
(see Greene 1972, 21). Kant, having made this shift to the conceptual understanding of
cognition, however, did not deliver “a genuine demonstration of his great principle” (Greene
1972, 21). The question remained whether we can move beyond an “abstract, empty idealism”
and build a relationship between a formalized unity of logic, and its contingent, and empirical
content, the ‘Realphilosophien’ (Greene 1972, 21). Historically, also Fichte’s abstract idealism
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Being, the determination of all determinations of thought, and thus metaphysics, it would remain subjective, if it
were not explored in the objective realms and discussed as an objective entity, namely with regard to its
reoccurrence in nature as emerging spirit. There is no last certainty, but a circle.
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could not exhaustively explain the relationship between the ‘I’ and the contingent content. In
Fichte’s theory, content remained as an external “Anstoß.”197 Thus, we stayed within the
boundaries of an unexplained dualism.
For Hegel, this contradiction of a rational self and an irrational outside is itself irrational
(see Greene 1972, 21). Accordingly, Hegel does not start with a transcendental subject. He
rejects the idea of a pure, self-evident ego that remains always the same and only confronts itself
with irrational content (see White 1983, 24).
The question, however, remains: how can we overcome the problem of external,
empirical reflection and achieve unity between the content (also called the truth, or the object),
and our knowing (also called our activity, or the subject)? Hegel’s solution is that the unification
is found in human beings and their ways of knowing themselves in a historically developed
society. For this reason, Greene writes: “The Sache selbst for our particular study is man himself,
who is commanded to know himself by the law of his own being as Spirit” (Greene 1972, 21).
Hegel’s epistemology is therefore based on a subject understood anthropologically. I will explore
this changed view of the subject and its epistemological role with regard to the introduction of
the Phenomenology of Spirit in the following point.
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Hegel’s pursuit of a unifying explanation of philosophy was focused on the mediation between the dualism
between the thing-in-itself and being-for-itself [Für-sich-sein]. Hegel himself refers to this: “In diesen Systemen tritt
das Ding-an-sich [Kant] oder der unendliche Anstoß [Fichte] zwar unmittelbar in das Ich und wird nur ein Fürdasselbe; aber er geht von einem freien Anderssein aus, das als negatives Ansichsein pereniert. Das Ich wird daher
wohl als das Ideele, als für sich seiend, als unendliche Beziehung-auf-sich bestimmt; aber das Für-Eines-Sein ist
nicht vollendet zum Verschwinden jenes Jenseitigen oder der Richtung nach dem Jenseits“ (Hegel WdL 181). In
Kantian terms it is the question of the justifiability of the two stems of cognition.
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4.2.2 From Individual to Universal Spirit
The main point of Hegel’s introduction to science is that science’s appearance is still incomplete.
Its incomplete spirit, however, moves toward universal spirit. Thus, Hegel writes: “But Science,
just because it comes on the scene, is itself appearance: in coming on the scene it is not yet
Science in its developed and unfolded truth” (Hegel PoS §76, 48). Incomplete spirit and
universal spirit stand in a relationship that governs the course of our investigation. Because of the
incompleteness of the beginning science, Hegel believes that we have to start with natural
consciousness, which is within the process of knowing, but that has not yet achieved its goal that
is scientific knowledge (see Rockmore 1997, 26). This implies that Hegel also hesitates in
acknowledging natural consciousness as delivering scientific knowledge. Yet, this denial will not
end in skepticism as Hegel further points out (see Hegel PoS §79, 51). The denial of natural
knowledge is always the denial of something, and thus, it yields a positive result. Hegel describes
this “incompleteness” of natural knowledge as “determinate nothingness” (Hegel PoS §79,
51).198 This term expresses the ever evolving and self-perpetuating series of scientific research,
according to which we have to deny former views of knowledge in a self-developing process
leading finally to a conception of philosophy as the highest cognitive form within our known
history. With this in mind, Hegel remarks that there is a goal of this movement:
But the goal is as necessarily fixed for knowledge as the serial progression; it is the point where knowledge
no longer needs to go beyond itself, where knowledge finds itself, where Notion corresponds to object and
object to Notion (Hegel PoS §80, 51).
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Brandom usually compares “indeterminate nothingness” to his idea of “material incompatibility” and believes
that Hegel justifies here a semantic condition for how things must be really structured. In fact, however,
indeterminate nothingness is not an ontological fact, but the result of the epistemological problem of incomplete
knowledge and its resulting dialectical movement.
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The goal of the process of knowledge is thus the fulfillment of an identity criterion that achieves
completeness of the Concept. It is the identity of the concept and the object. How can this
correspondence be justified and why is it the goal? Rockmore writes on this aspect:
Hegel’s approach rests on the subject’s ability to distinguish between its view of the object, roughly what
the subject thinks the object is, or its ‘theory’ about it, and what is given in conscious experience. This
conception presupposes a conception of self-consciousness (1997, 29).

So the “criterion” for the identity of the concept and its object is the object in-itself (PoS §81,
52). Though Hegel remarks that this criterion is not yet explicit with the emergence of the
science itself, he claims that we will see how knowledge, the object for us, and truth, the object
in-itself, occur in consciousness as necessary moments. We can compare both of these moments,
since the ontological difference is bridged by consciousness itself. The object will be revealed as
an externalization of consciousness so that consciousness grasps two objects, an object
reconstructed by itself and an object idealized by itself. From this distinction of two objects, we
will also be capable of determining the goal of a phenomenology, i.e., the identity of two objects
of thought, the object that we thought it was, and the object that we think is. Hegel writes on this
self-distinction within consciousness:
Consciousness simultaneously distinguishes itself from something, and at the same time relates itself to it,
or, as it is said, this something exists for consciousness; and the determinate aspect of this relating, or of the
being of something for a consciousness, is knowing. But we distinguish this being-for-another from beingin-itself; whatever is related to knowledge or knowing is also distinguished from it, and posited as existing
outside of this relationship; this being-in-itself is called truth (Hegel PoS §82, 52-53).

So consciousness is always reaching beyond itself by recognizing its limitations. It is a process
of self-negation, and thus, it does not retain what it has, but strives for the standard of an in-itself
to extend its own limitation. It is consciousness that posits a distance to the object by self-
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negation. Thereby, however, it projects objects in themselves, and thus relates to them by virtue
of projection. Yet, the object in-itself is not the supposedly outside and real object of a Kantian
theory, but the object that we can synthesize from the former process of our experience. The
thought object is the object of the former experiences of consciousness and its projection of the
object derived from experience. It is the relationship between a historically arriving
consciousness and its historical, not immediate presence. Consciousness arrives from the past
with its synthesized theories of objects, and compares them to the present moment. The
epistemological criterion is therefore provided by consciousness that distinguishes itself. Our
goal is, therefore, to bring the movement to a halt by grasping how consciousness produces its
object, so that it cannot exceed further limitations anymore.
Hegel writes on this internally, emerging criterion of consciousness: “Consciousness
provides its own criterion from within itself, so that the investigation becomes a comparison of
consciousness with itself; for the distinction made above falls within it” (Hegel PoS §84, 53).
Besides the main project of unifying consciousness in its process of knowing, this is also an
important change in the view of our criteria. The criteria for knowledge are provided by
consciousness itself. Most importantly, there is no external criterion. Instead, it is the process of
the experience of consciousness that conducts us towards a criterion.
This experiential process seems to require a phenomenological reduction so that the
object can appear as it is. This phenomenological reduction, however, would presuppose a mindindependent object that is supposedly altered by our misguided attitudes, or distorted by
existential categories. Against this phenomenological program, I have to say: things do not show
themselves. Presupposing this would be an anthropomorphism that attributes human activities to
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things themselves without considering our subjective activity as a part of the constitution of
objects.
Hegel avoids this problem and focuses instead on the object that is already in
consciousness and externalized by consciousness itself. For Hegel, the in-itself is a presupposed
relation of consciousness to the essence of an object, while the concept of it is knowledge.
Knowledge is true, if essence and concept are equivalent to each other. Since the truth, the mindinternal object, however, can change, the criterion for their correspondence can change as well.
In this sense, knowledge becomes a procedural term and should also not be conflated with a
progressivism towards truth or a preconceived, mystical event that ultimately reveals truth. By
this fundamentally different phenomenology, we are not getting closer to the Truth, but we act
coherently with regard to the criterion that our consciousness has achieved: a concept
corresponding to the essence of a mind-internal object that ultimately is consciousness itself.
Truth is then rather a question of coherently acting with regard to our experiences that are within
consciousness. We could say that we get closer to truth for us. Absolute truth is not the point of
Hegel’s discussion.199 Instead, Hegel’s point is an investigation of self-consciousness and its
historical society.
Beyond Hegel revising the view on truth that clearly distinguishes him from Brandom,
Hegel also reflects on the idea that objects depend on the theory about them. This means that if
the object turns out to be different, it is not only our theory that changes. Hegel writes on this
semblance: “If the comparison shows that these two moments do not correspond to one another,
it would seem that consciousness must alter its knowledge to make it conform to the object”
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Habermas’ discourse theory of truth presupposes that when we agree we agree about what really is, whereas it is
obvious that we can agree but be wrong about what we agree about.
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(Hegel PoS §85, 54). Instead of changing our theory, Hegel points out that objects depend on our
theory, our knowledge or the developed concept. Thus, there can be no progressive movement
towards an external reality. If the theory changes, then the related object changes. This implies
that Hegel introduces a concept of what it means to do sciences with respect to human
consciousness, the ground for having views on objects. This further implies that there is no
ultimate, formal criterion, or ultimate object that is certain, since our theories that determine the
object could change. Thus, Hegel proceeds:
[I]n other words, the criterion for testing is altered when that for which it was to have been the criterion
fails to pass the test; and the testing is not only a testing of what we know, but also a testing of the criterion
of what knowing is. (Hegel PoS §86, 55)

Hegel expresses here that even criteria can be altered. This implies that there is not a single,
methodological criterion, once and for all, but that criteria depend on contextual conditions. This
has already strong implications for Hegel’s later historicism. Here, however, Hegel develops
only the contextual conditions of knowledge that are based on experience. Hegel explains what
experience is for him:
This is the moment of transition from the first object and the knowledge of it, to the other object, which
experience is said to be about […] [T]he new object shows itself to have come about through a reversal of
consciousness itself (Hegel PoS §87, 56).

So experience is the process in which our views of the object change. It is unclear how this
process of experience occurs in all its details (see Rockmore 1997, 33). I assume that since
criteria for knowledge can be different, the process of experience might be different for
particular objects. In essence, Hegel does not say that experience is about a mind-independent
reality, but he talks about how objects can be constituted only with regard to our experience that
is mind-dependent. Here, we encounter Hegel’s ‘empirical realism’. With regard to empirical
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realism, Rockmore distinguishes three kinds: first, “direct knowledge of an independent object”,
second, “indirect knowledge of an independent object through a dependent object”, and third, the
denial of direct and indirect knowledge claims of a mind-independent world, but experience of
mind-dependent objects (see Rockmore 1997, 197). Given the former arguments, Hegel commits
strongly to this “tertiary empiricism” (see Rockmore 1997, 197). Experience is then the process
of the emergence and production of new objects. From this follows that since consciousness is
only consciousness of its objects, and since form does not exist independently from content,
consciousness must be altered in the process of experience. Since, however, mind-internal
objects do not exist independently from consciousness, a change in consciousness must also
change the object. This implies that the dialectic of consciousness cannot be brought to a halt. It
starts with experience, but it causes a cascade of infinite changes.
Regarding the ongoing dialectic of consciousness the following question emerges: how
can consciousness that projects the object in-itself as a result of former experienced objects, and
the experiencing, present, empirical consciousness be thought as one? In order to justify such an
activity of projecting and experiencing an object, we need to develop a theory of selfconsciousness. Before I discuss Hegel’s theory of self-consciousness, however, I have to discuss
Hegel’s empirical realism and its relation to historical systematicity.
With regard to our construction of sciences, Hegel makes clear that we do not simply
change our theory, if a new object arises. Instead, the new object as it will be reconstructed
contains its predecessor in the negation. By virtue of this positive negation, Hegel grasps the
“nothing of that from which it results” (PoS §87, 56). It is a result that “contains what was true in
the preceding knowledge” (PoS §87, 56). This is incompatible an approach of falsification.
According to the approach of falsification, we assume that a change in the perceived object
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ultimately denies our theory so that we would simply replace the former theory. Yet, we do not
simply replace the former theory. Instead, our theories are developing historically. They are an
integral part of what makes the objects that we have at hand. Thus, we do not discuss what mindindependent reality is, but we discuss what human cognition is in its historical development. In
this sense, we could say that the transcendental and empirical consciousness of Kant come
together in one theory of an ever evolving consciousness with regard to its history of
experiences. In conclusion, history does not only stand for the absolute relativity of our
standpoints. Rather, the inclusion of the concept of history delivers a better understanding of how
our cognition actually works. We will understand what qualifies as knowledge for us. Brandom’s
theory, for example, does not include such a history of experiencing language users. Rather,
Brandom reduces our knowledge to a formal game of giving and asking for reasons.
We can also already see how the concept of a historical systematicity is contained in the
simplest acts of knowledge. This means that each cognition stems from a process of comparing
the in-itself object with the for-itself-object, while each of these objects are the results of former
comparisons. Change, moreover, perpetuates further changes. In other words, there is a constant
series of comparisons between the object given in the present consciousness and the theories
about the object. Theories change if they are shown to fail in order to give way to more adequate
theories about the contents of experience. This is not a simple falsification, since the changing
theories are related to dialectical considerations and not simply replaced.
Following the presentation of the historical process of experience, Hegel claims that there
is necessity [Notwendigkeit] intrinsic to the overall process. It is difficult to understand, in which
sense this necessity has to be understood. Hegel writes on this: “[I]t is just this necessity itself, or
the origination of the new object, that presents itself to consciousness without its understanding
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how this happens, which proceeds of us, as it were, behind the back of consciousness” (Hegel
PoS §87, 56). I assume that the German term ‘notwendig’ expresses a change [wenden] of a need
[Not]. Consciousness has to alter its theory and its object, since it can never be satisfied with its
understanding and will eventually sublate the object at hand. Since for consciousness the
understood object in-itself is insufficient, in order to reach truth because it only turns it into
something that is known temporarily for-itself, it is necessary for consciousness to know how it
knows.
Problematic is that consciousness will reduce itself to an object in the process of selfknowing. If we become, however, aware of these processes, then, Hegel assumes, are we capable
of turning natural consciousness into scientific consciousness (see PoS §88, 56, see Rockmore
1997, 35). Necessity is thus understood as demonstrating that the different moments belong to
the process of our experience. With regard to the German term ‘Notwendigkeit’, consciousness
‘turns’ [wenden], or perhaps better, it ‘satisfies a need’ [Not]. The final criterion must therefore
be found in reflecting on an essential need, which, according to Hegel, is ultimately not found in
the calm and stable unity of self-consciousness, but in the ever-changing society and its historical
movement. The process of experience is, thus, the formation of self-consciousness in mutual,
societal relations, such as, for example the sciences. Yet, the process is not limited to the
sciences.
I have said before that the criterion for this endeavor cannot be formal. In his quest for
authentic experiential science, however, Hegel defines an abstract criterion for our science: “[…]
at a point where appearance becomes identical with essence, so that its exposition will coincide
with the authentic Science of Spirit” (PoS §89, 57). Obviously, this is the criterion for reaching
something that can be called science. We achieve science when consciousness knows how it
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knows. Given what we have said before, however, this must indicate only potential knowing, and
thus it only seems to be ahistorical. Instead, Hegel’s theory does not close with the idea of an
eternal scientific self-consciousness that exists independently from further action. Rather, a
theory of self-conscious subjects must be derived from subjects in their historical moment,
whose life of the Absolute Spirit is their own doing. The historical conditions for knowing can
thus still change according to their society. The resulting Absolute Knowing is for this reason
probably the most controversial aspect of Hegel’s theory and has to be discussed in more detail,
especially, since Habermas, as demonstrated above, identifies here an ultimately realist,
ahistorical account. It is the problem of whether we achieve an ahistorical position or whether
Absolute Knowing is historical. My interpretation is that Hegel’s seemingly introduced, a formal
criterion. It is absolute, but only absolute in the sense that it cannot be superseded by current
means of our time. Thus, it is a criterion that he proposes for our time. It is not formal, but open
to further change depending on the historical experiences of human beings.
What is therefore this Absolute Knowing? Is it, for example, independent from the forms
of objective spirit that self-consciousnesses constitute in their task to achieve themselves? The
following discussion has to be dedicated to this topic. It will conclude the discussion between
Habermas and Brandom by showing that Hegelianism is a viable solution to the epistemological
problems that Habermas pointed out in his criticism of Brandom.

4.3 Absolute Knowing in Relation to History and Time
As discussed above, unlike Kant, Hegel does not introduce a transcendental subject, or a soul
outside of the world that holds everything together for us. Rather, he refers to complete universal
spirit and incomplete Spirit. The movement between them captures the essence of finite human
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subjects who live out their lives in a given historical moment. Hegel determines the goal of this
movement in the final sentence of the introduction to his Phenomenology: “finally, when
consciousness itself grasps this, its own essence, it will signify the nature of absolute knowledge
itself” (Hegel PoS §89, 57). In other words, Hegel promises transparent self-consciousness. This
self-consciousness, however, has not always been there like the transcendental ego waiting in the
shadow of an undiscovered land. Instead, it rather develops historically through various stages.
Thus, self-consciousness is becoming in history (see Westphal 1979, 218).200
It is important to distinguish here between time and history and to point out that the
human subject remains historical, but not temporal since we conceptualize it independently from
time. While time is an intuitive form that consciousness uses to order empirical phenomena
perceived from a contingent stream of events, historicity is the process in which selfconsciousness can grasp its own development with regard to its experience and recognize this as
its own substance. Hegel does not claim to grasp history in its contingent totality, i.e. to order all
historical events in contingent time. But, he offers a concept that makes events part of one
ongoing history, so that we can understand otherwise unordered contingency organically with
respect to the way of how we actually know.
Despite this goal of achieving a science that orders all contingent occurrences with regard
to the necessity of knowing itself, Hegel is aware that there are already sciences existing. As
Westphal remarks these sciences are “highly reflective forms of natural consciousness” (1979,
218). Yet, their natural goal of Absolute Knowing is not yet achieved (see Westphal 1979, 218).
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They are not yet on the level of science. The main question arises from here: How do we have to
understand Absolute Knowing as the goal of these historical forms of natural consciousness?
There are two interpretations: either Absolute Knowing expresses a universal truth for all
time, a truth independent of history, an ahistorical framework according to which everything
develops, or Absolute knowing grasps what can be true for us under the conditions that must
have guided our development. According to the latter interpretation, Absolute Knowing would
be limited by ourselves, in so far as we are the subjects and objects of our self-produced history.
Absolute Knowing would then describe only how humans came to know and produce
themselves, but it would not deliver knowledge that is beyond their constitution in the current
historical moment. Habermas, who is influenced by the analytic misconception of Hegel,
believes that Hegel follows the former model. I will argue for the latter.

4.3.1 Hegel as a Thinker of History and Absolute Knowing
It is important to understand the distinction that Hegel draws between time and history in order
to understand Hegel’s project as a rejection of metaphysical realisms of all kinds, and thus also
as a rejection of Brandom’s semantic realism. The beginning of this distinction occurs in Hegel’s
chapter “Absolute Knowing.” I will argue that time is part of the representational understanding
[Vorstellung], also translated as ‘picture-thinking’) of spirit, while history is the conceptual
unfolding of Absolute Spirit. Absolute Knowing rejects time because it is a representational
intuition in seeking to grasp the historicity of Spirit. I discuss this point, since Habermas
criticizes Hegel’s concept of Absolute Knowing as annulling time, and thus criticizes Hegel’s
project as positing itself as eternally true. However, a correct reading of the passages will reveal
that Hegel defends an eternity that is self-produced and assumed by subjects in a community for
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themselves. This self-production is absolute only in the sense that it does not require any other
foundation than what is given to humans through experience and understood in reflection.
Hence, Hegel does not return to a transcendental realism as Habermas assumes, but rather turns
to a concept of reality that can be recognized as a subjective activity.
The discussion between Brandom and Habermas concludes in the question of the
historicity of Absolute Knowing. Habermas’ reading of Absolute Knowing as ahistorical
subjectivity is not unique, but is influenced by a common misinterpretation of
Hegel. Hoffmeyer refers to this misconception in the following passage:
According to the Phenomenology of Spirit, Spirit becomes itself only in and through history. Yet the
concluding section on ‘Absolute Knowing’ has left many interpreters wondering whether Spirit in Hegel’s
eyes is only penultimately historical. Does Hegel ultimately relativize Spirit’s historicity within an
ahistorical framework?” (Hoffmeyer 1992, 198)201

Fulda summarizes the discussion about the final chapter of Hegel’s Phenomenology similarly:
Spätestens in ihm [the last chapter], so die Kritiker, ist Hegels ambitiöses Unternehmen einer
wissenschaftlich-phänomenologischen Einleitung in Philosophie, die das Wirkliche von einer spekulativen
Logik aus systematisch begreift, manifest gescheitert [He refers to Habermas here]. Auch unter den
meisten Interpreten, die der Hegelischen »Phänomenologie« Wohlwollent entgegenbringen, wird fast nicht
anders gedacht (Fulda 2007, 340).202

Fulda takes up the debate that Habermas reinitiated in Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung. There,
Habermas agreed with Hegel’s understanding of society, which was intersubjective, but
criticized him for focusing on the eternal qualities of Absolute Knowing. Fulda, who criticizes
201

Hoffmeyer, John F. “Absolute Knowing and the Historicity of Spirit.” The Journal of Religion 72 (2), 1992: 198209. Accessed on July 12, 2017. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1205149.
202
Fulda, Hans Friedrich. “Das absolute Wissen – sein Begriff, Erscheinen und Wirklichwerden.“ Revue de
Métaphysique et de Morale 55, 2007: 338-401. Accessed on July 12, 2017. DOI 10.3917/rmm.073.0338.

300

this criticism of Hegel, attempts to reconstruct the last chapter of Absolute Knowing with regard
to its openness towards experience and historical change.203
Before I discuss the idea of Absolute Knowing and its historicity, I have to develop a
first, preliminary notion of Hegel’s concept of historicity. I assume that Hegel thinks historically,
and will argue that the last form of Absolute Knowing is itself historical. The problem of
interpreting Hegel, however, is that he is not entirely clear what historicism entails. Historicism
is, according to Rockmore, central to Hegel’s claims of knowledge (see Rockmore 2004, 194),
but it is not entirely developed by Hegel himself (see also Jaeschke’s evaluation in Perkins 1984,
101). Rockmore writes on Hegel’s historicism:
If Hegel is correct, the commitment to contextualism already entails a commitment to a historical
conception of knowledge, hence to historicism, which is a view about the intrinsically historical character
of all first-order cognitive claims (Rockmore 1994, 194).

Despite Hegel’s clear commitment to historicism, Rockmore points out that the meaning of this
historicity of cognition is “mysterious.” Rockmore states, therefore, that it is the interpreter’s
task to “construct and evaluate arguments that support Hegel’s view of the historicity of
knowledge” (Rockmore 2004, 193). In the following paragraphs, I therefore attempt to provide
an idea of Hegel’s historicism with regard to Absolute Knowing. I begin
with Jaeschke’s discussion of Absolute Spirit occurring in world-history and an eternal history of
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spirit. Then, I will demonstrate concretely how Absolute Knowing unfolds with regard to
history. It is helpful to begin with Rockmore’s definition of historical relativism:
“[‘Historical relativism’] refers to our incapacity to escape from the limits of our own historical moment,
can be taken as suggesting that claims to know are objective but also historically relative. A knowledge
claim that was historically relative but not objective would be uninteresting; and a knowledge claim that
was objective but transhistorical would not be historically relative” (Rockmore 2004, 195).

This means that, according to Rockmore’s definition, Hegel is only a historicist if all our claims
are relative to the historical moment. If Absolute Knowing is independent from its historical
moment, then Hegel’s theory would not qualify as historicist. Yet, this cannot exclude
objectivity, since otherwise the theory would not produce any value. With regard to Absolute
Knowing, it comes down to the question of how we can achieve communal, objective cognition
in history, and how it is understood within the limits of our specific world history.
Jaeschke remarks that since Hegel did not work out this relation between world history
and Absolute Spirit, this relation raises many further questions. For his
analysis, Jaeschke observes, first of all, that: “[T]he space that world history fills in Hegel’s
system looks comparatively small” (Jaeschke 1984, 102). It occurs to him that history is thus
only “limited to a specific part of the system” (Jaeschke 1984, 102). Consequently, it would be
an “overstatement” to see Hegel as a philosopher of history (see Jaeschke 1984, 102).
Yet, Jaeschke makes the point that the overall “extreme position, namely that his system as a
whole is a philosophy of history” can be reasonably defended, since everything is a form of spirit
in time (see Jaeschke 1984, 103). Since “even logic is implicitly spirit, and nature is spirit that
has externalized itself” (Jaeschke 1984, 103), Hegel’s whole account is grounded on history. In a
further step, Jaeschke, however, argues against this position, since if everything were grounded
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on one history, it would lead to a reduction of everything to forms of one occurring historical
spirit. This position of a super-spirit that works through all instantiations of history as one
guiding idea would be difficult to defend. There are, just to mention one example,
complex appearances of different forms of literature, which cannot simply be demonstrated as
occurrences of only one historical principle. Moreover, looking at Hegel’s historical attempts to
order world history with regard to the progression of European history, and looking at his
interpretation of America as the land of the future, it would turn him into nothing more than a
euro-centrist historian. Under these premises, we could easily criticize Hegel’s idea of an all
embracing world history, with respect to the complexity of occurring phenomena in history.
Absolute Spirit would be overpowered. Jaeschke summarizes therefore the major problem: “[…]
how it is even thinkable that one spirit could have diverse forms of history, and nevertheless still
remain one” (Jaeschke 1984, 104). In my mind, this expresses the problem of assuming one
ontological historical ground for all historical development. It might induce a confirmation bias
so that we interpret history with regard to one principle. Though “history is essentially history of
spirit” (Jaeschke 1984, 102), the status of Absolute Spirit itself is questionable. Some treat
Absolute Spirit as a mole.204 This means that we cannot see Absolute Spirit working itself, but all
events have to be attributed to this one hidden force (like a mole producing
molehills).205 For Jaeschke, it is questionable if we have to read each single passage of Hegel’s
philosophy with regard to its supposed end, a super-entity of Absolute Spirit. Yet, he also
introduces the term of an “eternal history of spirit” (Jaeschke 1984, 106). Of course, Absolute

204

Schmied-Kowarzi, Wolfdietrich: Denken aus geschichtlicher Verantwortung: Wegbahnungen zur praktischen
Philosophie Königshausen & Neumann 1999, 295
205
I claim that this understanding of Absolute Spirit would remain on the level of understanding, it would
understand all dialectical movements in history as the result of one force, and thus it would be a representation of
Absolute Spirit, but not yet conceptually grasp its reality.

303

Knowing it is not an eternal substance, but it is only comprehensive as a subjectively selfproduced substance. With his interpretation of an eternal history of spirit, Jaeschke attempts
therefore to preserve the objectivity of the historical principle. Jaeschke writes:
Since history is a property of the forms of spirit, it does not remain just a history of states or political
history. It is likewise the history of absolute spirit, and that means the history of art, religion, and
philosophy, in all of which absolute spirit unfolds itself (Jaeschke 1984, 104)

How then does Absolute Spirit stand in relation to world history, and its eternal unfolding in art,
religion and philosophy? The problem arises that the eternal history of spirit has “without doubt
[…] not only conceptual but temporal priority to the forms of history […]” (Jaeschke 1984, 106).
All historical events that are known to us would then be grounded in an original historicity, an
“eternal history of spirit” (see Jaeschke 1984, 106). Absolute Spirit would be the underlying
form of the “the process of alienation and return in itself [Spirit]” (Jaeschke 1984, 106).206
Though Jaeschke does not reject this position, he identifies the major problem in combining
eternal spirit with the temporal and partial history of spirit: “[J]ust as previously the supposition
of the eternal history was not entirely rejected, so also here the supposition of a temporal history
of absolute spirit is not to be completely rejected” (Jaeschke 1984, 110). Despite his emphasis of
the eternal history of Absolute Spirit, Jaeschke remarks that the absolute content of world history
is inadequately understood, if world history is understood “by the superstructure of several
histories of the absolute spirit, with one of these histories being more absolute than the other”
(Jaeschke 1984, 115). Further, this would not only be false with regard to the text, but this would
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also create “superworlds” from which a “very weak glance […] falls back to this world and its
history” (Jaeschke 1984, 115).
Instead, we have to see that Hegel attempts to mediate “metaphysics and
history.” Jaeschke concludes, with regard to a possible middle solution:
Such a meditation would not be achieved if the absolute content were present only in the separate histories
of absolute spirit, and the eternal were not embedded in actual history, too, and this actual history were not
elevated to the absolute (Jaeschke 1984, 115).

In other words, Absolute Spirit must be bound to its occurrence in history and cannot be thought
independently from its historical moment. The historical moment cannot be an expression of an
eternal and hidden spirit. Instead, the historical moment delivers an intuitive idea of the eternal.
Afterwards, we have to free it from all external elements in understanding and grasp it
conceptually.
In order to find such a middle solution, we have to shift from the idea of an Absolute
Spirit that works as a hidden force behind all events, to an epistemological principle that serves
us in order to understand historical events, and that we produce in the course of these events.
As Erp suggests, this principle must be similar to how spirit occurs in world-history. Erp writes:
“[h]istory is the way of how people express the principle that guides their actions” (see Erp 1998,
5). So their Absolute Spirit is not a mole that is the one force for many histories to occur. Instead,
there are principles of history included in these many principles of the people. The principles of
the people can be different. As much as we can decide to be the desiring, the honorable, the
witty, or the wise person, as much, such principles can be the guiding principles of specific
societies. We shall be honorable, a union of soldiers, or a union for graciousness and so forth.
The problem with regard to all of these principles is their problematic reversal related to the
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limitations of their determination. Everything that is determined will enter a dialectical process
according to Hegel’s overall theory. Applied to history, this means that principles lead to a
historical dialectic. This means that it will always turn out that each principle cannot satisfy our
goal because they are based on theoretical abstraction, and include external elements. Erp argues
therefore that the “spirit of a particular people” will always be finite only (Erp 1998, 5). The idea
is then that universal spirit frees the “development of the idea of the spirit as such” (Erp 1998, 6).
For the Phenomenology, this means that the goal is to develop the universal principle that is
science. The former principles occurring in world-history are spirit, however, spirit in a
convoluted form and therefore part of an ongoing dialectic. The principles have an external
motivation that will push them to their extremes.
Nevertheless, according to Hegel there is no spirit in independence from subjects. Hegel’s
is concerned to show the relationship of universal and individual spirit in Absolute Knowing,
more specifically, the interdependence of substance and subject in the dialectical movement
towards science in a society. Since spirit is historical, and not a natural development of a mindindependent world, “spiritual history of the world must be ultimately comprehensible as a
rational totality” (Erp 1998, 6). This rational totality is the freedom of the subjects of spirit to
determine themselves as expressed in Absolute Knowing. Erp points out that if Absolute Spirit is
freedom, then it is not the “conclusion of empirical knowledge and historical experience”
(Erp 1998,6). World-history is the hidden force of reason as if it were a hidden power in the form
of “a philosophical a priori” (Erp 1998, 6). In the religious representation, for example, it would
be “a matter of divine providence” (Erp 1998, 6). Hegel, however, is neither a philosopher who
defends a priori principles nor does he defend an instantiation of God in Absolute Knowing or
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Absolute Spirit. Instead, we have to understand history “in its concrete development as a rational
whole” (Erp 1998, 6) of subjects determining their own substance. Erp concludes:
A philosophical concept of world-history can only be developed from the moment that world-history itself
has reached the spiritual result that can be conceived of as its rational end. Therefore, world-history is itself
a special or concrete totality of time; it is time that has come to its end (Erp 1998, 6).

Hegel’s philosophy reaches the point, according to which all development can be explained
without further presuppositions. Looking at world-history as a succession of stages, it seems that
we have removed contingency in revealing necessity with regard to the former guiding principles
that we grasp in clarity only at the end of a concrete historical process. The last principle must
guide us on our historical path up to this historical moment, and that is free of external
assumptions, assumptions that are independent from the historical process. This points to the
need for a further distinction between history and time.
My point concerning Hegel’s distinction between time and history is the
following: Absolute Knowing determines all former moments of historical
becoming. Therefore, Absolute Knowing depends on the former moments. But since Absolute
Knowing is also the result of this becoming, it is thus paradoxically within the framework of
time. It is the condition, and simultaneously the result of all former moments of its becoming.
For this reason, we cannot proceed in thinking Absolute Knowing within the framework of time.
We therefore have to leave time as a succession of contingent events behind, and “free the notion
of history from the notion of natural time” (Erp 1998, 7). Erp concludes with regard to “the
absolute (‘untied’) spirit”, and with regard to the close relation of the forms of understanding to
“their historical environment”, that “[p]hilosophy's task is to develop the conceptual
understanding of this relation between the objective and the absolute spirit” (Erp 1998,12). With
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regard to world history, Erp explains that the final stage of Absolute Knowing closes “the history
of the world, but without the necessity of being understood as its historical end, that is to say, as
an end-point in time” (Erp 1998, 12). The end of world history is rather an achieved actuality of
self-knowledge, namely the condition for its occurrences and further history. For Erp “it is the
period in history in which the state, religion and philosophy recognise each other in a form of
perfect harmony” (Erp 1998, 13). In other words, Absolute Knowing concludes a historical
movement and prepares us for another form of historical movement.
Other philosophers such as Habermas believe that “the dialectical closure of philosophy
excludes a real future development of spirit” (Erp 1998, 14). Yet, it is false to compare “Hegel's
concept of spirit with some complex and abstract representation of a subsistent entity, separated
from our conception of ourselves” (Erp 1998, 14). This representation of a historically
independent substance is, according to Erp, caused by the right-wing-Hegelian movement. I have
already noted that this false interpretation of Hegel’s Absolute Knowing is popular in Habermas
and the analytic tradition. The right-wing Hegelians defend a view of religious substance that
finally leads to Absolute Knowing as one ontological substance, a view that Russell opposed. In
a sense, Habermas therefore criticizes right-wing-Hegelians, but not Hegel. Erp writes with
regard to these problematic criticisms:
Hegel’s notorious statement about the identity of actuality and reason sounds unbelievable to most of our
contemporaries and even as blasphemy for some. Fifty years after the Second World War, it has almost
become a commonplace to confront the pretensions of the Hegelian philosophy of history with the 'truth of
Auschwitz'. Auschwitz would be the absolute refutation of Hegelian thinking of totality, with its
identification of history, reason and providence (Erp 1998, 15).

It is true that Hegel’s identity of reason and actuality is implied in Absolute Knowing. The
question, however, is what this identity implies. It does not imply a predestined development of
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history. Instead, my thesis is that Hegel develops a principle of objectivity that does not exclude
further historical development of reason. The argument for such a development could be quite
simple, if we only consider the identity of the actual and reason: the actual is not stable but
historically unfolding, and so is reason. Absolute Knowing remains historical. In other words,
the idea of history grounds the identity of reason and the actual [das Wirkliche]. Hegel
introduces the thought of the identity of the actual [das Wirkliche] and reason in the Logic and
comes back to it later in the History of Philosophy and in the Philosophy of Right. In
the Logic Hegel maintains that reality that must be rational, since otherwise it could not be
known. Since, as already noted, he cannot mean reality as a mind-independent reality, he must
mean a reality that is for us. Since our capacity of reflection is grasped as reason, this thought
must then also be applied to the identity of reality, and reason that he discusses in the Logic. The
identity of reason is found in the subject that produces a notion of reality. Since the subject is
furthermore not stable, but moves in forms of spirit, what we take to be reality must be bound to
the dialectical movement of the subject. The problem is therefore not the identity of reason and
the actual [das Wirkliche], but rather whether there is a last and final stage of the development of
subjects. We could also ask the question of whether Hegel has a closed, and final system. Yet,
Hegel writes in a letter to Victor Cousin about his second edition of the Encyclopedia in
1827: “This book is only a collection of claims.”207 “A collection of claims” falls short for being
interpreted as a completed system. And also Schalhorn208 emphasizes that Hegel understood his
Encyclopedia merely as a guideline which does not give account to a complete system. Rather,
this guideline has to be taught in lectures. According to Schalhorn, Hegel expressed this

207

“ce livre n’est qu’une suite de thèses“ Hegel Philosophische Bibliothek, Volume 237 Meiner 1954, 169
(translation by me).
208
Schalhorn, C.: Hegels enzyklopädischer Begriff von Selbstbewußtsein. Hamburg: Meiner 2000, 14.

309

restriction in all three editions of 1817, 1827 and 1830 (See Schalhorn, 14). So it seems that
Hegel rather relates his systematic approach to the idea of teaching, guided by a desire for truth
and the nature of human beings to learn.
Like Jaeschke and Erp, I therefore argue that Hegel’s historicism must be linked to
Hegel’s idea of Absolute Knowing that occurs only in history and is thus limited to its historical
emergence. Of course, I cannot clarify the problem of history in its entirety. My remarks will
center therefore on Habermas’ misinterpretation concerning the supposed annulment of time:
In the Notion that knows itself as Notion, the moments thus appear earlier than the filled [or fulfilled]
whole whose coming-to-be is the movement of those moments. In consciousness, on the other hand, the
whole, though uncomprehended, is prior to the moments. Time is the Notion itself that is there and which
presents itself to consciousness as empty intuition; for this reason, Spirit necessarily appears in Time, and it
appears in Time just so long as it has not grasped its pure Notion, i.e. has not annulled Time (Hegel PoS
§801, 487).

The interpretation of the task to ‘annul time’, hinges on the question of why we have to annul
time. The moments necessary for achieving Absolute Knowing precede the result of Absolute
Knowing in history. However, if these moments of Absolute Knowing move in time, then their
movement must be caused by something that is external to them. The goal is insight into their
conceptual constitution as Absolute Knowing. As their goal it precedes them as moments. As
already presented in the preface of the Phenomenology, the fruit does not appear before the bud
(see Hegel PoS §2, 3).209 The whole plant is a succession of stages. Yet, neither the parts of this
whole, nor the whole of the plant, are the plant. According to Hegel, it is the challenge of
philosophy to present the plant as the ultimate result of all of its moments, and the whole. In
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other words, the becoming and the result both belong to a single process. With regard to
Absolute Knowing, it is similar. If we presented the result of Absolute Knowing as a
dead, teleologically preconceived goal, then we would exceed our horizon of current history, and
we would posit it as a lifeless result. We would posit this goal transcendentally. Consequently, it
cannot be the universal result that is the core of Hegel’s analysis. Moreover, it is also not the
individual moment of one historical instantiation. Instead, it is about freeing both the individual
and the universal from their contradiction in time in demonstrating that both are necessary
moments of one developing Absolute Knowing. We must grasp the process itself that produces
the notion of the individual moment and the universal concept. Since this process can neither be
after or before, nor simply now, time must be annulled. Absolute Knowing itself is not in time,
but it must be grasped as the conceptual ground for the conception of time, its eternity, and its
temporality. Absolute Knowing, however, is historically relative to the present moment.
Hegel’s discussion of Absolute Knowing is difficult to understand since it denies the
individual, abstract notion of time. It denies temporality, that is time as vanishing in seconds, and
it denies the universal notion of time, time as eternity that has no elements. It therefore only
seems as if Absolute Knowing denied or rejected time, while we actually attempt to sublate it in
the higher concept of history. Hegel writes on this relativizing of time therefore:
Time, therefore, appears as the destiny and necessity of Spirit that is not yet complete within itself, the
necessity to enrich the share which self-consciousness has in consciousness, to set in motion the immediacy
of the in-itself, which is the form in which substance is present in consciousness; or conversely, to realize
and reveal what is at first only inward […] (PoS §801, 487).

Westphal remarks that “the temptation is all but irresistible”, that Hegel refers to a
“transtemporal, super-human Absolute” as a “timeless knowing” (see Westphal 1979, 219). We
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have to deal with the problem of subjective substance and a substantial subject. In other words,
we must deal with the question of the identity of the actual [das Wirkliche] and our reason.
As Westphal remarks correctly, for this task, Hegel is not concerned with time’s “duration or
succession” (Westphal 1979, 220). He rejects the problematic externality of temporal relations.
Only in the religious consciousness, that is still a consciousness of representation “the unity of
human and divine is conceived of as a temporal event” (Westphal 1979, 220). Instead, Hegel
suggests a non-representational solution that abandons the subjective form of thinking that is
bound by categories or intuitions such as time. Instead, thinking really achieves its substance as
the standpoint of the historical subject. This Absolute Knowing occurs when the knower
knows its knowing as a particular result bound up in his or her particular, historical moment.
From this further follows that Absolute Knowing is relative to its self-knowledge, in particular to
its historical moment. This historical moment can only be with regard to its earlier historical
becoming, the succession of stages that led to it.
All of this is only an indication of what Hegel might mean. I will discuss the distinction
of time and history in the following parts. Before, I can come to a conclusion on these motifs, I
need to reconstruct Hegel’s concept of the Absolute. After this, I will discuss the externalization
of time, which is a part of Spirit’s nature, and history.

4.3.2 The Absolute
In the following, I briefly discuss Hegel’s concept of the absolute. ‘Absolute’ usually stands for a
concept that is independent from anything else, is final, and can serve as a principle (see
Rockmore 1997, 179). It presupposes a foundationalist tradition that is incompatible with
Hegel’s historicist approach, according to which knowledge is dependent on the historical
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context. After the Kantian turn in philosophy, the absolute was posited as a transcendental
condition for knowledge, and therefore it was believed that we had only indirect access to the
absolute. According to this view, the absolute has to be posited outside of ourselves as a
noumenon in order to achieve an understanding of our otherwise incoherent concepts (see also
Rockmore 1997, 179). Hegel’s position occurs at the end of a long debate, after which the
noumenon will be rejected as a transcendental condition that was derived on the basis of false
extrapolation.
Hegel introduces the concept ‘absolute’ in a different sense.210 According to the
definition of truth that Hegel also uses, thought and its object have to coincide. The unresolvable
problem of how to know an object outside of us is intertwined with the problem of an ontological
difference between the subjective activity and the passive, determinate object external to the
subject. The tradition that Hegel comes from seeks a mind-internal solution. In order to fulfill the
condition of the subjective, conceptual activity and the determined object coinciding, we must
find only one object that can be thought. The sought object, according to Hegel’s position, is
spirit, since spirit can be subjective, conceptual activity, and, at the same time, produces itself as
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Fulda explains the origin of Hegel’s term of Absolute Knowing in a Footnote: „Hegel hat den Audruck “absolutes
Wissen”, den er generell sehr sparsam verwendet, nicht als erster gebildet, sondern vermutlich bewußt von Fichte
übernommen, der ihn in seiner Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre aus den Jahren 1801/02 eingeführt, sogleich
exzessiv gebraucht und die Verwendung programmatisch Schellings Ausgehen vom Absoluten entgegengesetzt
hatte […]. Die Bedeutung, die der Ausdruck für Hegel besitzt, kann daher nicht schon in Absatz 11 des
letzten Phänomenologie-Kapitels, d.h. am Ende “unserer” Einführung des mit ihm bezeichneten Begriffs, voll
präzisiert werden, sondern erst im Zusammenhang der Auseinandersetzung mit Fichtes Parallelunternehmen (sowie
mit der Hegel wahrscheinlich bekannt gewesenen, brieflichen Kontroverse zwischen Fichte und Schelling), in
welche die Darstellung des erscheinenden absoluten Wissens ausläuft (vgl. Abs. 17). Aber schon “unsere” BegriffsEinführung gibt am Ende zu erkennen, daß die Hegelische Bedeutung von der bei Fichte herrschenden weit entfernt
ist. Sie will das als “absolut” bezeichnete Wissen nicht durch eine “Worterklärung” allem relativen (gleichwohl aber
nur wirklichen) Wissen von Etwasent gegensetzen und durch”Realerklärung” beschreiben als einander
“Durchdringen” der beiden “Merkmale” ruhendes Seyn und Freiheit (ebda § 7 f.), sondern es durch die singuläre
Verfassung, Vollzugsweise und Leistung seines Begriffs auszeichnen; und sie stützt sich zur Einführung dieses
Begriffs nicht auf wenige, hinsichtlich ihrer Gründe undurchsichtige Reflexionen, sondern beruft sich dazu auf den
ganzen vorherigen Gang der dialektischen Bewegung des seine Erfahrungen machenden natürlichen Bewußtseins.
Sie ist also beglaubigt durch dessen Selbstprüfung auf jeder seiner Stationen“ (Fulda, 2007, Footnote 16).
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the object of this activity. The activity and the produced object could then be the same and thus
fulfill the basic condition of truth.
This insight into the necessity of identity is simple. The sought unity of spirit, however,
cannot be an empty and abstract formula like ‘I’=’I’, an idea that Fichte committed to. Instead,
the sought unity must also be recognized in its process. In other words, the standpoint of
Absolute Knowing has to be achieved as a unity of being and becoming. Hegel commits to this
view of an identity already in his Differenzschrift and also defines the form of the investigation
that is related to his solution:
But if the Absolute, like Reason which is its appearance, is eternally one and the same – as indeed it is –
then every Reason that is directed toward itself and comes to recognize itself, produces a true philosophy
and solves for itself the problem which, like its solution, is at all times the same. In philosophy, Reason
comes to know itself and deals only with itself so that its whole work and activity are grounded in itself,
and with respect to the inner essence of philosophy there are neither predecessors nor successor (Hegel
1977, 87).211

Hegel demonstrates here that the acceptable philosophical form of investigation is reflection,
since it relates to an activity that can be unified and remains itself with regard to itself. Reflection
does not refer to a truth that is external to the subject. At the same time, it remains like the
Absolute as one with its content. Thus, it can serve as a ground for knowledge claims that are
relative to a stable, internal unity. Philosophy’s goal is, consequently, to achieve the Absolute as
an identity of itself with itself, i. e., a unity of subject and object, knower and known, through
reflection (see also Rockmore 1997, 182). Reflection must stem from its substance, and
substance must be demonstrated as a content of reflection.
211

Hegel, G.W.F The Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling's System of Philosophy: An English Translation of
G. W. F. Hegel’s Differenz des Fichte’schen und Schelling’schen Systems der Philosophie. SUNY Press, 1977, 87.
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If this is, however, the task of philosophy, then this expresses rather a requirement, not a
result. This implies further that if the task is to unify, then there must be a difference to be
overcome, since philosophy begins in difference. Reflection about the Absolute reveals the task
of overcoming all of the upcoming contradictory differences in order to grasp them in an open
concept of oneness that must be the ground for knowledge. Rockmore writes:
The idea is, then, twofold since it expresses the identity of the concept and objectivity and further expresses
the relation of the subjective and objective poles, or the concept and objectivity as immediately given. This
definition is now said to be absolute and, as such to supersede all previous definitions of the absolute
(Rockmore 1997, 184).

In his epistemological reading of Hegel’s Phenomenology, Rockmore discusses this kind of
Absolute and its relation to Hegel’s form of investigation that is based on the experiences of a
subject. It is the task of providing unity between an experiencing subject and the object of its
experiences. For Rockmore, Hegel holds on to the Absolute “as an ultimate principle, which is
independent of all further principles” while this constitutes “monism” (Rockmore 1997, 184).
I would like to specify this approach in order to separate it from Russellian monism and
Brandom’s semantic account. Hegel’s monism is an epistemological necessity for achieving
knowledge, but does not include claims about monist ontology. Instead, the main task is to
understand objectivity without presupposing external reality.212 This does not exclude oneness. It
is, however, an epistemological endeavor. At our historical moment, the only object that can
provide oneness, and thus resembles the sought Absolute, is reflective reason in the objective
form of spirit. By involving spirit, Hegel moves finally away from asking for the abstract
conditions of knowledge (see Rockmore 1997, 184). Alternatively, he looks at how knowledge
212

An approach that is entirely different from Brandom’s who claims that external determinate objects make our
views true.
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arises as a phenomenon through which a subject relates to itself through an other that historically
occurs in communities. The Absolute, however, remains an ideal that provides an
epistemological regulative of oneness that is, at the same time, the reason why these reflecting
communities exist. In this sense, the absolute as the sought object of communities and the
subjective activity of building communities must be understood as the same spirit.
I will discuss Hegel’s solution of Absolute Knowing in the following points. As already
said, Habermas criticizes Hegel’s return to an eternal Absolute, and thus rejects a possible
Hegelian return as dogmatic metaphysics. Hegel’s final paragraphs on history and the sublation
of time in Absolute Knowing reveal, however, that historicism is already considered in Hegel’s
account. Historicism means that all our cognitive claims intrinsically depend on the historical
moment. Habermas’ simplistic reading and rejection of these passages fails to grasp Hegel’s
view of history.

4.3.3 The Achievement of Absolute Knowing
I begin with an outline of Hegel’s chapter about Absolute Knowing. In §788 and §789, Hegel
briefly expounds the problem of spiritual identity in religion. Religious consciousness intuits the
unity of self-consciousness, but cannot grasp the outcome of this identity conceptually. In §790
to §795, Hegel summarizes the previous development of spirit in religion. He explains that the
movement of consciousness leads consciousness beyond itself and that a series of forms of selfconsciousness appears; all worldly forms of knowledge are finally unified in religious
knowledge. Religious knowledge, however, occurs first as a contradiction between the beautiful
soul, the good, and its realization, the evil. The reconciliation will provide an implicit concept
that is accessible to all reasonable subjects in a community. This concept can be experienced by
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human beings in their culture and forms of communication. The main problem, however,
remains: substance is not yet subjective, and the subject has not yet become substance. Even in
their highest form, religious communities can only deliver formal, intuited solutions, but cannot
yet solve the problem of unity (§796). According to Hegel, philosophy is superior by grasping
spirit through the concept (§797). In §798, Hegel explains this last and final shape, which is ‘the
concept’. The unity of this concept, however, is still only formal. §799 is therefore dedicated to
the action of individuals who experience Absolute Knowing as their own act. Yet, humans run
through the different stages of spirit and experience its development only intuitively. Hegel
demonstrates in §800, that the task of science is to work through these various stages of
subjective knowing in order to arrive at Absolute Knowing. Nevertheless, the problem persists in
that the substance occurs before it is grasped subjectively. This means it is still external to
thought. In §801, Hegel points to the incomplete appearance of spirit that still includes
contingency. He comes to the conclusion that time is the source for this contingency. Time is a
last remainder of intuition and, thus, it has to be annulled. We should keep in mind that this
annulment of time will lead Habermas to the false view that Hegel denies historicity. In §802,
Hegel analyzes how to transform “Substance into Subject” (Hegel PoS §802, 487). This
transformation shows the concrete relation of cognition to experience. Experience is the starting
point that involves subjects, but it also grounds an intuitive relation to substance. In §803, we
encounter the conceptual argument about Absolute Spirit as intuited substance in history. In
particular, Absolute Knowing results from the labor of spirit to grasp itself in various historical
forms. In a historical analysis, Spirit emerges as a result of human action through historical
forms in history. Spirit is developed through different philosophical stages, and only finally
arrives at identity. This identity, however, is only intuited. Hegel summarizes his historical
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moment, according to which the philosophical positions up to this moment still assume an
Absolute outside of thinking.213 Hegel solves this problem on the basis of spirit’s capacity for
reflection that enables self-differentiation (§804). He develops a final version of Absolute
Knowing relying on the concept of negation and reconciliation. This concept does not operate in
time, but is in its negativity the unity of all historical processes. In §805, Hegel describes this
solution as the existence of the Concept, in which the Concept no longer falls apart in truth and
knowing. Hegel exhibits here a unity independent of time in foreshadowing his idea of the Logic.
The science of Logic, however, does not come to a halt. It is unrelated to the stable and
ahistorical resting point that Habermas falsely assumes. In §806, Hegel introduces us therefore to
the thought that if we know the limit of an object, then we are already beyond this limit. In the
case of spirit, this knowing means that spirit has to “sacrifice” itself. Absolute Knowing in its
highest form freely externalizes itself. Firstly, it externalizes itself in Nature as its own
immediacy. Secondly, it externalizes itself through Spirit as History. Hegel introduces here the
idea that each moment of the movement of Absolute Knowing can be expressed in a science of its
own (§806). In §807 Hegel, explores nature as an externalization in time, which is contingent. In
§808, Hegel develops the concept of history that ultimately removes this last contingency of
time. Science and history, however, build two sides that have to be understood together in our
historical moment as culture [Bildung]. Humans actually know culture, but since knowing means
to go beyond, it will always produce a new beginning within their culture [Bildung].
It is remarkable that Hegel’s theory counts as a historical philosophy, while only the last
four paragraphs of the Phenomenology consider the term ‘history’ itself. The last two paragraphs
demonstrate that history does not come to an end in the idea of Absolute Knowing. Rather, they
213
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show that history as an externalization of spirit is related to itself through culture [Bildung].
Absolute Knowing means to know one’s cultural process, which changes the cultural process
itself. Absolute Knowing is thus rather a persistent goal in history, and must be achieved again
with each new beginning in a culture.
In the following paragraphs, I explain these steps in more detail and relate them to the
problem of history that Hegel discusses in the last four paragraphs of his chapter on Absolute
Knowing.

4.3.3.1 The Exposition of the Problem of Spirit
Following Kant’s thesis that reason can only know what it has produced by itself (see
Rockmore 1997, 181), Hegel turns to reason’s capacity for reflection in which consciousness
recognizes itself as a producing externality (see PoS §788, 479). The guiding idea is that, since
consciousness already includes self-consciousness, there might be a possibility that
consciousness can recognize its own activity in its own process of externalizing itself. The
argument is the following: if knowing knows itself, then the identity of subject and object might
be achieved. Objective knowledge might be possible.
This capacity of consciousness to acquire knowledge of itself is self-consciousness. This
process of self-knowing, as promising as it sounds, is not yet a simple unity. As it is true for all
knowing, consciousness cannot immediately bridge the gulf between truth and knowing, and so
consciousness also does not know itself immediately. Instead, consciousness knows by virtue of
mediation. Thus, consciousness has to enter a process of such a self-mediation through the
concept in a historical, human community. Hegel replaces, therefore, self-consciousness by the
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concept of spirit. The challenge is, then, to show that consciousness knows all the stages of its
spiritual self-mediation. For this, it has to identify any and all external influences that hinder a
clear self-knowing. It has to know itself only with regard to what has made itself, a social world
of subjects that constructed reason (see Harris 1997, 709). If we can achieve this, then our
community could be legitimately called ‘rational’ (see Harris 1997, 709).
Hegel describes the difficulties of grasping this community as the problem of
representation, which seemingly brings him closer to Brandom’s critical understanding of
representationalism. Yet, Hegel does not defend any kind of Brandomian inferentialism. Since
Brandom’s belief in mind-independent things is the foundation for our communication,
Brandom’s standpoint would be a return to something external and unexplained. Brandom’s
inferentialism remains in a position of consciousness that cannot know its substance subjectively.
Hence, it is irrational. This is because his position relies on a connection to the object that is not
yet presented as a subjective production. In Hegelian language, substance does not become
subject, which means that something unexplained lies outside our theory.
Hegel emphasizes, therefore, that it is not simply a return into consciousness but that
knowing “is the externalization of self-consciousness that posits the thinghood” (PoS §788, 479).
Unlike Brandom, we therefore have to understand how we come to the idea of how things really
are. Historically, this presupposing of things is not an eternal fact, but rather a subjective
production of consciousness (see Harris 1997, 713). Furthermore, this externalization also does
not mean that the world becomes meaningless through the activity of self-consciousness. In
relation to the activity of consciousness, the value of objects might be reduced to nothing. Hegel
remarks, however, that we have to grasp it as a positive result. Though “self-consciousness
knows the nothingness of the object […] because it externalizes its own self”, it gains itself as

320

the positive result of this negating process (PoS §788, 479). It can know how the subject
becomes the object through externalization. This is by “virtue of the indivisible unity of beingfor-self, whereas self-consciousness is also, at the same time, in-itself” (PoS §788, 479).
Consciousness, however, cannot simply access the process of its production in simple, unified
form. It is not just there as a unity before us. Knowledge of consciousness itself has to be
produced and it has to be recognized in the way it is produced.
Consciousness must recognize itself in this alienating objectification and return to itself
as this externalization. For this return to itself, consciousness has to recognize its
intersubjectivity. In other words, consciousness can only achieve “communion with itself in its
otherness as such” (PoS §788, 479). Hegel calls the movements of the return to consciousness
“the totality of moments” (PoS §788, 479). Totality, however, is not yet a whole. In order to
achieve a whole that is the sought communion, we need to grasp the aforementioned idea of
spirit. Hegel writes: “This totality of its determinations establishes the object as an implicitly
spiritual being, and it does truly become a spiritual being for consciousness when each of its
individual determinations is grasped as a determination of the Self, or through the spiritual
relationship to them that was just mentioned” (PoS §788, 479-480). So, we know what spirit is
implicitly. In the course of the Phenomenology it comes to the fore as the revealed religion, a
historical moment of the appearing substance. But Spirit must be grasped as the whole of an
otherwise only composed totality.
Hegel’s idea is that we will know ourselves through our self-externalization in society
that reaches its historical peak in revealed religion. This implies that the overall dialectical
investigation focuses on consciousness that produces its object by externalizing itself in a
spiritual society. While doing so, consciousness attempts to grasp itself as an in-itself, and
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acknowledges that self-consciousness, a for-itself, is involved in this process. Selfconsciousness, however, can only be adequately understood with regard to an intersubjectivity
that is not only formal. We must really understand how we come to self-consciousness through
the concrete historical process.
Hegel remarks that we have, so far, only “affirmed” consciousness’ “spiritual
essentiality” (PoS §789, 480). Consciousness occurs therefore only as the “shape of
consciousness”, a for-itself, and as “a number of such shapes which we bring together” (Hegel
PoS §789, 480). In a sense, ‘God’ “is the absolute concept” (Harris 1997, 708) that guides
humans in their ultimate search for self-understanding (see Harris 1997, 708). In their religious
communities, the substance of their understanding has preceded them. The problem, however, is
not to understand substance from this standpoint external to thought. Rather, the question is: how
to grasp the unity of the process of self-differentiation with regard to humans in their history?
This question will lead us to Absolute Knowing.
After this brief exposition of the problem, Hegel draws attention to natural consciousness
again. The cognitive object is not a fantasy, not simply imaginary. It must bear objectivity. At the
same time, there cannot be anything presupposed outside us. For example, it would be
problematic to presuppose a metaphysical reality, as Brandom does. There cannot be anything
that is only affecting us through, for example, an empirical side to sensibility, a transformation of
something real by virtue of imagination, or an ideal of reason that gives us logical forms.
Hegel proceeds, therefore, with repeating the results of his former investigation of
consciousness and applies them to spirit. He distinguishes the moments of knowing, or the object
that has to be captured in more detail: “[…] the object is in part immediate being or, in general, a
Thing-corresponding to immediate consciousness; in part, an othering of itself, its relationship or
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being for-an-other, and being for-itself, i.e. determinateness-corresponding to perception; and in
part essence, or in the form of a universal-corresponding to the Understanding” (PoS §789, 480).
This means, first, in the case of sense-certainty, that the object is grasped as outside of
consciousness. It is a thing and it bears its seemingly immediate and complete truth.
Consciousness, however, cannot remain in this immediacy, since we cannot disclose any
meaning with regard to the many ‘this’s and many ‘now’s that one universal ‘this’ or ‘now’
refers to. We realize that there is a dialectical movement between the thing and the way it is
perceived. Perception alters the immediate. Thus, and this is the second point, consciousness
reveals the thing to be a “determinateness corresponding to perception” PoS §789, 480). In
altering the difference between oneness and many, the thing is brought to absurdity. It follows
that—and this is the third point— that the dialectic of the object between the one and the many
must be governed by an “essence” that can be grasped “in the form of a universal corresponding
to the Understanding” (PoS §789, 480). Consciousness is the totality of these moments. None of
these moments can be outside of consciousness so that consciousness reveals in a first act of selfconsciousness that the object is what self-consciousness is itself.214 Hegel makes reference to
self-consciousness’ conceptual activity: “It is, as a totality, a syllogism or the movement of the
universal through determination to individuality, as also the reverse movement from
individuality through superseded individuality, or through determination, to the universal” (PoS
789, 480). The problem of self-knowledge is phrased in terms of the relationship between the
universal and the individual that already alludes to Hegel’s Logic.215 Logic can be regarded as
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the attempt to mediate between individual and universal by virtue of syllogisms. I have already
suggested that ‘universal’ and ‘individual’ are universal terms; hence, they are abstractions. I
hold the position that neither universals nor individuals can be ‘true’ concepts, since in both
cases the terms do not fully coincide with their essence. Nevertheless, knowing the process that
connects and produces these crucial terms might give us a ground to understand them
objectively. In other words, Hegel’s project is the question of how to mediate the terms
‘universal’ and ‘individual’ in relation to a concept derived in a phenomenological process. In
the specific context of the Phenomenology, he must show that we can achieve a concept that is
not dependent in any way on an external term or terms. The elimination of externality in our
thought points us toward grasping the influences of our cultural becoming in history. Only then
we can deliver objective knowledge relative to history.
On the basis of this process of elimination, we can ultimately know ourselves in the
historical moment. This self-knowledge is not mediated through a timeless product of thought
unrelated to culture or history, but this self-knowledge is the product of a phenomenological
investigation of culture and history. The process itself will then be formally presented as a
movement from the universal to the individual and vice versa. Hence, the process is understood
through conceptual activity. Nevertheless, it is the conceptual activity in a concrete historical
moment that we have to understand first.
Before, we can investigate this logical movement of the conceptual activity, we need to
approach the concept itself phenomenologically. This means that we have to show how
consciousness can know itself through its appearance in history. Hegel remarks therefore that
“this Knowing is to be indicated only in its process of coming to-be, or in the moments of that
aspect of it which belongs to consciousness as such, the moments of the Notion proper or of pure

324

knowing in the form of shapes of consciousness” (PoS §789, 480). In other words, our goal is to
entirely explain the process relative to our experiences occurring in our history. Only in this
sense we are approaching an absolute.216 The conceptual shape of the notion will be the result of
rejecting any external, presupposed element, yet it will not be independent from its culture and
history. A potential logic that we could derive is therefore the result from culture and history.217

4.3.3.2 Spirit in Religion – The Unification of Consciousness with Self-Consciousness
In order to grasp self-consciousness’ activity concretely, Hegel refers to each shape of
self-consciousness as it occurs. When consciousness, in an attempt to grasp the object, discovers
itself, it becomes self-conscious. It, however, only becomes self-conscious as an othering of
itself. Thus, it does not simply achieve unity. In what follows I explain this problem with regard
to Hegel’s exploration of the religious stages of spirit.
There are three historical shapes in which consciousness attempts to recognize itself: as
immediate, as perceived, and as corresponding to understanding. Each of these three forms is
unsuccessful, but each builds toward Absolute Knowing.
Through the first stage of recognizing consciousness in its immediacy, we come to a
judgement with respect to ourselves that the ‘I’ is a thing. Here, we consider self-consciousness
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One last remark is necessary to grasp the significance of Hegel’s endeavor that Habermas, for example, neglects.
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an eternal substance that is ahistorical, as Habermas assumes. Rather, it is the determination of the current
standpoint of man in so far s/he can know itself.
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only with regard to its objective pole. This means that the ‘I’ is seen as a thing. This expresses
itself in phrenology, or the idea that the ‘I’ can be understood by the structure of the skull. This
immediate presence of consciousness in the world, its in-itself, is an extreme.
In the second stage of perception, we come to the second extreme insight that “the thing
is I” (PoS §790, 481). Here, we consider self-consciousness only with regard to its subjective
pole. This means that the immediate thing stands in relation to consciousness. Thus, it is everchanging according to the utility of the observer. All objects are mediated with regard to
consciousness and therefore they are understood only with respect to the reason that is
established in communities of consciousness. Self-consciousness occurs here as reflected and
for-itself.
The recognition of consciousness’ essence oscillates between the immediacy of its outer
appearances of the ‘I’, a lifeless object, and the perceived utility of these appearances for a
community of ‘I’s without stability. With this oscillation, through a third stage of understanding,
we come to morality. In morality, we attempt to mediate the relationship between an object that
can be a subject and the subject that can see itself as an object. In moral understanding,
consciousness is neither simply object, nor the mediating subject. Rather, consciousness knows
that “the objective element into which it puts itself forth, when it acts, is nothing other than the
self’s pure knowledge of itself” (PoS §792, 481, 482). Hegel alludes here to the view that moral
action produces an object in which communities come to know themselves. Through this
awareness of their acts, the subjective and objective poles begin to build spiritual unities.
Since these paragraphs represent a summary of the complex movement of “Reason” and
“Spirit”, and since that Hegel wrote these paragraphs under enormous time pressure, it is
probably not possible to produce a fully coherent account of this portion of the text. Obviously,
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Hegel himself can only mention fragments of the overall movement that ultimately lead up to the
historical moment that will be captured as Absolute Knowing. We have reached the standpoint of
morality, in which not only the abstract rules of a society matter, but also subjective intentions.
The duties of morality imply the necessity of action, but action includes “errors of ignorance”
(Harris 1997, 720) on the side of the subject. A dialectical movement of responsibility and
conscience in society begins. The problem is that the societal acts that led to these spiritual
unities were, on the one hand, necessary for the development of spirit, but on the other hand,
they also include inevitable “errors of ignorance” (Harris 1997, 720). In order for selfconsciousness to come into existence it has to act. Action, however, cannot be foreseen. For this
reason, the ideal, morally hardened consciousness must be given up. In order to achieve an
accurate understanding of human beings, we have to forgive and allow them to act (see Harris
1997, 720). Consciousness has to recognize actions as part of a practical community that cannot
be grasped before it appears through action. While moral consciousness says ‘no,’ the forgiving
community recognizes the practical circumstances of action and says ‘yes’ (see Harris 1997,
720), and thus, affirms its existence. Only through this unification of forgiveness the former
moments of spirit arrive at the abstract formula of ‘I’=’I.’ This formula represents the formal
reconciliation between what we are as knowing consciousness and willing consciousness (see
Hegel PoS §793, 482) that acts. In other words, the knowing, subjective ‘I’ and the true,
objective ‘I’ come together in the forgiving action of a society. This unity, however, is not yet
understood. It is only grasped in the formal expression, but it does not grasp how individuals
were able to form societies on the basis of forgiveness. The spiritual stability of societies is,
therefore, the fragile result of acknowledging individuals who form their communion with
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respect to belief. Thus, their community does not know itself. Without knowing the inherited
force of forgiveness, they cannot truly build a community of freely self-determined ‘I’s.
Since the self-conscious unity of ‘I’=’I’ is void of its true spiritual content, it cannot relate
to its reality as an externalized, acting consciousness in society. It only forgives by virtue of an
established practice. It lets communities be, but does not understand how they are by virtue of
this forgiving. For Hegel, there are therefore two sides: the universal, knowing side of selfconsciousness that is for-itself, and the relation of consciousness to the individual content of its
actions that is in-itself. Though, we have achieved a stage of forgiveness, it is only on the basis
of a formal identity of an ‘I’. In this sense the forgiving ‘I’ is still opposed to a community of
acting ‘I’s. Hegel writes with respect to these two sides:
[B]y themselves [consciousness and self-consciousness] they are single and separate, and it is solely their
spiritual unity that constitutes the power of this reconciliation. The last of these moments is, however,
necessarily this unity itself and, as is evident, it binds them all into itself. The Spirit that, in its, [sic]
existence, is certain of itself, has for the element of existence nothing else but this knowledge of itself”
(PoS 793, 482).

Hegel explicates here the conditions of the last unity that we have to achieve. Spirit’s existence
must be self-consciousness as the knowledge of all of its unified moments. Without these
moments of consciousness, there would be no necessity for a unifying spirit. Spirit would be
empty. The formal unity is therefore incomplete. Spirit does not endlessly relate to itself in a
formal unity of an ‘I’=’I.’ In other words, an idea of something is not enough. Spirit has to be
recognized in its realization.218
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Rockmore writes on this: “It is obviously not sufficient to have an idea. The idea must also be realized”
(Rockmore 1997, 174).
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Since spirit can therefore be only the existence of self-consciousness, not only the idea of
it, spirit must first understand how it came to comprehending itself in a fundamental opposition.
This opposition consists of, on one side, the moments of consciousness, the acting part, the
historical moments, the in-itself, and on the other side, self-consciousness, the inner dimension
of a beautiful soul that is only for-itself, self-consciousness. Hegel writes on the unity of these
two contradictory sides: “This reconciliation of consciousness with self-consciousness thus
shows itself as brought about from two sides; on one side, in the religious Spirit, and on the other
side, in consciousness itself as such” (PoS §794, 482). Both sides, that is, consciousness as
religious spirit and as formal self-consciousness, stand in extreme tension and therefore require a
reconciliation that works for both sides. Consciousness as religious spirit precedes the formal
awareness of self-consciousness in time. Yet, with spirit’s only intuited unity of spirit, it is
impossible to achieve a final reconciliation through religious spirit.
Nevertheless, we have to take this historical becoming of spirit through religion seriously.
Harris remarks here: “The lesson that philosophy is not to be understood apart from its history is
widely understood; what Hegel’s science of experience teaches us is the much more demanding
imperative that philosophy and religion must be comprehended together in the context of the
actual history of the human community” (1997, 721). Harris highlights that the merely formal
unity cannot be understood apart from its historical becoming in religion. In other words, the
formal unity is not the ahistorical end of Hegel’s endeavor. The whole project of Absolute
Knowing is rooted in its historical becoming.
A look into the chapters on religion helps to understand why consciousness that finds
itself intuitively as an in-itself in a religious community cannot completely grasp itself. We can
only come to a formal unity, or the ‘I’=’I’. Even though Absolute Spirit is the content of the
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religious community, spirit cannot achieve reconciliation through the community, but must also
find its substance as intrinsically related to subjectivity (see PoS §766, 466). Religion is limited
in grasping this unity. For this reason, Rockmore writes: “For although religion can represent its
[consciousness] key events, it cannot comprehend them” (1997, 178). For religion, Absolute
Spirit occurs almost as a transcendent entity, an outside savior who unifies the particular, human
community in one universal practice. Nevertheless, these religious communities are not fully
aware of the incarnated substance and its relation to their subjectivity. Hegel holds that the savior
by virtue of his death represents the idea of how the universal becomes accessible as a concept of
oneness (see PoS §785, 476). The practice even persists after the savior’s death.
Hegel’s criticism of religion is that substance is only represented as a common practice,
but that religion does not provide an explicit concept of what religion does. The knowing of the
involved self-consciousnesses remains therefore external to the actions of self-consciousnesses,
and thus there remains alienation.219
According to Hegel, the two extremes are not yet reconciled and build the following
extremes:
a) Self-consciousness which “flees from contact with the actual world” (PoS §658, 400).
Hegel describes this as a “self-willed impotence to renounce its self” (PoS §65, 400). So
this self-consciousness stands in “absolute difference” to the experiencing, acting self
(PoS §658, 400). “[D]evoid of substance […]” this consciousness finds itself as an
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Rockmore writes on the further goal therefore: This reconciliation is not realized in religion that “gave its object
the shape of actual self-consciousness” (§794,482-483). After religion has done its work, we still lack full selfconsciousness of human being “as it is in itself and for itself” (§794, 483*). The entire series reaches closure in the
unity of consciousness and self-consciousness. For when this reconciliation has been accomplished, the real
cognitive subject has been comprehended, since we have finally understood ourselves. (Rockmore 1997, 187)
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unhappy, lost, yet “beautiful soul” (§658, 400, see also PoS §795, 483). We can also call
this ‘empty self-consciousness’ or ‘spirit for-itself’.
b) The opposite of the beautiful soul is “its realization”, the religious act, so that the
beautiful soul disappears in “thin air” (PoS §795,483). It is the religious community that
obtains spirit as it is in-itself.
Hegel writes about the unification of this divide in “Absolute Knowing”:
The unification of the two sides has not yet been exhibited; it is this that closes the series
of the shapes of Spirit, for in it Spirit attains to a knowledge of itself not only as it is in
itself or as possessing an absolute content, nor only as it is for itself as a form devoid of
content, or as the aspect of self-consciousness, but as it is both in essence and in actuality,
or in and for itself (PoS §794, 483).
The solution for Hegel is the following: from the side of reflection, self-consciousness must
grasp its realization in religious consciousness without external means. Through historical
information, self-consciousness must become a self-knowing absolute unity, according to which
all former appearances of spirit can be objectively explained, so that self-consciousness knows
its own reality in spirit and can make further objective assumptions about spirit on the basis of
spirit’s historical becoming. Hegel’s solution is to grasp it as the Concept.
The Concept fulfills the fundamental rule of unifying both extremes of consciousness and
self-consciousness:
“[…] it is the Notion in its truth, viz. in unity with its externalization; it is the knowing of
pure knowledge, not as an abstract essence such as duty is, but of knowledge as an
essential being which is this knowledge, this pure self-consciousness which is, therefore,
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at the same time a genuine object, for the Notion is the Self that is for itself” (PoS §795,
485).
Hegel introduces us here to the criterion for Absolute Knowing, namely the comprehension of all
of spirit’s moments through a single concept. The Concept produces and is produced
simultaneously. It is immediate, externalizes and reconciles. With regard to religious spirit it
sacrifices its immediacy, becomes for-itself, returns to itself, forgives, and thus becomes in- and
for-itself. If the Concept is, indeed, the way of how human societies have formed themselves in
history, then it is the objective criterion, according to which human beings can grasp themselves
without any external means. If this Concept is, moreover, rich enough, then it will reveal how it
has implicitly guided the process of human beings who produced themselves through human
knowledge.
The goal is therefore to make this substantial, historical process of the implicit Concept,
its substance, subjective. This means to transform substance into knowledge. Overall, the
exposition of the problem as it reaches the stage of religion ends here. After this, we have to
develop the idea of the simple Concept.

4.3.3.3 The Unification of Consciousness with Self-Consciousness through the Concept
From the exposition of the problem, we know that the unification of the extremes of
consciousness has to be grasped as the unity of the “simple Notion” (PoS §796, 484). According
to Hegel, this is the “simple Notion which has surrendered its eternal essence” (PoS §796, 484).
In a word, it has to act. To relate it to the question of historicity, this means that we have
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developed an idea of an eternal substance that, however, is falsely understood if we do not
comprehend it in its externalizing activity.
Though the simple Concept is not the inwardness of the beautiful soul, it is also not the
externalization of its act. It is the sublation of both. The simple Concept must be powerful
enough to incorporate all of the experienced contradictions. Looking at the chapter “Absolute
Knowing,” however, the discussion with regard to the simple Concept is limited. Instead of
formally discussing the simple Concept as a solution, Hegel follows his phenomenological
approach. His goal is to observe how humans act in society in order to grasp their spiritual
becoming representationally, and then to eliminate the representational moment within our
understanding of it. As a result, we will arrive at the Concept that is derived from a historical
perspective. Ultimately, we do not show that humans are concepts, but that in their historical
moment, they can be objectively understood through their conceptual activity.
After having discussed the problem of revealed religion, and after having introduced the
formal solution of the simple Concept, Hegel observes the simple Concept in human
communities.220 This means that humans recognize each other through their actions, which we,
however, must reconstruct with respect to the Concept.
Again, the overall shift to a spiritual Concept, a concept that is really at work in societies,
is supposed to solve the problem of the ontological difference between recognizing subjects and
the recognized objects that are the subjects within the community. If we can know the forgiving
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For De Nys the practical solution for the last difference lies therefore in the community:
“[T]he intelligibility known in and through this reconciliation is an intelligibility that is determined, one might say
produced, by the action of each self. Each is integrated into a community with the other, each presents itself in a
determinate way to the other, and each stands in a condition of immediate separation from the other, on account of
what it does. And what it does, most fundamentally, is to know the other and itself in a specific way. In this way,
that which the self knows is now ‘the Self’s own act,’ and is understood to be precisely that” (De Nys, 566).
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unity as a result of our conceptual activity, then we will know what objective knowledge of our
community is for us. Rockmore summarizes the importance of the subject’s conceptual activity:
For philosophy, the importance of consciously acting is that the subject ‘carries out the
life of the absolute spirit’ (§776, 484*). As concerns the concept, the final step is that
‘what happens in principle is at the same time explicitly for consciousness’ (§796, 484) or
actually carried out. Through human action, the contradiction between what is the case in
principle and actuality is overcome. (1997, 187-188).
The main idea is that the simple Concept is the “self’s own act” (PoS §797, 485), which occurs
through the interactions of humans who create a common conceptual sphere. The subjects carry
out “the life of the absolute spirit” (PoS §796, 484) in this conceptual activity. Absolute Spirit
occurs therefore in the historical stages of this community and comes through this community to
its self-knowing.
In more detail, the life of the community is grounded on the self-consciousness’ selfrenouncing act. This renouncing act is repeated by each individual consciousness in the
community through action. Action, however, is guided through concepts. Without having a
concept guiding my actions, it is unreasonable to say that I act at all.
We get a first glimpse of the conceptual impregnation of society by looking at the
division between good and evil. According to the former analysis, good and evil are dialectically
related to each other as not acting and acting. The “self-sundering, or the negativity which the
Notion is” (PoS §797, 485) is evil. The Concept releases itself and thus damages its ideal unity
through separation. Consciousness as this conceptual activity becomes its “own act of
renunciation, just as the Notion which it renounces is its own Notion” (PoS §796, 484). The
Concept turns out as appropriate, in order to describe the “determinateness of both” (§796, 484).
334

It is an ideal unity that mediates itself through action, that grounds the moral evaluation of this
action, and that forgives through the renouncing of its own renouncing.
Hegel sees in the Concept a possible unification of the individual and the universal. The
Concept as the act of renunciation produces evil. This evil is the unique, individually realized
Concept. By virtue of this, the Concept renounces the good as its dead universal concept. In a
word, the good is a lifeless, moral ideal. Acting, however, will always deviate from the ideal
good, and thus turn out to be evil. A society can only exist if it forgives this course of action,
since otherwise communities would fall apart. Societies are built on forgiving, which is
represented by religious spirit. With regard to this process, Hegel identifies the “Notion’s being
within itself in its individuality, and universality” (PoS §796, 484). In other words, Hegel
describes the ground for every action in the community by virtue of conceptual activity.221
It is tempting to call Hegel’s philosophy a nominalism that is neither a realism of
universal forms, nor a realism of individuals. The terms ‘individual’ and ‘universal’ are abstract
terms that cannot be entirely grasped. Habermas, when discussing Brandom, refers to this
problem as a nominalism that cannot achieve a concept of reality (i.e., neither a reality of
individuals, nor a reality of universal forms). Hegelian nominalism, however, turns out to be a
conceptualism, since the universal non-acting soul and the individual act of evil are both the
dialectical result of the Concept’s negating activity. In his view of the Concept, Hegel, unlike
Habermas, proposes a solution to the problem of knowledge. Since the concept is the conceptual
connection between the subject’s conceptual activity and the recognized conceptual object, it
221

Hegel describes this foundation of each community dramatically as a struggle to death:
“The former dies to its being-for self, disowns itself, makes confession; the latter renounces the obstinacy of its
abstract universality, and in so doing dies to its lifeless Self and to its unmoved universality; the former has thus
completed itself through the moment of universality which is essence, and the latter through the universality which
is Self” (PoS §796, 484).
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might bridge the ontological difference and successfully deliver an identity. Identity, as
presented above, is the ground for truth.
Hegel further explains how conceptual action lifts us to the level of thought: “It is only
through action that Spirit is in such a way that it is really there, that is, when it raises its existence
into Thought and thereby into an absolute antithesis, and returns out of this antithesis, in and
through the antithesis itself” (PoS §796, 484). Our task is to shift from the representational
paradigm of religious spirit to the conceptualizing activity of philosophy. Hegel emphasizes that
action as a result of a negative conceptual activity builds a fundamental link to human actions,
and relates actions to concepts. Self-consciousness grasps the action of the Concept in society. It
arrives at the “unity of knowing” by understanding society neither intuitively nor
representationally, but rather conceptually (PoS §796, 484). Self-consciousness is the capacity to
step back from our immediate experiences and to look at the process of experiences and
conceptualize them. Self-consciousness is thus the conceptual activity itself. However, it is also
only in and through the society. We, thus, shift from the representational paradigm of religious
spirit to the conceptualizing activity of philosophy that comes to the fore in self-consciousness.
Our task is to grasp self-consciousness and its historical becoming in a community, in one unity,
that is the Concept.
Yet, up to this point, we only have a formal idea of this identity of consciousness and
self-consciousness. We need to show that we can understand the ontological difference between
the conceptual activity of self-consciousness and its historical society through the Concept. This
link to the real, historical community through the activity of the Concept has therefore to be the
center of the following investigation.
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4.3.3.4 The Concept and Human History
Before we are going to discuss the dialectic of this last, conceptual shape and its
involvement in history, we can summarize the discussion as follows. First, knowing occurs
abstractly in consciousness. This means that consciousness knows something that is
distinguished from itself (see Fulda 2007, 350). The movement of consciousness, however, led
consciousness beyond itself (see Fulda 2007, 350). In this way a series of forms of selfconsciousness appeared. In the end, the worldly knowledge of these forms became unified
through religious spirit. Hegel describes this as the idea of the beautiful soul. Reflecting on this
result, we realize that this soul has to act. The action stands in an extreme tension to the inner of
Spirit, the beautiful soul (see Fulda 2007, 350). Though communities externally reconcile this
tension through religion, the true reconciliation must achieve a concept that is accessible to all
reasonable subjects based on their negative activity. The main idea is that the concept is
experienced and used by human beings to build their community in their historical moment. The
Concept provides the implicit structure for differentiation and reconciliation, and thus explains
societies.
Fulda makes here the important point that the substance of this community has to become
subjective. This means that the substance has to be known by virtue of the Concept. Fulda writes
that this is the:
Exemplifikation sich begrifflich bestimmender Einheit von beidem jeweils in einem einzelnen, sich selbst
gleichen Ich, das mit anderen seinesgleichen zur substantiellen Vernunftidentität gekommen und als solches
ein Wissen ist ‚von diesem Subjekte als der Substanz‘ und von der Substanz als diesem Wissen seines
Tuns” (Fulda 2007, 350-351).
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This identity of the community of ‘I’s is the last shape of religious spirit. But, it will only be as
stable as the identity of substance and subject in the Concept. We have, therefore, come to the
“last shape of Spirit” that “gives its complete and true content the form of the Self” (PoS §798,
485). In other words, its former substance becomes subjective by virtue of its own activity. This
activity can know itself since both, society and knowledge, have the same grounding structure.
This knowing, which is the community, is conceptual.
Hegel alludes to this self-knowing as an identity of truth and certainty: “Truth is not only
in itself completely identical with certainty, but it also has the shape of self-certainty or it is in its
existence in the form of self-knowledge” (PoS §798, 485). The shape of self-certainty means to
obtain the form of the ‘I’s that operate on the basis of concepts in a human environment that is
by virtue of this conceptual operation itself.
Truth understood as the identity of concept and object is problematic in so far as the
object is distinct from the concept. Hegel’s solution lies in the view that the object as well as the
subject are conceptually unified in the historical society. Thus, he pursues the identity of the
conceptual activity of a society with the conceptual object that is the society. The idea is that the
conceptual activity establishes the society. Yet, at the same time, the conceptual activity is
produced by the society. The idea is that we can eliminate the externality in the religious object.
We achieve this elimination by demonstrating that the truth of the religious object in society is
the subjective and conceptual activity (see Fulda 2007, 354).
This further implies that Hegel introduces a relativism that reaches objectivity for our
subjective knowing since both truth and certainty, or object and the knowing activity of the
subject, can be explained in one concept. This achievement concludes the task of the
Phenomenology. Fulda explains why we can could call this relative knowledge absolute: “Dies
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Wissen ist absolut […] zu nennen, weil der sich darin realisierende Begriff mit seiner gesamten
Realisierung in sich selbst bleibt wie die ‚absolute Substanz‘ mit allen Modis und Attributen, in
denen sie ihre Realität hat“ (Fulda 2007, 351). In other words, the achieved knowledge is
knowledge of consciousness for-itself (see Fulda 2007, 351). It knows how it knows by virtue of
the Concept, which formally grasps its process of determination, negation and reconciliation.
Hegel describes the last shape of spirit by providing a further criterion: “The nature, moments
and movement of this knowing have, then, shown themselves to be such that this knowing is a
pure being-for-self of self-consciousness” (PoS §799, 486). Self-consciousness is purely foritself. This means that the substance is already subjective. The formal requirement has been
achieved.
We have so far only discussed the formal idea of conceptual congruence. However, is this
self-knowledge really achieved in societies? We still have to show that our conceptual activity
of self-consciousness is what the historical form of society is in-itself. In other words, Hegel
must still give us an idea of how the conceptual activity is embedded in historical societies.
Hegel thinks that the formal idea of a conceptual adequation of truth and certainty is
expressed in the content of the ‘I’ and its relation to a community. He writes “it is ’I’, that is this
and no other ‘I’, and which is no less immediately a mediated or superseded universal ‘I’” (PoS
§799, 486). Hegel explores here the aforementioned problematic relationship between the
universal and the individual with respect to the ‘I’. The advantage of this focus on the ‘I’ is that
the ‘I’, though it is individual, is not merely individual. It is also an other without being an other.
Hegel writes on this ‘I’:
“It has a content which it differentiates from itself; for it is pure negativity or the dividing of itself, it is
consciousness. This content is, in its difference, itself the ‘I’, for it is the movement of superseding itself, or
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the same pure negativity that the ‘I’ is. In it, as differentiated, the ‘I’ is reflected into itself; it is only when
the ‘I’ communes with itself in its otherness that the content is comprehended” (Hegel, PoS §799, 486).

I will explain this view of a communing ‘I’ with regard to the relationship between an ‘I’ and a
‘you.’ If I address somebody as a ‘you’, I do not address him as an individual, but as a ‘you’ that
is ‘I’. If I refer to myself as an ‘I’, I do not refer to myself as an individual, but as an individual
who is, at the same time, for somebody else a ‘You’. Yet, this universal ‘I’ that is a ‘You’ for
another is not the dead universal, meaning that it is separated from its individual ‘I’. As naïve as
it sounds, for this self-reference to take place, there must be universal individuals. This means
that they have to be individual ‘I’s in order to be universal ‘I’s. The ‘I’ in its social occurrence
has, therefore, the potential to be the spiritual unity of a society that Hegel is seeking.
Yet, the problematic relationship is not solved by an abstract formula like ‘I’=’I’, or in
this case, an ‘I’=’You’. Hegel thinks that we cannot solve the problem of the ‘I’ merely
subjectively. In fact, the complicated relationship between ‘I’, ‘you’ and ‘we’ has to be
understood with regard to its actual community, in which everyone operates as an individual ‘I’,
and everyone treats each other as an ‘I’. In other words, it is the question of how objects are
subjects, and how subjects are objects with regard to their actual social contexts. This, as
discussed above, is Hegel’s transition to spirit, and thus Hegel develops it further:
“Stated more specifically, this content is nothing else than the very movement just spoken of; for the
contends Spirit that traverses its own self and does so for itself as Spirit by the fact that it has the ‘shape’ of
the Notion in its objectivity (PoS §799, 486).

Spirit, not the ‘I’=’I’, expresses the real solution for the problem of the ontological difference.
Rockmore remarks that humans achieve here the standpoint of science if they capture what they
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actually do (see Rockmore 1997, 189).222 This is a moment of self-certainty, in which the
problem of knowledge comes to an end for Hegel (see Rockmore 1997, 188), since we overcome
the ontological difference between subject and external object. We will overcome this difference,
however, only in a reflection of the spiritual shapes of a historical society in relation to the
Concept. Hegel writes on this goal: “Spirit, manifesting or appearing in consciousness in this
element, or what is the same thing, produced in it by consciousness, is Science” (Hegel PoS
§798, 486). At this moment, we, therefore, need to reconstruct a relation to the appearance of
spirit within a historical moment that is related to historical subjects in their societies who act by
virtue of the Concept.
The appearance of Absolute Knowing is, as also Fulda remarks, the end of a process (see
Fulda 2007, 357) that only happens in history. That spirit remains historical is the important
point. The appearance of spirit in history, however, is confused and conflated with forms of
knowing that are actually not grasping the essence of its process (see Fulda 2007, 357) that is its
Concept. Our goal must be to transform the external representation of spirit into Hegel’s
solution, the Concept, which finally grasps spirit in what it really is. This is Absolute Knowing.
By analyzing the problem so far, we have gained only a standard of knowledge. Now, we
know, however, that the Concept has to be understood dialectically with regard to the history of
human beings and their spirit. Since we became what we are in history by virtue of spirit, and
since spirit is a form of knowledge, we can successfully reflect on ourselves through the criteria
of spirit that have brought us to this historical moment. So, we are not at the end of science, but
only at its beginning. In short, by getting to know the identity of the ontological difference
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Rockmore, Tom. Cognition. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997.
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between subject and object through the history of spirit by transforming itself into the ‘I’
expressed as the Concept we do not reach the end but rather only the starting point of the
process. In this sense, we are not overstepping our historical limits, but arrive at an idea of how
to identify our current historical state with regard to an objective criterion that we possess by
virtue of our own conceptual activity.
All of this means that we pursue Absolute Knowing as an existing Concept, not only as a
formal, external criterion for knowledge. Regarding “the existence of this Notion”, it does,
however, not come on the scene before “Spirit […] knows what it is” (PoS §800, 486).
Knowledge of ourselves is rather a goal at this moment, and not yet achieved as Hegel writes:
“Spirit that is in and for itself and differentiated into its moments is a knowing that is for itself, a
comprehension in general that, as such, substance has not yet reached, i.e. substance is not in its
own self an absolute knowing” (PoS §800, 486). Hegel attempts to complete the project by
discussing the temporal relationship between religious spirit and the self-knowledge of spirit.
The problem is that our knowing of “substance […] exists earlier than […] its Notion-determined
‘shape’” (PoS §801, 486). This is because “substance […] as yet undeveloped in-itself or the
Ground and Notion in its still unmoved simplicity […] the inwardness or the Self of the Spirit”
(PoS §801, 486) has not yet developed. It is only represented. In other words, substance has not
yet a self. For this reason, we have only encountered substance as the abstract moment (see PoS
§801,486) in the historical moment of religion.
At this point of our attempt to recognize spirit, we encounter the problematic concept of
time that has confused many interpreters, including Habermas:
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“In the Notion that knows itself as Notion, the moments thus appear earlier than the filled [or fulfilled]
whole whose coming-to-be is the movement of those moments. In consciousness, on the other hand, the
whole, though uncomprehended, is prior to the moments.” (QUELLE)

Does Hegel argue that Absolute Knowing as the knowledge of consciousness’ own activity is
outside of time and history? Since Absolute Knowing precedes its moments as substance, but
since it is also a result of these moments, the representational concept of time alone is
insufficient to grasp Absolute Knowing. The consequential rejection of the insufficient concept
‘time’, however, does not exclude that Absolute Knowing is historical. According to the criterion
of our knowledge that nothing should be external to our recognition of the process of knowledge,
we only have to annul the contingent aspect of Absolute Knowing occurring within history. This
contingent aspect is not history; it is time. History will turn out as an intrinsic part that, with
regard to Absolute Knowing, is not contingent but a necessary part of what it is.
Absolute Knowing occurs as the result of a concrete, ultimately historical experience.
Unlike Brandom’s account, Absolute Knowing as a form of mediation is not a pure inference,
not a meditation of possible, conceptual connections in a semantic net. Rather, it is a
confrontation with the real content of experience that is substance. It belongs to an effort to
understand our experiences by virtue of the Concept.223
Absolute Knowing is thus a historical result of the forms of spirit. According to Absolute
Knowing, we understand, how spirit can have guided all historical stages, since it exhibits the
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Fulda summarizes this as the criterion according to which the „Selbstprüfung seines Bewusstseins stattfindet”
(see Fulda 2007, 364). He writes further: Doch es muß dem Bewußtsein dafür nicht zugeschrieben werden, daß ihm
das Ziel bewußt sei, das wir schon kennen: sein Bewußtsein der Substanz mit seinem begreifenden Selbstbewußtsein
auszugleichen. Wenn feststeht, nach welchem Vorstadium die Geschichte des erscheinenden absoluten Wissens
beginnt und in Bezug auf welches Ganze von Erscheinungen die Selbstprüfung seines Bewußtseins stattfindet,
haben wir an jenen Ausdrücken, welche je spezifische Erfahrung bezeichnen, das Wichtigste für die dialektische
Bewußtseinsbewegung und können diese mit Sinn aufnehmen (Fulda 2007, 364).
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Concept which was also the structure of history itself. Its current historical stage, however, is not
an empty concept. It is the moment of reconciliation. This is the final shape of current selfconsciousness, an ‘I’ that knows what it can know through itself, the Concept of its historical
moment that is also the ground for our society.
Habermas’ interpretation of this moment of Absolute Knowing as an ahistorical, pure
innerness is false, since the existing Concept224 is what societies are at this moment in history.

4.3.3.5 The Contradiction of Time and a Science of Experience
We have now encountered the final contradiction for achieving Absolute Knowing. On
the one hand, with regard to the self-knowing Concept, the moments of its self-knowing occur
earlier than the whole (see PoS §801, 487). On the other hand, the non-conceptualized [das
unbegriffene] whole occurs earlier than the moments in the intuition (see PoS §801, 487). This
whole is then conceptualized in time that is infinitely moving forward. Hegel writes about this
infinity that is still related to time: “Time is the Notion itself that is there and which presents
itself to consciousness as empty intuition” (PoS §801, 487). In other words, time fulfills the role
of grasping substance. While this grasp is not yet entirely subjective, it only presents history as
an irrational series of contingent events.
Grasped by virtue of the concept of time, substance is not yet limited by the subject, but
grasped intuitively as an infinite movement. Subjects, however, are limited and only seek a
relation to the universal through their finiteness. Hegel implies here that time grasped as the
eternal must be set aside, since otherwise humans cannot grasp spirit as the Concept entirely. He
224

I say ‘existing Concept’ [Begriff] since it refers to the Concept that is realized in our society.
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writes: “It is the outer, intuited pure Self which is not grasped by the Self, the merely intuited
Notion; when this latter grasps itself it sets aside its Time-form, comprehends this intuiting, and
is a comprehended and comprehending intuiting” (PoS §801, 487). If Hegel grasps time as an
inaccurate representation of eternal substance, then Hegel also denies its eternity.
This denial of eternity contradicts Habermas’ thesis, that is, that the annulment of time
leads to a concept that is ahistorical. Instead, Hegel wants to eradicate the notion of an
unhistorical eternity that comes with the intuition of time. In other words, Hegel wants to achieve
the Concept that can provide a clear grasp of history from the standpoint of historical, finite
human communities.
Time as an intuition has, for Hegel, different functions. It can appear as the destiny of
spirit, as the immediacy of the in-itself in motion, and “reveals what is only inward” (PoS §801,
487). Hegel summarizes the appearance of time with regard to all of these functions:
Time, therefore, appears as the destiny and necessity of Spirit that is not yet complete within itself, the
necessity to enrich the share which self-consciousness has in consciousness, to set in motion the immediacy
of the in-itself, which is the form in which substance is present in consciousness; or conversely, to realize
and reveal what is at first only inward (the in-itself being taken as what is inward), i.e. to vindicate it for
Spirit’s certainty of itself (PoS §801, 487).

It would be superficial to state that the connection between individual and universal spirit occurs
in time. Rather, we grasp the movement conceptually. Absolute Knowing is timeless because it
is not related to the external intuition of time. Rather, it is a concept. Time itself is an
appearance, while Absolute Knowing is timeless and not appearance. Yet, its timelessness does
not mean that it is not historical. An indication that Absolute Knowing depends on the historical
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moment, though it exceeds the intuitive representation of time, is given by Hegel’s discussion of
experience [Erfahrung]. Absolute Spirit, as Hegel explains, brings us to a science of experience:
For this reason it must be said that nothing is known that is not in experience, or, as it is also expressed, that
is not felt to be true, not given as an inwardly revealed eternal verity, as something sacred that is believed,
or whatever other expressions have been used. For experience is just this, that the content – which is Spirit
– is in-itself substance, and therefore an object of consciousness (PoS §802, 487).

Hegel argues that, the content of experience is substance. Since the intuited whole of substance
occurs before its subjective conceptualization, it must be obtained through experience in the form
of represented objects. These objects are only partially grasped through experience. Though
substance is experienced as part of consciousness, it is not yet fully subjective. Spirit, in this
sense, is incomplete. Hence, according to the criterion of Absolute Knowing, we have to
eradicate the intuition of time in order to make it subjective. We must reach the identity of
knowing with its experiences. The resulting science is therefore not greater than its experiences,
and if we are successful in grasping the essence of our experiences, then the resulting science is
also not smaller than our experiences. I call this identity the ideal of an organic unity so that,
according to our original epistemological criterion, subject and object really coincide.
Since Spirit must remain identical in its moments, it will reveal itself as striving toward
an organic unity of both in-itself and for-itself. This organic unity is not built on a formal
presupposition of an outside, transcendental thing, but only concludes what it does when it
experiences. Hegel defines his project therefore as a circular epistemology: “The movement is
the circle that returns into itself, the circle that presupposes its beginning and reaches it only at
the end” (PoS §802, 488). There never was a substance outside us. We produce this substance
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subjectively, and now only reflect on its becoming. Thus, we have reached the moment, in which
we can understand how societies are possible.
Fulda qualifies Hegel’s concept of the Absolute with regard to experience. Substance is
the object of consciousness (see Fulda 2007, 375). Since this reflection about substance cannot
begin with something outside, nor with something external, it must begin with both substance
and subject. This unity is given in the circle of experience and is not given as a mindindependent reality (see Fulda 2007, 375). After characterizing the historical genesis of
philosophy in §803, Hegel will propose this solution of a beginning in substance and subject in
§804. Fulda remarks that this is still a historical moment, though a historical moment in which
we have no further reason to go beyond, as long as there is no new experience:
Sein Wissen entspricht seinem Maßstab und sein ‘Begriff dem Gegenstande‘ sowie ‘der Gegenstand dem
Begriffe‘ […] zumindest insofern, als sich gegenwärtig von keinem schon ins Begreifen aufgenommenen
oder neu aufzunehmenden Moment der Substanz aus im Bewußtsein Erfahrungen bilden, gemäß denen das
durch jenes Erkennen erreichte absolute Wissen mit seinem von nichts ihm Äußerlichen mehr
eingeschränkten und von keinem ihm innerlich Fremden mehr verwischten, allumfassenden Umfang noch
korrigiert werden muß. Daß das auch in Zukunft so bleiben wird, ist damit nicht behauptet. (Fulda 2007,
377)

Hegel therefore has no last or final philosophy. Fulda emphasizes the openness that comes in
with regard to the concept of experiences. Hegel’s philosophy begins with experience,
understands how it experiences, and remains open for further experience.
We have reached here the most extreme point of the incompatibility between Brandom’s
and Hegel’s views. Hegel has a science of experience that relies on the historical emergence of
humans who reflect on their historical experience. Brandom defends a semantic realism,
according to which rational subjects play language games. They play these language games
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according to the idea of an ahistorical mind-independent reality. Brandom, as shown above, also
does not deliver a developed concept of experience.
We turn now to Habermas misinterpretation of Hegel’s historicism. Here it will suffice to
point out the difference between time and history in noting that Hegel’s final chapter provides a
first conception of history.
4.3.4 Externalizations of Spirit – Time and History
We have already clarified the basic shape of Absolute Knowing, as well as its relation to time
and experience. It remains to investigate the relation between time and history.
Time, to be more precise, is the abstract understanding of the externalization of Spirit in
nature (see Hoffmeyer 1992, 198). History, however, is the externalization of nature through
spirit (see Hoffmeyer 192, 198). In simple language, time is a phenomenon that belongs to the
concept of nature, while history is a social phenomenon that belongs to the concept of spirit. We
can reconstruct these ideas and their relation to each other in the following subpoints.

4.3.4.1 Definition of Time
In the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel demonstrates the relation between time and space as
time deduced from space. Space is the result of the logical idea, spirit in-itself, freely releasing
and externalizing itself as nature. The first externalization of nature, therefore, space in its three
dimensions. The second externalization of this externalization is time. Since this concept of time,
however, is only abstract, Hegel further derives movement and motion in pushing the concept of
nature further and further beyond itself. In a word, nature is neither simply space, nor time. In
this sense, time is only the concept of our naturalist attitude when we look at an externalized
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world and conceptualize it in a merely, intuitive way. It can deliver a preliminary foundation for
understanding further concepts of nature. Nature itself, however, has to be grasped in a higher
concept since it is neither space nor time.
As concerns time, Hoffmeyer writes correctly: “Hegel goes on to say that when the
concept grasps itself as itself, it ‘sublates its time-form’” (1992, 200). Time is only an abstraction
of spirit’s movement that in its contradiction pushes toward its overcoming. Spirit can relate to
itself in the intuition of time. So, for example, we see different historical principles contingently
following each other in world history. Through time, we intuit such historical movements and
express them in principles. Movements can, therefore, occur in the abstract notion of nature, or
in the more complex notion of world spirit. In any case, time is related to intuition, and as Hegel
argues, at the beginning of his section on “Absolute Knowing,” for achieving an actual
understanding of ourselves, intuition has to be grasped conceptually.
Hoffmeyer states: “[The movement of Spirit] leaves behind time as it is understood in
abstraction from the movement of Spirit” (Hoffmeyer 1992, 200). We could look at history in
terms of time, but this view would constitute only a contingent becoming of spirit as Hegel
writes “in the form of free contingent happening” (PoS §807, 492). It would constitute world
history without, however, understanding how it takes place. We would recognize historical
events as a ceaseless succession of events on a timeline, yet not understand why they occur. So,
in a sense, the time of spirit can be intuited, but our goal is to conceptually grasp spirit’s
movement. As an ultimate principle of unity, Absolute Knowing can order all occurrences of our
experience coherently, not only with regard to time, which would be an external, intuitive
solution, but with regard to their necessity. In other words, Absolute Knowing serves as a
principle for understanding world spirit organically.
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In Philosophie der Weltgeschichte, Hegel distinguishes ‘original history’ that captures the
first occurrence of spirit in time, ‘reflected history’ that already grasps different forms of world
history, and a ‘philosophical world history’ (see PdW, 3) that orders all world historical
occurrences with regard to one principle. ‘Philosophical world history’, however, is not based on
an arbitrary universal [Allgemeines], but rather on a concrete universal [konkretes Allgemeines].
It is the spiritual principle of the people and the leading soul as Hegel explains (see PdW, 14). It
has to be captured as its own activity. It is the historical production of its own occurrence. For
Hegel, it therefore achieves a form of identity: “Denn der Geist ist ewig bei sich selbst“ (Hegel
PdW, 15).
It is, of course, questionable whether Hegel can really deliver such a unifying principle in
an explicit shape. It is, however, clear that an explanation with regard to history as a progression
in time is insufficient as an explanation. Without appropriate, conceptual understanding spirit
would be “[p]ure restlessness, total absence of stability […] neither motion nor time”
(Hoffmeyer 1992, 200). So there must be a substantial principle of order that we attempt to
grasp. This substance cannot be simply a movement in time, a ceaseless becoming. We attempt
to point out the principle as a conceptual resting point, in which spirit can realize how it became.
If this is true, then everything that is must be grasped as intrinsically related to the historical
moment of self-knowledge.
Whether such a form of objective relativism is possible is a difficult question. Habermas
critique of Hegel’s ahistoricity, however, is false. The principle of Absolute Knowing is timeless,
yet, explicitly historical. Nevertheless, can we really eliminate all external elements in reflection
and only relate to our own historical becoming? Given the complexity of history, it seems that
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this remains a challenge. We should, however, look at Hegel’s proposed solution and discuss his
concept of history.

4.3.4.2 Definition of Nature and History
Hoffmeyer writes: “Nature is Spirit’s immediate process of coming to be itself. History is
the self-mediating process of Spirit coming to be itself” (Hoffmeyer 1992, 198). Nature, which is
the externalization of the logical Idea, expresses the immediate becoming of spirit. In its
immediacy, however, it remains abstract. History, on the contrary, is the self-relation of spirit.
We could say it is the project of coming to know what it really is. Hegel distinguishes nature and
history as two forms of how spirit becomes. He writes on nature as resulting from Spirit in the
Phenomenology:
Dieses sein letzteres Werden, die Natur, ist sein lebendiges unmittelbares Werden; sie,
der entäußerte Geist, ist in ihrem Dasein nichts als diese ewige Entäußerung
ihres Bestehens und die Bewegung, die das Subjekt herstellt. (Hegel PdG 589)
We can look at nature as the in-itself that occurs to us only in its mode of externality. I
understand this in the way that I look at a phenomenon during my normal course of life, and just
take it to be there, a self-subsistent, apparently immediate entity outside of myself. It is
represented, and thus, I use the intuitions of time and space to locate it. I neither investigate this
entity dialectically, nor do I question the intuitions of time and space. Yet, any serious
investigation of the object would reveal that this entity is not only contained in an immediate,
eternal externality, but that my subjective activity is involved in constructing it.
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In the Philosophy of Nature, Hegel will therefore show that nature has to be sublated as
Spirit by revealing its internal contradictions. This means that knowledge of space and time gives
us only an abstract representation of objects. For these reasons, Hegel demonstrates the other
side of spirit that is history:
Die andere Seite aber seines Werdens, die Geschichte, ist das wissende, sich vermittelnde
Werden – der an die Zeit entäußerte Geist; aber diese Entäußerung ist ebenso die
Entäußerung ihrer selbst; das Negative ist das Negative seiner selbst. Dies Werden stellt
eine träge Bewegung und Aufeinanderfolge von Geistern dar, eine Galerie von Bildern,
deren jedes, mit dem vollständigen Reichtume des Geistes ausgestattet, eben darum sich
so träge bewegt, weil das Selbst diesen ganzen Reichtum seiner Substanz zu
durchdringen und zu verdauen hat. (Hegel PdG 589)
So history is not the immediate appearance of spirit, but its mediated knowledge. Hegel remarks
that history that is not merely a succession, is a negative movement that negates itself, and thus
creates a succession of spirits. With regard to the definition of spirit’s historical side, we can then
summarize the main differences between time and history: Since Time that is immediate cannot
represent a movement. History, on the contrary, is a movement of spirit. This is because history
is related to knowing that it is an activity of consciousness, and thus a mediated becoming.
The various forms of spirit are subjectively mediated by self-conscious individuals. Selfconscious individuals, however, are impossible without consciousness of something. For Hegel,
the immediate knowledge of oneself is impossible. Consciousness involves therefore a concrete
process of mediation. Individual subjects that are not abstract, immediate entities only occur with
regard to their particular mediation processes in an actual society of a historical moment. Thus,
history is not a movement of substance, but a movement of a subjective substance. Hegel calls
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history’s progression of achieving higher and higher forms of self-consciousness ‘Bildung’. It is
the idea of how the particular consciousnesses are formed and come more and more to an insight
of themselves. In the cited passage above, Hegel claims that this movement of a gradual
progression towards self-knowledge is slow. This is because the process of ‘Bildung’ is mediated
by stages. We can understand these stages of self-reflection as a gallery of spirits that follow
each other in time. Since Absolute Knowledge is knowledge of the relationship between
consciousness within a historical moment and self-consciousness as a self-relation within this
historical moment, knowledge depends on the historical content. Yet, it is not explicable by the
intuition of time, a mere succession of stages. As concerns time, spirits would only be a
succession of events as if they were entities causing each other. Spirits are bound by the actions
of the individuals guided by their socially mediated principles and their intuitive grasp of them. It
is not possible to isolate a historical event as the cause for another historical event. This view of
causality would be sociologically naïve. Absolute Knowing, in reflecting on its preceding spirits,
achieves independence from time. Absolute Spirit, the goal of these movements, connects these
stages with regard to one idea.225 By investigating different, historical principles that guide
societies at different times, spirit can discover itself as within the historical process.
If we followed, on the contrary, Habermas’ false idea that Absolute Knowing is unrelated
to the historical moment itself, then it would be the case that we created a substance, a view from
nowhere, a God’s eye view.
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According to the Science of Logic, the idea is the concept that can justify a concept of objectivity (see Hegel,
G.W.F. Wissenschaft der Logik II. Suhrkamp, 1969, 402).
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4.3.4.3 Hegel’s Solution of Absolute Knowing
For Habermas, it seems that Hegel does not only annul the concept of time as a
contingent form of intuition, but that he also annuls historicity, and thus defends an ahistorical
approach. Given Hegel’s distinction between time as an intuition and history as a problem of the
movement of spirit, this is false. Absolute Knowing is bound to its historical moment. It results
from the concrete historical movement of ideas. The last chapter will test Hegel’s view of
Absolute Knowing understood as the idea that knowledge claims are limited to the historical
moment. Within our historical moment, we know our history in and through our objective
claims.
In order to make the idea of historicity plausible, let us assume that the understanding is
situated outside the historicity of consciousness. Under this premise, it would be problematic to
understand anything that could count as knowledge for us, since all our knowledge would be
immediate. Our knowledge would be limited to the partial comprehension of the object before
us. Without historical movement, the knowledge we gained could not go beyond the immediacy
of sensations.
Instead of rejecting historicity, a systematic approach to experience is the ground for
natural consciousness that turns these immediate sensations into knowledge. This mechanism
consists in a series of changing objects in mind composed with regard to changing sensations. In
order to grasp this process, we have to become aware of the relationship between consciousness
and the sensed object. We could apply the term ‘history’ to this process of knowing, and call it a
history of how consciousness finds its objects. However, it could still be argued that this is rather
an ahistorical process than the pursuit of knowledge limited to the historical moment.
Nevertheless, in order to know, consciousness must grasp itself. For self-consciousness, its own

354

history becomes crucial, since the process of its becoming is relevant for knowing. Our
becoming occurs in society. Our society distributes different roles to the individuals that alter
their self-consciousness with regard to societal demands. There are different views about
political institutions, their structural components, artefacts, products of skill and inspiration, and
so on. And we have different developing views on the religious aspects that unify our society.
Finally, we have different viewpoints about science. These views unify or diversify our
interactions. These views are grounded in active communities with different histories. Our
individual actions are only immediate occurrences that they result from a series of mediations
that integrate experiences into a communal body of knowledge. This communal body of
knowledge forms a culture limited to the historical moment. Ultimately, these bodies of
knowledge form the spirits of a world history that we study and that is the basis for studying
ourselves.
In Absolute Knowing, Hegel studies these first appearing contingent histories, the series
of events necessary for forming societies as the recognized history of our historical moment.
Absolute Knowing can be grasped as a criterion for as single history, our history. Absolute
Knowing explains this history without any non-conceptualized arguments. We are not looking
for external explanations of our arrival at our historical moment. But we have to examine our
place within this history. Since history determines what we are, there might be a possibility to
grasp ourselves as an object in our subjective activity through understanding our history. Hegel
does not go beyond this internal standpoint.
Hegel’s solution to the problem of knowing and truth is that the spirit in all of these
historical actions can neither be the unorganized substance that contingently occurs in world
history, nor can it be a subject that imposes unreflected means, in order to understand the objects
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of history. It has to be the subjective substance that emerges from its own historical process and
clarifies itself. Hegel writes therefore “Spirit, however, has shown itself to us to be neither
merely the withdrawal of self-consciousness into its pure inwardness, nor the mere submergence
of self-consciousness into substance” (PoS §804, 490). Hegel wants to present subjective and
substantial spirit as one movement. Thus, he proceeds:
this movement of the Self which empties itself of itself and sinks itself into its substance, and also, as
Subject, has gone out of that substance into itself, making the substance into an object and a content at the
same time as it cancels this difference between objectivity and content. (PoS §804, 490).

Hegel identifies this movement of the self between subject and substance as “reflection out of
immediacy”, which is the subject’s capability to step back and look at itself. Hegel calls this “the
Notion’s separation of itself from itself” (PoS §804, 490). This “pure act of ‘I’ = ‘I’” is, however,
“the Notion posited indeterminateness and is thus also its immanent movement” (PoS §804,
490). By no means have we achieved a harmony of object and subject in this only abstract
understanding of ourselves. The Concept is only indicated as a solution.
However, our historical moment moves toward the conceptualization of what we are,
since action and forgiving,226 the basis for a society, require conceptual awareness in order to be
stable. Hegel attempts to capture this movement towards the conceptualization of its own
principle through the Concept. He disqualifies a possible resting position of this Concept in
abstraction “as if it were afraid of the externalization of itself” (PoS §804, 490). Instead, spirit as
the social unity of the ‘I’ in world history has to demonstrate its identity “in its externalization”
(PoS §804, 490).
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By ‘forgiving’ I refer to the German ‘vergeben’. By ‘reconciliation‘ I refer to the German ‘Versöhnung’.
Forgiving is a simple act of forgiving somebody an morally questionable deed. Reconciliation, however, only occurs
if two parties can get beyond their differences and find unity.
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Hegel points out on various occasions that the self-awareness has to be thought as a
procedural unity of negation. This implies that spirit is a constant becoming by virtue of
negation. For this identification, as argued, we cannot simply look at ourselves, since we would
look at ourselves as an object. For Hegel, this capacity to look at ourselves resembles what
history is for us. It is based on self-reflection, which requires externalization and the negation of
this externalization. The Concept is therefore not an abstract becoming of, for example, a
substance that is located in abstract time and space. The Concept achieves itself in a concrete
history of negating former forms of knowledge. As we observe these negations, we come to the
conclusion that no moment rests immediately in-itself. We see that every moment contradicts
itself. Overall, we learn through various historical examples that this movement constitutes a
circle of contradictions and reconciliations. This circle is therefore not an abstract idea of
Absolute Knowing. Instead, Absolute Knowing is our history. Our self-differentiation of our
history is the self-differentiation of ourselves. In this sense, Hegel’s philosophy remains
empirical, since we derive Absolute Knowing as a part of our world history and of our historical
understanding. To be more specific, Absolute Knowing is the end of a world-historical period at
the end of which spirit captures its own self.
Hegel explains that the Concept is “the movement of carrying forward the form of its
self-knowledge […] the labor which it accomplishes as actual History” (PoS §803, 488). Still,
we have to understand the Concept through an appropriate understanding of history. In §803,
Hegel proposes therefore a very brief history of philosophy that moves from the first insights of
religion to philosophy. First, we discover the identity of Thought and being. Second, the identity
becomes substance. Third, we express this as the identity of being and externality. Fourth, this
leads to the insight ‘I’=’I’. Since, fifth, this substance is in movement, we have to understand it
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as an identity of thought and time. Yet, there is still an external element left, as Hegel writes:
“But the difference left to itself, unresting and unhalting Time, collapses rather within itself; it is
the objective repose of extension” (PoS §803, 489). Hegel comes to the conclusion that the
identity of Being and extension, and the identity of Being and time are not yet reconciled.
Substance is not yet subject. Hegel completes this very brief historical summary of philosophy’s
development in §804. There, he offers his solution of a subjective substance and a substantial
subject. In §805, Hegel elaborates the only meaningful solution to the historically remaining
problem of the ontological difference. Spirit has “shaped itself … burdened with the difference
of consciousness” (PoS §805, 490). It has clarified itself by means of negations that led to
reflections of what it is for itself. Finally, Hegel notes that in this historical process we have
“won the pure element of its existence, the Notion” (PoS §805, 490). The Concept is the final
result and is demonstrated as the core of what we are. Hegel finishes his argument here.
The Concept is the central concept as demonstrated through the history of philosophy.
The content of the concept is difference in-itself. In this difference, it knows how it alienates
itself (see PoS §805, 490-491). Alienation introduces the need for the content (see PoS §805,
490-491), while it is a “restless process of superseding itself, or negativity” (PoS §805, 491).
Content never remains in-itself, but reveals itself as identical with its becoming, since the
“content is the Notion” (PoS §805, 491). Spirit thus inhabits both “its existence and movement”
by virtue of the fact that this “is Science” (PoS §805, 491). All differences of consciousness are
therefore unified in the “Notions […] as their organic self-grounded movement” (PoS §805,
491).
Science is the one Concept that explains, according to one category, namely the Concept,
how it contains difference, how it cancels, and reconciles it. Hegel’s criterion of truth is met
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here, since the object as Truth and the subject as knowing come together in a single “immediate
unity” that is the Concept (PoS §805, 491). There is no “passing back and forth”, since the
Concept can be seen as the working force behind all of its occurrences (PoS §805, 491). As the
concept has been the content of Absolute Spirit all the way through history, and as it grasps its
form, we can call this Absolute Knowing. Hegel summarizes the last step of his project:
To know the pure Notions of Science in this form of shapes of consciousness constitutes the side of their
reality, in accordance with which their essence, the Notion, which is posited in them in its simple mediation
as thinking, breaks asunder the moments of this mediation and exhibits itself in accordance with the inner
antithesis” (PoS §805, 491).

The result is the Concept that knows itself and even includes its own antithesis. However, with
this last move, the Concept as the substance of former history is not yet completed with respect
to further movements. Almost paradoxically, the limit of the concept is its beyond. I conclude
from this that history has not come to an end, but that it moves on. Now, however, we can know
and approach our further becoming scientifically.
Obviously, the Concept is only a working definition that occurs as the best
epistemological strategy in order to explain our processes of knowledge. The Concept can now
be applied to everything that exists. In this sense, it has to prove itself during its application
[Bewährung]. It is, thus, not true that by virtue of the Concept we predict the entire shape of a
system. Rather, we have an idea of what it means to do science and how to work systematically.
In a final argument, Hegel clarifies why the Concept is not only emerging within history,
but is further limited to history. For this clarification, Hegel will also explain that we understand
nature and history through the Concept. Hegel’s explanation proceeds from the inner antithesis
that is part of the Concept to the constitution of an external nature. Though we cannot supersede
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the achieved standpoint of science by means of reflection, and though we have come to an end of
the current epistemological investigation, we can still explore the power of the Concept by
observing its “necessity of externalizing the form of the Notion” (§806). Now knowing the
Concept’s limit means to go beyond. Hegel explains:
[…] Self-knowing Spirit knows not only itself but also the negative of itself, or its limit: to know one’s
limit is to know how to sacrifice oneself. This sacrifice is the externalization in which Spirit displays the
process of its becoming Spirit in the form of free contingent happening, intuiting its pure Self as Time
outside of it, and equally its Being as Space (PoS §807, 492).

Here Hegel provides explanation of the logical constitution of the concept as it is for-itself. It
knows itself as a limit. Since the limit is always inside and outside of a determined object, it is
thus also always beyond. It can thus grasp itself as nature.227 Beyond the exploration of its inner
necessity that is externalized nature, Hegel will then explain how we return from the Concept of
nature back into consciousness through spirit (see §806). All together this constitutes a circle:
self-knowing spirit as the Concept understands itself in an externalized form and can thus capture
itself as nature. Spirit becomes nature, a substance in-itself, “its living immediate Becoming,”
which will, however, go beyond its existence. After a series of sublations, it will “reinstate[.] the
Subject,” since otherwise the nature, shattered in differences, could never be grasped (PoS §807,
492).
Hegel’s last step is to connect nature through the Concept of spirit to history. History is
self-externalization (see Hoffmeyer 1992, 205) of spirit. Furthermore, as also Hoffmeyer points
out, nature is only possible within history. This means that the concept of nature can only be
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The thought itself foreshadows the Logic. In the Science of Logic, Hegel will demonstrate how the inner concept
actually can provide a concept of something that is external. This stands in connection to the idea of how infinity
and finiteness are related to each other.
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understood through its dependence on what it is in relation to historical subjects. Hoffmeyer
argues, therefore, that nature is a concept that cannot remain as an immediacy in-itself. It must
also be sublated. Consequently, nature must become subject. As Hegel presents later in The
Philosophy of Spirit, we need to follow the anthropological constitution of humans who occur to
themselves in history.
World-spirits govern our self-conceptions. With regard to the earlier difference between
time as a succession of spirits and the conceptual organization of these world-spirits, Hegel
distinguishes two sides of how the “goal, Absolute Knowing, or Spirit that knows itself as Spirit”
on this “path of recollection of Spirits as they are in themselves” occurs (PoS §808, 492). First,
from “the side of their free existence,” the spirits appear as “contingency” (PoS §808, 492). This
occurrence of spirit on a timeline is what Hegel defines as ‘history’ or perhaps better ‘worldhistory’. This means that different periods of time emerge on a timeline. History is a succession
of events that also follows the development of concepts. Therefore, history emerges, secondly,
“from the side of their [world-spirit’s] comprehended organization” (PoS §808, 492). This is “the
Science of Knowing in the sphere of appearance” (PoS §808,492), also called ‘phenomenology’.
History and science taken together deliver “the actuality, truth, and certainty of his
[Absolute Spirit’s] throne” (PoS §808, 492). First, spirit became actual, since the Absolute
Knowing of Spirit is the culmination of its development toward self-knowledge. Second, spirit is
true, since Absolute Knowing offers a starting point, according to which subject and object are
identical. Third, spirit is certain, since Absolute Knowing’s identity is based on the principle that
guided the development of spirit. Hegel concludes: “[o]nly from the chalice of this realm of
spirits foams forth for Him his own infinitude” (PoS §808, 492). This means that Absolute
Knowing is grounded in finite spirits identifying themselves through the process that determines
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them. It is the historical development of world spirits reflecting on themselves. Hegel claims that
we find infinity on the basis of this knowledge. Infinity has to be explained in order to
distinguish it from the idea of ahistoricity.
We conclude that spirit is the form of movement that at its end knows itself as its limit
concept. By knowing its limit, it has to sacrifice itself. This sacrifice, as the Concept
externalizing itself, is rooted in spirit’s conceptual circularity and leads to nature. The negation
of its negation leads back to itself. It is the negating activity of the concept that brings it back to
itself. During this process of negation, it comes to know itself, while the return to itself is a
return that is higher than the starting point of the circle. The circle does not finish the movement.
This openness of the circular movement towards history is one way of how to understand
‘infinity’.
The new circle must begin from a higher standpoint. Spirit, in this sense, is history itself
that does not stop. At the end of each world-historical period, spirit can capture itself, while the
resulting knowledge implies that it has to overcome itself. Conceptual thinking does not simply
stop because it has reached a convincing thought. If we grasp our culture in history, we will see
its flaws, its mistakes, its injustices. Reflecting on our culture and grasping it means that we
cannot remain, at any single point, but that on the basis of reflection our culture has to change.
The resulting infinity of its movement is, therefore, limited to further experiences in time,
which display themselves through consciousness. Since consciousness is part of this experiential
circle, Absolute Knowing remains, therefore, in history. It knows only how it constitutes an end
of each single circle of world history. Hence, Absolute Knowing marks each new beginning; a
moment in which we grasp our current world-spirit, present to us in its organization according to
its own principle. In this moment we grasp at the same time its opening toward a new history. In
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its openness, it occurs as an infinitude. Absolute Knowing remains, therefore, as a goal. Yet,
Absolute Knowing is also the end of the former world history and the beginning of a new world
history. In other words, grasping itself in its historical moment by means of reflection will
remain the infinite task of reflecting subjects.
As we now know, there is no end to this reflection. Hence, instead of coming to a definite
end of history, Hegel closes with Schiller’s poetic lines: “from the chalice of this realm of spirits
/ foams forth for Him his own infinitude” (PoS §808, 493). With this metaphor, Hegel does not
reduce science to a semantic explanation by virtue of the Concept. As explained further above,
analytic philosophy attempts to demonstrate a semantic closure. We cannot, however, close the
circle of experiences; we cannot close the project of knowledge with a last solution. Historically,
we can, however, know, if not who we will be, at least who we were and who we are. History is,
thus, evolving with regard to the capacity of reflection and experience. These two ingredients –
reflection and experience— build therefore the substance of subjective knowledge. Altogether,
we can say that science has found its objective starting point, but science, that is still at its
beginning, has not yet achieved its final form.

5. Conclusion
My main goal was a discussion of the divide between the analytic and Continental philosophy.
The recent claims of a unification are a misrepresentation of its current status. Contrary to
Rorty’s claim, for example, Brandom does not transition analytic philosophy into its Hegelian
stage. Instead, he still attempts to address problems that resulted from the early analytic rejection
of a false construction of Hegel. This false rejections results in an external realism. Brandom

363

does not realize how his solution to the resulting controversies around external realism is based
on a rejection of a false Hegelian model. As a consequence, he offers an alternative solution to a
problem that has not much in common with problems Hegel that Hegel attempts to solve, i.e.,
how to develop a theory of knowledge without a noumenon. Yet, Brandom’s alternative solution
to the problems of analytic philosophy is based on another false Hegelian model. The difficult
task in understanding the divide is therefore to understand in how many different ways Hegel
was misunderstood.
At first, Russell rejects Hegel’s supposed anti-realism. Later, in order to solve the
problems that resulted from the discussion around an external realism, Brandom introduces
Hegel as a cognitive realist. Thus, we deal with two false models of Hegel combined in one
approach of analytic philosophy. The problem is that Hegel is neither an anti-realist, nor is he a
cognitive realist.
The solution for the conflict must be to reconstruct Hegel as a relativist, empirical realist,
which I claim is a more accuate account of Hegel. This means that Hegel denies our cognitive
access to a mind-independent reality. He still, however, offers a conception of truth that relies on
experience and historical reflection. In comparison, Hegel is the prototype philosopher of
history, while Brandom is a thinker of a formalized linguistic discourse model that presupposes
progress towards a mind-independent reality. Both approaches are therefore incompatible. As a
consequence, borrowing from Hegelian relativism under the analytic premise of approaching a
mind-independent reality will always compromise the Hegelian philosophy. For this reason, the
divide cannot be bridged by a mere implementation of Hegelian ideas into the analytic approach.
Instead, we need to establish an understanding of Hegel that is not based on the premises of neo-
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pragmatic, social contextualism and its metaphysical realism. This includes that analytic
philosophy has to take the problem of history seriously.
Habermas is an anchor for my discussion, since his Discourse Theory has an interest in
bridging the divide. The idea is to preserve the Continental project of critical emancipation, and
instead of adhering to the consciousness paradigm of Continental philosophy, to carry it out with
the post-metaphysical, linguistic instruments of analytic philosophy. However, in his book
Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung, Habermas develops a critical understanding of neo-contextualism
and its method. In particular, he gives up on his idea that securing the ideal conditions for
communication could built a pathway towards truth. For Habermas, Brandom’s formal semantics
cannot solve this problem. Basically, Habermas acknowledges that truth is always an
intrinsically produced phenomenon that depends on our contexts. He explicitly excludes the
possibility of a context of all contexts.
Though Habermas’ criticism of Brandom’s conceptual realism turns out to be concise, he
understands Hegel as presenting an ahistorical solution that is close to conceptual realism.
Habermas therefore follows a similar false construction of Hegel that grounds Brandom’s
approach, i.e., Hegelianism as a social theory that can ahistorically justify making progress
towards reality.
On the contrary, I have demonstrated that Hegel denies that we have cognitive access to a
mind-independent reality. Unlike Habermas, Hegel delivers a viable conception of truth that can
be justified for our current communities based on an analysis of history. Hegel’s philosophy is
therefore not a desubstiantialized philosophy, like Habermas’ approach, but can address
metaphysical topics. Contrary to Brandom, Hegel has a tertiary empirical realism according to
which we can develop knowledge on the basis of experience in relation to history. History is
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therefore the fundamental subject that Brandom neglects and that Habermas ultimately denies as
Hegel’s grounding idea.
Based on my analysis it can be concluded that owing to false constructions of Hegel’s
philosophy, we still cannot accurately see how our tradition links back to Hegel’s historicist
philosophy and trace how our society has been influenced by his thoughts. Since both analytic
philosophers and some Continental philosophers still base their ideas on false rejections of what
they took to be the Hegelian philosophy, it is crucial to engage into Hegel’s historicism. Only
under this condition, the debate can positively contribute to a mediation between Continental and
analytic philosophy.
This suggestion on a historicist continuation of the debate is not arbitrary. This is because
knowledge and history are fundamentally interlinked to each other. I therefore disagree with a
sharp distinction between a philosophy of history and a pure philosophy. With regard to Hegel,
only reflection on history can ground our claims of knowledge. Therefore, a new point in
philosophy, as well as in any other science, can only be reached if it is built on former views that
crucially need to be made transparent. This is because the object that can reveal contradictions
depends on the theory about the object. Therefore, a theory cannot be renewed if it already limits
the objects that can falsify it. Under this condition, it would only allow a range of experiences
that always restricts us to the way of how we already think. Instead of such a falsificationism,
Hegel realizes that theories are the results of a historical movement. We cannot move further by
positing a gap between theories and objects, but have to grasp their relation as a part of the
movement. Through such a reflection, we acknowledge how theories limit our experience and
lay out the ground for overcoming them through understanding their historical ground. Absolute
Knowing, which is defined as the moment when we have grasped our history, according to

366

which we can explain all elements of our current historical understanding, means to make all of
our theories transparent. This is not yet achieved with regard to the current debate.
However, Absolute Knowing will not resolve all problems. It is not the standpoint from
nowhere, meaning that we have finally achieved an ahistorical foundation. Rather, it is a
historical grounding that is, however, harder and harder to obtain, since with growing societies
history becomes more and more complex. Different cultures, and more people produce more
historically relevant events. It is therefore questionable whether such a grounding of Absolute
Knowing can be reached for our time. At least, it is more difficult than before. Hegel’s
philosophy might therefore fail or reveal itself as inappropriate for our time. Yet, it would not
fail, because it is a rigid system. Rather, it would fail because the idea of describing all
historically relevant phenomena with regard to one idea has become too complex.
Nevertheless, even here we have to keep in mind that Hegel does not assume one superspirit that rules all sciences or historical occurences. Sciences, for example, mediate their own
positions pragmatically. Sciences, contrary to Hoyningen-Huene’s position, work with respect to
their own history and agree on different standards mediated through their history. However, it is
possible to explain their occurrence and operations with respect to the concept of a historical
spirit. Their development could be described as a spiritual movement so that we take up the
project of Absolute Knowing in a qualified sense. Although it remains questionable whether our
time can reach a comprehensive understanding of everything that has determined us historically,
Hegel’s historicism suggests that philosophy must be continued as a philosophy of history that
overcomes the idea of mind-independent objects.
This dissertation was intended to historically determine the status of the divide with
respect to Brandom, Habermas and Hegel. With regard to my chapters on Hegel’s linguistic
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approach (see 4.1.2.3) it is clear that I am not not rejecting analytic philosophy and its focus on
language. As already said, analytic philosophy is another historical achievement of philosophy
that, however, misinterprets its own position. It falls behind the epistemological achievements of
Hegel and defends a dated metaphysical and procedural realism. With our historical knowledge,
however, we should have come to the conclusion that analytic philosophy does not provide the
last epistemological foundation. Rather, it is the achieved position after a historical development.
Analytic philosophy has therefore to take the problem of history seriously and apply it to itself in
order to understand itself.
Finally, I would like to indicate that from the problems of analytic philosophy, we
observe the emergence of New Realism in Germany. Gabriel’s and Ferraris’ meta-metaphysical
nihilism claims to leave the problem of a mind-independent reality behind and denies a mindindependent world. I can only indicate that the question remains whether these new realists can
adopt Hegel’s historicist insights or whether they conceive of us as formalized subjects who
objectively approach, in their words, a ‘field of sense’ [Sinnfeld]. By posing the question of
historicity, my dissertation can contribute to the current movement beyond analytic philosophy’s
mind-independent realism.

6. References

Adorno, Theodor, W. 1974. Drei Studien zu Hegel. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Apel, Karl-Otto. 1988. Diskurs und Verantwortung. Das Problem des Übergangs zur
postkonventionellen Moral. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

368

Austin, John L. 1972. Zur Theorie der Sprechakte [How to do things with words]. Translated by
Eike von Savigny. Leipzig: Reclam.
Bavaresco, Agemir. 2012. “On Articulting Reasons of Robert Brandom and His Hegelian
Methodology.” International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 2 (19): 74-86.
Accessed November 11, 2017.
http://www.ijhssnet.com/journals/Vol_2_No_19_Special_Issue_October_2012/8.pdf.
Bell, Jeffrey, Andrew Cutrofello and Paul Livingston. 2015. Beyond the Analytic-Continental
Divide: Pluralist Philosophy in the Twenty-First Century. New York: Routledge.
Biletzki, Anat and Anat Matar. 2016. “Ludwig Wittgenstein.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed November 5, 2017.
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2016/entries/wittgenstein.
Bohman, James and William Rehg. 2017. “Jürgen Habermas.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed on November 26, 2017
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2017/entries/habermas/.
Brandom, Robert. 1997. “Review: Précis of Making It Explicit.” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 57 (1): 153-156. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2953784.
Brandom, Robert. 1998. Making it Explicit. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Brandom, Robert. 2000. Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Brandom, Robert. 2002. Tales of the Mighty Dead: Historical Essays in the Metaphysics of
Intentionality. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

369

Brandom, Robert. 2008. Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Brandom, Robert. 2008. “Responses.” The Pragmatics of Making it Explicit, edited by Pirmin
Stekeler-Weithofer. Amsterdam: John Benjamins Publishing.
Brandom, Robert. 2009. Reason in Philosophy: Animating Ideas. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Brandom, Robert. 2010. “Reply to Charles Taylor’s ‘Language not mysterious?’” Reading
Brandom. On Making It Explicit, edited by Bernhard Weiss, Jeremy Wanderer, 301-305.
New York: Routledge.
Brandom, Robert. 2013. “A Sketch of a Program for a Critical Reading of Hegel: Comparing
Empirical and Logical Concepts.” Accessed on January 13, 2014.
http://www.pitt.edu/~brandom/hegel_2013/index.html.
Brandom, Robert. 2013. “A Spirit of Trust, Part Two, Chapter Five: Determinate Sense
Universals and the Aristotelian Structure of Objects and Properties.” Accessed on Mai 3,
2013, http://www.pitt.edu/~brandom/hegel_2013/index.html.
Bransen, Jan. 2000 “Normativity as the Key to Objectivity An exploration of Robert Brandom’s
Articulating Reasons.” Inquiry 45 (3): 373-392. Accessed November 25, 2017.
www.ru.nl/publish/pages/536984/nko-inq-def_rtf.pdf. I used the draft from
https://www.academia.edu/300185/Normativity_As_the_Key_to_Objectivity_An_Explorat
ion_of_Robert_Brandom%CA%BCs_Articulating_Reasons.
Braun, Edmund. 1996. Der Paradigmenwechsel in der Sprachphilosophie. Darmstadt:
Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Darmstadt.

370

Braun, Edmund. 2007. “K.-O. Apel - Transzendentalpragmatik als normativ-semiotische
Transformation der Transzendentalphilosophie.“ In Aufgang – Jahrbuch für Denken,
Dichten, Musik 4, edited by Jose Sanches de Murill und Martin Thurner, 413-434.
Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer.
Chase, James, and Jack Reynolds. 2014. Analytic Versus Continental: Arguments on the Methods
and Value of Philosophy. Oxon: Routledge.
Diggins, John Patrick. 1991. The Promise of Pragmatism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Düsing, Klaus. 1976. Das Problem der Subjektivität in Hegels Logik. Bonn: Bovier Verlag
Herbert Grundmann.
Ferraris, Maurizio. 2014. “Introduction.” In Bridging the Analytical Continental Divide: A
Companion to Contemporary Western Philosophy, edited by Tiziana Andina. Leiden: Brill.
Fierke, K.M. 2015. “Breaking the Silence.” In Language, Agency, and Politics in a Constructed
World, edited by Francois Debrix. Oxon: Routledge.
Franks, Paul W. 2005. All or Nothing: Systematicity, Transcendental Arguments, and Skepticism
in German Idealism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Fulda, Hans Friedrich. 2007. “Das absolute Wissen – sein Begriff, Erscheinen und
Wirklichwerden.“ Revue de Métaphysique et de Morale 55: 338-401. DOI:
10.3917/rmm.073.0338
Gadamer, Hans-Georg. 1976. Hegel’s Dialectic: Five Hermeneutical Studies. Translated by P.
Christopher Smith, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976.
Gansel, Cristina and Frank Jürgens. 2002. Textlinguistik und Textgrammatik. Wiesbaden:
Westdeutscher Verlag.

371

Gerhard, Myriam. 2015 Hegel und die logische Frage. Berlin, Walter de Gruyter.
Giovagnol, Raffaela. 2001. “On Normative Pragmatics: A Comparison between Brandom and
Habermas.” Teorema XX (3): 51-68. Accessed November 26, 2017.
http://docplayer.net/53202287-On-normative-pragmatics-a-comparison-between-brandomand-habermas.html.
Greene, Murray. 1972. Hegel on the Soul - A speculative ontology. Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.
Grier, Phillip, T. 2017. Identity and Difference: Studies in Hegel's Logic, Philosophy of Spirit,
and Politics. New York: Suny Press.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1976. Zur Rekonstruktion des Historischen Materialismus. Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1987. Knowledge and Human Interest. Translated by Jeremy J. Shapiro. New
York: Polity Press.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1991. Erläuterungen zur Diskursethik. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Habermas, Jürgen. 1999. Wahrheit und Rechtfertigung. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Habermas, Jürgen. 2005. Die Zukunft der menschlichen Natur: Auf dem Weg zu einer liberalen
Eugenik? Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Habermas, Jürgen. 2015. On the Logic of the Social Sciences. Translated by Shierry Weber
Nicholson and Jerry Stark, Jerry. Cambridge: Polity Press.
Hegel, G.W.F. 1861. Lectures on the Philosophy of History. Translated by J. Sibree. London:
Henry G. Bohn.

372

Hegel, G.W.F. 1959. Philosophy of Nature: Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences II
(1830). Translated by A.V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Hegel, G.W.F. 1969. Wissenschaft der Logik I, II. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Hegel, G.W.F. 1977. Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by A.V. Miller. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Hegel, G.W.F. 2010. Science of Logic. Translated by George Di Giovanni, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Hegel, G.W.F. 2014. Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse 1830;
Erster Teil Die Naturphilosophie. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Hegel, G.W.F. 2014. Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften im Grundrisse 1830;
Erster Teil Die Wissenschaft der Logik mit den Mündlichen Zusätzen. Frankfurt:
Suhrkamp.
Höffe, Ottfried. 2010. Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason: The Foundation of Modern Philosophy.
Tübingen: Springer.
Hoffmeyer, John F. 1992. “Absolute Knowing and the Historicity of Spirit.” The Journal of
Religion 72 (2): 198-209. http://www.jstor.org/stable/1205149.
Hookway, C.J. 2016. “Pragmatism.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by
Edward N. Zalta. Accessed November 25, 2017.
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2016/entries/pragmatism.
Hoyningen-Huene, Paul. 2013. Systematicity: The nature of science. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.

373

Irvine, Andrew David. 2015. “Bertrand Russell.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
edited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed July 5, 2017.
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2015/entries/russell.
Jackman, Henry. 2017. “Meaning Holism.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by
Edward N. Zalta. Accessed on November 25, 2017.
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/meaning-holism.
Kant, Immanuel. 1990. Kritik der Reinen Vernunft. Hamburg: Felix Meiner.
Kant, Immanuel. 1998. Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Paul Guyer. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Kolb, David. 1978. “Sellars and the Measure of All Things.” Philosophical Studies: An
International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 34 (4): 381-400.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4319263.
Kuhlmann, Wolfgang. 1992. Sprachphilosophie – Hermeneutik – Ethik. Würzburg:
Königshausen & Neumann.
Lafont, Christina. 1999. The Linguistic Turn in Hermeneutic Philosophy. Translated by Jose
Medina. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Lakoff, George and Mark Johnson. 1980. Metaphors we live by. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Levinson, Stephen C. 1990. Pragmatik. Translated by Ursula Fries. Thübingen: Niemeyer
Verlagmeyer Verlag.
Levine, Steven. 2007. “The Place of Picturing in Sellars’ Synoptic Vision.” The Philosophical
Forum 38 (4): 247-269. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-

374

9191.2007.00266.x/full. I used the draft provided by Levine from Academia.edu
https://www.academia.edu/3304708/Sellars_on_Picturing.
Levine, Stephen. 2010. “Habermas, Kantian Pragmatism, and Truth.” Philosophy and Social
Criticism 36 (6): 677-695.
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0191453710366216.
Levine, Steven. 2011. “Truth and Moral Validity: On Habermas’ Domesticated Pragmatism.”
Constellations 18 (2): 244–259. http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.14678675.2011.00636.x/abstract, I used the draft provided by Levine
http://faculty.umb.edu/steven.levine/papers/Habermas'_%20pragmatism.pdfhttp://faculty.w
ww.umb.edu/steven.levine/papers/Habermas'_%20pragmatism.pdf.
Lin, Chung-I. 2008. “No Communal and First-Person Errors: A Critique of Brandom’s
Objectivity Proof.” National Cheng Chi University Philosophy Academic Newspaper 20:
105-122. Accessed November 26, 2017.
http://oldthinker.nccu.edu.tw/new_paper/paper001/20-3.pdf.
Lin, Chung-I. 2008. “No Communal and First-Person Errors: A Critique of Brandom’s
Objectivity Proof.” National Cheng Chi University Philosophy Academic Newspaper 20:
105-122. Accessed November 26, 2017.
http://oldthinker.nccu.edu.tw/new_paper/paper001/20-3.pdf.
Mander, W. J. 2011. British Idealism: A History. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Margolis, Joseph. Pragmatism without Foundations: Reconciling Realism and Relativism.
London: Continuum, 2007.

375

Margolis, Joseph. 2009. “A ‘Pragmatist’ among Disputed Pragmatists: Robert Brandom’s
Between Saying and Doing: Towards an Analytic Pragmatism.” In Contemporary
Pragmatism 6 (1): 185-196.
Marshall, David L. 2013. “The Implications of Robert Brandom’s Inferentialism for Intellectual
History.” History and Theory 52: 1-31.
Marx, Karl and Friedrich Engels. 2009. The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and
the Communist Manifesto. Translated by Martin Milligan. New York: Prometheus Books.
Marx, Werner. 1975. Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit. Translated by Peter Heath. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press.
Mosteller, Timothy M. 2014. Theories of Truth: An Introduction. London: Bloomsbury
Publishing.
Mueller, Alex. 2014. „Löst Brandoms Inferentialismus bedeutungsholistische
Kommunikationsprobleme?“ Zeitschrift für Semiotik 34 (3-4): 141-185. Accessed July 02,
2017. https://philpapers.org/archive/MUELBI.pdf.
Nickel, Bernhard. 2012. “Dynamics, Brandom-Style.” Philosophical Studies 162 (2): 333–354.
Accessed May 29, 2017. http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:13041028.
Papineau, David. 2017. “Naturalism.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by
Edward, N. Zalta. Accessed May 1st, 2017.
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/naturalism/.
Pedersen, Jørgen. 2008. “Habermas’ Method: Rational Reconstruction.” Philosophy of the Social
Sciences 38 (4): 457-485.
http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0048393108319024.

376

Peirce, Charles Sanders. 1998. The Essential Peirce, Volume 2: Selected Philosophical Writings
(1893-1913). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
Pippin, Robert. 1989. Hegel’s Idealism. The Satisfactions of Self-Consciousness. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Pippin, Robert. 2008. Hegel's Practical Philosophy: Rational Agency as Ethical Life.
Cambridge: University Press.
Pihlström, Sami. 2015. “Pragmatist Metaphysics.” The Bloomsbury Companion to Pragmatism.
Edited by Samy Philström. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
Pinkard, Terry. 1994. Hegel’s Phenomenology – The Sociality of Reason. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Priest, Graham and Franscesco Berto. 2017. “Dialetheism.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy, edited by Edward N. Zalta. Accessed November 26, 2017.
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2017/entries/dialetheism/.
Putnam, Hillary. 1998. “A Half Century of Philosophy Viewed from Within.” In American
Academic Culture in Transformation: Fifty Years, Four Disciplines, edited by Thomas
Bender and Carl Schorske, 193-227. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Quante, Michael. 2001. “Vorwort.” In Vermittlung und Versöhnung: die Aktualität von Hegels
Denken für ein zusammenwachsendes Europa, edited by Michael Quante and Erzsébet
Rózsa. Münster: Lit Verlag Münster.
Quine, Willard Van Orman. 1951. “Main Trends in Recent Philosophy: Two Dogmas of
Empiricism” The Philosophical Review 60 (1): 20-43. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2181906.

377

Rescher, Nicholas. 1979. Cognitive Systematization: A Systems-theoretic Approach to a
Coherentist Theory of Knowledge. Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
Rescher, Nicholas. 2005. Cognitive Harmony: The Role of Systemic Harmony in the Constitution
of Knowledge. Pittsburgh: Pittsburgh University Press.
Rockmore, Tom. 1989. Habermas on Historical Materialism. Bloomington: Indiana University
Press.
Rockmore, Tom. 1996. On Hegel's Epistemology and Contemporary Philosophy. New Haven:
Humanity Press.
Rockmore, Tom. 1997. Cognition. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Rockmore, Tom. 2000. “Essentialism, Phenomenology, and Historical Cognition.” The
Empirical and the Transcendental: A Fusion of Horizons, edited by Bina Gupta. Oxford:
Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
Rockmore, Tom. 2001. “Analytic Philosophy and the Hegelian Turn.” The Review of
Metaphysics. 55 (2): 339-370. http://www.jstor.org/stable/20131711.
Rockmore, Tom. 2004. Foundationalism. Oxford: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers.
Rockmore, Tom. 2004. Hegel, Idealism, and Analytic Philosophy. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Rockmore, Tom. 2004. “On the Structure of Twentieth-Century Philosophy.” Metaphilosophy 35
(4): 466-478. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24439712.
Rockmore, Tom. 2007. Kant and Idealism. New Haven: Yale University Press.

378

Rockmore, Tom. 2008. In Kant’s Wake: Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing.
Rockmore, Tom. 2012. “The Pittsburgh School, The Given and Knowledge.” Social
Epistemology Review and Reply Collective 2 (1): 29-38. Accessed November 11, 2017.
http://wp.me/p1Bfg0-A.
Rockmore, Tom. 2016. “On the Pittsburgh School, Kant, Hegel, and Realism.” Wilfrid Sellars,
Idealism, and Realism: Understanding Psychological Nominalism, edited by Patrick J.
Reider. London: Bloomsbury Publishing.
Rodriguez-Pereyra, Gonzalo. 2015. “Nominalism in Metaphysics.” The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy, edited by Edward, N. Zalta. Accessed November 22, 2017.
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/nominalism-metaphysics.
Rorty, Richard. 2003. “Analytic and Conversational Philosophy” In A House Divided –
Comparing Analytic and Continental Philosophy, edited by C. G. Prado. Amherst, NJ:
Humanity Books.
Rorty, Richard. 1988. “Representation, Social Practise, and Truth” Philosophical Studies: An
International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition 54 (2): 215-228.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/4319982.
Rorty, Richard. 1994. “‘Introduction’ to Wilfried Sellars.” In Empiricism and the Philosophy of
Mind, edited by Richard Rorty. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Rorty, Richard. 1997. “What Do You Do When They Call You a ‘Relativist’?” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 57 (1): 173-177. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2953787.

379

Redding, Paul. 2007. Analytic Philosophy and the Return of Hegelian Thought. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Russell, Bertrand. 1995. My Philosophyical Development. London: Routledge.
Russel, Bertrand. 1914. Our Knowledge of the External World. Chicago: Open Court.
Sellars, Wilfrid. 1968. Science and Metaphysics - Variations on Kantian Themes. New York:
Humanities Press.
Stekeler-Weithofer, Pirmin. 2008. The Pragmatics of Making it Explicit. Amsterdam: John
Benjamins Publishing.
White, Alan. 1983. Absolute Knowledge : Hegel and the Problem of Metaphysics. Athens: Ohio
University Press.
Whiting, Daniel. 2008. “Meaning Holism and De Re Ascription.” Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 38: 575-599. http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1353/cjp.0.0033.
Williams, Michael. 2016. “Pragmatism, Sellars and Truth.” In Sellars and his Legacy, edited by
James R. O’Shea, 223-260. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sellars, Wilfrid. 2007. “Being and Being Known.” The Space of Reasons, Selected Essays of
Wilfrid Sellars, edited by Kevin Scharp and Robert Brandom. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
Sellars, Wilfrid. 1997. Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind. Cambridge: Harvard University
Press.
Sellars, Wilfrid. 1956. “Is There a Synthetic Apriori.” American Philosophers at Work: The
Philosophic Scene in the United States, edited by Sidney Hook, 135-159. New York:
Criterion Books.

380

Sellars, Wilfrid. 1949. “Language, Rules and Behavior.” John Dewey: Philosopher of Science
and Freedom, edited by Sidney Hook, 289-315. New York: The Dial Press, 1949.
Stout, Jeffrey. 2004. Democracy and Tradition. Oxford: Princeton University Press.
Swindal, James. 2012. Action and Existence – A Case for Agent Causation. New York: Palgave
Macmillan.
Taylor, Charles. 2010. “Language not Mysterious?” Reading Brandom – On Making it Explicit,
edited by Bernhard Weiss, Jeremy Wanderer, 32-47. New York: Routledge 2010.
Weiss, Bernhard and Jeremy Wanderer. 2010. Reading Brandom – On Making it Explicit. New
York: Routledge.
Westphal, Merold. 1989. History and Truth in Hegel’s Phenomenology. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press.
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. 1922. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. New York: Harcourt, Brace and
Company.
Wolff, Jonathan. 2017. “Karl Marx.” The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by
Edward N. Zalta. Accessed November 26, 2017,
https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2017/entries/marx.

381

